"I"

AND

"OTHER"

in Light of Phenomenological-Hermeneutics
Reflection

Edited by
Marcin Rebes

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INTRODUCTION

The problem of interpersonal relations is an important social problem. In fact, the conflicts that arise between individuals, as well as between communities and nations, have at their root the problem of the symmetry of relations. It is only on the basis of the question "Do I see an adversary in the other?" that the content gets revealed. In his critique of Kant, Max Scheler observes that what precedes all cognition is not only the experience of utilitarian values but also ethical ones. Before I know, I experience myself in the realization of values together with others. Being empathetic precedes my awareness. Martin Buber's philosophy introduces the I-Thou relationship into philosophical thought. Only in this relationship do we find ourselves, which in fact means being for the other.

In this collection, the *alter ego* is presented not only as a second, but also as a third other. The other can be myself, but also another who makes me credible in my being a witness for the other. It is easier for me to enter into dialogue with another person, whom I can address as "you." And what happens when this person is another unlike me? What is my relationship with them? This book is an attempt to answer this question with a method that is really only a reflection in which otherness with its radicalism is revealed to me. This otherness is by no means an object to which I have a distance, which can be judged from the perspective of something that is far away from me, but it is that which attracts and fascinates me, which takes shape within me. Before I can put the encounter in the category of consciousness, the relationship with the other is already part of me, and it is only this that makes it possible to enter into a strong relationship. Before I know the outside world, I already somehow understand and embrace it. This volume deals with the subject of the other precisely on the basis

of the description of the phenomenon of otherness and an attempt to understand it on the basis of various literary descriptions, philosophies and also social phenomena. The analyses are made in view of the migration crisis of contemporary Europe and the archetype of the pilgrim man, the man on the road. This problem is depicted from many differences perspectives such as philosophy, education, and sociology.

The monograph consists of six chapters. In the first chapter, entitled *Senses and Meaning of Hospitality* Marie-Anne Lescourret, author of biographies of Emmanuel Levinas and Paul Claudel, focuses on the problem of hospitality, referring, among others, to Caravaggio's painting *The Seven Works of Misericordia*, as well as comparing the meaning of hospitality with other concepts such as charity, compassion, for example. She also finds the meaning of these synonyms in the passages of St. Matthew's Gospel, in which the source relationship between me and the other is revealed. The author sees an analogy between contemporary problems, the migratory crisis, which has the face of a human being, of a neighbor, and the words of St Matthew, who not only calls us to stay beside the other, to accompany them, but also to act. The author presents the problem of hospitality through the prism of the relationship between word and reality. As she notes, apart from all forms of feelings and actions, the afore-mentioned painting lacks vision and language, that is, looking and seeing. The author interestingly tries to show the importance of listening and speaking for hospitality; they are an essential element of hospitality.

The second chapter, entitled *The Equal and the Same*, by Hans Sepp, author of *Phänomenologie und Oikologie*, among other books which deal with phenomenology, is a continuation of the first chapter and is devoted to the issue of reciprocity. The author addresses the problem of equality, starting out by presenting it through the prism of the relationship between Cain and Abel, as well as between them and God. The problem of God's acceptance of Abel's sacrifice lies at the root of Cain's jealousy of his brother. The author presents the contradiction in the attitude of Cain, who demands equality but does not practice it himself. The demand for equality and equal treatment does not contradict the fact that the Self and the Other are absolutely different from each other. Each is indispensable to the other, unlike the performance of different social functions.

The book also explores the problem of the role of the Self as a third party in the relationship between two persons. It is discussed by Thomas Keller, author of *Verkörperungen des Dritten im Deutsch-Französischen Verhältnis*, in the third chapter entitled *Ich-Andere-Dritte. Vom Personalen zum Medialen*. Thomas Keller focuses on the role of the Self as a third person who is not only a witness for others, but also needs a witness for his role as mediator, confidant of others. The self as third party in the relationship of two subjects transfers the content of one into the domain of the other,

performs transculturalism. The third, however, also needs a confidant, a witness to his experience. The witness who accompanies the first and second persons also needs someone who confirms his experience, who makes him credible. Like the interpreter, the third needs an outside witness whose relationship with him will not be reciprocal, but is necessary for my validation. The author presents various scenarios in which the transition from egology to tertiarity takes place. The philosophy of dialogue focuses on the I-Thou relationship, while, as in Simmel, the third, the stranger, plays an important role. In this sense, the ambivalence between familiarity and betrayal, familiarity and strangeness in the cultural sense is revealed. The one who translates is the one who opens the door to those who are the addressees of the message, the mission.

In the fourth chapter, *Learning from the Other: A Study in Philosophy of Education*, Rafał Godoń, the author of numerous works on the philosophy of education, presents relations with others through the prism of the process of upbringing. He shows the way of experience, in which man learns from the other. He wonders under what conditions it is possible to support students in their own learning from others. He poses the question of a pedagogical culture at school in which students' participation in a truly valuable education will be promoted. The author focuses on the experience in which students learn from others. He presents it from a theoretical and practical, empirical perspective. He argues that the school should provide space for student activity in a pragmatic dimension as well as conceptual thinking. Work and dialogue belong to educational experiences.

In the fifth chapter, *Migrants in Contemporary Europe as Significant Others: Some Thoughts Concerning Persistent Appeal of Civilisational Boundary Drawing*, Grzegorz Pożarlik, a sociologist exploring the questions of identity and integration of Europe, shows the problem of the other from the perspective of the migration crisis in Central Europe. He presents the phenomenon in which immigrants become a symbol of civilizational otherness. In view of the Arab Spring, as well as the crisis on the Polish-Belarusian border as seen in the public debate on it, the message emphasizing the civilizational borders between Europe and "Not-Europe" is reinforced. This type of identity narrative has a history. European civic identity grew out of a confrontation with otherness, but was also regarded from the positive side as an aspirational goal.

In the sixth chapter, *Solidarity with/for Other and Responsibility for Other in Light of Reciprocal Relation between Man and Man: Philosophy of Other*, Marcin Rebes takes up the problem of responsibility for another and solidarity with him in view of these notions. The key to them is the philosophical turn towards dialogue, towards dialogicality, which replaces the hitherto understanding of the world through the prism of subject-object relations. The relationship between man and man eludes such an approach and is based on openness, which does not allow for the objectification of man, but

for the creation of a space "between," for which solidarity with and responsibility for others means a relationship between two subjects who are able to relate to each other despite their separateness, dissimilarity. The notion of responsibility and solidarity, crucial in a social sense today, is rooted in the source experience of the other.

The book discusses the important problem of the other considered from different perspectives and in different relations. The fundamental problem is not so much the I-Thou relationship, as this relationship from the perspective of being a third, of witnessing someone to someone else (a third), and the context of the encounter, building a relationship, a society that also needs a mediation dialogue. The problem of the other is a very important issue from the perspective of cultural and social processes and the question of identity. They are based on the relation I-Other.

Caravaggio, *The Seven Works of Mercy*, 1607. Source: public domain

Marie-Anne Lescourret

SENSES AND MEANING OF HOSPITALITY

A painting by Caravaggio called *The Seven Works of Misericordia*, and exposed in a Neapolitan chapel, represents the Christian Deeds as listed by Matthew, XXV, 35-36:[1] they show the Christian ways of interrelation between I and the other, between me and my neighbor. In the third instance, Matthew recommends giving shelter to the stranger: a relationship between human beings most questioned in Europe nowadays in the face of a flood of migrants in destitute condition.

I shall comment those deeds, and one in particular, on the methodological basis of the Wittgensteinian philosophy of language, according to which philosophical problems are problems of language, which have to be understood according to forms of life since the meaning of the words comes from their use, and more precisely, from "the way this use meshes with our life."[2] Therefore, a conclusion drawn by the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, all reasoning will be submitted to the consciousness (and critique) of "the scholastic illusion," which grants timelessness to philosophical thinking. Sense, thus, will be conceived as practical, applied. Eventually, we shall reach the kind of hermeneutics that Paul Ricœur calls "modern" as far as it deals with situations[3] and not only with biblical or legal texts, as it did originally.

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[1] Matthew, XXV: 35, "For I was an hungred, and ye gave me meat; I was thirsty and ye gave me drink; I was a stranger and ye took me in"; 36, "Naked and ye clothed me; I was sick and ye visited me; I was in prison and ye came unto me."

[2] L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Grammar*, transl. by A. Kenny, Oxford 1974, §29.

[3] P. Ricœur, *Parcours de la reconnaissance: trois études*, Paris 2005, p. 310. "A cet égard, le retour à la notion aristotélicienne de phronesis marque le recours contemporain à la catégorie 'herméneutique d'application,' dès lors qu'il s'agit d'interpréter des situations où peuvent se vérifier des corréla-

Words and Deeds

What are the senses of hospitality? What does "hospitality" mean? What are the notions and ideas surrounding it? It obviously started with mercy (*misericordia*), and the seven ways of practicing it according to the Bible. The New Testament provides more descriptions.

> Luke, VI, 3: "What David did, when he himself was an hungred, and they which were with him?
>> 4: "how he went into the house of God and did take and eat the shewbread and gave also to them that were with him; which is not lawful to eat but for the priest alone."
>> 28-30: "bless them who hate you, bless them that curse you, and pray for them who despitefully use you … and of them that take away thy goods, ask them not in reward."
> Paul, XIII, 9: "thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself"
>> 10: "Love worketh no ill to his neighbour, therefore, love is the fulfilling of the law".
> Peter, I, 5-7: "And beside this … add to your faith virtue, knowledge, temperance, patience, godliness … and to godliness, brotherly kindness, charity".

Matthew clearly associates hospitality with charity and its main deeds, namely feeding, clothing, sheltering (XXV, 35-36). He also links hospitality and good deeds with salvation: XXV, 46 "the righteous shall go into eternal life." This last point will be contested in due time by the Protestant Reformation. Nevertheless, according to this selection of verses from the New Testament, hospitality means charity, care, compassion, help to those in need, holding out one's hand to a fellow-being in distress.

Of course, hospitality existed before Christian times. Emmanuel Levinas recalls that the word "hospitality" occurs forty times in the Pentateuch. It relies on one main exhortation: "thou shalt neither vex a stranger nor oppress him: for we were strangers in the land of Egypt" (Exodus XXII, 21). It reaches some memorable, hyperbolic dimensions, such as Loth delivering his daughters rather than his guests to the infuriated people of Sodom (Genesis, XIX, 2-8), or the temple being open also to non–Hebrews (Kings, VIII, 41) since Yahweh "loves the stranger" (Deuteronomy, X, 18-10). My favorite one comes from Deuteronomy, XXIV, 19-22, however: it recommends

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tions entre reconnaissance de validité au plan des normes et reconnaissance des capacités au plan des personnes."

to leave grapes on the vines and olives on the trees for the fatherless, the widow and the stranger to pick up and eat.[4]

These statements clearly show that hospitality concerns the stranger, the one who does not belong to the community (in that case the Hebrew community) and that it is not a matter of charity, but of moral or civil duty. It is not a sentimental, cordial or gracious act as in the Christian tradition. It refers to the link of the Hebrew to his God, and to the prescriptions, to the law, to the conception of justice that the Hebrew people received from Him and which constitute them as a community, a people. As Levinas writes in *Les imprévus de l'histoire*, "it is not a matter of expanding charity to the Unfaithful, as for the Christian, it is a matter of legally integrating the stranger."[5] I won't discuss Levinas views. I consider them as true to Judaism and its understanding of the divine message as law. I retain from them what enlarges my first description of hospitality, namely:

–   Hospitality concerns the stranger.
–   It is a legal matter.
–   It contributes to the social link.
–   It is a practical, an earthly matter, as the biblical examples show: "moral purity, moral dignity are not displayed face to face with God, but among human beings," Levinas writes in *Difficult freedom*:[6] being hospitable does not mean trying to please God in search of an eternal reward, but applying the divine law among the human community in order to establish peace on earth.

Hospitality also exists beyond the Judaeo-Christian civilization. It was a Greek and a Roman custom, as we read in Plato and Seneca, among others, and as etymology tells us. The word 'charity' comes from the Greek *kharis*, and 'hospitality' comes from the Latin *hospis*. But rather than indulging into what Bourdieu calls "philologism"

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[4]   Kings, VIII, 39: "then hear thou in heaven thy dwelling place, and forgive and do and give to every man according to his ways, whose heart you knowest…"
41: "Moreover concerning a stranger, that is not of thy people Israel, but cometh out from a far country for thy name's sake."
Deuteronomy, X, 18: "he doth execute the judgment of the fatherless and widow and loveth the stranger."
XXIV, 19: "when thou cutest down thine harvest in thine field, and hast forgot a sheaf in the field, thou shalt not go again to fetch it: it shall be for the stranger, for the fatherless, for the widow."
22: "and thou shalt remember that you was a bondman in the land of Egypt: therefore I command thee to do this thing."

[5]   E. Levinas, *Les imprévus de l'histoire*, Cognac 1994, p. 187.

[6]   Idem, *Difficile liberté*, Paris 1988, p. 745.

– a conviction that etymology will provide "the" meaning of a word – and preferably to lifeless references and definitions of a dictionary, I would rather favor Emile Benveniste's "vocabulary of Indo-European institutions,"[7] which relates the meanings of the words to the circumstances (the situations, the forms of life[8]) they are used in.

For instance, in Latin, guest is said both *hostis* and *hospes*, showing a common root for 'hospitality' and 'hostility.' In the Greek city, hospitality is governed by Zeus Xenus, in which we are able to recognize the root of xenophobia, at least of the stranger, foreign to our country, our city, our community, and our customs and as such, suspicious. In both cultures, the stranger does not "belong": he is different, peculiar, and as such perceived as threatening, and thus elicits hostile, rather than friendly, welcoming or hospitable, behaviors. Hospitality, therefore, appears as practiced with a background of hostility: a kind of anxiety arising in front of the unknown, an anxiety that the stranger will try to overcome in different ways, the first being that of bringing presents as pledges of peaceful intentions. Thereby appears the conditionality of hospitality, which is testified to by giving – albeit not immediately exchanging – gifts.

Kharis, the Greek word for gift, refers in fact to a particular kind of gift, namely, the one-sided, non-reciprocal gift that expects no reward. In Homer's *Odyssey*, *kharizestai* means delivering presents, gifts for hospitality. In *kharis,* the purpose is to please the beneficiary without any hope of requital, counter-gift. It is a gracious giving away, free of any expectation and gratuitous (therefore gracious). It matches the Christian charity criticized by Levinas, and expressed in Luke VI, 27: Love your enemies, be good to them and lend without expecting any reward. This understanding of charity was also advocated by Seneca in his treatise *De beneficiis*, where the Latin stoic describes the transformation of the "primitive" or original formal, ceremonious gift into pure oblation, thereby endowing it with a moral sense.

This way of giving, free or moral, is the idea we have usually been trained to. Hospitality, pertaining to charity, could then be understood as a kind of gracious, disinterested gift: you feed and shelter the stranger or the poor without demanding or even expecting anything in return. The counterpart concept appears to be that the poor or the stranger expects people to behave that way, the unilateral gift being the only appropriate one towards the destitute and distressed. You wouldn't ask money or any kind of compensation from the fatherless, the widow or the stranger who eats the fruit intentionally left behind on your fields.

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[7]   E. B e n v e n i s t e, *Vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes*, vol. 1 «économie, parenté, société», vol. 2 «pouvoir droit, religion», Paris 2003-2005 (1969).

[8]   To borrow Ricœur's or Wittgenstein's formulations.

This far, according to ancient vocabulary, texts, laws and convictions, it seems that hospitality, first, corresponds to a matter of identity that underlies the difference between me and my fellow-citizens and the stranger, or between me with my possessions and the destitute (stranger, widow, orphan, cut off from their economic and family helpful background); it is also a matter of justice, since it contributes to a more equal distribution of goods between those who have and those who have not; and it eventually becomes a matter of morals, even of love, including the feeling of sympathy for those who suffer and therefore demand or deserve or provoke an act of (pure) generosity, of unconditional giving.

We are now facing two questions: "Is hospitality conditional or not?" and "Does it expect any reward if it is intrinsically disinterested?"

Sociological and anthropological approaches

In his celebrated and remarkable books *Le prix de la vérité* and *Le don des philosophes,* Marcel Hénaff[9] provides a clear (and necessary) description of the social implications of the condemnation of (monetary) interests in spiritual matters. Very roughly, this attitude is first exemplified in the Platonic criticism of the Sophists, whose teaching is paid for; it reappears in the stoic and Christian conception of gift as pure oblation (discarding the "primitive" reciprocal gift, which I shall later describe in anthropological terms). Am I exaggerating when I sustain that Western thinkers and philosophers, as well as monks and nuns, all act (all believe they act) for the sake of truth and faith, and not in search of any material reward, any monetary compensation, that would make them dependent on the will of the paying party?[10] Religious people have at least professed a desire for poverty, and as we all know, knowledge and science, both practiced and experienced, are free. Truth is timeless and immaterial… There is the chore of what Bourdieu calls the "scholastic illusion," this pretention of philosophers to escape ordinary conditions and to deal with eternity, which Thomas Nagel accurately expresses in the title of his book, *The point of view of nowhere.*

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[9]   M. H é n a f f, *Le prix de la vérité: le don, l'argent, la philosophie*, Paris 2002; i d e m, *Le don des philosophes: repenser la réciprocité*, Paris 2012. Marcel Hénaff (1942-2018) was a French philosopher and anthropologist, who taught for most of his life at the University of San Diego in California.

[10]   Therefore, at least in countries where teaching is free, and universities state universities, the anxiety to see them privatized, financially and intellectually dependent on the sponsors that tend to favour useful teachings, rather than useless – humanistic (and critical) – ones: but Socrates already died for this cause.

In his will to reintegrate thought into reality, at least into sociological circumstances, Bourdieu criticizes the general appraisal of "disinterestedness." Though he calls the usual conviction that art, religion and philosophy are pursued disinterestedly "narcissistic," Bourdieu does not feed any moral intention into this critique. He just acknowledges the fact that any undertaking of ours responds to an interest, a will, a wish; at the beginning of whatever issue we pursue, be it a game, there is a personal engagement, which also drives this action. We may call it pejoratively *perseveratio sui*. But can we at all deny – even in the Levinassian hyperbolic "otherwise than being" – that we are the subjects of our actions and their finality, even if they are accomplished for the good of the other: the happiness of our children or the welfare of the destitute?

Of course, Hannah Arendt provides a positive approach to interest as *inter-esse*: as a way of considering oneself among (*inter*) others. The subject of action ceases to be a solipsistic entity concerned only with its personal fulfilment: it is conscious of the fact that all living, all action happens in the middle of a community and by virtue of it. Practically, 'being' means 'being with.'[11] This extended understanding of "interest" tends to equate gift and hospitality with responsibility, whereas the oblative Christian approach tends to assimilate non-rewarded, disinterested gift with sacrifice. According to Bourdieu and others, whichever "sacrifice" we make, it is always for the sake of our own satisfaction.

At this point, one easily remembers Dostoyevsky 's famous passages in his novel *The Idiot* about the self-contentment of the one who gives alms to the poor… And can Stefan Zweig's *Dangerous pity* be read without reckoning that one belongs to those weak miserable people, whose pity actually consists only of their incapacity to face the distress of the other… Whereas according to Zweig, real pity means sacrifice, made gracious through painful offering (sacrifice being another moral and anthropological problem, not to be elucidated here).

Was mother Theresa being self-satisfied since dedicating her life to the starving beggars was her personal choice? What would be the use of uttering this criticism, however: she did help numerous indigents. What is at stake in Bourdieu's analysis is the removal of the moral privilege of disinterestedness, which may contribute eventually to reclose the good-doer on his contentment. But, skeptical towards disinterestedness or pure oblation, as advocated by Seneca and Christianism, Bourdieu

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[11]   Emmanuel Levinas even goes farther, when he substitutes the priority of ethics to the priority of ontology, thereby defining the subject accusatively or as passive: being means being second, responding to God or my neighbor who, by His appeal or demand, brings me into existence. At the beginning, is not action but debt.

praises personal engagement in any game, any action, with the view that our initial motive will change and adapt in the course of the collective game on the social field.

Bourdieu then exposes a special meaning of meaning, which he inherits from his experiences as a football-player: sense is not what the dictionary keeps written down once and for all. Just like the sense of the game, which consists in adapting one's personal actions to those of the others, the sense is dynamic and constantly invented in accordance with what happens in reality, factually, on the playground, amidst other footballers. (This approach resembles Levinas' conception of moral dignity which, according to him, occurs only amidst fellow human beings.) For Bourdieu, sense is first of all practical and dynamic, applied. It governs and feeds action, an action that corresponds to a goal and is realized, if not for their sake, at least amidst other people. The critique of disinterestedness seems to lead him to the Arendtian concept of *interesse*, literally "being-between": for any action to have sense, it must bring us together with our fellow-people in some way, by speech or deed.

Stefan Zweig's analysis suggest that there is a kind of hierarchy in pity, in generosity: true gift being not only pure oblation as we saw with Seneca, but even more, since true pity, true charity means, according to Zweig, surrendering oneself ("substitution" as Levinas would say) or sacrifice.

Speaking of hierarchy in giving, I'm not asking whether it makes sense to give my life for another (it makes sense for me to give my life in order to rescue my child): I'm wondering why Saint Martin gave only half of his coat. Are there degrees in giving, in hospitality? What is their measure?

Practical sense

As I noted formerly, catholic education tends to make us think that a true gift is a pure gift, a non-reciprocal oblation. We think that giving is for the sake of giving and for the sake of the other, the poor, the destitute, the traveler, homeless, migrant or refugee from whom we do not and must not expect any compensation. During the Middle Ages, when there were neither inns nor hostels, homeless people were "hospitalized" in barns: they could rest for a night or two, not exactly in the house but within the confines of an estate, and they received a bowl of soup for free or in exchange of some farm work. The intimacy of hospitality disappeared with the emergence of special dwellings for itinerant people, for passers-by.

At this point allow me two remarks, apparently trivial, intended to contribute to a factual description of hospitality. First, in the Provence, where I come from, on Christmas Eve, you always set an extra plate and a seat at the family table, in case

a beggar would knock at the door. Second, a compliment you can make to a hotel is to say that it is a place where you feel "at home," better than in an impersonal venue. Hospitality concerns travelers in need of a 'home': that is not merely a place to stay, but also a place of interpersonal relationship for a short while. Hospitality is a human but temporary link: the pilgrim, the traveler, the tramp will continue on their way after a brief rest. Nowadays, in our cities, urban dwellers have few barns to accommodate travelers in, and may even lack spare rooms in their tiny flats. At the same time shelters – charity institutions – are scarce and often overcrowded… However, it is always possible to spread a mattress on the floor, and a bowl of soup (and even a cup of tea or coffee) are easily available. How can hospitality become a problem, then?

An old French movie *Boudu rescued from the river*[12] shows the story of a tramp pulled out of a river by a kind-hearted commoner who takes him home. There, the tramp turns into a tyrant for the family of his benefactors, all paralyzed by the idea that Boudu is a poor man and that they have to act charitably to him. They practice a kind of total, unilateral generosity towards him, with an underlying (as it seems) sense of guilt. As if welcoming somebody into home meant giving up one's intimacy, offering one's personal dwelling, as a kind of implicit redress of a known or unknown (or eternal) sin.

In his Gilson lectures, *Du sens des choses*,[13] Jean Grondin, to whom we owe deep and enlightening commentaries of Gadamer and Heidegger, sustains that meaning comes from things: it is not something we read into them. Therefore, understanding means detecting the finality of states of affairs, not reading it into them according to our representation. Epistemology is not our concern now, however it is important to emphasize the necessity of seeing, experiencing and drawing links (*intelligere*) between facts in order to detect their *logos*, their reason for being, their finality, their sense, what they are aiming at, what they lead us to.

When Bourdieu pleads for "practical sense" as a kind of "objectivist hermeneutics" in his *Choses dites*,[14] on the one hand, he refuses to fall into a kind of Marxist pit that would consider everything as the result of material circumstances, but on the other hand, he also refuses the hermeneutic pretention to reach "the" interpretation on the basis of what he contemptuously calls *jeux d'écritures sémiologiques*, "semiological accounting games."[15] Bourdieu actually refers to (and relies upon) the Wittgensteinian

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[12] *Boudu sauvé des eaux*, 1932, a movie directed by Jean Renoir, starring Michel Simon.

[13] J. Grondin, *Du sens des choses: l'idée de la métaphysique*, Paris 2013.

[14] P. Bourdieu, *Choses dites*, Paris 1987.

[15] Idem, *Le sens pratique*, Paris 1980, p. 35. But does indeed interpretation ever reach a final point even for hermeneuticians?

conception of meaning as use, of meshing with life, according to which the meaning of a word is not once and for all settled in a dictionary definition, but enriches and refines itself along its applications. Therefore our question becomes: What do we do when we speak of hospitality? This practical approach is all the more demanded by the fact that hospitality involves the intimacy of the home.

According to anthropological and ethical considerations, there are three ways of being hospitable:

– Respecting the purely oblative model, sheltering the stranger, feeding and clothing the poor for the very sake of doing it as we read in Matthew or see in Caravaggio.
– Using the primitive model of potlatch, described by Marcel Mauss (in his essay on gift),[16] which implies that the beneficiary rewards the benevolent beyond what he received from him.
– Last but not least, applying the model of reciprocal gift, which is not only a primitive custom, prior to the pure oblation advocated by Seneca and Christianism: actually, the ceremonial reciprocal gift resembles the models of charity defended by Kant, Levinas, and Ricœur. It has been described by anthropologists, Claude Levi-Strauss, Marcel Hénaff for instance, and shows the following features.

"Primitive" people wishing to make friends, and possibly conclude matrimonial exogamic links exchange gifts with the tribes they are visiting. A gift releases a counter-gift as a way of acknowledging the first offering and of confirming, in its acceptation, that the giver is admitted, accepted, since any gift works as a substitute for the giver. Thus, as an exchange between two parties, the reciprocal gift appears as the bearer of the social link. It is a matter of mutual recognition, whichever stimulation it comes from: friendliness, ethical, of religious rule (Matthew X, 8: "you received graciously, give graciously"). The reciprocal exchange of gifts turns the stranger into a member of the community[17]: the stranger being the one whose gift has not been accepted or the one who did not accept the counter-gift. This "rule" or custom of equality in giving appears in the so called "golden rule," praised by Kant, which goes: "don't treat the other in a way you would not like to be treated" or "do to the other what you would like them to do to you." (The golden rule was exposed as early as

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[16] M. Mauss, "Essai sur le don," in *Sociologie et anthropologie*, ed. by M. Mauss, C. Lévi-Strauss, Paris 1989.
[17] We consider here a gift reciprocal as far as it is accompanied by a "counter-gift", and take it for granted, without wondering with the anthropologist Marcel Mauss what kind of strength there is, in the first gift, that releases a counter-gift, and without claiming with M.R. Anspach that reciprocity always implies a surveying transcendence.

Matthew VII, 12: "Therefore, all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them".)

We have read in Levinas that "charity implies justice,"[18] which is a correlative of his former criticism of hyperbolic Christian charity. If I rightly understand him, this means that charity is governed by justice, that is equal weight of both parties. Thus, there should be no hierarchy between the giver (who might be considered as "superior", since he/she has enough to feed, clothe, etc. the indigent") and the receiver ("inferior" because he is in need of food, shelter, etc.). Charity is also a way of re-establishing equality of condition between both parties, it is a kind of (or a matter of) re-distribution. In a while, in a sort of temporal dissymmetry, the beneficiary will be in a position to give back what he received from the giver. Returning a gift, making a counter-gift helps the beneficiary out of his passivity and puts him on the same level as his benefactor, hence actualizing his integration.

For – if we practice what Ricœur calls "hermeneutics of application"[19] – let us consider what is happening in the streets on a daily basis… at least in Paris. If you practice the non-reciprocal gift, it means that you distribute your alms to the beggars, and go. Far from being generous, you just indulge in the common incapacity of coping with the distress of someone. Of course, sometimes you'll exchange a few words with the "poor," but never or seldom make friends with them. You won't take them up in your flat for a bath, or hire them for a "little job," cleaning your flat or washing your car… Giving alms is a way of getting rid of the indigent – and of the guilt we feel facing them. Our behavior communicates, "take your money and leave me in peace." The non-reciprocal gift, though not destroying the social link, does not contribute to the integration of the poor, the stranger, the migrant, in our community. The potlatch, described by Mauss, has the same result, but in a reverse way: by giving back more than I received, I show you my desire not to be dependent on you; if I give you back more than I received, then you owe me. In both cases benefactor and beneficiary remain in distinct, if not opposed, communities.

The reciprocal gift, on the other hand, implies what Ricœur would call a *parcours de la reconnaissance*, "schedule of recognition," which frees us from the dilemma egoism–altruism: the counter-gift puts the benefactor and the beneficiary on the same level, as justice would do… as it works in commercial exchange. It is no surprise then that for instance in Montesquieu, the topic of hospitality appears in the chapter

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[18] See above, E. Levinas, *Les imprévus de l'histoire*, p. 139.
[19] The kind of hermeneutics that Ricœur describes in his book *Parcours de la reconnaissance* in the following way: "Respect that considers the interpretation of the situations in which people are entitled to claim for their rights". P. Ricœur, op. cit., p. 310.

of commercial exchange. In a less pragmatic way – the way of philosophers, not of grocers – Ricœur regrets the modern loss of the golden rule of "reciprocity," that relies on three steps: giving, accepting, returning. Receiving (accepting), the second step, bears the interpersonal engagement required in the gift.

Senses and meaning of hospitality

Trying to describe the senses of hospitality, I mentioned related terms: charity, compassion, stranger, beggar, tramp, duties, exchange, pity, hospitality appearing as temporary, conditional and (possibly) reciprocal.

Marcel Hénaff wonders why nowadays thinking of the gift is up to date. His answer is that the failure of socialism in terms of democracy and justice, together with the triumph of market economies, leads us to think about what seems to have disappeared, namely, the will to share for the sake of humanity. As if we were left with a society of individualistic accountants.

Of course, no need to wonder about the reasons of our present interest for hospitality. It can't but be related to the flow of migrants and refugees from the Middle East, Asia, Africa… who seek shelter (or a better life, the immemorial cause of human migrations) in Europe nowadays because of wars or starvation and other reasons. The situation, the conditions of reception, differ from one country to another, first for geographical reasons. It is much more difficult to throw back people into the sea – where they will surely die – than to erect a wall or close a door. Hence, the special position of Greece and Italy, with their coasts appealing or convenient for the vessels of all kinds that leave Africa with their desperate passengers. One could say that all those people saved from drowning are still considered human beings and are helped out of human feelings of compassion, sheltered, fed and clothed out of "Christian charity," according to the duties of Misericordia as displayed on Caravaggio's painting.

Afterwards, however, it seems that international and national rules turn those human beings into what Hannah Arendt called "superfluous beings," or into "undesirable" as written in *Le monde diplomatique*.[20] The superfluous beings have no house, no soil, no country to stay in or on. Actually, that is their choice, since they left their home country and family voluntarily (often driven by difficult living conditions). They even destroy their identifying documents in order not to be sent back to where they come from. What are the "elected" countries to do with them? Beyond

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[20] M. Agier, "La fabrique des indésirables", *Le monde diplomatique*, Mai 2017.

or after the first rescue, the general answer seems to be the "logic of encampment": those destitute people are gathered on dedicated areas until a "solution" is found for them… This means that their fate responds to a decision that obeys laws, rules, and conveniences mostly indifferent to their wishes. This "model" was executed in Italian Lampedusa, the landing place of Africans who dreamt of Europe, and in French Calais, retaining people who wanted to reach England. The migrants were fed, sheltered, clothed according to the usual commandments of charity, but they were denied the human dignity of freedom, of free will, of freely travelling and settling. And shortly, as obvious in the logic of encampment, hospitality was/is also denied, since the migrants are/were kept away from the houses, from the homes even of their benefactors (they would come to the camp with food and blankets but did not – or only seldom did – invite the destitute families to their homes). Then, after the camp was destroyed, or after a period of rest in their first Mediterranean shelter, the inhabitants were dispatched to different cities or rendered to their own initiative, which often means continuing on their way through Italy towards France and possibly England.

This good-doing, this benevolence (of states, of individuals) – though helpful at a time – resembles very much the distribution of alms, full of a condescendence that clearly ignores the beneficiaries and forbids any reciprocity, as if the helper definitely held or stuck the helped (migrant, homeless) in their exceptional status, in their status of exclusion not only from the society but also from humanity. Benevolent and beneficiary do not stand on the same human level. The latter remains the destitute, inferior to the former, who enjoys the position of supporting him (or not), in a relationship of insuperable distance.

When France faced the problem of the Syrian refugees, I discussed the reciprocal gift with a friend. She reacted: "Do you want to be invited in Syria?" As if counter-gift meant giving back exactly what you received. Indeed, what is at stake in the reciprocal gift is the recognition of the beneficiary no more as a destitute or a beggar, a "superfluous" or "undesirable" creature, whose place is out of the city, but as a human being among others. On the reverse, the stranger, the foreigner, the refugee, the migrant, keeping their human dignity, instead of being categorized (and maintained) in an inferior position actualized in the passive attitude of the demanding, shows, by their offerings (in the primitive model), a will to exchange, not only in a commercial, material but also (and mainly) in a symbolic way. It is our common humanity that is expressed in the counter-gift, in reciprocity.

Obviously, miles away from home, penniless after they paid the smugglers who rushed them through the borders, the migrants are materially devoid of anything they could give us back. Their major way of giving-back is to get hired by our firms. And in the times of unemployment, people may feel threatened by this lower paid

working-force unless they undertake to contribute to the services done to them, such as maintaining their shelters, or learning the language of the host countries granted that they are allowed or encouraged to do so: hospitality thereby appearing as conditional.

With his usual accuracy, Paul Ricœur discloses the failures of reciprocity:

– Giving back what he received may maintain the beneficiary in a long and difficult position of indebtment.

– Or the giver may consider he is not repaid enough or too late. Reciprocity cannot always be symbolic. It requires material deeds and proof. It does not go without a certain paradox, since then, generosity, giving, obeys a rule, a constraint (giving back): therefore it ceases to be a free attitude, a behavior relying on the spontaneity of the heart, substantially described by Vassili Grossman in his book *Life and Destiny* in the character of the simple monk Ikonikov, who practices the daily "little goodness."

Consequently, Ricœur suggests forgetting the mystic of a transcendent third part that would command the counter-gift, as well as the relational rule (obligation) of giving-back. He recommends rather to consider the link as such between giver and receiver, the moment of the gesture, that includes both parts in a same world. "Between," inter-esse, being-with, means more to him that whatever is given, inasmuch as it demonstrates the reality of a shared existence. Mutuality appears as the simultaneous symmetry of an exchange between I and the other. Perhaps in a glance, in a word. Still wise, and anthropologically informed, Ricœur asks: Do we ever receive enough recognition? Is there a limit to our need for recognition?

Conclusion

I started with problems of language, equating the sense of hospitality with related notions of charity, compassion, sheltering, feeding… All these feelings and deeds are displayed on Caravaggio's painting… except for two: sight and language, looking and speaking. Isn't silence what distorts our hospitality, isn't language what lacks on both parts, this symbolic (but enacted) exchange, by which the initial stranger and guest would come nearer to each other, knowing or learning (as a first step of mutuality) the other's language. Rather than (or together with) giving, receiving, and returning, dialogue, speaking, listening and answering would warrant the reciprocal exchange, the social link… and first of all humanity on both parts.

Meaning something is like "running towards somebody" writes Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Grammar*: a brisk description of the schedule of recognition…

Meaning "hospitality" would be like listening to the stranger as a human being endowed with language and reason and not only distress, and answering not only to his material needs, but also to his spiritual abilities, and the reverse. Therefore the importance of language in hospitality, and the need for hermeneuticians…

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ABSTRACT

Reading Caravagio's painting of the Christian virtues, I focused on the duties of charity and hospitality as particularly relevant to the problematic of migration at stake in Europe nowadays. The question is: Do we have to welcome strangers, the homeless, unconditionally? The answer will come from the works of the philosopher Paul Ricoeur and the anthropologist Marcel Henaff, who both demonstrate that in order to preserve the social link, charity must rely upon reciprocity.

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The Equal and the Same[1]

Equal?

Cain kills his brother Abel. The reason for this murder is only hinted at in the few lines of Gen 4:1-8. Both Abel, the shepherd, and Cain, the farmer, sacrificed to God. While God looked upon Abel and his offering, he refused to look upon Cain. The reason for this is not directly mentioned, and first we only hear of Cain's reaction: he felt hot all over and lowered his gaze. God's response is, "If you act well, you may look up." Cain's acting was obviously not good in the eyes of God. In what did this act consist, what did it have to do with Abel, and what prompted his killing?

The short but central passage between the expulsion from paradise and the settling down of humans with their grounding of cities has a *horizontal* and a *vertical* structure: the horizontal relation between the pair of brothers and the vertical between them and God. The fourth element, besides Abel, Cain and God, is the sacrifice, which stands in the middle where the horizontal and vertical axes intersect. Both sacrifices are *not the same*, because each brother sacrifices for himself, and they are apparently *not equal*, because Abel's sacrifice is observed by God, and Cain's is not.

However, is the relationship that exists between Cain and Abel really sufficiently defined if one calls it a horizontal one? The horizontal is disturbed by the fact that Cain does not receive the same treatment from God as Abel. But if Cain expects to be treated in the same way as Abel, the suspicion arises that precisely therein lies his guilt: his intent is not directed at the sacrifice itself, but at his own interest in equal

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[1] This article was written at the Central European Institute of Philosophy in Prague (Faculty of Human Sciences of Charles University).

treatment. He does not have God in mind, but squints at his brother; he does not turn to the vertical, but keeps himself fixated in the horizontal. The fixation in the horizontal may satisfy a legally justifiable principle of equality – but does it form a sufficient basis for determining alterity? This leads to the question of whether the Other, for example as *alter ego*, can be located at all in relation to me.

Cain obviously wants to have the same success with his sacrificial act as it is given to Abel. But the conditions are not equal. Not only does the reference of humans, like Cain and Abel, to God not connect equal entities – because the man is not God – but this reference is also different for every single person, since none can be replaced by another in it. Moreover, Cain differs from Abel not only by his act of sacrifice, but by its abusive application: since he speculates on success with his sacrifice, the effect of the sacrifice is abolished and the reference to the high of the god is nullified. Cain turns the act that was supposed to confirm God in his unavailability into a competition with his brother. With this functionalization of the sacrifice, which objectifies Abel, Cain not only disturbs the vertical reference to God, but also establishes the relationship with his brother, whom he makes his rival, on a horizontal level. Precisely in the will to perform an act *equivalent* to the action of his brother, a principle of non-equally is revealed.

Cain thus maneuvers himself into a contradiction, which he himself does not see through and which consists in demanding the equal, but not being equal or doing the equal. If the sacrificial attitude of Abel and Cain is not equal and Cain nevertheless expects an equal treatment before God, then he not only deceives himself about that contradiction, but at the same time denies his own by orienting himself at the Other in an action, which only he can carry out, and moreover thereby accepts his own object interest. The guilt that Cain thus imposes on himself is action out of self-denial and selfishness – out of self-denial, insofar as the sacrificial attitude is measured against the Other and thereby the Other is also levelled; out of selfishness, insofar as the act of comparing is directed by the interest in the desired object. Self-denial and selfishness are thus only the reverse sides of the same: to forget oneself in an intention of action that degrades what it desires to an object.

From the egocentric will, anchored in the object, to forget oneself and thus not to have the Other in view as the unreachable results in a fixation on a purely horizontal level under exclusion of any possibility of a vertical reference. The lowering of the gaze is this turning away from the vertical and towards the merely horizontal. This fixation on the horizontal can be understood as the inability to experience the Other as Other. The otherness of the Other is guaranteed by the third, the reference to the Absolute. This is the principle of otherness and names an attainable unattainable: the Other is unattainable in his or her otherness, but attainable *as this*.

The justified demand for equality and equal treatment does not contradict this principle: that I and the Other are each absolutely different. Each one is absolutely herself or himself, since she or he cannot be replaced by another. Someone can be replaced or substituted only with regard to her or his social function. The social function, however, does not constitute the respective individual existence as an individual, which is determined solely by the fact that in each case it is *I* who *live*. If that demand for equality and equal treatment and the principle of otherness are respected, the vertical being to the other and to myself is intact. The danger of overdrawing lurks where the vertical finds admission in a horizontal alignment with the object reference and is extinguished therein.

Cain, by demanding equality with Abel, violated the principle of the absolute Other, and he has not seen the reason for the disregard of the principle in this alignment caused by him, but attributed it to God's preference of Abel. Cain's egocentric self-denial culminates in his taking Abel for the point of reference through which he is denied recognition of his own sacrificial act. Thus, the paradoxical situation arises that Cain orients himself to the commandment of absolute otherness and at the same time betrays it with his fixation on the object and his assimilation to the Other – a situation from which only the physical annihilation of Abel remains for him an option to free himself. Cain does not simply kill Abel since he feels ignored in his own act of sacrifice, but because he has imprisoned himself in Abel, i.e., in an image of him that he has created in an objectifying reference to the Other.

The only superficial contradiction between equality and equal treatment on the one hand and absolute alterity on the other hand is to be resolved in the fact that the former is owed to the latter, the absolutely irreplaceable individual. Cain exchanges this supposed contradiction with the one that holds itself within its self-forgetfulness in the indissoluble tension of self-dominance, the unconditional desire for equality and equal treatment, and self-surrender, the orientation towards the Other in the flight into the object. This leads to the question whether there is the possibility of a repeal of this exchange that not only does not culminate in the murder of the Other, but avoids placing oneself in a merely horizontal relationship to him or her.

In essence, it is a matter of specifying the all-too-understandable demand for equality by distinguishing – with a view to the *basic sameness* of our existence – what we inevitably are from what we all too willingly want to be, and of asking to what extent a reality of the Same stands in the way of the dream of equality and what possibilities emerge for dealing with this reality in the best possible way. The guiding idea is that only an analysis of the Same provides the necessary precondition for a clarification of dealing with the other person. In fulfilling this task in the following, we should not

be deterred by the risk of entering into the otherness of temporally and regionally widely divergent documents.

Recognition

1. In the first volume of his *Foundations of Rights* (*Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre*) of 1796,[2] J. G. Fichte questions the relationship between I and the Other from the point of view of law. Two key points are at stake: on the one hand, the I-subject must set itself in such a way that it "contains in itself the ultimate ground of something that is *in it*;" on the other hand, it equally sets the Other as the "being apart from itself".[3] Even if the last determination of efficacy lies in my action and if I thereby prove myself to be an "absolutely free being",[4] I am nevertheless also conditioned by the action of the Other. Insofar as I not only determine myself as a free individual in my sphere of action, but also accept the other individual as such, which is determined by his or her sphere of the possibility of action, I set both spheres at the same time.

Fichte explains this with a gradual step: the sphere of free choice exists at first only for me. But I set myself as a "reasonable and free being" only by the fact that I credit this also to the Other, also attribute reason and freedom to him, but connect this with the assumption that he respects my free choice in his choice, i.e. recognizes me. This recognition becomes "categorical" when I actually recognize the Other, through my actions, as a being of reason. When that happens, a "unification" takes place, in which the "point of unification" lies in me,[5] i.e., in each I of the participants in such "interaction".[6] To recognize each other, thus, means to treat each other as free beings, and therein rests the foundation of the theory of right for Fichte.

He thus points to a significant tension in the individual. On the one hand, the individual is "the being of reason determined by opposition to another rational being," and, as that point of unification, by an "exclusive expression of freedom".[7] In

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[2]   J.G. Fichte, *Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Prinzipien der Wissenschaftslehre*, Jena–Leipzig 1796; in English: *Foundations of Natural Right*, transl. by M. Baur, ed. by F. Neuhouser, Cambridge 2000 (below my translations).

[3]   J.G. Fichte, op. cit., p. 34.

[4]   Ibid., p. 35.

[5]   Ibid., p. 42.

[6]   Ibid., p. 38.

[7]   Ibid., p. 35.

this sense, every individual forms an absolute uniqueness; only he can behave and act in such and such a way. At the same time, the concept of the individual is an "*alternating concept*," and in this sense it is "never *mine*," since "*mine and his*" is "a communal concept".[8] Obviously, Fichte wants to satisfy two phenomena with this balancing act between singularity and sociality: on the one hand, the original mode of experience of the ego, which cannot really be skipped, and, on the other hand, the ideal of a social mode that avoids particularism preventing togetherness. Remarkably, Fichte does not even try to include a third realm in which I and Thou have already met and from which both only split up, obviously recognizing that such a realm would be a construct insofar as the original experience of the I-self is skipped then.

The decisive moment which connects the single individual with the Other here is the statement expressing that interaction that I set myself as a free being only if I ascribe this also to the Other with the precondition that he or she likewise recognizes me as such a being and takes into account my possibility to choose in the action with his or her choice. Consequently, there is not simply an interaction here, but one in which each and every participant is strengthened in his and her individuality, because with the acceptance of my freedom, my singularity is recognized. Indeed, reciprocity ultimately makes possible only the confirmation of my individuality – through the corresponding action of the Other toward me. Thus, Fichte can say that not only individuality but, with this and the original legal relationship thereby established, also self-consciousness results from the recognition actually accomplished by action.[9]

It has been emphasized that Fichte's concept of recognition is only horizontal. This is true insofar as the emphasis is on reciprocity and interaction. However, it must not be overlooked that the horizontal relationship presupposes and includes a vertical one insofar as first of all a behavior towards oneself forms the basis: that it is always 'I' who sets myself as a free being and understands the Other as such, to whom this freedom is likewise due. It is only the further step, of I setting both spheres, mine and the Other, at the same time, that establishes the horizontal reciprocity. This becomes even clearer where Fichte, with reference to the possibility of action, speaks of a "self-restraint"[10] that I must exercise on myself, taking into account the recognized freedom of the Other. Ultimately, however, the horizontal interaction dominates, since it is the "same concept"[11] of a free being that I set in myself and ascribe to the Other. This leads to the fact that the individual, despite the emphasis on

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[8]   Ibid., p. 43.
[9]   Cf. Ibid., p. 50.
[10]   Ibid., p. 37, 49.
[11]   Ibid., p. 37.

the expression of freedom that is unique to him or her, is embedded in a horizontal social scheme via that 'same concept.'

This scheme certainly knows a "higher point of view."[12] However, this exists only for me, and I am allowed to take it if the Other does not fulfil his immanent obligation of self-restraint. Since the non-observance of this restraint is at the same time a contradiction between his/her actual action and his or her participation in the 'same concept' of the free being of reason, in which s/he and I participate, I am allowed to refer to this "*law*" and to set myself up as "*judge*," as his or her "superior," however, with the invitation to him or her to restore the reciprocity and "to judge together with me at the same time."[13]

It remains open not only whether a legal relation is indeed to be founded on the principle of the equality of the free being of reason, but also whether it is sufficient to explain an ignoring of the demanded self-restraint with a violation of this principle. In contrast to this, it could be asked whether it is not rather necessary to uncover the obviously always existing tendency to such ignoring, i.e. not to ask the question how it can come to the consensual interaction of I and Thou, but rather why it mostly *does not* come to it. The answer could be, because I, out of an egocentric self-centeredness concealed to me, just tend to assimilate the Other and thus assume a comparison with the additional option that at best I myself am the higher one in this relation. A theory, which does not destruct this tendency, but builds on it, would thus itself still be a case of this tendency.

2. Fichte's definition of self-consciousness on the basis of horizontal interaction and the only rudimentary consideration of vertical genesis in the development of the subject is answered by Hegel in the chapter "Self-Sufficiency and Non-Self-Sufficiency of Self-Consciousness" (*Selbständigkeit und Unselbständigkeit des Selbstbewußtseins*) in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.[14] Here, as it is well known, Hegel is concerned with setting forth the formation of generality and objectivity with the movement from consciousness to reason that occurs *via* the genesis of self-consciousness. The general self-consciousness as the appearance of reason is one that has upconverted itself from its singleness and knows itself affirmed in the other self, and recognition is here to be made possible by this affirmative knowledge of oneself in the other self. To achieve

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12   Ibid., p. 46.
13   Ibid.
14   G.W.F. H e g e l, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, transl. by T. P i n k a r d, Cambridge 2018 [*Phänomenologie des Geistes*, 1807].

this goal, Hegel outlines in the *Phenomenology* and later in the *Encyclopedia*[15] a development in which two levels are intertwined, namely, the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness in a single subject and the relation of one subject to another: in order for general self-consciousness to be realized and, with it, mutual recognition to become possible, a change must take place in the verticality of the one subject. The path from the self-consciousness, which is still bound at the stage of consciousness, to the self-consciousness, which has realized itself in its general being-for-itself, is for Hegel one that runs between the non-self-sufficiency and the self-sufficiency, or the "servant" and the "master." On the level of the interpersonal, this process acquires social relevance.

Hegel analyzes this process in three steps. Self-consciousness in its natural mode, bound to consciousness, could seize the opportunity to free itself from its embrace by consciousness; in doing so, however, it would only realize a being-for-itself in which the self is still external to itself as an object. On the other hand, from another point of view, it acquires a self-sufficient being-for-itself, but only by means of the non-self-sufficiency that becomes serviceable to it in relation to things of acquisition. Only in a further respect can it be shown how non-self-sufficiency cancels itself out into self-sufficiency and thereby enables the formation of a general being-for-itself.

Since self-consciousness acts in the performing process of consciousness, it is outside itself. Consciousness relates to objects that are desired by it and thus have no duration. This being related to things, acquired with an externalization of itself, is what Hegel calls "life"[16] or "natural existence."[17] The self-consciousness concealed from itself is here only a "simple" or "abstract" being-for-itself. As consciousness, it is *immediate* and as such a *singular* and *desire*: a singular insofar as it is only so *for itself* that it merely functions as the real that it is, and desire insofar as it is *in itself* only in the desired object. This reference to the object brings about the first negation of consciousness, since desire posits its object as one that is consumed. Desire is therefore "destructive" and "selfish."[18]

Inasmuch the subject in the mode of consciousness is itself the Other as the thing it desires – so that the Other (first and foremost *it*, then also *he* and *she*) appears only in the manner of its desire through it – the Other is double-sensed: my Other is

[15]   I d e m, *Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*, 3 ed., Heidelberg 1830 [1 ed. in 1817]; in English: *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline*, transl. by K. B r i n k m a n n, D.O. D a h l s t r o m, Cambridge 2010 (below my translations).

[16]   I d e m, *Phenomenology…*, p. 110.

[17]   Ibid., p. 115.

[18]   Cf. G.W.F. H e g e l, *Encyklopädie…*, §§426-428.

not the Other as such, as little as mine is really mine, or, as it is said in the *Encyclopae-dia*, here the object is set just as subjectively since the subject externalizes itself in the object.[19] The task in the formation of self-consciousness consequently culminates in a double-sense abolition of this double otherness: namely, in abolishing the Other in order to become certain of myself, and at the same time in abolishing myself, since what had hitherto been considered the Other was only myself. The retreat that self-consciousness has to undertake is thus a "double-edge sense of a return *into itself*."[20] This movement is both an action against oneself and against the Other, and it is an action that not only the One but also the other person has to perform.

In describing this movement, Hegel considers the case that the "*natural* position of consciousness" could only be opposed by the "*natural* negation"[21] of not wanting to be the Other. Since I do not know myself as myself in the Other, I try to abolish both the immediacy of the Other for me and the immediacy in myself. Natural negation thus turns as "death" against the life of natural existence. With this negation, immediacy and singularity are indeed annulled, so that the abstract being-for-itself is transformed into a "*generality* and *identity* of self-consciousness", but I know myself only as an object that still remains outside me.[22] This negation consequently rises out of natural existence with the shortcoming that each one has thus only carried out this confrontation on oneself. The One and the Other "decompose" into "extremes" being for themselves, so that where before the Other was still mediated – albeit by my setting myself in conformity with it (or him/her) – now there is no mediation at all: "the middle collapses into a life-less unity" – both leave themselves free only "indifferently . . . like things."[23] As a mere abstract negation, this naturally negating withdrawal from thingness provides no basis for a general self-consciousness and a mutual recognition.

It is different when another point of view is added, i.e. when it is considered that not only life is negated, but that a "life and death struggle" occurs.[24] Initially, this struggle takes place between "two opposed shapes of consciousness":[25] a sufficient one, the self-consciousness of 'the master' – which is indeed for itself, but in such a way that it is dependent on an Other for its enjoyment of the things it desires – and the consciousness providing these things, which is thereby a non-sufficient one, 'the

19 Ibid., §427.
20 I d e m, *Phenomenology…*, p. 109.
21 Ibid., p. 112.
22 I d e m, *Encyklopädie…*, §429.
23 I d e m, *Phenomenology…*, p. 112.
24 Ibid., p. 111; I d e m, *Encyklopädie…*, §432.
25 I d e m, *Phenomenology…*, p. 112.

servant.' The struggle for 'life and death' is the struggle of self-consciousness to free itself from dependence on the consciousness chained to the momentary consumption of things.

With the servant's preference for life, and thus his choice of non-self-sufficiency, the struggle ends as a one-sided negation or one-sided recognition. The preference of life is a reaction to the disturbing experience of the "fear of death, the absolute master;" it causes consciousness to fear for the "whole being" and therefore chose life. This fear dissolves being at the mercy of things, so that a situation in which "all stable existence becomes absolutely fluid" is the result.[26] The fact that the servant in his affirmation of life maintains himself as a single self-consciousness giving up his being recognized and the master lets himself be recognized by the servant, opens up a common space of *mediation*. Since the master wants to maintain the means of his dominion, the servant, in his life, this relationship establishes a commonality of need in the concern for the master's satisfaction. In this way, the immediate consumption of things is replaced by an acquisition that is designed for the long term, and an intermediary is created in which the two extremes of self-sufficiency and non-self-sufficiency, of master and servant, join together; thus a generality is achieved, which, however, for the time being still refers unilaterally to the satisfaction of need.[27]

Only a final point of view makes visible a movement that establishes a general self-awareness.

The fear of existence had only opened the space of mediation; this center becomes real through the *labor* of the servant. By such working off the individual and self-will in the service of the master, the single being-for-itself is also abolished.[28] Only this opposes the whole of natural existence, including the natural, abstract negation, to "absolute negativity,"[29] which in the working turning to things detaches from being tied to natural existence. This abolition leads to a transformation of desire, which clings to things with the goal of satisfaction for the purpose of mere consumption. Labor is inhibition of desire; in the halted dwindling of consumption, it brings about a tightening of time and possesses a forming, a constructive potency[30] in the unfolding of the world. Fear of existence and laboring set into motion a radical release from the thing and make possible for the subject a being-for-itself that initially functioned only abstractly, then appeared as an object, and finally, with

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[26] Ibid., p. 115.

[27] I d e m, *Encyklopädie…*, §434.

[28] Ibid., §435.

[29] I d e m, *Phenomenology…*, p. 112.

[30] Cf. ibid. p. 116.

fear of existence, comes "*in its own self*" and is, by the process of forming, its "*own* being-for-itself."[31]

If one applies the master-servant relationship to the relation of I and Thou or the One and the human Other, the relationship between self-sufficiency and non-self-sufficiency shows up in the same way. The struggle for life and death, with which a general self-consciousness is to be realized, is to be understood in that double sense that it is a matter of doing something against oneself and against the Other, and this with regard to the One and the Other: the One turns against its inclusion in the Other and thus both against oneself and against the Other to which it has assimilated itself; and this is undertaken by the One and the Other respectively.

A general self-awareness only arises where the individuals no longer decompose into unconnected extremes, leaving only a lifeless middle between them, but rather each becomes "the mediating middle to the other." Each communicates to itself and to the Other as a being that exists for itself: "They *recognize* themselves as *mutually recognizing each other*."[32] At this stage, general self-consciousness is realized as *the affirmative knowledge* of oneself in the other self. Although absolute self-sufficiency belongs to each as a free singleness, the One does not differ from the Other because of the negation of his or her immediacy (singleness and desire): the difference of the individuals is in this identity "*a difference that is none*."[33]

Without overstretching Hegel's approach, one could perhaps go so far as to say: in that the Other is only my Other, he or she is in his or her non-self-sufficiency 'servant' in relation to me; I am (i.e. everybody is) indeed the 'master' as the one who makes an image of the Other and in general as the one who is performing the own existence, but with the restriction that I do not recognize this my mastery over him or her as such, since I take my product of the Other for the latter itself. Here, not only would a general self-consciousness and a mutual recognition not be realized, but there would be no chance of understanding the really Other and myself, either. If, however, the clasp of being lost in the desiring relation to the thing is loosened through existential fear and labor, I myself am freed to myself and the Other is redeemed from my domination. When the Other also makes this experience and releases me from the bond to him or her, there is not only a general self-consciousness in the sense of a We, but also a mutual recognition occurs: the Other confronts me with the factuality of his or her form of 'processing,' so that I realize that through this action, he or she acts in an *equal* way as I do.

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[31]   Ibid.

[32]   Ibid., p. 110.

[33]   I d e m, *Encyklopädie…*, §436f.

The remarkable step that Hegel makes is that he clarifies how a becoming self-sufficient grows out of the non-sufficient. This means that becoming oneself with the simultaneous aim of recognizing the Other must begin where it does not exist. This is for Hegel, on the one hand, the struggle for an escape from being at the mercy of the instantaneously desired and on the other hand, a basic appreciation of life in one with the creation of space and time, of *a worldly middle* as a concrete document of common interaction. Therewith a way is paved on which the self steps back from its self-forgetful being at the mercy of the Other and in the formation of such a world-middle a sphere unfolds to enter into unity with the Others who build on it in a movement that cannot be completed.[34]

By contrasting the handling of the real for the purpose of instantaneous satisfaction with the formation of social structures that maintain permanence, Hegel's concept of recognition also reveals the genesis of cultural world-forming and, to some extent, the possibility of the exchange of one world-form with other forms. The vertical movement in the respective self comes to the fore, but after all, just as in Fichte, flows into a horizontal scheme unifying the One and the Other under the auspices of reason. Thereby, it is presupposed that self-externalization is to be grasped as the result of the thing-consumption of desire committed to the moment and that its abolition is to be accomplished through labor as world-formation. However, it is questionable whether the being-for-oneself in the form of general self-consciousness arising from this abolishing is able to give a sufficient determination of one's own self as well as of the Other.

Abolition *via* upconverting through labor initially concerns a surface self and would in turn have to be questioned in its vertical depth structure. This questioning encounters the sense-genealogical stratification of any world formation, the reconstruction of which, both for the self and for the Other (also in reciprocity), would be an undertaking that could not reach an end; the fact that I am never able to sound out either myself or the Other not only does not prevent the possibility of constantly setting such a sounding out into motion anew, but motivates it in the first place. Such a sounding out, however, comes up against a limit that cannot be overcome, at which the self-performing life of the individual existence is not able to illuminate itself any further, insofar as grasping through meaning already presupposes a distancing from one's own life. *Life* can only be lived by a single subject itself, without being able to 'have' itself reflexively in this consummation of its life. Levinas, deviating from Hegel,

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[34]   The self-consciousness is "the infinite mediating middle," insofar as it "becomes *for itself*, unifies the universal essence and its isolated actuality, raises the latter to the former…" (G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology*…, p. 256).

calls this original permanent self-actualization 'enjoyment' (*jouissance*) – life always lives itself, without distance – and thus loosens the bond with which Hegel chains enjoyment to desire aiming at things.[35] This *Same* of life, which, being accomplished, always exists, is the lowest floor of the self and absolutely free of any alterity; it is unavailable not only to Others but, seemingly paradoxically, precisely in that I *am* it, also to me. It is *original egoism*.[36] Through it and with and in it, I am ab-solute, separated, pre- and extra-social, i.e. an *a-social in-dividual*.

Therefore, it is not generally desire that leads to an externalization of the self, but a fundamental egocentric trait of human existence, so that a being out of one-self that disguises myself and the Other could only be avoided by an at least partial containment of this egocentricity. While the original egoism of the Same cannot be overcome at all – in this case I would have indeed to put an end to my life – it mutates in the socialization of its bearers to egocentric forms. The egocentricity anchored in the egoism of the same expands to a finiteness of the reference to reality in one with a tendency to a hardening of my attitude in this reference. But if socialization cannot avoid at least a certain form of egoism – which is its own product – the usual simple contrasting of sociality and the individual also falls short.

Neither is the reference to the self obstructed by enjoyment, nor does externalization result from the fact that the subject desires *per se*, but because, in the social struggle for objects, it shoots itself at them out of egocentric interest. Only when life-egoism transforms into an egocentricity of positionality and perspectivity of existence, which terminates in the desired object, does it externalize, and when the egocentric self absolutizes its view of reality, its egocentricity grounds the style of its world-reference. World-forming, therefore, not only presupposes this original egoism,

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[35] Cf. E. Levinas, *Totalité et infini. Essai sur l'extériorité*, La Haye 1961, pp. 82-88, *Phaenomenologica*, vol. 8.

[36] For Levinas, this egoism of the bodily-corporeal separated subject is *l'égoïsme même de la vie* ["the very egoism of life"] (ibid., p. 84). In his study on Levinas and Heidegger, Marcin Rebes rightly points out that in Levinas's conception of alterity there is indeed an "asymmetrical relation" to the Other (M. Rebes, *Der Streit um die transzendentale Wahrheit. Heidegger und Levinas*, Nordhausen 2014, cf. p. 104, *Libri nigri*, vol. 33). This asymmetry extending from the originally Same to the completely Other is an indication for the verticality of I and Thou. Therefore, the original egoism of the Same, precisely because it is free of any alterity, forms the prerequisite for the encounter with the Other. In his study of the concept of love in Stein and Sartre, Marius Sitsch shows to what extent the original Same as original loneliness – "one-ness" (*Ein-samkeit*) – first creates the condition for the possibility of being able to enter into a relationship with the Other (M. Sitsch, *Liebe und Ein-samkeit. Komplementäre Gegebenheitsweisen des Anderen nach Edith Stein und Jean-Paul Sartre*, Nordhausen 2018, *Ad Fontes*, vol. 11).

but, moreover, results from egocentric inducement: the resistance that is presented to me by the real – from the inclemency of nature and social pressure to the absolutely resistant of impending death – leaves open to me only the possibility of taking refuge in the construction of a world that cannot initially be any other than the egocentrically *mine* and the egocentrically *common one* of that social group I belong to by birth, by habit, or on the basis of a decision. Characteristic of the egocentricity of this kind is that its sense content overdraws its account when I or a We already involuntarily tend to totalize my/our limited horizon of experience.

Thus, it is not labor, not even in the broad sense of world-building, which is able to abolish this egocentricity. The upconverting of a single being living in desire through social- and world-forming labor describes in fact the transformation of the original egoism into the egocentricity of a group, but with the parameter of the poles of the *single* and the *general*, itself an all too European heritage, it does not contribute to the determination of being to the Other. The essential difference does not run between the single or the individual on the one hand and the general on the other, but in the individual itself. The real alternative is therefore not singleness vs. generality, but absolutization of one's own separated existence vs. respecting the other separated existence. What becomes indirectly clear in Hegel, however, is that generality itself is to be spelled in the plural, because ultimately there is constant movement here: groupings of generalities come together and dissolve all over again; in any case they change and cannot therefore be fixed as social identities, for instance in the sense of Carl Schmitt's *nómoi*.

However, if that relation to the real which externalizes or more or less willingly absolutizes the own is not to be abolished by labor and not by actualization of a self-consciousness – and likewise not by an 'authentic' selfhood of whatever nature – it can only be dissolved by a modification of the egocentric desire, as far as it is possible to inhibit it in the first place. Such dissolution, too, is about *respect* – not the kind I have to expect from Others, but the way I have to give myself, both in relation to Others and to myself. As far as the access to one's own self is concerned, the *re-spicere* is a stepping back to be undertaken in a looking around oneself, a looking behind oneself vertically into the genesis of one's own world position, as a turning back to the structure of one's own positionality and perspectivity. With respect to the Other, recognition is not sufficient for a stabilization of the relationship between I and Thou. The *respicere* reveals here its further meaning of approaching, becoming concerned, taking into account up to caring for – always with the reservation that the Other is and remains unavailable. Her or his unavailability is comparable to mine for myself – and yet again not, insofar as I *am* my own unavailability, but that of the Others I can never be. In this sense, they always transcend me, so that they can in

principle not be enclosed in a horizontal relation to me and a generality to be formed can at best be a refuge, but not a movement that leaves me and the Others really free.

The Same

The Gilgamesh Epic, in its later Babylonian version from the middle of the second millennium B.C., bears the title *He Who Saw the Deep* (*ša naqba imuru*). One can understand the surviving text as opening up a vertical axis that reaches from the realms of the gods to the depths of the self – as a story that is about the opportunity of repeating the event of domestication. The repetition is made possible by the fact that with the protagonist, the prince Gilgamesh, who rules over the city of Uruk, an incision in the previous socialization takes place. In him, not only the worlds cross – so he is in two thirds god, in one third man – but also his name refers to the fact that his bearer sets a hiatus in the genealogical sequence: the meaning of the name can be rendered as "the old man is a young man," but also as "the ancestor was a hero" or "the descendant is a hero." These variants point to the fact that an accustomed order for a certain time gets into the limbo, but then continues – because the type of the 'hero' is supposed to still exist, so that in principle nothing has changed. Is this already an indication that the chance to repeat the domestication has been missed?[37]

This chance could be interpreted as the possibility of splitting up a fusion that had taken place. In the course of settling down, two basic modes of human existence were merged, which refer to two heterogeneous levels: on the one hand to the life in social standardization and on the basis of the norms set thereby, and on the other hand to the life which cannot be affected by any socialization: the life taking place in the depth of the self as that ab-solutely separated, in-dividual, a-social Same. Socialization causes that in the pursuit of interests, in the conflictive agreement in the struggle for things in the so communally forming world, this 'mute,' but always present, indeed the single existence supporting life is overformed, without ever being able to be extinguished. The individual 'awakens' in the social and receives from there the tablet of his or her knowledge of the world. And yet, the original egoism of the a-social life is always in function and announces itself especially in radical forms: as deviant, traitor, or late, and mainly in European cultures, as individual or 'individualist' of whatever color – and only this individual enters into opposition to the social. These forms therefore appear superficially, horizontally, as a deficiency of

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[37] For the textual basis, see the latest edition of the epic by A.R. G e o r g e, *The Babylonian Gilgamesh Epic: Introduction, Critical Edition and Cuneiform Texts*, vol. 1-2, London 2003.

the social structure and are mostly not recognized with regard to their source, which lies in their principle a-sociality.

The epic begins with a personalization of these two basic modes of human existence, the socialized subject and the subject not (yet) subdued to the social. Gilgamesh is portrayed as a ruler, a hero who has already accomplished great things, in particular, he has visibly consolidated the horizontal structure of his community by building a city wall surrounding it. At the same time he is said to pay homage to a despotic style of government, that is, he embodies the type of an individual radicalized in the context of the social. Here the caesura occurs: the gods intervene and create Enkidu, a being similar to humans but untouched by any socialization. In a dream (dreams play an important role in this epic) and its subsequent interpretation, Gilgamesh learns of the impending encounter with Enkidu.

With this caesura, the protagonist gets the chance to revise his socialized life. The figure of Enkidu, who has not been born and does not come from a generational sequence but is created from clay, can be understood as the Same, the depth of Gilgamesh's own existence: His appearance makes the opportunity to inhibit the misguided socialization demonstrated with the protagonist's person, which does not perceive the fact of in-individual a-social existence and therefore does not know how to deal with its excesses rampant in the social. However, this opportunity is in fact not seized, which enfolds in two steps.

The first step consists in the fact that despite his belligerent words, Enkidu does not appear as a strong adversary to Gilgamesh in this experiment, but is himself immediately subjected to a domestication process and introduced into the human world. Paradoxically, he is socialized in order to change Gilgamesh's deviant social behavior. The second step concerns the first meeting of the two, which happens in a very peculiar way, and precisely at this point several text lines are missing in the source texts known today. At first a relentless duel is described from which, as it seems, nobody emerges as the winner – but then Enkidu suddenly surrenders to Gilgamesh and gives up further resistance. One could say that already here the experiment has failed, and the following gives right to this view: with the reconciliation of both characters, Gilgamesh's mother declares Enkidu to be his brother, and thus introduces Enkidu into the generation sequence that carries the community.

The Gilgamesh epic reveals here its tragic twist: the opened chance for a reformation of domestication is destroyed, and worse, a restoration occurs. In the person of Gilgamesh, the remaining nine panels of the epic document this restoring of the equal related to Others. By showing how Gilgamesh continues to appear as the egocentric hero, they demonstrate how no renewed possibility arises here to loosen the clasp of horizontal world constitution. When Gilgamesh kills the sky bull on his

adventurous journeys undertaken together with Enkidu and praises himself for the deed, he challenges the wrath of the gods. They decide that one of the two, Gilgamesh or Enkidu, must die. The choice falls on Enkidu, and his death definitely seals off the access to the depth of the self. In his reaction to Enkidu's death, Gilgamesh laments the great loss, but otherwise celebrates himself by carrying out large-scale projects: he sacrifices to the gods in an overabundant manner, has a statue of Enkidu erected, and dams a river for his tomb. The intrinsically other is carried to the grave in the social rituality of burial.

Poured out into the surface of his socialized existence, Gilgamesh worries about the finitude of his life. The epic ends where it had begun: at the city wall of Uruk. The immortality Gilgamesh hoped for congeals into the finite endlessness of the horizontal circle, as represented by the circle of the girding of the city. This becomes not only a manifestation of Gilgamesh's power on earth, but also an expression of fear of existence and labor – if it is fear that prompts to fortify a place, and labor that creates the world encircled within. The circularity of the mythical narrative is a trap, which now, following an exclusive renewed contact – which (how could it be otherwise?) resulted in the repetition of the equal – has snapped shut, after it had already closed in on itself from the beginning.

Not the Equal

1. Is there no possibility at all to escape this trap and to break the circle of being-in-the-world? Here it is necessary to go a little further along the path on which the first answer was already given at the end of the second section. If Cain had exchanged the contradiction between equality and equal treatment on the one hand and absolute alterity on the other hand with the contrast of self-dominance (the unconditional desire for equality and equal treatment) and self-disclosure (the orientation towards the Other in the flight into the object), it would have to be asked once again whether there is a prospect of a re-exchange and thus of the formation of an attitude that does not only relate horizontally to the Other. At first, it does not seem as if this would be the case. As far as in that culture of the settling down of early farmers and cattle breeders Cain's self-giving to the horizontal in comparison with Abel results in Abel's murder, the chances are indeed poor that something should change for the settled man in this respect as long as settling down itself is horizontally grounded.

Nonetheless, already in the making equal there is also the unequal. Abel remains the completely Other: even if he is killed, his murder does not equalize him; and also Cain is in the depth of his self an incomparable, absolutely separated in-dividual.

The very fact of this original egoism forms the only real counter-moment to any attempt of equalization and totalization. But Cain murders nevertheless. By killing his brother, he not only eliminates a supposed competitor from the world, but thereby also touches the *principle* of the Other. Since this principle, however, does not lie on the horizontal level of the murderous deed, but rather permeates him as a vertical axis just as it culminates in the very Other, it cannot really be resolved.

The murder creates the basis for settling down and for the foundation of the city. It will not be Romulus first who – also this a fratricide – kills Remus, now with the clear motive that Remus committed the greatest conceivable sacrilege by jumping over the *pomerium*, the boundary ditch that encircles the new city. Already Gen 4:17 reports that after his deed, Cain became the builder of a city, which he named after his son Enoch.[38] Before that, however, he was banished from the face of the earth as punishment, from that ground from which his brother's blood cried out to God (Gen 4:10). This punishment thus consists of an uprooting that followed the short phase in which humans fell out of the status of being completely lifted up in paradise and had to earn their bread by the sweat of their brow, but in which they still possessed a last original bond with the earth. The curse of uprootedness implies a *restlessness* (Gen 4:12), so that settlement and the founding of cities and houses, i.e. anchoring in one place, are precisely modes of the opposite, of the unhoused. Only because human beings are not originally bound to the earth, they seek identification through a place, and even more: because one is identical only in the Same of one's self with regard to one's original egoism, one seeks and invents personal and social identities. Fear of existence, at least in the realm of the settled down, is evidently based in the unhoused tension between place-denial and place-taking.

Settling down as horizontal communalization is the process of an equalization. With the taking of place, the egocentricity radicalizing in the social receives a breadth, in the truest sense a stage in the light of the created world and its time-spatial structure. The horizontal breadth can also express itself in a horizontally occupied verticality such as the dynastic succession of generations, which is horizontal because it serves to consolidate claims to rule and power. Parallel to the naming of the city foundation in real space, Gen 4:18 indicates the temporal succession of the ruling dynasty: Cain's son Enoch had begotten Irad, and in further continuous line Mehujaël, Metuschaël, and Lamech were born.

However, social integration and its social coercion are only relative, and the constantly threatening possibility that an individual will drop out exists only because in

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[38]   In the second book of his *Antiquitates Judaicae*, Flavius Josephus mentions that Cain was the first to draw boundaries in the open terrain and build a wall-fortified city.

its depth its separated in-dividuality cannot be equalized in the end. In addition to the existential fear, a social body is always in a mode of unsecured because of the social loyalty of its members, which ultimately remains in uncertainty. The fear of existence and this insecure factor of the social structure, which is anchored in the in-dividual, drive the intensifying establishment of security systems in the construction of a settlement, beginning with the real, but also imaginary encircling and fortification of its terrain.

The episode of the Tower of Babel (Gen 11:1-9) can be described as an aitiological narrative: An explanation is sought *post festum* for the visible fact that there are migrations and that people spread out over the earth and that there are many different languages. In the beginning, everything was one, there was only the same language. Actually, according to this assumption, there would be no room for existential fear or insecurity, and yet the group that settled in the land of Shinar decided to build a city with a tower whose top would reach the sky, stating as the reason that they did not want to be scattered all over the earth. The city, with its radical solution of an extraordinary tower, was thus intended to save the people from the hereditary curse of Cain – who had been condemned with his entire lineage to restlessness – and thus, strangely enough, to break the fatal chain of homelessness and settlement by an extreme building endeavor.

For God, the erection of this building was an offense. He opposed the project on the grounds that nothing would now be out of reach for these people and so their plan should be stopped. In fact, the tower competes with God in that it was built not for the glory of him, but for the celebration of man – for the purpose of an arbitrary undoing of Cain's condemnation. The tower is vertical at first sight but, parallel to the dynastic genealogy applied to real space, in fact horizontal, since it is not dedicated to the heights of the wholly Other, but is a reflection of finite human will. Seen in this way, it could be said that this enterprise, in its extreme, sky-scraping form, which attempted to free the people from the chain of homelessness and settlement, is still subject to it as an ultimate solution variant. In its unconditional extension, the tower becomes the epitome of the violation of the principle of the absolute Other – and is at the same time an evidence of an increased egocentricity, which is able to achieve all that it sets before itself: a *pro-jectum*. The tower rising into the sky becomes a sign for the fullness of power on earth which goes so far as to build heaven into the earthly. This incorporation would not know any real difference any more and through an equalizing unification it leads the project of the all-embracing alignment *ad absurdum*.[39]

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[39] In his book *Turris Babel*, Athanasius Kircher demonstrates with a cosmological touch the impossibility that the Tower of Babel could have reached the moon. The aspired equal would tip the

The identitarian tendency to unification, however, fails because of the insurmountable fact of the respective absolutely separated, a-social existence. The *principle* of absolute otherness, which is founded in it, revolts against this attempt to unify with a practice of diversification, that is, with confusion of language. This confusion and the subsequent dispersion through social dissolution thus become the manifestation of the ignored otherness: where separation is not accepted as a primordial fact of human existence, it gets enforced. It reveals the project of an identity inherited or to be created in the context of social formation of meaning as self-deception and thus as one that is doomed to failure in principle.[40]

3. If the fact of a-social existence cannot really be dissolved into sociality, the question remains how to deal with this fact so that neither it is suppressed and covered with social levelling nor it radicalizes itself and disturbs social cohesion, whereby the latter mostly results from the former. My bare realizing of life as the absolutely own is the closest thing to me and, in relation to its catching up by the sense-forming consciousness, at the same time the first foreign thing for me. Since it cannot really be touched by consciousness, it marks an indestructible in each of us and is the reason why the Others are basically unavailable – inaccessible in a comparable way as my life living itself is for my consciousness. The Other stands vertically to me, because I meet myself (in the Same of my realizing life as in my self at all) vertically, too. Although I can relate to myself, I am not able to do this towards Others, which I am not. To reach them in empathy and re-living is something else than when I reflectively immerse myself in my self; I cannot fathom both, although the possibility exists that under certain circumstances I may understand traits in Others better than they would be able to do so themselves, and *vice versa*. But the difference remains unbridgeable and only I, no matter what or how I am, am myself and can never be an Other. This

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balance of the earth due to the sheer material weight of the tower (*Turris Babel, sive archontologia, qua primo priscorum post diluvium hominum vita, mores rerumque gestarum magnitudo, Secundo durris fabrica civitatumque extructio, confusio linguarum, & inde gentium transmigrationis, cum principalium inde enatorum idiomatum historia, multiplici eruditione describuntur & explicantur*, Amstelodami 1679).

[40] Only Abraham will be the one who makes a radical cut with an extreme sacrifice – the killing of his son. By being ready to give the most valuable offering, he risks the radical cut in any horizon reference by breaking off the lineage. Whereas in the case of Cain and Abel as well as in the case of the Tower of Babel, it is God himself who breaks into the events, here it is man who, albeit on God's instruction, carries out the rupture of his world of his own accord. It will be Jesus to radically express the rupture of the succession of generations, cf. Mt 12: 48-50: "Who is my mother and who are my brothers? . . . Behold, this is my mother, and these are my brethren! For whoever does the will of my Father in heaven, he is brother and sister and mother to me."

difference also marks a distinguishing point in the unavailable. The Others are not my depth, into which I could descend; they are and remain *the height*, which I will never be able to climb. They are ahead of me in life. Every horizontal, *inter*-subjective view ignores this fact.[41] Overlooked thereby is that there is not an original equality between you and me – and this is so because only this one equality exists that every existence as such is absolutely divorced from every other as such.

This non-equal regarding each single existence can be clarified in four steps. 1. The only equal that exists for all of us is the mere fact of difference, i.e. the self-identity of the Same, which is actually different for everyone – that *original egoism*, the fact that I am and that I live my life and that it is at the same time closed for my reflexive understanding: language and meaning cannot catch up with it and cannot grasp it one to one. 2. As a social being, which I am at the same time, I overplay this and am directed in a social association in the exercising my interests towards common objects. Here I am open towards the communally formed world, but in the respective mode of my selfish orientation towards material availability. My positionality and the resulting perspectivity of the orientation of interests describe a *rudimentary egocentricity* on the basis of the original egoism. 3. This egocentricity of the approach changes into a *radical egocentricity*, where the own position and perspective are set absolutely and the social reference moves from a selfish opening to a selfish closing. It is important to see that both forms of egocentrism are founded in that original egoism which I simply am. They are, so to speak, a wild growth that sprouts on the ground of socialization, where equalization mutates the original egoistic separation. 4. The counter-turn in the sense of *respicere* would be a radical withdrawal from the horizontal and thus the vertically directed release of the Other. The really radical work begins with myself: I try to dismantle the hypertrophic egocentricity and to get to know the first, rudimentary form – my being placed in the world – in a process that can have no end. In doing so, I do not simply recognize the Other, but recognize the difference of the Other. A balance between individual existences only takes place by respecting the non-equal, the in-dividuality of each one, just as a social balance only arises in the unbalanced, by recognizing and respecting the absolute difference of each individual. The goal is not the realization of an *equilibrium*, but the stabilization of the imbalance.

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[41]   In this respect, horizontal models of "horizon merging" (Gadamer) or of "fusion of horizons" (Taylor) also fall short of the mark (cf. H.-G. G a d a m e r, *Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*, Tübingen 1960, 1990 (6 ed.), p. 383 [in English: *Truth and Method*, transl. by J. W e i n s h e i m e r, D.G. M a r s h a l l, 2 ed., New York 2004]; Ch. T a y l o r, *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition: An Essay*, Princeton 1992).

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ABSTRACT

The only superficial contradiction between equality and equal treatment on the one hand and absolute alterity on the other hand is to be resolved in the fact that the former is owed to the latter, the absolutely irreplaceable individual. In essence, it is

a matter of specifying the all-too-understandable demand for equality by distinguish-ing – with a view to the *basic sameness* of our existence – what we inevitably are from what we all too willingly want to be, and of asking to what extent a reality of the Same stands in the way of the dream of equality and what possibilities emerge for dealing with this reality in the best possible way. Thus the guiding idea here is that only an analysis of the Same provides the necessary precondition for a clarification of dealing with the other person. In fulfilling this task, one should not be deterred by the risk of entering into the otherness of temporally and regionally of widely divergent documents, such as the biblical story of Cain and Abel, the Epic of Gilgamesh, and the debate about recognition in Fichte and Hegel.

KEYWORDS: the same, the equal, depth of the Oneself, height of the Other, steps of egocentricity

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Ich – Andere – Dritte

von personaler zu transkultureller Alterität

Einleitung: Ich?

Ich möchte hier in mehrfacher Weise – durchaus quer zu gewissen Regeln des wissenschaftlichen Diskurses – über Alterität schreiben: Ich rekonstruiere eine Bewegung in der Philosophie, die vom selbstbezüglichen Ich wegführt und mich ein Leben lang begleitet hat; ich beziehe mein Leben zwischen Kulturen ein, um die Wandlungen von Alterität als Erfahrung plausibel zu machen. Sie führt somit zu mir zurück; ich habe indes nicht eine Ich-Identität durchgehalten, sondern ich bin ein transkultureller Anderer geworden.

In meinem Leben haben Figuren der Alterität eine Hochzeit, ich habe etwa die Konjunktur der Lévinas-Rezeption erlebt. Einige liegen vor meinem Leben. In der Geschichte des Denkens des 20. Jh. hat sich in einer ersten Etappe – im ersten Jahrhundertdrittel – das Du an die erste Stelle gesetzt. Das dialogische Denken inthronisiert damit den Anderen. Nach den Konjunkturen des Anderen setzt eine Überbietung durch den Eintritt des Dritten ein. Auch der Dritte ist ein Anderer, freilich ein anderer Anderer. Nach Lévinas sollte er nicht aus einer *alter-ego*-Beziehung hervorgehen. In Sozialanthropologien der Tertiarität von Simmel bis heute erschließt sich der Dritte hingegen als gesellschaftsstiftende wie als störende Instanz. Der Dritte ist eine so unerlässliche wie irritierende Figur im Geschehen von Interaktion.

Für einen Kulturwechsler ist die Alterität eine Alltagserfahrung, verlegt in mein Selbst. Mein Leben ist eines als ein mehrfach Anderer. Ich bin in einem Dorf in Westdeutschland aufgewachsen. Dann bin ich in sehr jungen Jahren weggegangen.

Soll ich sagen geflüchtet? Oder ausgewandert? Um ein anderer, ein Renegat, ein Konvertit zu werden, angezogen von einer Kultur, die mir verlockend erschien? Ich habe fast vierzig Jahre in Frankreich gelebt und gearbeitet. Inzwischen lebe ich wieder im jetzt geeinten Deutschland. Ich bin ein Anderer für Franzosen geblieben. Ich bin ein Anderer für Deutsche geworden. Aber wer bin ich für mich selbst?

Lange habe ich mich auf zwei Länder und auf zwei Kulturen, die deutsche und die französische, bezogen. Dies in inneren Auseinandersetzungen und in Analysen während der beruflichen Tätigkeit als Vermittler deutscher und deutsch-französischer Realitäten an französischen Universitäten. Es hat lange gedauert, bis ich mich selbst nicht nur als ein Sich-Integrierender, sondern mich auch als Beobachter, als Akteur, als Mitspieler dabei bemerkt und entdeckt und schließlich als Dritter thematisiert habe.

Wer bin ich nach der Rückkehr? Verliere ich die Qualität des Dritten wieder? Die verschiedenen Kulturen haben sich jeweils verändert wie auch angeähnelt. Mit welcher bin ich stärker synchronisiert? Jetzt wieder stärker mit der deutschen? Hält sich in mir eine personale biographische Kohärenz jenseits von Kulturwechseln durch? Oder ist das Wechseln selbst meine Alterität? Bin ich überhaupt zurückgekehrt?

Im Gegensatz zu den Entthronungen des Ich durch den Marxismus – die Produktionsverhältnisse bestimmen Subjektivität – oder durch die Psychoanalyse – das Unbewusste beherrscht das Bewusstsein – oder durch den Strukturalismus – es spricht im Menschen – scheint die Verrückung auf Andere sogar Personalität steigern zu können. Als Unverfügbares kommt Alterität eine transzendierende Funktion zu. Auch in Theorien der Interaktion nimmt der oder die Dritte die Gestalt einer personalen Figur an. Meine deutsch-französische Praxis geht indessen in eine andere Richtung: zum poststrukturalistischen Denken, das anstelle des Paars Identität-Differenz auf gleitenden Verschiebungen von Bestimmungen von Sinn abhebt; zum Hereinnehmen von wandernden Dingen; zum Gewahrwerden eines fremden Selbst.

So bedeutet für mich, transkulturelle Erfahrungen zu machen, zugleich, das Gebot der personalen Identität auszuhebeln.

Du und Andere: Vom Ego über die Dyade zur Tertiarität

Der theoretische Weg vom Ersten, zum Zweiten, zum Dritten geht nicht nur voran. Er kehrt sich auch um: vor *ego* schiebt sich *alter*, vor *alter* rückt *tertius*. Der Weg ist nicht nur ein philosophischer und soziologischer, er ist vielmehr eine gesellschaftliche und kulturelle Bewegung im 20. und 21. Jh., die Deutsche und Franzosen verbindet – und begleitet auch meinen eigenen Weg, so wie ich diese Denkformen lebensweltlich

bezeuge. Für jemanden, der weg will, ist Alterität, die sich vor das Herkommen schiebt, verlockend.

Michael Theunissen hat in *Der Andere* (1965) eine solche vorgängige Anderheit ins Spiel gebracht. Er hat die dialogische Unmittelbarkeit als Vorrang des Du vor dem Ich mit einer Rekonstruktion von Diskussionen in der Zwischenkriegszeit beschrieben. Historisch vollzieht sich eine Gegenbewegung gegen den Neukantianismus und Hegelianismus. Franz Rosenzweig zufolge hat die philosophierende Vernunft am Ende zu begreifen, dass nachdem sie alles aufgenommen hat, der Mensch die Erfahrung macht: Ich bin noch da. Gegen die Philosophie des allgemeinen Subjekts bildet sich ein Denken der Kontingenz der Vernunft[1]. Die Widerfahrnisse des Menschen bestehen aus der dialogischen Erfahrung. Sie geschieht nicht in der Sphäre der Subjektivität, sondern im Dazwischen. Sie ist eine Begegnung. Auf die Vorstellung einer dialogischen Unmittelbarkeit zu verweisen, heißt nicht, an sinnliche Gewissheit zu appelieren. Sie fordert aber, ein logisch nicht zu vermitteltendes Geschehen anzunehmen. Zu den Vertretern des dialogischen Denkens gehören Buber, Ebner, Rosenstock-Huessy, Wittig. Buber verweist weder auf Orthodoxie, noch auf die Gewissheiten eines Glaubens. Er bekennt sich aber zur Heiligung des Alltäglichen. Beim Ich und Du ist das *und* entscheidend. Die Begegnung bildet eine Mitte, über das einzelne Ich und Du hinausgehend. Sie entzieht sich der intentionalen Kontrolle. Ist sie bei Buber auch eine Begegnung mit dem „ewigen Du", so legt sie Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy beginnend mit der frühesten Kindheit vor allem familial und gesellschaftlich an: „Das erste, was dem Kind widerfährt, ist das Angeredetwerden"[2]. Alterität ist hier horizontal, nämlich Verbundenheit mit mitlebenden Anderen. Die Struktur der Begegnung bleibt. Die Personen, die die Rolle des Anredenden spielen, wechseln.

Freilich ist die Hypostasierung des Du auch problematisch. Es währt nur einen Akt lang[3]. Du kann ich nur im Moment des Angesprochenseins sein. Wer und was bin ich in den anderen Momenten und Zeiten? Theunissen kritisiert Buber, sofern dieser die Ich-Du-Beziehung als immer wahre, unberührt von den gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen, behauptet: „Vor der transzendentalistischen Lehre von der Konstitution des fremden Subjekt in je meiner Subjektivität und vor der dialogistischen These über die Geburt des Ich aus dem Du wäre deshalb zu prüfen, inwieweit wir überhaupt noch das Ich eines Du zu sein vermögen"[4]. Das Personsein selbst ist fraglich.

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[1]   M. T h e u n i s s e n, *Der Andere*, Berlin–New York 1977, S. 249.

[2]   Zitiert nach: ibid., S. 379.

[3]   Ibid., S. 343.

[4]   Ibid., S. X.

Theunissen rekonstruiert genealogisch, er schreibt Philosophiegeschichte. Ich selbst war aus historischem Interesse mit den Denkern des Anderen im Dialogismus befasst. Sie gehören zu den Begründern des Personalismus. Im personalistischen Denken ist das sich seiner selbst gewisse Ich infrage gestellt. Der Kreatur-Kreis gehört zu seiner Genealogie. Über ihn habe ich im Zusammenhang der Dritten Wege gearbeitet, nachdem ich diese Wege zunächst zeitgenössisch erforscht, nämlich die Denkformen der Grünen rekonstruiert hatte. Ich war auf der Suche nach Bewegungen, die das Ich dezentrieren, ohne einer technokratischen Ökoherrschaft den Weg zu bereiten. Das Problemfeld der Alterität wurde mir wichtig, um Andere und Anderes, auch nicht-menschliche Wesen und Sachen einzubeziehen und doch personal in einer Art Treuhänderschaft zu vertreten.

Theunissen habe ich auch gelesen, um mehr über die Vorgeschichte Dritter Wege zu erfahren. Der Kreatur-Kreis mit Buber, Rosenzweig, Rang und Wittig, bei Theunissen in Fußnoten verborgen[5], versucht in der Weimarer Republik ein Religionsgespräch. Es ist ökumenisch, das heißt jüdisch-protestantisch-katholisch, dies aber nicht als Selbstbehauptung von Personen, die jeweils eine Religion repräsentieren, sondern ereignishaft. Mir war die umwälzende Wirkung der Begegnung konkret, plastisch und nachvollziehbar in der berühmten ökumenischen Szene zwischen Rang und Buber zu Pfingsten 1914 geworden: bei der friedensorientierten Gründung einer internationalen Gruppe durch den Forte-Kreis behauptet der ehemalige protestantische Pfarrer Christian Florens Rang, es seien zu viele Juden für das Projekt vorgesehen. Buber protestiert. Er hält dem entgegen, Juden kannten Jesus in besonderer Weise. Es ist nicht der Wortwechsel, der den Umschwung bringt. „Er (Rang, T.K.) stand auf, auch ich stand, wir sahen einander ins Herz der Augen. «Es ist versunken», sagte er, und wir gaben einander vor allen den Bruderkuss… leibhaft geschah das Faktische."[6] Hier tritt der Unterschied von Gegenseitigkeit durch bewusstseinsmässige („geistige") Anerkennung von Personen zu Gegenseitigkeit in leiblicher Begegnung zutage. Angesprochen hat mich das Religionsgespräch als aufgezeigte Möglichkeit, zu lernen und sich zu verändern, ohne zu konvertieren. Konvertitentum – dasjenige vom Judentum zum Christentum (oder umgekehrt), heute vielleicht: das zum Buddhismus – löst nichts. Für meine Lebenskonstellation heißt dies: diejenige zum Franzosentum auch nicht. In der Begegnung hingegen entsteht ein Feld, eine Öffnung und ein Kontakt zu beiden Positionen und eine Fähigkeit zu „switchen", den anderen stellzuvertreten, ohne diese Person zu sein.

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[5]   Ibid., S. 244, 334-345.

[6]   M. B u b e r, „Zwiesprache," in *Das dialogische Prinzip*, Heidelberg 1979, S. 145.

Bei Theunissen tauchen französische Philosophen nur sporadisch auf. Er erwähnt etwa parallele Fassungen des Du von Gabriel Marcel. Er stellt auch kurz Sartres Aufschlüsselung des Blicks und Lévinas' Denken vor – ohne deren Schritt zum Dritten zu erwähnen. Sartre zufolge konfrontiert der Blick des Anderen das Subjekt mit seiner Nicht-Identität mit sich selbst. Der Blick entfremdet mich, beschämt mich. Ich werde zum Ding. Sartres Fassung der Beschämung im Für-sich-sein ist doppelt: Schaut jemand durch ein Schlüsselloch, mag er eine peinliche Wahrheit aufdecken. Er selbst befinde sich indes ebenfalls in einer beschämenden Situation, derjenigen des Voyeurs. Erst im Mitsein taucht der oder die fremde Dritte als Macht auf, die den erblickten Blick erblickt, dieser dritte Blick wandert zum Ersten und Zweiten[7]. In seiner Geschichtsphilosophie macht Sartre den hinzukommenden fremden Dritten revolutionstheoretisch zur Instanz der Vernunft. In der fusionierende Gruppe ist die Herrschaft des einen über den anderen überwunden, sofern alle den erblickten Blick erblicken und Dritte werden. Alle werden Dritte und durchbrechen so ihre Ohnmacht[8].

Gegen Sartre habe ich eine regelrechte Aversion entwickelt, da er die Figur des Dritten pervertiert. Im Kapitel über die „mauvaise foi" in *L'Etre et le néant* spricht Sartre über frigide Frauen und Homosexuelle, die angeblich kein wahrhaftiges Verhältnis zu ihrer Lust gewinnen und dadurch beziehungsunfähig und – damit implizit – unfähig zum Drittsein werden[9].

Zwar ist man meist gut beraten, das persönliche Leben und das Werk nicht aufeinanderzubeziehen. Im Falle von Sartre und Simone de Beauvoir ist das jedoch unmöglich. Die beiden haben immer wieder – auch nach eigenem Eingeständnis[10] – ihre Partner-Loyalität missbraucht, um ihre Zweierbeziehung auf dem Rücken Dritter auszuleben. In politischer Hinsicht legitimiert Sartre mit der Figur des Dritten den Auftrag der revolutionären Gruppe, die dialektische Vernunft gewaltsam in der Geschichte durchzusetzen.

Nun tritt Tertiarität in Sartres Analyse des Blicks wie auch in Lévinas' Anrufen des Angesichts auf. Zugleich ist der Cartesianismus Sartres, das angeblich mögliche Losreissen des Subjekts vom Seienden, völlig unvereinbar mit Lévinas' Haften am und für den Anderen. Theunissen erwähnt Lévinas nur als Vermittler deutscher

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[7]   J.-P. S a r t r e, *Das Sein uund das Nichts*, Hamburg 1952, S. 338-361.

[8]   I d e m, *Kritik der dialektischen Vernunft*, Reinbek 1967, S. 126.

[9]   I d e m, *L'être et le néant*, Paris 1993, S. 90-91.

[10]   Sartre und Beauvoir im Gespräch mit Schwarzer 1973 über die Spielregeln ihrer Beziehung, *Emma*, 1. Januar 2008. „Beauvoir: Unsere Beziehung ging wirklich ein wenig auf Kosten dieser Dritten. Also ist diese Beziehung durchaus zu kritisieren, denn sie schloss ja manchmal ein, dass man sich den Leuten gegenüber nicht sehr korrekt benahm."

Philosophie für Sartre und als derjenige, dem Buber widerspricht: „mein Ich… verdanke ich dem Dusagen, nicht der Person, zu der ich Du sage".[11] Gegen das Bekenntnis Bubers „Beziehung ist Gegenseitigkeit"[12] setzt Lévinas Asymmetrie. Das Subjekt antwortet auf einen vorgängigen Anspruch. Bei Lévinas gibt es zwei Andere: den irreduziblen, nicht ersetzbaren Anderen, dessen Antlitz mir begegnet, er ist nackt, verletzlich[13], sterblich. Er ist der Nächste. Das Antlitz des Anderen zwingt mich zur Fürsorge. Die asymmetrische Intersubjektivität macht das Subjekt zur „Geisel des Anderen", so Lévinas[14], zum Zeugen. Zugleich ist das Subjekt den verschiedenen unendlichen Ansprüchen vieler Anderer ausgesetzt, die miteinander streiten. So gibt es den Anderen und andere Andere, das heisst es gibt Dritte. Die Ansprüche der anderen Anderen drängen nach Generalisierbarkeit. Sie zwingen mich, meine Beziehung zum ersten Nächsten, einem jeweils besonderen Anderen, einzuschränken. Aus der Vielzahl der Ansprüche ergibt sich das Problem der Gerechtigkeit. Aber die Ansprüche kollidieren miteinander. Sie können nicht – gleichsam hegelianisch – auf dem Wege allseitiger Anerkennung befriedigt werden. So ist die Frage nach Gerechtigkeit eine des Widerstreits. In diesen Ansprüchen treten dann der Staat, die Politik, die Arbeit, damit auch Sozialität auf. Der Dritte verkörpert Verletzlichkeit auf zweierlei Weise: leiblich im ungeschützten nackten Antlitz, und im Einstürmen der streitenden Ansprüche.

Von der Person zur persona

Im heutigen Abstand nehme ich wahr, dass mich Alteritätsphilosophien als Versprechen gereizt haben, durch Andere ein Anderer und anders zu werden. Es nahm die Form einer asymmetrischen Dynamik an, nämlich eine Anstrengung, Übertragungen von Konzepten in französische Konzepte mit grenzüberschreitenden Lebensentwürfen zu verbinden. Mit der Erforschung des Personalismus habe ich eine deutschfranzösische anti-utilitaristische Transversale erfasst. Die Denkform ist nicht getrennt in eine deutsche und französische. Das Angesprochensein – adsum, hier bin ich, der Mensch antwortet auf einen Anruf – erfasst in mehr oder weniger religiöser Diktion eine Dimension der Person jenseits von Selbstüberhebung des Ich und bürgerlicher Moral. Sie bewährt sich verantwortlich und engagiert für Werte in einen

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[11]   M. T h e u n i s s e n, op. cit., S. 274.
[12]   Ibid., S. 264.
[13]   P. D e l h o m, „Gastlichkeit und Verletzlichkeit," in *Das Fremde im Selbst – das Andere im Selben. Transformationen der Phänomenologie*, Hrsg. M. F l a t s c h e r, S. L o i d o l t, Würzburg 2010, S. 209-224.
[14]   E. L e v i n a s, *Jenseits des Seins oder anders als Sein geschieht*, Freiburg–München 1974, S. 50.

deutsch-französischen Kontext als Dritter. Als Emigrant in den 30er Jahren setzt der Scheler-Schüler und Mittler Paul Ludwig Landsberg Konzepte aus dem deutschen Erstkontext für sein Leben mit Anderen in Frankreich praktisch ein. Er ist derjenige Bote, der Konzepte für transkulturelle Übertragungen neu fügen kann und auch leiblich eine Verbindung schafft. Er setzt sich der historischen Situation aus. Sein Engagement gilt einer notwendig unvollkommenen Sache. Leiblich eine besondere Person, die schliesslich ihr Leben drangibt, bezeugt sie die von ihr vertretene Denkform[15]. Ob Landsberg, ob Lévinas, ob Sartre, sie alle gehören der non-konformistischen Generation an, die nicht mehr daran glaubt, dass Subjekte über die Anerkennung gegenseitiger Rechte erfolgreich in der Geschichte bestehen.

Mit dem Personalismus hatte ich eine Denkbewegung identifiziert, die deutsche und französische nonkonformistische Impulse verbindet und einem Lebensgang der Veränderung entspricht. Sie widerstrebt dem Zwang der Gegenseitigkeit, sofern weder Personen aus dem Herkunftskontext noch solche aus dem Zielkontext die Rolle des Übertragenden übernehmen. Niemand vertritt ihn. Unter weit weniger dramatischen Umständen wurden auch für mich die Ansprüche des Anderen diejenigen des Gastlandes, das zunehmend zu meinem Land wurde. Der geläufige Weg ist derjenige der Integration durch Assimilation. Ich tauchte immer weiter in die zweite Sprache ein und eignete mir die grösstenteils ungeschriebenen impliziten Regeln und Verhaltensnormen der französischen Kultur an.

Meine Aufnahme schien nun auch legitimiert durch einen doppelten Dienst. Ich bin geschickt worden und vertrete mein Herkunftsland; ich vermittle französischen Studenten Deutschlandkenntnisse. Mit der Arbeit am Personalismus kam etwas hinzu: Die personalistisch geprägten Dritten Wege in Frankreich bezeugen, wie aus deutschen Kontexten stammende Konzepte erfolgreich in den französischen Aufnahmekontext eingearbeitet werden. Ich beziehe den französischen Kontext ein. Ich eigne mir Kenntnisse des französischen Parteiensystems, sozialer Bewegungen, ideologischer Kämpfe insbesondere der Zwischenkriegszeit an. Ich hatte einen Kulturtransfer beschrieben: Diesem Ansatz zufolge entscheidet bei Übertragungen zwischen Kulturen – im Widerspruch zur Vorstellung eines Einflusses einer Kultur auf die andere – die zweite, also die andere Kultur[16]. Der Aufnahmekontext bestimmt, was durch – und ankommt, wie es bearbeitet wird, um angeeignet werden zu können. Mit Landsberg hatte ich freilich auch eine Möglichkeit eines aus Deutschland Ausgestossenen, also eines Dritten, herausgestellt, etwas zu überbringen und einzupflanzen,

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[15] Vgl. T. Keller, *Deutsch-Französische Dritte-Weg-Diskurse. Personalistische Debatten der Zwischenkriegszeit*, München 2001.

[16] M. Espagne, *Les transferts culturels franco-allemands*, Paris 1999.

auf neue Kontexte aufzupropfen. Ich verfolgte eine Spur, wie ein Einwanderer eine Sprache des Übergangs schmiedet, um im Bereich des Anderen mitspielen zu können.

Nun verbindet der hohe Ton den personalistischen Diskurs mit der Rede von Alterität als alltäglicher Transzendenz, ob gegenseitig (das ewige Du) oder asymmetrisch (das Antlitz) gefasst. Dieses vertikale Alteritätsdenken untergräbt die Annahme eines autonomen Subjekts, einer *ego*-Identität, und stärkt zugleich das Gebot personaler Identität. Bekannt ist die Abneigung von Lévinas gegen Ideologien des Bodens. Die erhöhte Stellung des Anderen bestimmt auch den Kontakt zwischen Kulturen. Der Fremde konfrontiert mich mit Alterität. Ich bin nun aber auch selbst alter: ich begegne dem Anderen als Zeugen für mein Fremdsein. Lévinas' Bestehen auf Asymmetrie trifft in einer eigenen Weise einen für mein Leben entscheidenden Punkt: Wenn der Einlass eines Fremden, eines Einwanderers von Assimilation (also Franzose werden als *alter-ego*-Identität) und Gegenseitigkeit abhängig wird, sind sein Willkommen und seine Rechte an eine Bedingung geknüpft, der er nicht genügen kann. An dieser Hürde habe ich mich gerieben, wenn mir Gleichberechtigung mit Franzosen verweigert wurde unter dem Hinweis, es fehle das Äquivalent für Franzosen in Deutschland. Das Postulat der Gegenseitigkeit gerät in eine Falle der Binarität. Meine Tätigkeiten waren eben von Nicht-Gegenseitigkeit bestimmt. Sie wird in Drittfunktionen für Andere manifest, also auch in Rollen. Damit aber ist der Dritte nicht nur Person, sondern auch persona.

So wie die Hypostasierung des *ego* mir nicht eingeleuchtet hat, ist mir auch diejenige des *alter*, auch des *alter tertius*, immer fragwürdiger geworden. Das Denken von *ego* und alter nimmt immer noch eine binäre und vergleichende Perspektive ein. Es ist immer noch orientiert an Identität und Differenz. Das steile alter stellte sich gewissermassen vor meine widersprüchlichen Alltagserfahrungen. Was fehlt, ist die leidvolle und glückliche Erfahrung, durch Positionswechsel und die Übernahme verschiedener Rollen sein Ich loszuwerden. Auch das „und" zwischen *ego* und *alter* bleibt zu diffus, nebulös, um dieses Spielfeld zu beschreiben. Unabhängig von allseitiger Anerkennung sein, heißt, einen Ausweg aus Narzissmus zu finden, aus meinem und aus dem des Anderen.

Bei den Anstregungen, die steilen Fassungen von Alterität ins konkrete Leben zu drehen, hat mir Derridas Insistieren auf die unendlichen Verschiebungen des Sinns geholfen. Seine Vorstellung vom Propfen findet eine Konkretion in den De- und Rekontextualisierungen in transkulturellen Übertragungen. Ohne dem strukturalistischen Credo vom Tod des Menschen zu folgen, bin ich immer wieder auf Derridas Rekonstruktionen von Nicht-Identität gestossen – wenngleich mir seine ewigen Verweise, Präsenzerfahrung sei nicht möglich, zunehmend auf die Nerven gegangen sind. Nun finden Begegnungen immer auch zwischen Personen aus konkreten

unterschiedlichen Kulturen und zwischen schon Daseienden und Hinzukommenden statt. Ich machte die Entdeckung, dass ich mich selbst als Mittler, als Dritter, als Rollenspieler herausgenommen habe. Meine Analysen waren ohne Selbstgefühl und Mitgefühl mit mir. Nun spüre ich mich im transkulturellen Leben zunächst vor allem als Dritter, als Stellvertreter für Andere. Meine Verletzlichkeit wie meine Spielfreude benötigen eine Einbeziehung konkreter Leiblichkeit im Kulturkontakt. Diese Drittfunktionen sind freilich widersprüchlich.

Der Dritte: Vom Interaktionismus zur transkulturellen Vermittlung

Dialogisch-personalistische Philosophie und Sozialtheorie konvergieren darin, dem *ego* Selbstreferenz abzusprechen und es insofern zu entmachten. Der Andere ist nicht von mir konstituiert, sondern ich begegne ihm, so dass er an meiner Genese wirkt. Im Interaktionismus ist dies formalisiert: Es gibt ohne alter kein *ego*. Jedes *ego* bildet sich im „Umgang mit bedeutenden Anderen" (Mead). Erst der oder die Dritte aber verhindert, dass der oder die Andere ein alter *ego* ist. Übertragen auf transkulturelle Verhältnisse heißt, dies, dass der Dritte nicht nur Kulturen verbindet, sondern sie auch trennt, so dass sie unterscheidbar sind. Er hat die Macht des Entzweiers. Der Dritte lässt sich nicht auf Gegenseitigkeit mit dem einen oder dem anderen festlegen. Er entzieht sich in Rollen.

Die Figur des Dritten begegnet konventionell und infrakulturell immer schon, etwa als Dreifaltigkeit, sie stiftet Einheit zwischen zweien, ohne sie zu verschmelzen. Dieser steile Dritte taucht nicht zuletzt auch in transkulturellem Kontext auf: er ist der Vermittler. Wie das Du oder das Antlitz ist auch dieser Dritte ein alter mit Tendenz zur Überhöhung. Er beerbt Figuren der Theologie, der Mittler legt nicht nur ein Mittel für zwei ein (eine Mitgabe), er steht auch in der Mitte zwischen Erde und Himmel und verbindet beide. Die transkulturelle Beziehung dreht die vertikale Beziehung in eine horizontale. Der Vermittler bringt nicht nur Mittel, das heißt Medien der Übertragung von Informationen bei, er steht auch zwischen Kulturen, in der Mitte, er schafft Abstand zu beiden, er verbindet beide. Der transzendierenden Funktion des Mittlers entspricht die immanente Entschärfung von kulturellen Konflikten durch den Vermittler. Er ähnelt hierin dem Mediator, der im Unterschied zum Schiedsrichter neutral bleibt, keine Entscheidung für den einen oder anderen trifft. Nicht nur darf alter nicht alter *ego* werden, beide müssen unterscheidbar vom Dritten bleiben.

In meiner deutsch-französischen Erfahrungswelt ist nun – quer zum Idealbild vom (Ver)Mittler – die zwiespältige, widersprüchliche Anlage der transkulturellen Handlungen auffällig und konstitutiv. Der hochgestimmte versöhnende Aspekt von

Vermittlung – der Vermittler bringt Mittel bei, um Kulturen in Kontakt zu bringen, er übernimmt übertragende Funktionen wie die Übersetzung und vermindert den Abstand, womöglich die Feindseligkeit der Kulturen – beruht auf denselben Fähigkeiten, die Vermittlung herabstimmen: der Mittler horcht den Anderen aus, erobert und unterwirft ihn. Der vertraute Feind ist leichter zu besiegen. Vermitteln vermittelt auch Macht, für sich und für andere. Zudem ist die angeblich durch Vermittlungsleistungen wachsende Kenntnis der anderen Kultur häufig ein blosses Bedienen von fixen Stereotypen, die von den Vermittlern in die Welt gesetzt und gepflegt werden.

Um diesen Mittler-Dritten auch ganz profan in seiner Komplexität zu erfassen, ist Simmels Fassung von triadischer Intersubjektivität noch immer sehr erhellend. Simmel arbeitet einende wie irritierende Element heraus. Er begreift den Dritten als Mittel der Vergesellschaftung in genereller Form wie auch in spezifischen Funktionen. Der Dritte wiederholt eine Regel zwischen *ego* und *alter ego*: sie wird sozial, eine Verhaltensnorm: so gehört es sich. Er ist gleichwohl nicht auf diese Funktion reduzierbar. Für ein jedes Element gilt: Ein jedes Element der Trias wirkt als Zwischeninstanz zwischen den beiden anderen, es verbindet und trennt. Nur der Dritte aber verfügt über eine Doppelbeziehung. Ein jedes Element unterhält zwei Modi der Beziehungen: eine unmittelbare (A zu B, A zu C, B zu C), und eine mittelbare, die A und B durch ein gemeinsames Verhältnis zu C bilden (oder A und C zu B oder B und C zu A).

Simmel beschreibt zugleich eine Vielzahl von spezifischen Dritten: den vermittelnden Dritten, der wie der Schiedsrichter stabilisiert; den lachenden Dritten (tertius gaudens), der Vorteil aus dem Zwist zwischen zweien zieht; den herrschenden Dritten, der einen auf seine Seite zieht (*divide et impera*). Gesellschaftsbildung findet sowohl aufgrund der unspezifischen generalisierenden wie der spezifischen Eigenschaften des Dritten statt.

Für eine Theorie transkultureller Alterität ist insbesondere der von Simmel beschriebene Fremde aufschlussreich. Er ist zunächst nicht zugehörig. Er stößt auf eine vor ihm existierende Gemeinschaft. Erst durch ihn wird deutlich, dass der erste und der zweite nicht für einander fremd sind. Seine Position ist zwiespältig: sofern er nicht-zugehörig ist, kann er für die beiden Anderen vermitteln. Im Gegensatz zu dieser Chance können ihn aber auch der erste und zweite ausschließen.

Eine dritte Möglichkeit ist die Gelegenheit des Wechsels der Loyalitäten. Diese ist durch die Theorien des mimetischen Begehrens nach René Girard und des Parasiten nach Michel Serres in den Blick gekommen. Beim mimetischen Begehren kippt es zweimal. Jemand begehrt das, was ein ein anderer begehrt, der damit zum Rivalen wird. Die Nachahmung erzeugt Gewalt. Die Zunahme des Konflikts erreicht ihren Höhepunkt und wird dann unterbrochen, wenn die Situation umschlägt und *ego* und

alter sich verbünden, um einen Dritten auszuschließen. Der Ausgeschlossene wird Sündenbock. Als heiliges Opfer kann er dann wieder eine Ordnung neu begründen.

Die Möglichkeit des Loyalitätwechsels ist wohl am besten von Michel Serres Studie über den Parasiten[17] erfasst. Der Parasit ist derjenige, der vom Wirt abzweigt, der sich dazwischen stellt, die Identität von A und B verhindert. Auch der Parasit ist eine Kippfigur. Mit dieser Figur lässt sich beschreiben, wie der Informant zum Spion, der Versöhnende zum Konflikterzeuger wird. Dieses *tertium datur* erlaubt es, sowohl die intime und doppelte Bindung zu zweien in der Figur des Verräters[18] zu beschreiben wie auch die Auflösung jeglicher Zuschreibungen in der Figur des Tricksters[19].

Bezeichnenderweise tauchen sowohl bei Bernhard Waldenfels wie bei Sybille Krämer Botenfiguren wie Übersetzer, Therapeuten und Zeugen auf. Sie übernehmen stellvertetende Funktionen und können nicht nur über ihre Funktionen der Medialität, sondern auch als verkörperte Medien der Übertragung, nämlich als Mitte und Mittler begriffen werden[20]. Allerdings richten die Schmiede einer Theorie der Tertiarität nicht den Blick auf konkrete transkulturelle Situationen. Transkulturelle Akteure übernehmen ebenfalls die spezifischen Funktionen von Schiedsrichtern, lachenden Dritten, ausgeschlossenen Dritten und Boten, dies allerdings in einer besonderen Lokalisierung zwischen kulturellen Kontexten. Augenfällig wird dies im System der Medien: Korrespondenten schaffen Informationen von weit her, die sonst für den Ersten und den Zweiten unzugänglich blieben. Die Möglichkeit der Rotation besteht prinzipiell auch transkulturell: jeder kann prinzipiell eine Rolle wie den Ein – und Ausschliessenden einnehmen, jeder potentiell Sündenbock werden. Die Figuren wie der Übersetzer oder der Kulturvermittler sind indes nur bedingt tauschbar, sie sind nicht von jeder beliebigen Person auszufüllen, da sie bestimmte Fertigkeiten und auch ein bestimmtes, nämlich grenzüberschreitendes Leben voraussetzen. Neben der allgemeinen Möglichkeit der Beobachtung und Selbstbeobachtung kommen Dritte ins

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[17] M. S e r r e s, *Der Parasit*, Frankfurt am Main 1980.

[18] E. P o z z i, „Le paradigme du traître," in *De la trahison*, Hrsg. D. S c a r f o n e, Paris 1999, S. 1-33.

[19] K. R ö t t g e r s, „Transzendentaler Voyeurismus," in *Theorien des Dritten. Innovationen in Soziologie und Sozialphilosophie*, Hrsg. T. B e d o r f, J. F i s c h e r, G. Lindemann, München 2010, S. 33-72; E. S c h ü t t p e l z, „Der Trickster," in *Die Figur des Dritten. Ein kulturwissenschaftliches Paradigma*, Hrsg. E. E s s l i n g e r et al., Berlin 2010, S. 208-224.

[20] S. K r ä m e r, *Medium, Bote, Übertragung. Kleine Metaphysik der Medialität*, Frankfurt am Main 2008. Bernhard Waldenfels betont die stellvertretende Funktion der Dritten und gibt ebenfalls die Figuren des Übersetzers, des Therapeuten und des Zeugen an. B. W a l d e n f e l s, *Hyperphänomene. Modi hyperbolischer Erfahrung*, Frankfurt am Main 2012.

Spiel, die wie die Übersetzer oder Dozenten Kenntnisse beider Kontexte benötigen und sich schwer ersetzbar machen.

Der Dritte ist potentiell einer, der den ersten und zweiten und sich selbst beobachtet. In Kontrast zu der überhöhenden Rede vom Mittler erkennen wir transkulturelle Dritte in eher problematischen Rollen des Leidtragenden oder des Ausnutzenden: sie können Dritte sei, die von ihrer Herkunfts- und Zweitkultur ausgeschlossen sind, womöglich sogar von beiden als Sündenbock stigmatiert; sie können lachende Dritte sein, die Konflikte in ihrer Herkunfts- oder Zweitkultur ausnutzen. Die Position des Lauschers dient der transparenten Informationsbeschaffung für andere oder dem heimlichen Ausspionieren. Auch der Verräter profitiert davon, dass er an Geselligkeit teilhat. Er muss erst einmal ein Mittler sein, das Vertrauen derer haben, die er verrät; auch er ist ein *tertius gaudens*. Die beschriebenen Konstellationen sind im deutsch-französischen Verhältnis leicht aufzufinden. Etwa die Funktion von *divide et impera* im Spanien-Topos deutscher Denker von den Romantikern bis Curtius; erwähnt sei die Vorliebe August Wilhelm Schlegels für Calderón, um die französische Klassik und Aufklärung abzuwerten.

Zu der Selbstbeobachtung und Selbstreflexion innerhalb transkultureller Situationen gehört die Einsicht, dass der vermittelnden Position eine Kippfunktion inhärent ist. Ein exzellenter Kenner einer zweiten Kultur kann sie auch gut ausspionieren. Transkulturell wächst die Zwiespältigkeit noch, die besondere Situation an Schnittstellen erlaubt besondere Varianten des Kippens: der Zeuge wird Spion, der Verbündete wird Überläufer, der umworbene Bündnispartner wird Rivale, der misstrauisch Beäugte wird Fürsprecher… Die Rückseite der gelungenen Integration ist der Verrat. Die Loyalität, die fides kann wandern von der Zweit- in die Erstkultur. Die vertraute Alterität eines Korrespondenten schlägt um in eine klandestine.

Dies ist keine theoretische Möglichkeit, sondern alltägliche Praxis. Sie wird besonders virulent bei Systemwechseln. Friedrich Sieburg, einer der besten deutschen Frankreich-Kenner, Korrespondent der *Frankfurter Zeitung* in Paris und Verfasser von *Gott in Frankreich?* (1929), zieht 1940 mit der Wehrmacht erneut in Paris ein und arbeitet für die deutsche Besatzungsmacht. Nach 1945 veröffentlicht er im Feuilleton weiter als Frankreich-Spezialist. Er ist derselbe geblieben, sofern er immer für die deutsch-französische Verständigung gearbeitet hat – mit Loyalität zur deutschen Seite. Ein anderer ist er indes geworden, sofern er die Veränderung der Systeme mitgemacht hat. Entsprechende Lebensgeschichten habe ich auch bei Romanisten und Komparatisten ausgemacht[21].

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[21] „Vrais' et ,faux' médiateurs. La connaissance des lieux et ses équivoques," *Cahiers d'Etudes Germaniques* 60 (2011), coordonné par T. Keller, S. 345.

Auch ohne Systemwechsel, wie nach 1945, ist das Kippen oder das Gleiten von einer zur anderen Loyalität immer eine Möglichkeit. Mein Leben ist von Kulturwechsel ohne Systemwechsel geprägt. In meinem Alltag habe ich eine Fülle spezifisch transkultureller Funktionen übernommen. In einem Annäherungsprozess war ich Bote, Informant, Kundschafter, aber nicht Überläufer. Unter den Funktionen sind Dienste und Stellvertretungen. Ich habe Informationen in beide Richtungen, über deutsche Grün-Alternative wie über Dritte Wege in Frankreich geliefert, ich habe aus dem Französischen übersetzt. Ich bin Fürsprecher nicht nur für französische Welten, sondern auch für Leidtragende der deutsch-französischen Beziehungen geworden, für Emigranten und für geschorene Frauen, die deutsche Soldaten geliebt haben. Ich habe mich so auch als Dritter anderen Dritten zugewandt. So habe ich zweierlei Rollen ausgefüllt: die als Bote, der Eigenes mitbringt; die als jemand, der für andere eintritt.

Ich habe immer mehr Informationen über beide, deutsche und französische Kontexte, angeboten und miteinander verbunden. Habe ich dadurch Aufnahme gefunden? Habe ich dabei innerfranzösische Spannungen genutzt? In den Analysen des Fremden fehlt eine besondere Figur des Dritten: Bleibe ich den jeweils zweien der beteiligten Kulturen gegenüber übrig, können die zwei mich draussen lassen oder mich einschliessen in ihr Tun. Sicher ist, dass ich Dritte als Türöffner benötigt habe. Ich habe Informationen aus Frankreich für Deutsche, Informationen aus Deutschland für Franzosen verschafft; Franzosen haben mir auch gegen Widerstände von Franzosen eine Tür geöffnet, Deutsche gegen Widerstände von Deutschen. Sie haben sich ein Stück aus ihrer Kultur gelöst. So treffen zwei Dritte – ich und der Türöffner – aufeinander und verbinden sich. Das was ich als Dritter kann, ist nur ein Teil des Geschehens. Ich brauche diesen anderen Dritten, den Türöffner. Meine Drittposition und diejenige meines Türöffners verschränken sich. Indes gilt auch hier die Kippfigur: stellt sich der Aufgenommene als allein seiner Herkunftskultur gegenüber loyal heraus, spioniert er womöglich oder nutzt er eine Machtposition aus, ist nicht nur der Übertragende unglaubwürdig, auch der Türöffner gerät in den Ruch des Kollaborateurs. Der Türöffner kann den transkulturellen Dritten auch einlassen, um sich Verstärkung für Auseinandersetzung in der eigenen Kultur zu holen. Er kann dabei sogar Texte de- und rekontextualisieren, deren Verfasser diskreditiert sind[22]. Die

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[22] Bourdieu sieht in transkulturellen De- und Rekontextualisierungen von Jünger und Heidegger in französischen Texten eine Verfälschung des Erstkontextes, die deren politische Verirrungen verbirgt, und nicht die Möglichkeit produktiver Sinnverschiebungen. Vgl. P. B o u r d i e u, „Les conditions sociales de la circulation des idées,“ in: *Romanistische Zeitschrift für Literaturgeschichte*, 14/1-2 (1990), S. 1-10, bes. 3-5.

Übertragung durch Dritte benötigt Vertrauen in die Wahrhaftigkeit der Absichten. Letztere benötigt die Garantie des Abstands. Mein Leben als Dritter gelingt nur mit Abstandhalten, nur mit einem dauernden Wegrücken, die die gänzliche Identifikation mit dem der einen oder der anderen Kultur vereitelt: das bin ich nicht!

So haben transkulturelle Dritte an einer Dynamik der Auflösung dyadischer Zwänge in beiden Kulturen teil. Sie erschaffen durch die Verbindung von A und B etwas Komplexeres mit einer Vervielfältigung von Dritten. Im Angesichts lähmender Konflikte wie auch satter Eintracht zwischen zweien lösen sie eine festgefahrene Situation auf, öffnen einen Raum. Sie dienen und sie profitieren auch. Die transkulturelle Übertragung bildet offenbar ein Feld, eine besondere Sphäre.

Medialität von Drei plus: weitere Figuren und das Feld

Das ständige Rücken und der andauernde Positionswechsel von *ego*, *alter* und *tertius* legen den Schluss nahe, dass Tertiarität personal wie auch sächlich vorkommt, ein Feld bildet. Das Dritte drängt sich auf. Kommt es zu den personalen Dreien hinzu? Was ist mit Verhältnissen jenseits der Drei? Gemeinhin wird ab dem Vierten eine abnehmende Relevanz festgestellt. Die Polymorphie, die typologische Fülle der Figuren ist nur dem Dritten eigen[23]. Indes existieren weitere regelhafte soziale und politische Interaktionen, die von grösseren Zahlenverhältnissen bestimmt sind.

Das sogenannte Cowling-Gesetz, nach dem gleichnamigen britischen Historiker benannt, erfasst über Drei hinausgehende Personenkonstellationen. Im Machtzentrum konkurrieren nur wenige entscheidende Politiker um die Macht. Wenn sie eine politische Haltung und Meinung teilen, muss sich einer von ihnen dagegen positionieren und auf eine entsprechende öffentliche Welle setzen, um seine Chance auf Macht zu nutzen. Dies gilt vor allem für Systeme, in denen die Macht von kleinen Eliten ausgeübt wird, die sich untereinander seit langem kennen, dieselben Institutionen durchlaufen haben, etwa Eton, Oxford, Cambridge in Grossbritannien, *khâgnes, Ecole normale supérieure* und ENA in Frankreich. Hier belauern sich einige wenige Menschen, die sich kennen.

Hier handelt es sich allerdings um eine zwanghafte Alterität eines aus dem Konsens Ausscherenden, die Nachahmung nur variiert. Sie ist eine mechanische

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[23]   „Der Vierte oder Fünfte bringen keine solche Figurenfülle wie der Andere oder der Dritte hervor" (J. F i s c h e r , „Tertiarität/Der Dritte. Soziologie als Schlüsseldisziplin," in *Theorien des Dritten, Innovationen in Soziologie und Sozialphilosophie*, Hrsg. T. B e d o r f , J. F i s c h e r , G. L i n d e m a n n , S. 131-160).

Kippfigur: wenn mehrere dasselbe tun, kann sich jemand nur behaupten, sich aus-
zeichnen, indem er das Gegenteil tut – wodurch er allerdings ebenfalls im Bann der
Anderen bleibt. Hier wäre zu überlegen, ab welcher Mindestzahl der Drang zur Ab-
weichung einsetzt.

So wie Dritte gesellschaftsbildend sind, stehen auch Vierte oft im Dienste einer
Systemkonsolidierung. Die vierte Größe muss im Spiel sein, „weil… sie die Wieder-
holung und Steigerung der dyadischen und triadischen Figurationen signalisiert und
damit zur Pluralität überleitet"[24]. In „Vergesst mir den Vierten nicht" stellt Reinhard
Brandt eine Fülle von 1, 2, 3 /4-Konstellationen vor : die Heiligen drei Könige und
der König der Könige Jesus; die dreifaltige Gottheit und die Kirche; die drei Stände
und der Souverän ; die drei Musketiere und d'Artagnan; die drei Gewalten Legislative,
Judikative, Exekutive und die Verfassung; die drei Gewalten und die öffentliche Mei-
nung[25]. Die vierte Instanz steht höher, ist aber häufig verborgen bzw. unthematisiert.
Die Beispiele Brandts unterscheiden nicht klar zwischen einer zusätzlichen vierten
Person wie d'Artagnan und nicht-personalen Vierten wie die öffentliche Meinung.
Auch finden in einigen Fällen im Vierten sehr unterschiedliche Wechsel der Kategorie
statt (etwa von Gottheiten zu Kirche oder von politischen Gewalten zu Verfassung).
Bei letzterem liegt offensichtlich eine Verschiebung auf eine andere apersonale Ebene
vor.

Nun können personale wie auch sächliche Aktanten Teile einer Triade sein und
auch zu dreien hinzukommen. Das Dritte kann zweierlei bezeichnen, einen Aktanten
und ein Feld. Die Theorie des Dritten verschiebt ihren Fokus, wenn sie sächliche
Dimensionen in den Blick nimmt, in dem die verbundenen Welten lokalisiert und
repräsentiert sind. Volker Schürmann verwendet deshalb die Formel 2 und 1 für
Dritte, die hinzukommen, und die Formel 3 und 1 für das mit dem Dritten eröffnete
Feld, hier dasjenige des Gesellschaftlichen, das zwei verkörpert und repräsentiert.[26]
Ihre Materialität macht ihre besondere Medialität aus. Schürmann führt die Hostie
als Beispiel für ein „Quasi-Objekt"[27] an, weist auch auf das Wasser, in dem die Fische
schwimmen, biegt dann aber das Feld in eine triadisch gewendete hegelsche Theorie
der Anerkennung von Personen zurück.

In Anbetracht von sächlich-menschlichen Mischwesen dürfte dem aufmerksamen
Leser nicht entgangen sein, dass die Begrifflichkeit hier in die Nähe der Rede der sog.

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[24]   J. Fischer, „Tertiarität/Der Dritte…," S. 147.
[25]   R. Brandt, „Vergesst den Vierten nicht! Kleine Strukturanalyse der europäischen Institutionen,"
       in *Theorien des Dritten…*, S. 117-127.
[26]   V. Schürmann, „Der/die oder das Dritte," S. 73–90.
[27]   Ibid., S. 80.

Quasi-Objekte und Hybriden gerät, wie sie von Michel Serres und Bruno Latour beschrieben worden sind. Solche Dinge sind Stellvertreter: der Ball vertritt den Spieler (ein Beispiel von Serres[28]), die Bodenschwelle (*gendarme couché* auf Französisch), die Fahrzeuge abbremst, den Polizisten (ein Beispiel von Latour[29]). Quasi-Objekte besitzen die Eigenschaft, die Aufträge und das Vorgehen menschlicher Lebewesen mit unbelebten Gegenständen zu verquicken und diese als stellvertretende Aktanten für Ereignisse und Handlungen einzusetzen, ja zu instituieren. Allgemein gesagt, ist ein Quasi-Objekt das materiale Medium für die Verschiebung einer Information auf einen anderen Körper, der den Platz hält, wenn der erste Kontext abwesend ist. