

NATALIA ADAMCZYK 

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An assessment of defence policy of EU member states in 2014-2018; the cases of France, Great Britain, and Poland

ABSTRACT: As a result of the Russian annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine, security and defence policy was revised in many European Union countries. However, the degree of these changes varied depending on the potential represented by a given country, its security policy implemented so far and defence capabilities, including the condition and place of the army in security strategy of the state. The aim of the paper is to show the defence potentials of selected EU countries in 2014-2018, including the evolution of budget spending on defence, army composition, numbers and equipment, as well as involvement in missions and operations abroad. The most important strategic documents in the field of national security and defence will also be analysed to show political priorities and determine what modernization plans were implemented.

KEYWORDS: security and defence policy, armed forces, European Union

Introduction

Following many years of budget cuts, Europe has started to reinvest in defence after 2014. While many factors contributed to that shift, two of them deserve special attention. First of all, after a significant financial crisis, the economic situation has improved across the continent. Most countries have experienced higher GDP growth rates, which enable further increase of national defence budgets. Moreover, European countries have been pressed by Donald Trump's administration to increase defence spending and assume more responsibility for collective defence under NATO. Secondly, the European security environment has significantly changed, and simultaneously, new threats coming from the south and east of Europe have brought existential challenges to the EU's interests. Those are, among others, the conflict in eastern Ukraine, ongoing since 2014, the Russian annexation of Crimea, the Syrian conflict, the instability in the North African region, and the influx of immigrants to Europe. The EU Global Strategy of 2016, presented by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, reflects the general awareness of those threats. In comparison to the previous document, the European Security Strategy of 2003, the new document introduces an essential shift in thinking. The new strategy defines five ambitious priorities of the EU foreign policy: the security of the EU, state and social resilience of the states south and east of the EU, achieving an integrated approach to conflicts, cooperative regional orders, and global governance for the 21st century.

Bearing the above in mind, the goal of this paper is to assess the defence policy of several EU countries based on their defence potential as presented in 2014-2018. This will include the share of budget expenditure on defence; the content, quantity, and equipment of selected armed forces; as well as their involvement in foreign missions and operations. The paper also analyses the most important current strategic documents concerning security and defence of the analysed countries. The selected documents illustrate the situation in major dominant countries, such as France and Great Britain (superpowers), and medium countries of regional importance on the example of Poland.¹

¹ For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed here that the dominant role in the EU is played by the countries with a significant economic, military, territorial, and population potential. Their position identifies them as countries which have the biggest influence in the international arena, including international institutions. Medium countries are those with less influence in the international community, however, they remain important players in their region. Medium countries demonstrate smaller potential, nevertheless, they fall above the EU's average, as opposed to small states. As a result, it is justified to identify France, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy as major, or dominant countries in the EU. It is important to notice, however, that only France and Great Britain belong

The leading assumption of this paper is that in 2014–2018, the examined states were becoming increasingly aware of the importance of defence issues, which manifested not only in the political arena but also in the intensive investment plans and modernization initiatives.

The defence and security policy of France – main assumptions

Nuclear deterrence which protects France from attacks targeting national interests, regardless of their form or direction, remains the foundation of country's security strategy.² The assessment of the French defence and security policy is provided in White Papers that cover the span of twenty years. Based on White Papers, new acts on defence planning, the direction of potential changes, estimated costs, and budget are passed every six years. As regards defence, France relies on several essential rules: universality (realized in all areas), continuity (the defence is organized during peace and war times), statehood (the state is responsible for preparations and realization), and decentralization (capabilities are divided between the state, regions, departments, and communes).³

The currently binding White Paper of 2013 defines French sovereignty as the autonomy to make decisions and take action while respecting the international law order. Apart from the UN, the key guarantee of the security and defence of France is NATO, and next, the EU. The White Paper also underscores the importance of collaboration with the closest partners, namely Germany and Great Britain. The privileged partnership also includes the „Weimar Triangle” countries, and interestingly, it broadens its formula to acknowledge Spain, Italy, and the members of the Visegrád Group.⁴

As a consequence of the aggressive Russian politics, which led to the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing war in Donbas, the political relations between France and Russia have been suspended. Despite supporting the imposition of sanc-

to the group of nuclear superpowers while Germany and Italy participate in the agreement to use American nuclear weapons under NATO's Nuclear Sharing arrangements. Medium states of regional importance are, for example, Spain, Poland, Holland, Romania, and Sweden. This analysis focuses only on France, Great Britain, and Poland.

² *Defence And National Security Strategic Review 2017*, accessed online: <https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/document/defence-and-national-security-strategic-review-2017> (1.04.2020).

³ T. Hoffman, Francuska polityka bezpieczeństwa i obrony, *Wrocławskie Studia Politologiczne* 19/2015, accessed online: wrsp.wuwr.pl (17.08.2019).

⁴ J. Pawełek-Mendez, *Biała księga obrony i bezpieczeństwa Francji 2013: państwo peryferyjnej Europy jednym z biegunów światowego porządku* in: *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe*, III-2013/27, accessed online: <https://www.bbn.gov.pl>.

tions against Russia, president Emmanuel Macron, ever since taking the office, has attempted to amend the diplomatic isolation of the Russian government and re-establish communication channels. Examples include the visit of Vladimir Putin on the 29th of May, 2017 in Versailles and the participation of Emmanuel Macron in the International Economic Forum in Petersburg on May 24–25, 2018.⁵

On October 13, 2017, the French Ministry of Defence published the Strategic Review of Defence and National Security.⁶ The document is not intended to be the new White Paper, however, it presents the updated issues of security and defence, the current state of the national armed forces, and the threats that may concern France. In the context of security, the Strategic Review emphasizes that France aims at maintaining strategic autonomy while supporting the creation of stronger Europe, capable of facing new challenges.⁷ In order to meet the responsibilities towards the allies, the document underlines the need for ‘strategic autonomy’ that contributes to building ‘European strategic autonomy.’ The means of reaching that objective are provided by the European Defence Fund and the Permanent Structured Cooperation. On the European level, France wants to enter the next decade with ‘a shared doctrinal corpus, a credible joint military intervention capability, and common budget tools.’ An example of such planning was the European Intervention Initiative presented by Macron at the end of September 2017, directed to the interested states which possess appropriate military capabilities undertake common out-of-area NATO and EU operations.⁸

The document was part of the preparation process for creating the Military Program Law (*Loi de programmation militaire*, LPM) for 2019–2025, which defines the main strategic challenges as the defence of the national territory, the ability to respond to a crisis in the vicinity of France, maintaining the advantage over the non-state agents which act within the scope of French interests, and assuming responsibility in the case of military conflict with other countries. In July 2018, president Macron signed the act for long-term financing of the national armed forces for 2019–2025.⁹ That

⁵ Ł. Jurczyszyn, *Ryzykowna strategia zbliżenia: Rosja w polityce zagranicznej Francji*, PISM, 24.10.2019, accessed online: <http://www.pism.pl/czytaj/Rosja-w-polityce-zagranicznej-Francji> (17.11.2019).

⁶ *Strategic Review Of Defence And National Security 2017*, accessed online: <https://pl.ambafrance.org/Strategiczny-przegląd-obrony-i-bezpieczeństwa-narodowego> (17.08.2019).

⁷ *Strategiczny przegląd obrony i bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, Ambasada Francji w Polsce, 20.08.2019, accessed online: <https://pl.ambafrance.org/Strategiczny-przegląd-obrony-i-bezpieczeństwa-narodowego>.

⁸ *Francja: przegląd strategiczny na miarę nowych ambicji [ANALIZA]*, 4 November 2019, accessed online: <https://www.defence24.pl/francja-przegląd-strategiczny-na-miare-nowych-ambicji-analiza>.

⁹ *Draft Military Planning Law 2019 / 2025*, accessed online <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/file> (17.08.2019).

document provides the basis for technological modernization of the French military, and its implementation should move the armed forces of the Fifth Republic, including the Navy, to the front of global armed forces. It also assumes the annual increase in military expenses (from what is currently 1.82%) to reach 2% of GDP for the military budget in 2025, which is in accordance with NATO requirements.¹⁰ Currently, even without reaching 2% of GDP, France is still one of the countries with the most powerful armed forces in the world. Nuclear arsenal, modern air force, the only (except for the US) nuclear-powered aircraft carrier in the world, and other factors make France one of the three military superpowers in Europe (next to Great Britain and Russia).

The act assumes four main aspects of modernization.¹¹ The document states that the expenses on defence will come up to 197.8 billion euros between 2019 and 2025. The average annual defence cost during those five years will total 39.56 billion euros. Moreover, between 2024 and 2025, the expenditure will increase by 100 billion euros. It means that defence spending will cost as much as 294.8 billion euros in 2019–2025.¹²

It is worth noting that such significant funding is also meant to increase the French capabilities to conduct autonomous operations in various parts of the world. Currently, the French fighting terrorism in the Sahel region must depend on the US support in areas such as unmanned aerial systems and electronic intelligence. To develop the capability to conduct external operations, it is crucial to modernize all types of armed forces. The plans assume spending 37 billion euros on main programs between 2019 and 2023, and a total of 58.6 billion euros until 2025. 37 billion euros will go towards the maintenance of the current equipment, and 11.1 billion euros to investments in defence infrastructure. Finally, as much as 25 billion euros will be spent on nuclear deterrence.¹³ The military potential is also going to be augmented. According to the accepted modernization plan, France will spend 112.5 billion euros on new equipment during 2019–2023. The new supplies will serve the land forces, the air force,

¹⁰ According to the plans of the Ministry, the military budget will increase by 1.7 bn euros every year during 2019–2022, and by 3 bn euros in 2023. Until then, the military budget will secure 198 bn euros which means 1.91% of GDP. The average annual defence spending in 2024–2025 are supposed to increase by almost 100 bn euros total. It means that the military expenditure will reach 294.8 bn euros in 2019–2025. *Jak w najbliższych latach będzie modernizować się francuska Marine nationale?* 26.04.2019, accessed online <https://portalstoczniovy.pl/wiadomosci/jak-w-najblizszych-latach-bedzie-modernizowac-sie-francuska-marine-nationale/> (20.08.2019).

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

¹² 'Francja inwestuje w obronność,' *Polska Zbrojna*, 22.02.2019, accessed online: <http://www.polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleshow/24813#> (17.08.2019).

¹³ *Ibidem*.

and the navy. The Ministry of Defence declares that purchases will be accompanied by modernization of infrastructure. Moreover, they also announced the beginning of a research project that would lead to replacing the aircraft carrier “Charles de Gaulle,” which is going to retire from service by 2040. An additional 37 billion euros is dedicated to the modernization of the French nuclear potential during the period defined in the document. This includes building new nuclear submarines of the third generation and new cruise missiles. In total, in 2018, 730 million euros are to be spent on research, and the sum is supposed to rise to 1 billion euros by 2022. The government suggests spending 1.1 billion euros on foreign operations by 2025, which also includes military training for soldiers in their deployment locations.

The date that defines the modernization goal for the French armed forces is 2030. The plan provided by the Ministry of Defence states that until then, the military should rely on ‘a full-spectrum and balanced model’ which will ‘guarantee fundamental capabilities that are inevitable for our defence.’ Moreover, it should ensure the French strategic autonomy, and in a broader perspective, European strategic autonomy.¹⁴

Cybersecurity

In the middle of December 2016, the French Ministry of Defence published a new doctrine on cybersecurity, based on the concept of active defence that allows the newly created corps of cyber force to identify and track potential aggressors, and neutralize attacks by using counter attacks based on the escalation model. Cyber-defence has been defined as military art and applies to the entire French officer corps. The cyber corps, mainly populated with foreign intelligence agencies, answers directly to the Chief of Defence. The new doctrine confirms the existence of the Individual Access Unit which has been active for over 30 years and is deployed abroad to be able to track specific targets. The number of military personnel of the cyber corps as announced by the doctrine is supposed to be increased to 2,600 soldiers.¹⁵

In February 2018, the Cyberdefence Strategic Review was published, emphasizing four operational areas: protection, intelligence, judicial investigation, and military action that can use ‘active cyberwar’ and allow for ‘national defence operations.’ It is worth noticing that one of the annexes of the strategic document discusses a possibil-


¹⁴ *Spełniona obietnica Macrona? Francja zwiększa budżet obronny [ANALIZA]*, 14.02.2018, accessed online: <https://www.defence24.pl/spelniona-obietnica-macrona-francja-zwieksza-budzet-obronny-analiza> (17.08.2019).

