


INTENTIONNALITÉ
COMME IDÉE

PHENOMENON,
BETWEEN EFFICACY
AND ANALOGY



Edited by Piotr Janik, Carla Canullo

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On peut déterminer le sens de la « réalité »
seulement à condition d'opposer son idée aux
idées d'autres modes possibles d'existence et de
discerner à la fois dans chaque mode d'existence
le moments existentiels qui s'y trouvent sous la
forme de différentes synthèses.

Roman Ingarden¹

The natural world [...] is a phenomenon whose
originality must first be described and analyzed
and only then interpreted, in such a way that
the phenomenon does not vanish with the
interpretation.

Jan Patočka²

¹ R. Ingarden, "Les Modes d'Existence et le Probleme « Idealisme-Realisme »", *Proceedings of the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy 1949*, vol. 1, 347-350, p. 34.

² J. Patočka, *The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem*, transl. E. Abrams, eds. I. Chvatík and L. Učník, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press 2016, p. 127.

Introduction

To be, or not to be, that is *not* a question.

The attempt of René Descartes' analysis, addressed over time by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, was to construct a *mathesis universalis*. Starting from the grasp of a clear and yet distinct ideas, it goes ahead toward the language of science, capable of accommodating what is, of which the notation of the infinitesimal calculus is but a concrete expression. The tension between the sense-content of the idea and its scientifically proven objectivity reaches its climax in the plainly expressed claim. However, science is free neither from metaphors nor from rhetorical figures that provide a framework for interpretation, such as paradigm, model, analogy, and so on. In other words, the findings need to be accommodated in order to be received and are not otherwise communicated. The situation today seems to be that of different approaches that share the same words but use them in the particular way. The truth asserted within the fact is thus found only in the singular perspective and at most in principle. It is the state of things, which does not allow anything but contrast.

However, the situation influenced by science is that it has become "common sense," or, in Jan Patočka's words, the *natural world*, the world we live in. Both the understanding of reality and of the other, as well as communication itself all the way up to the translation of experiences between cultures in order to feed one's own development,

come close to the threshold of incomprehension. In the digital world, humans are accompanied by increasingly specialized artifacts, i.e., artificial intelligence devices, however, people are not completely left out of the game. On the contrary, it is up to us, as always, to understand and make responsible uses of things.

Perhaps, first of all, we need to capture the ‘idea’ itself in its exposure. Rationale in the sense of the “mechanical” reasoning that informs the ‘idea’ of everyday use is a discrete form of thought itself that goes back to Aristotle’s syllogism; except that its articulation is located in the indistinguishable space between the discontinuity of partial moments and the uniqueness of the product-content. However, this is only a construct, which must be valid, as it were, but cannot be justified except by a human *fiat*, of acceptance or rejection. Nevertheless, it is proper for the human to precede. In other words, the sense of things within the idea, soundness, or relevance is up to the human, and this makes that the authentic doing is marked by caesura, that is a reason.

The efficacy of an utterance rests in the utterance. It is not the vision it refers to to justify it, not even the warrant it perhaps requires to lean into the conversation. Undoubtedly, the utterance can be neither empty nor all-encompassing. Perhaps, it is not perfect in any respect. The efficacy of the utterance consists in addressing the conviction and challenging it. Thus, this does not mean apparent contrast, that is, encountering the fact itself, being reflected in it. Rather, it is almost always the case of the overlooking the content, failing to become aware of it. So, addressing the challenge requires being present, i.e., stopping and turning oneself in temporality of coping with respect, or – saying in Edmund Husserl’s terminology – *bracketing* for making proper investigation. In this point of “stopping and turning oneself in temporality” starts every heresy of phenomenology, to paraphrase Paul Ricœur. However, one cannot escape the interval between the attention fixed for a radical reversal of analysis and the outcome, i.e., the finding; not even in the case of Martin Heidegger’s *Dasein* understood ostensibly as a vindication of the present. The interval feels like an empty space,

a gap between turning one's gaze and insight. And it is indeed so, that is, from the point of view of ratiocination. An attempt is made to become acquainted with this unfamiliar space through the use of analogy. Yet, is it not true that – as in the case of the *natural world* in Patočka – this unknown space is precisely corporeality and life-feeling?

* * *

The opening chapter is Wojciech Starzyński's on the question concerning the idea in Descartes in light of Jean-Luc Marion's thesis, posed in his famous article "En quel sens la phénoménologie peut-elle ou non se réclamer de Descartes?" Namely, the thesis of the reduction of perceptions and representations – "before and independently of the famous operation of doubt" – to the pure presentation of the datum itself. In other words, this thesis claims, again according to Marion, an alternative starting point of phenomenology, as opposed to *cogito ergo sum*. "Leaving aside the further elaboration of this courageous thesis of the French phenomenologist," Starzyński goes only with "a complementary thesis, namely, that such a fundamental reduction to something that appears as such is accomplished by Descartes within and through his theory of ideas . . . in particular in the reading of the idea as a quasi-image, as an autonomous basis of any presentation . . . as well as moments of correlation between act and object."

The second chapter by Piotr Janik goes back to the birth of modern ontology and the question of intentionality as the immediate legacy of the Middle Ages synthesis, that of Francisco Suárez's *aliquid in rerum natura*. The chapter offers a historical overview and discussion of being in the sense of something which is not nothing, but at the same time is not real either, so the committed term is that of *irrealia*. Special attention is given to Augustine's "inward turn" and the path that leads from there to the *Einsicht* and *Einfuehlung* of phenomenology, that is of *insight* and *empathy*, respectively. But the whole story would not be told in adequate detail without Jan Patočka's extensive contribution, ranging from Plato's "care of the soul" to his own claim of the "being

as abstract.” Patočka’s legacy is found in the efforts to reconcile the life-feeling with the modern perception of reality.

In the third chapter, Andrzej Gielarowski turns to the phenomenology of the other, with different attempts inspired by the analyses of Edmund Husserl, Emmanuel Levinas, and Michel Henry. It is the three of them, at first glance so opposed to each other or rather overtaking the previous one’s position, that can contribute to the theme. In the first case, the point of departure is Husserl’s fifth *Cartesian Meditation* in the line of intersubjectivity, that is, to constitute the other “in and from intentional life.” Levinas’ is a vindication of the primordial situation, i.e., ethical in his terminology, which opposes the objectification of the other through the appropriation of the idea. Henry’s, by contrast, tries to start from life as “a mode of ecstatic manifestation, as the visibility and objectivity of things,” that is, from within. The chapter four by Agata Zielinski concerns the phenomenology of the other, in a sense of empathy (*Einfuehlung*). However, the situation discussed is one that offers nothing for constitution of the other, either through human similarity or the ethical horizon of shared experience. Indeed, on the one hand, there are “extreme situations presented to us by the clinic: people in a coma, people in a chronic vegetative state, or people with certain types of multiple disabilities,” which attest that “[t]he experience lived by others in their own flesh remains forever inaccessible to me.” On the other hand, “something is experienced (in oneself therefore), which gives rise to representations concerning another.” Thus, Husserl’s thought about empathy is to be deepened, as Zielinski notes, relying on the findings of Natalie Depraz’s analysis.

In chapter five, following in the footsteps of Paul Ricoeur, Robert Grzywacz advances the claim that it is vulnerability that is constitutive of man in the sense of the capacity for action, and it lies in our susceptibility to mental disorders. Because of “a double belonging of man: to the sensible, biological world on the one hand, and to the order of the intelligible, to the rational on the other” any comprehension or “objective synthesis realized” make the moment fragile. For Ricoeur,

Grzywacz notes, “the feeling (*le sentiment*) is what is always exercised on the border between the outside and the inside. It is characterized by a coincidence, in the same lived, ‘of the intentionality and the interiority, of the intention and the affection.’” Grzywacz’s analysis concludes in a psychopathological application, that is, finding evidence of the Ricœur’s thesis in the work of a Polish psychiatrist Antoni Kępiński, who in his book *Psychopathies*, speaks about “psychopaths” as people who suffer and make others suffer.

In the sixth chapter, Kamil Moroz defends the idea that subjectivity does not lie at the heart of Husserl’s phenomenology or even Freud’s psychoanalysis. On the contrary, “these two methods always situat[e] themselves already outside (ἐν παρέργῳ) the something.” In other words, “[n]either for Husserl nor for Freud does thought really have an end, not only because of the diversity of *cogitationes*, but because of its link with the desire for the something. It is in this, however, that the greatness and danger of the hidden and manifest thought lies, in a single word – in the something – that perhaps remembers the times without words.”

The chapter seven by Jagna Brudzińska focuses on the unconscious, which for both Husserl and Freud from the beginning “takes shape not as a mere negative of consciousness, not as a mere non-consciousness, but as a sphere with its own meaning and functioning. From this initial intuition phenomenology and psychoanalysis develop distinct but not contrary analyses that deeply influenced philosophy and culture of the 20th century.” Brudzińska provides a historical background and reports various attempts in embracing consciousness by Husserl that lead him to the discovery of “the Unconscious as source of motivation.” Finally, relying on the psychoanalysis initiated by Freud, she seeks to emphasize “the role that unconscious dynamics plays in the interactions between people.”

The chapter eight of Maciej Jemioł is the investigation into the mode of engagement in video games. Jemioł indicates two different approaches to this issue. “According to the first, based on the phenom-

enological ideas of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the player is embodied in a video game, while according to the second that rises from the field of literary and media studies, the player is immersed in the game.” Attempting to reconcile the two competing interpretations, Jemioł states, “what we do when we engage in a video game is then . . . we actually inhabit the virtual world, but we also . . . pretend to inhabit the fictional world.”

The chapter nine by Piotr Janik is dedicated, on the one hand, to the controversy over reality, on the other hand, to the digital world we live in. The “natural world,” a term already investigated by Jan Patočka, is not the one supposed by Husserl. Put differently, “with regard to a currently very widespread life-feeling, that man who has experienced modern science no longer lives simply in the naive natural world.” So, it is not entirely clear how to proceed with phenomenological analysis starting with the bracketing. The directive seems to be out of place, in fact the data is already there, at least it seems so. Nevertheless, the digital world is the world *tout court*. But how exactly does this streaming, dubbed the real world, take place? No doubt, the digital experience is *discrete*. Thus, you no longer live by metaphors, but you function in the procedural control system, powered by artificial intelligence. However, you can sense that something is wrong.

In chapter ten, Jarosław Jakubowski seeks a guiding idea, conformable to the method of today’s phenomenology. Jakubowski points out that the lesson from the history of phenomenology allows us to see some diversity within the method, which nonetheless harbors a common idea, namely, tending toward and describing what is originally given in the revealing of itself. The challenges of today, Jakubowski notes, are “linked by the constitutive requirement that a transition should be made from the realm of *theorein* to that of *praxis*” – perhaps in a sense of Ricœur’s turn – to find oneself within two worlds, the political and the virtual.

Finally, the chapter eleven by Marco Deodati somewhat recapitulates the issue under consideration, i.e., intentionality, on the one hand,

and phenomena, on the other. His analysis revolves around the question: “What is the peculiarity of desire?” according to Husserl. In the light of Husserliana XLIII, known as *Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins*, Deodati states, that the very sense of desire is longing. Put differently, “[t]he lacking is no longer given as something merely desirable, but as something that is calling us strongly, attracting us, that we are passionately longing for.” However, “[a]ccording to Husserl’s analyses in the *Studien*, it does seem possible to distinguish three different phenomena in the field of desire consciousness.”

* * *

The hope of the editors is to offer the reader, thanks to all the contributors, a textbook of quality and relevance, and perhaps a particular input to challenge and find what is given by revealing itself and/or oneself.

Piotr Janik, Carla Canullo

The texts collected in this volume are the result of research in the field of the pressing issues of phenomenology as a "formal," i.e., genetic-constitutional, investigation of the sense in the scientific and philosophical dialogue to which it aspires from the beginning with Edmund Husserl.

The hope of the editors is to offer the reader a textbook of quality and relevance, and perhaps a particular input to challenge and find what is given by revealing itself and/or oneself.

The range of topics is very wide [...]. The choice of topics itself is extremely interesting; it makes phenomenology, broadly conceived, and its tradition, as well as its present day, a lively and passionate subject.

Piotr Mróz

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