¹⁵ *The Military Balance 2019*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 109.

ity of counterattacks as a response to cyber-attacks. The document assures that such a response should be used as the last resort when all other attempts fail (e.g. prevention, collaboration or negotiation). It states, however, that in justified cases, the response to cyber-attacks can employ both 'cyber' and 'non-cyber' methods. A cyber-attack on a large scale could be interpreted as armed aggression. In this context, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter justifies this kind of response.¹⁶

A review of defence capabilities of France

Chart 1. The proportion of defence expenditures in the overall national budget in 2014– 2018 (in billion euros)



Source: *Annuaire statistique de la défense – édition 2018*, Ministère des Armées, accessed online: <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/sga/sga-in-action/defence-economics/annuaire-statistique-de-la-defense>.

¹⁶ Ł. Olejnik, *Cyberbezpieczeństwo we Francji – ciekawy kierunek?* <https://prywatnik.pl/2018/02/15/cyberbezpieczenstwo-we-francji-ciekawy-kierunek/> (29.09.2019).

Table 1. The number and types of the French Armed Forces in 2018 (in thousands)

2018						
Structure	Total	Army	Navy	Air force	Other personnel	Gendarmerie
Active Personnel	307 300	114 450	35 300	40 800	13 350	103 400
Reserve Personnel	36 300	21 650	5 400	5 550	3 700	40 000

Source: *The Military Balance 2019*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 105.

Table 2. The Armed Forces personnel in France, total, in 2011-2018 (in thousands)¹⁷

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Number	332 250	325 600	318 400	312 350	306 350	306 100	307 000	307 300

Source: *Armed forces personnel, total – France*, WorldBank data, accessed online: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1?end=2017&locations=FR&start=2010&view=chart> (22.08.2019).

Table 3. The organization and equipment of the French Armed Forces in 2018

Status	Service	Equipment
Strategic nuclear forces	Navy/Strategic Oceanic Force (2200 personnel)	nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine: 4 fighters: 20
	Strategic Air Forces Command (1800 personnel)	multi-role fighter aircraft: 20 tankers/transporters: 11 tankers: 3
	Space	7 satellites
Regular forces		
	Army 114 450	main battle tanks: 200 armoured fighting vehicles: 248 armoured reconnaissance vehicle: 1516 infantry fighting vehicle: 627 armoured personnel carrier: 2338 tracked armoured personnel carrier: 53 wheeled armoured personnel carrier: 2285 multipurpose armoured vehicle: 16

¹⁷ Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces.

Status	Service	Equipment
		engineering and maintenance: 193 NBC vehicles: 40 anti-tank infrastructure – guided missiles: 110 artillery: 273 transport aircraft, light: 13 attack helicopters: 70 multi-role helicopters: 110 transport helicopters, heavy: 8 transport helicopters, medium: 114 unmanned aerial vehicles: 23 air defence, short range
	Navy 35 300	nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine 4 nuclear-powered attack submarine: 6 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers: 1 destroyers: 12 frigates: 11 patrol and coastal combatants: 20 mine warfare: 17 landing ships: 3 landing crafts: 38 logistics and support ships: 34 naval aviation multirole combat aircraft, ground attack: 42 anti-submarine aircraft: 12 airborne early warning aircraft: 3 search and rescue aircraft: 4 transport aircraft: 26 trainer aircraft: 7 anti-submarine helicopters: 38 multi-role helicopters: 45 air-launched missiles
	Airforce 40 800	satellites: 7 fighters: 41 multirole fighter aircraft: 167 electronic intelligence aircraft: 2 airborne early warning aircraft: 4 tanker aircraft: 3 transport-tanker aircraft: 12 transport aircraft, heavy: 14 transport aircraft, medium: 34 transport aircraft, light: 70 trainer aircraft: 153 multi-role helicopters: 37 transport helicopters, heavy: 11 transport helicopters, medium: 25 unmanned aerial vehicles: 6 air defence, long and short range

Status	Service	Equipment
	Gendarmerie 103 400	armoured fighting vehicles: 28 wheeled armoured personnel carrier: 153 patrol and coastal combatants: 38 transport helicopters, light 60

Source: *The Military Balance 2019*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, pp.105-108.

Table 4. The involvement of the French armed forces in foreign missions and operations (in 2018)

Deployment	Name of the mission	Number of soldiers
Arabian Sea	Combined Maritime Forces ¹	2 frigates
Burkina Faso	Operation Barkhane	250
Central African Republic	(EU) EUTM RCA (UN) MINUSCA	40 10
Chad	Operation Barkhane	1500
Ivory Coast	-	950
Djibouti	-	1450
French Guiana	-	2100
French Polynesia	-	1180
French West Indies (Martinique and Guadeloupe)	-	1000
Gabon	-	350
Germany	Eurocorpus	2000
Gulf of Guinea	Operation Carynbe	2 vessels
Indian Ocean (La Réunion, Mayotte)	-	2000
Iraq	Inherent Resolve (Chammal)	500
Jordan	Inherent Resolve (Chammal)	8 fighters
Lebanon	(UN) UNIFIL	669
Mali	Operation Barkhane, EUTM, MINUSMA	1787
New Caledonia	-	1660
Niger	Operation Barkhane	500
Qatar	Inherent Resolve (Chammal)	1 vessel
Senegal	-	350
Syria	Inherent Resolve (Chammal)	1 Special Force Unit
Ukraine	OBWE	18
United Arab Emirates	Inherent Resolve (Chammal)	650 + 1 fighter squadron

Source: *The Military Balance 2019*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 109.

3. The defence and security policy of Great Britain

– main assumptions

After winning the 2010 elections, the Conservative Party cut the defence expenditure by 8% and reduced the military staff by 1/6.¹⁸ In the face of the new geopolitical circumstances, including the events of 2014, the state of the British armed forces proved to be inadequate to the new challenges. As a result, on November 23, 2015, the government in London published the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015. The document defines the defence strategy and modernisation priorities for the British armed forces until 2025. The strategy highlights four long-term challenges: the increasing threat posed by terrorism, extremism and instability; the resurgence of state-based threats; and intensifying wider state competition, cyber threats, and the erosion of the rules-based international order.¹⁹ Russian politics is mentioned as the main challenge in the area of threats connected with international competition and one of the challenges to complying with international norms. In recent years, the British view of Russia has been shaped not only by the modernisation of the Russian armed forces and regaining the influence in the post-Soviet states but also by using active measures, such as disinformation campaigns or the adverse actions of the Russian special forces towards Great Britain. Nevertheless, the British do not forget that Russia is a crucial political player, being also one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Consequently, regardless of the obvious differences in the ways of conducting politics, Great Britain will 'seek ways of cooperating and engaging with Russia on a range of global security issues, such as the threat from ISIL.'²⁰

In the new strategic review of defence, the British government vowed to maintain the level of military expenses at 2% of GDP, which means spending 179 billion GBP on equipping all three branches of the armed forces within the next decade. It will also lead to creating the Joint Security Fund, which is supposed to secure 1.5 billion pounds. Moreover, 1.2% of the defence budget is supposed to finance research and

¹⁸ *Brytyjski parlament krytykuje rząd: polityka bezpieczeństwa nie odpowiada rzeczywistości*, TVN24, 24.03.2015, accessed online: <https://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiata,2/wielka-brytania-strategia-nieadekwatna-do-wspolczesnych-zagrozen,527197.html> (29.09.2019).

¹⁹ *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015*, accessed online: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/555607/2015_Strategic_Defence_and_Security_Review.pdf (30.09.2019).

²⁰ *Koniec redukcji brytyjskich sił zbrojnych. Założenia polityki obronnej na najbliższą dekadę*, Defence24, 26.11.2015, accessed online: <https://www.defence24.pl/koniec-redukcji-brytyjskich-sil-zbrojnych-zalozenia-polityki-obronnej-na-najblizsza-dekade> (30.09.2019).

new technologies. The increased funds and the implemented organizational changes should facilitate the development of expeditionary force, which is planned to increase from 30,000 to 50,000 soldiers. The army has been promised to receive 589 Ajax armoured fighting vehicles in nine different versions, and the air force should obtain 9 American patrol aircraft Boeing P-8A Poseidon. The Navy will be augmented by the Type 45 destroyers and new frigates. The British government also confirmed the implementation of a program to build new ballistic missile submarines.²¹

During the conference Defence Space 2018, which took place in London, the representatives of the British government and the Royal Air Force announced the preparations for introducing the first British military strategy in space. The British Minister of Defence, Gavin Williamson, presented the main premises of the new plan. The realization, management, and directing military operations in space have been officially delegated to the RAF Air Command.²²

The British security policy after anticipated Brexit

The discussions about the future of the British security policy have gained momentum after the decision to exit the EU. Even though the debate on leaving the Union has not subsided yet, the authorities in London claim that supporting and developing the international system of alliances and partnerships is an absolute necessity. Both the Conservative Party and their main opponent, the Labour Party, postulate more activity in that area. The Conservatives answer to Brexit with the concept of 'Global Britain' which assumes using British diplomatic, military, financial, and trade potential as well as the development aid to bolster the position of Great Britain in the international arena. Strengthening the network of alliances and partnerships is of crucial importance. In multilateral formats, the leading role goes to NATO,²³ in bilateral relations, the priority is the bond with the USA (and next with France, Germany, Japan, and Australia.) The joint defence under NATO and the military presence on NATO's Eastern flank are important points in the post-Brexit vision of the security policy of the Tories. On the other hand, the countries on the Eastern flank count on the British military might

²¹ Ł. Pacholski, *Brytyjski strategiczny przegląd obronny AD 2015*, Zespół Badań i Analiz Militarnych, dostęp online: <http://zbiam.pl/brytyjski-strategiczny-przegląd-obronny-ad-2015/> (5.10.2019).

²² *Wielka Brytania tworzy własną strategię obrony kosmicznej*. „Poszukiwanie alternatyw”, Space24, 23.05.2018, accessed online: <https://www.space24.pl/wielka-brytania-tworzy-wlasna-strategie-obrony-kosmicznej-poszukiwanie-alternatyw> (5.10.2019).

²³ 'NATO is at the heart of the UK's defence policy,' *Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015*, op. cit.

and their readiness to use it. Great Britain is a nuclear superpower that has the biggest defence budget at its disposal (approx. 60 billion USD, i.e. 2.1% of GDP in 2018) and the fifth-largest armed forces (ca. 150 thousand soldiers) among all European allies. After 2014, Great Britain contributes significantly to the military deployment on the Eastern flank as part of the Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP). It also plays an important role in the NATO Response Force, being included in its air, sea, and land component and serving as the lead nation for the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). In the Baltic Sea region, Great Britain is a framework nation for the NATO battlegroup in Estonia, where it continuously rotates a mechanized infantry battalion of approx. 700 soldiers. 130 British soldiers are also a part of a battlegroup in Poland, complementing the US forces. Moreover, Great Britain participates in an allied mission to supervise the airspace of the Baltic states (Baltic Air Policing) and regional military practices, such as Saber Strike training exercise, BALTOPS maritime-focused exercise, and Arctic Challenge Exercise for the air force. Great Britain also delegated staff personnel to regional headquarters, for example, the headquarters of Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin (MNC NE) and Multinational Division Northeast in Elbląg (MND NE).²⁴

Other important elements of the 'Global Britain' concept is the activation of security policy outside Europe and strengthening the British presence 'east of Suez,' that is in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. A British naval base was recently opened in Bahrain, and Great Britain still actively supports FPDA in Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, some experts tend to be doubtful about the general concept since, for example, from the military perspective, the deficits in staff and equipment undermine the plans of increasing the British military presence outside the NATO territory. Some commentators are wary of dispersing the already limited resources; Great Britain lacks enough potential to simultaneously strengthen its position in Southeast Asia to block China and play the main role in deterring Russia. In 2018, the British Parliament criticized the concept of 'Global Britain' as a collection of ambitions rather than a real strategy.²⁵

In the review of national security capabilities of 2018, the authors emphasized that, according to the Security Strategy of 2015, the British government spent 14.6 billion out of 178 billion GBP and had been systematically following the accepted mod-

²⁴ P. Szymański, *Konsekwencje Brexitu dla polityki bezpieczeństwa Wielkiej Brytanii i wschodniej flanki NATO*, Komentarze OSW, 3.04.2019, accessed online: <https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/komentarze-osw/2019-04-03/konsekwencje-brexitu-dla-polityki-bezpieczenstwa-wielkiej> (5.10.2019).

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

ernization plans.²⁶ In 2018, the Secretary of State for Defence, Gavin Williamson, presented the final update to the Modernising Defence Programme to the House of Commons.²⁷ However, even though the modernization of the British armed forces has been ongoing, the defence budget is pressured by the falling pound and the increasing costs of the main equipment programs, which means that saving goals are difficult to meet. The fall in the number of soldiers, understaffed units, equipment wear due to multiple missions, and delays in the realization of new military programs can lead to limiting the foreign presence of the British armed forces and, at the same time, alter the international image of Great Britain. The sophisticated defence industry of the country, which is also the leading exporter of arms, may not, in the end, meet all needs of Great Britain.²⁸

Cybersecurity

The National Cyber Security Centre plays an essential role in coordinating the British cyber policy and collaborates with other ministers and agencies to implement programs of cybersecurity. In 2013, the new Joint Forces Cyber Group was created, including the Joint Cyber Reserve Force that provides support to two Joint Cyber Units and other units responsible for intelligence in the entire defence sector. The growing fear of the potential of informative operations in the cyber realm was the key reason to establish the 77th brigade in 2015. The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review of 2015 confirms that Great Britain's reaction to cyber-attack will be the same as in the case of any conventional attack of similar importance. In October 2016, Great Britain publicly acknowledged the use of offensive cyber capabilities against ISIS. In April 2016, the British government announced that there would be the Cyber Security Operations Centre created under the Ministry of Defence to protect the Ministry's cyberspace. The Defence Cyber School was opened in March 2018. Great Britain has also been developing special rapid response teams, trained in isolation, protection, and reaction to cyber threats. Through the National Offensive Cyber Program, which forged a partnership between the Ministry of Defence and the

²⁶ *National Security Capability Review 2018*, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/705347/6.4391_CO_National-Security-Review_web.pdf (5.10.2019).


²⁷ *Modernising Defence Programme – Update*, 18.12.2018, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/modernising-defence-programme-update> (5.10.2019).

²⁸ *The Military Balance 2019*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 158.

central authorities in 2015, Great Britain strengthened its cyber capabilities and has been perfecting them along with conventional capabilities of armed forces.²⁹

A review of defence capabilities of Great Britain

Chart 2. British defence expenditure in 2009-2018 (in million USD)



Source: *United Kingdom Military Expenditure, Trading Economy*, accessed online: <https://tradingeconomics.com/united-kingdom/military-expenditure> (20.09.2019).

Table 5. The number and types of the British Armed Forces in 2018

2018				
Structure	Total	Army	Navy	Air force
Active Personnel	148 350	83 500	32 350	32 500
Regular Reserve	43 600	29 450	6 550	7 600
Volunteer Reserve	34 350	27 450	3 650	3 250

Source: *The Military Balance 2019*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 158.

²⁹ *The Military Balance 2019*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 162.

Table 6. The Armed Forces personnel in Great Britain in 2011-2018 (in thousands)³⁰

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Number	165 650	169 150	159 150	154 700	152 350	150 250	148 000	148 350

Source: *Armed forces personnel, total – United Kingdom, WorldBank data*, accessed online: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1?end=2017&locations=FR&start=2010&view=chart> (30.09.2019).

Table 7. The organization and equipment of the British Armed Forces in 2018

Status	Service	Equipment
Strategic nuclear forces	Royal Navy	nuclear-powered submarines: 4 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine: 48
	Royal Air Forces	early missile defence alarm system: 1
	Space	communication satellites: 8
Regular forces	Army 83 500	main battle tanks: 227 armoured reconnaissance vehicle: 613 infantry fighting vehicle: 623 armoured personnel carrier: 1291 tracked armoured personnel carrier: 895 armoured personnel carrier: 396 armoured personnel carrier: 1238 engineering and maintenance: 590 NBC vehicles: 8 anti-tank infrastructure – guided missiles artillery: 598 air defence : 74
	Royal Navy 32 350	nuclear-powered submarines: 4 conventional submarines: 6 aircraft carriers: 1 destroyers: 6 frigates: 13 patrol and coastal combatants: 22 mine warfare ships: 13 landing ships: 2 logistics and support ships: 4

³⁰ Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces.

Status	Service	Equipment
	Royal Fleet Auxiliary	landing ships: 3 logistics and support ships: 12 transport aircraft, light: 4 trainer aircraft: 17 anti-submarine helicopters: 58 tracked armoured personnel carrier: 99 anti-tank infrastructure – missiles: 110 artillery: 39 patrol and coastal combatants: 2 air defence, short range landing crafts: 30
	Royal Air Force 32 500	aircraft: 250 fighters: 154 multi-role aircraft, ground attack: 37 reconnaissance aircraft ISR: 9 electronic intelligence aircraft: 3 airborne early warning aircraft: 3 transport-tanker aircraft: 14 transport aircraft, heavy: 28 transport aircraft, medium: 19 transport aircraft, light: 10 trainer aircraft: 208 multi-role helicopters: 5 transport helicopters, light: 3 unmanned aerial vehicles, heavy: 9 air-launched missiles

Source: *The Military Balance 2019*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 158-161.

Table 8. The involvement of the British armed forces in foreign missions and operations (in 2018)

Deployment	Name of the mission	Number of soldiers/ equipment
Afghanistan	NATO : Operation Resolute Support	1 100
Albania	OSCE: Albania	2
Arabian Sea	Operation Kipion	1 destroyer, dock landing ship
Armenia/ Azerbaijan	OSCE: Minsk Conference	1
Ascension Island	-	20
North Atlantic/Caribbean	-	1 dock landing ship
South Atlantic	-	1 inshore patrol vessel
Bahrain	-	160, naval base
Belize	BATSUB	12

Deployment	Name of the mission	Number of soldiers/ equipment
Bosnia-Herzegovina	EU: EUFOR; Operation Althea OSCE: Bosnia and Herzegovina	2 3
British Indian Ocean Territory	-	40, 1 naval base
Brunei	-	1 000
Canada	BATUS	370
Cyprus	- UN: UNFICYP Operation Tosca	2 260 278
Democratic Republic of the Congo	UN: MONUSCO (Operation Percival)	2
Egypt	MFO	2
Estonia	NATO: Enhanced Forward Presence (Operation Cabrit)	900
Falkland Islands	-	1 200
Germany	-	3 750
Gibraltar	-	570
Iraq	Operation Shader	400
Kenya	BATUK	350
Kuwait	Operation Shader	50
Libya	UN: UNSMIL (Operation Tramal)	1 observer
Mali	Operation Barkhane EU: EUTM Mali UN: MINUSMA (Operation Newcombe)	90 8 2
Nepal	-	60
Nigeria	-	50
Oman	-	90
Persian Gulf	Operation Kipion	mine warfare ships 4
Poland	NATO: Enhanced Forward Presence	115
Serbia	NATO: KFOR OSCE: Kosovo	24 5
Somalia	EU: EUTM Somalia UN: UNSOM (Operation Praiser) UN: UNSOS (Operation Catan)	4 43; 3 observers 40; 2 observers
South Sudan	UN: UNMISS (Operations Trentor & Vogul)	333
Ukraine	Operation Orbital OSCE: Ukraine	53 65
United Arab Emirates	-	200

Source: *The Military Balance 2019*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 162.

6. The defence and security policy of Poland – main assumptions

The currently binding National Security Strategy is a document adopted in November 2014. The strategy states that ‘the security of Poland will depend on its ability to effectively advance its national interests and fulfil strategic objectives in current and predicted security conditions.’ The strategy also emphasizes that the security of Europe is determined by four main factors: NATO, the EU, the strategic presence of the US in Europe, and the relations with Russia. It also asserts that regaining the status of a superpower by Russia at the expense of the neighbouring states and the increasingly confrontational policies of the Russian Federation, for example, the conflict with Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea, have negatively influenced the state of security in the region. At the same time, Russia is seen as a direct threat to Poland and to the international order. As a result, the Strategy lists three priorities for the Polish security policy:

- maintaining the readiness and displaying a determination to act in the sphere of security and defence, as well as bolstering national defence capabilities, especially those areas of national security where the assistance of allies may be difficult;
- supporting processes that lead to strengthening the NATO capabilities of collective protection, the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the UE, augmenting strategic partnerships (including the one with the US) and strategic relations with regional partners;
- supporting and participating in selected operations of the international community, which are realized according to the international law and aim at preventing the creation of new sources of threats, responding to existing crises, and preventing them from spreading.³¹

The document discusses various preparatory, strategic operations which ensure that the national security system maintains adequate connections between the military and non-military, as well as between the external and internal components. This is especially important in regard to integrating management and executive subsystems, particular operational subsystems (defence and protection), and preparing universal subsystems of support (social and economic).

³¹ See: *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej – kluczowe zadania*, accessed online: <https://www.premier.gov.pl/wydarzenia/decyzje-rzadu/strategia-bezpieczenstwa-narodowego-rzeczypospolitej-polskiej.html> (10.10.2019).

In October 2016, the Minister of National Defence, Antoni Macierewicz, signed the updated Technical Modernization Plan for the Polish Armed Forces in 2017–2022.³² Using 2022 as a reference point, the plan assumes equipping the Polish armed forces with anti-aircraft missile sets and missile defence systems Wisła, Narew, Poprad, purchasing multi-purpose and attack helicopters, modernizing Leopard tanks, buying Rosomak fighting vehicles, supplying the army with subsystems of arms, observation, surveillance, and ballistic missile defence, as well as equipping and modernizing defence and patrol vessels. One of the priority areas remains equipping the Territorial Defence Forces, which started recruitment in 2017.³³ The Modernization Plan for 2017–2022 fits within the broader Polish Defence Concept from May 2017, which is supposed to serve as the foundation of the Polish security for the next 15 years. The document contains a number of announcements, declarations, assurances, and guidelines, on the basis of which the government is planning to build defence, military and strategic policies, as well as increase and modify armed forces. The goals and expected results are supposed to be achieved by 2032. The main objective of the Defence Concept for 2017–2032 is to prepare the Polish armed forces to deter Russian aggression. The Defence Concept is a document intended for the public use, and it roughly summarizes the Strategic Review of Defence from 2016. The latter remains undisclosed to the public as decided by the Polish Ministry of National Defence.³⁴

On February 28, 2019 the Ministry of National Defence introduced another amendment and presented the Technical Modernization Plan for the Polish Armed Forces for 2017–2026. The Ministry assumes that during that period, the amount of money spent will reach 185 billion PLN, which is 45 billion more than suggested in the previous document for 2013–2022. In 2018, the Ministry of National Defence prepared ‘Detailed directions of reconstruction and technical modernization of the Armed Forces for 2017–2026,’ adopted by the Council of Ministers. As a next step, the head of the Ministry of National Defence signed an order introducing the Armed Forces Development Program. The Technical Modernization Plan is yet another

³² Initially, the document was adopted on December 11, 2012, when Tomasz Siemoniak was the head of the Ministry of the National Defence in the PO-PSL government. The realization was planned for 2013–2022, however, after PIS won the parliamentary elections, the new leadership, headed by Antoni Macierewicz, decided that the plan required updates and the implementation was postponed. *Zaktualizowany Plan Modernizacji Technicznej Sił Zbrojnych RP na lata 2017–2022*, 19.10.2016, accessed online: <http://www.nowastrategia.org.pl/zaktualizowany-plan-modernizacji-technicznej-sil-zbrojnych-rp-na-lata-2017-2022/> (10.10.2019).

³³ *Ibidem*.

³⁴ *Koncepcja Obronna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 17.05.2017, accessed online: <https://www.gov.pl/attachment/78e14510-253a-4b48-bc31-fd11db898ab7> (10.10.2019).

strategic document issued by the Ministry of National Defence. However, due to an almost 800-day delay, the document contains the expenses from 2017 and 2018, which is 8.8 billion PLN and 12.5 billion PLN respectively. The head of the Ministry of National Defence emphasized that the modern equipment would first go to the newly created 18th Mechanised Division. The Ministry predicts that in 2019, technical modernization will cost 11 billion PLN. In the next years, the funds dedicated to that goal will be 17.6 bn in 2021, 19.2 bn in 2022, 20.3 bn in 2023, 25 bn in 2024, 25.9 bn in 2025 and 30.8 bn in 2026. The previous edition of the document referred the period between 2013–2022 and assumed the expenditure of 140 bn PLN. As a result, before issuing a new document, the government was not able to make financial promises for the time after the year 2022. Thanks to the changes in the legislation at the end of 2018, the next edition of the modernization plan will include the next 15 years, and the Ministry of National Defence has started working on the Technical Modernization Plan until 2034. The plan of modernization expenses for 2017–2026 concerns 16 main programs.

One of the seven main priorities is to purchase 32 fifth generation multi-purpose aircraft as a part of the program Harpia, as well as attack helicopters Kruk. As part of the program Orka, the Navy is supposed to receive new submarines and, as within the Miecznik program, offshore patrol vessels. The Ministry announced the purchase plan for medium-range UAV, code-named Gryf.

The Army is going to receive a division-level rocket launcher module Homar, which is able to hit targets between 70 and 300 km away, and company-level fire modules M120K Rak. There is also a plan to purchase more 155-mm self-propelled tracked howitzers AHS Krab as part of the Regina program, light, anti-tank guided missiles, code-named Pustelnik, and an infantry fighting vehicle Borsuk.³⁵

The Polish government also expressed interest in conducting research on new technologies. There are ongoing plans to develop the national base of the military industry, which is now consolidated under the state-owned holding company Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ), which uses the transfer of technology and international partnership. Besides PGZ, several international military companies have their branches in Poland.³⁶ It is worth noticing that the Armament Inspectorate of the Ministry of National Defence has already signed 236 agreements, spending 32.5 billion PLN from the funds planned for 2019–2026. There are still 111 billion PLN left to spend.

³⁵ 'Polski Plan Modernizacji Technicznej 2017–2026,' *Magazyn Militarny MILMAG*, accessed online: https://www.milmag.pl/news/view?news_id=2007 (15.10.2019).

³⁶ *The Military Balance 2019*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p.135.

105 of the agreements, worth a total of 13.9 bn PLN, are signed with local providers. 131 agreements, worth 18.6 bn PLN, are with foreign providers, including the US, which secured 106 agreements and 16.6 bn PLN. The numbers indicate that the Ministry of National Defence plans on spending more money in the American, rather than the Polish market.³⁷

Cybersecurity

In February 2015, the National Security Bureau published a doctrine concerning cybersecurity. The doctrine identifies the most important tasks required to develop national capabilities of cybersecurity. The document notices the need for continuing 'active cyber protection, including defensive operations in cyberspace' and 'readiness for cyberwar.' In November 2018, the Ministry of Defence announced that a classified plan for developing the armed forces in 2017-2026 had been prepared, mentioning the plan to create cyber defence forces.³⁸

A review of defence capabilities of Poland

Table 9. The number and types of the Polish Armed Forces in 2018

2018									
Structure	Total	Army	Navy	Air force	Special Forces	Territorial defence	Joint	Paramilitary	
Active personnel	191 200	61 200	7 000	18 700	3 400	14 000	13 500	73 400	
								Border Guard	Maritime Border Guard
								14 300	3 700
									Police (anti-terrorist operations)
									59 100

Source: *The Military Balance 2019*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p.135.

³⁷ *Wydatki MON na modernizację. Więcej w USA niż w Polsce*, 8.05.2019, accessed online: <https://www.defence24.pl/wydatki-mon-na-modernizacje-wiecej-w-usa-niz-w-polsce> (15.10.2019).

³⁸ *The Military Balance 2019*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p.137.

Table 10. The Armed Forces personnel in Poland in 2011-2018 (in thousands)³⁹

Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Number	118 050	172 700	172 700	172 700	172 700	178 400	191 000	191 200

Source: *Armed forces personnel, total – Poland*, WorldBank data, scessed online: [https://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1?end=2017&locations=PL&start=2000&view=chart](https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1?end=2017&locations=PL&start=2000&view=chart) (15.10.2019).

Table 11. The structure and equipment of the Polish Armed Forces in 2018


Status	Service	Equipment
Regular armed forces	Army	armoured fighting vehicle: 637 armoured reconnaissance vehicle: 407 infantry fighting vehicle: 1636 armoured personnel carrier: 227 protected patrol vehicle: 30 armoured mobility vehicle: 85 engineering and maintenance vehicle: 174 anti-tank infrastructure – guided missiles artillery: 815 attack helicopters: 28 multi-role helicopters: 64 transport helicopters, medium: 9 transport helicopters, light: 25 Air defence, long and short range
	Navy	conventional submarines: 3 frigates: 2 patrol and coastal combatants: 4 mine warfare: 21 landing ships: 5 landing crafts: 3 logistics and support ship: 20 coastal defence air defence, short range naval aviation: 41 patrol aircraft: 10 transport aircraft, light: 4 anti-submarine warfare helicopters: 11 multi-role helicopters: 1 search and rescue helicopters: 8 transport helicopters, light: 7

³⁹ Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, organization, equipment, and control suggest they may be used to support or replace regular military forces.

Status	Service	Equipment
	Air force	aircraft: 98 fighters: 32 fighters/ground attack: 66 transport aircraft, medium: 5 transport aircraft, light: 39 trainer aircraft: 68 multi-role helicopters: 8 transport helicopters, medium: 29 transport helicopters, light: 40 Air defence, long and short range Air-launched missiles
	Special forces: Maritime Border Guard	patrol and coastal combatants: 18 landing crafts: 2

Source: *The Military Balance 2019*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 135-137.

Chart 3. Defence expenditure in Poland in 1990-2017



Source: SIPRI, quoted from *Polska wydaje na wojsko coraz więcej. W 2018 r. aż 12 mld dol.*, accessed online: <https://businessinsider.com.pl/finanse/wydatki-na-wojsko-polskie-w-2019-r/sbs6ys6> (12.10.2019).

Table 12. The involvement of the Polish Armed Forces in foreign missions and operations (in 2018)

Deployment	Name of the mission	Number of soldiers
Afghanistan	NATO: Operation Resolute Support	315
	UN: UNAMA	1 observer
Armenia /Azerbaijan	OSCE: Minsk Conference	1
Bosnia-Herzegovina	EU: EUFOR; Operation Althea	39
Central African Republic	EU: EUTUM RCA	1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	UN: MONUSCO	1 observer
Iraq	Operation Inherent Resolve	130
Latvia	NATO: Enhanced Forward Presence	160
Romania	NATO: MNB-SE	225
Serbia	NATO: KFOR	252
	OSCE: Kosovo	1
	UN: UNMIK	1 observer
South Sudan	UN: UNMISS	1 observer
Ukraine	OSCE: Ukraine	41
Western Sahara	UN: MINURSO	2 observers

Source: *The Military Balance 2019*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p.137.

Conclusion

The leading assumption of this paper was that in 2014–2018, the examined states were becoming increasingly aware of the importance of defence issues, which manifested in the political formulation of the assumptions of security and defence policy as well as the implementation of investment plans and modernization programs of individual countries.

The following conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis:

The most important European countries have decreased their military expenditure during the last decade. The fact that in 2012, Asia surpassed Europe as regards defence spending, claiming the second position after North America among the continents, shows the scale of this unprecedented development. Three years later, Asian defence expenditures were 36.4% higher than in Europe. Among various indicators, some demonstrate that the military budget of Great Britain was reduced from 2.55% to 2.2% of GDP, and in the case of France, it fell from 2.4% to 1.8% of GDP. In com-

parison, Germany decreased its military spending from 1.3% to 1.2% of GDP and Italy went from 1.4% to 1.1% of GDP. The situation in Poland was the opposite, however rather unstable.

Those countries also cut down the number of the military, reduced the equipment necessary for handling a typical, high-intensity conflict, as well as decreased or maintained the level of combat readiness.

The changes that took place after 2014 forced European governments to analyse the current situation and re-examine the untended development of defence potential. In every country analysed in this paper, some attempts were made to modernize and improve the state of their armed forces, supported by a series of amendments or new initiatives pertaining to defence, including the adjustment made to prepare for potential cyber threats.

The development of international collaboration on both bilateral and continental levels remains to be an absolutely essential matter. New instruments, such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), as well as the tools to support the defence industry, like the European Defence Fund, are supposed to provide additional help to European countries to adapt defence policies to new challenges.

When analysing the obvious changes in the defence policies of particular countries, one should mind varied possibilities that reflect the scale and rate of prospective modernization developments, including purchases of new equipment. It is connected with the size of the defence budget and planned expenses which directly influence the actual possibility to realize the objectives of defence and security policy set in strategic documents. It may be useful to examine the following summary of 2017–2018 that demonstrates the differences in the budgets and expenditures of selected EU countries.

Table 13. A comparison of budget expenses and defence budgets of six largest EU countries (in billion USD)

Country Year/ indicator	France		Germany		UK		Italy		Spain		Poland	
	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018	2017	2018
Budget expenses in bn USD	46.1	50.7	45.7	49.7	55.4	59.0	23.9	25.1	11.9	13.5	9.94	10.9
Defence budget in bn USD	48.7	53.4	41.8	45.7	52.4	56.1	22.9	24.9	13.4	15.1	9.98	10.8

Source: Own work based on *The Military Balance 2019*, International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Each of the analysed countries has declared keeping or increasing the GDP dedicated to defence to 2% or even 2.5% as in the case of Poland. The countries have also committed to dedicate 20% of the NATO defence budget for buying equipment. The data above clearly show what kind of equipment particular countries have and what equipment they plan to invest in.

In the case of medium-sized countries, equipment purchases are made abroad since local military industries are usually not able to meet all the needs, neither in terms of quantity nor quality. The orders are usually covered by international corporations, whose main shareholders are large, influential countries like France and Great Britain, as demonstrated in the table below. This possibility significantly increases the opportunity to obtain modern military equipment.

Table 14. European Corporations in the top 100 largest military industry corporations in the world

Lp.	Corporation	Military sales revenue (in million USD) in 2017	Origin of capital (largest shareholder)	Place in the top 100 in the world in 2017
1.	BAE Systems	22790	Great Britain	4
2.	Airbus	12520	several UE countries	7
3.	Leonardo	8500	Italy	9
4.	Thales	8170	France	11
5.	Rolls-Royce	4420	Great Britain	17
6.	Naval Group	4130	France	19
7.	Rheinmetall	3420	Germany	25
8.	MBDA	3380	several UE countries	26
9.	Babcock International	3230	Great Britain	27
10.	Safran	2910	France	33
11.	Saab	2670	Sweden	36

Lp.	Corporation	Military sales revenue (in million USD) in 2017	Origin of capital (largest shareholder)	Place in the top 100 in the world in 2017
12.	CEA	2170	France	46
13.	Dassault Aviation	2120	France	50
14.	ThyssenKrupp	1920	Germany	53
15.	Fincanteri	1660	Italy	58
16.	Cobham	1580	Great Britain	59
17.	GKN	1410	Great Britain	63
18.	Serco	1250	Great Britain	69
19.	PGZ	1190	Poland	73
20.	Hensoldt	1160	Germany	74
21.	UkrOboronProm	1020	Ukraine	81
22.	Nexter	960	France	83
23.	Navantia	910	Spain	87
24.	Meggitt	880	Great Britain	93
25.	RUAG	870	Switzerland	95

Source: P.L. Wilczyński, *Geografia przemysłu zbrojeniowego Europy*, Polskie Towarzystwo Geopolityczne, Kraków 2019, p. 37.

The collaboration between the EU members is the key to achieving means of defence against modern threats. Divisions on the national level, protectionist policy, and budget limitations may result in a poor efficiency and ineffective use of military resources.

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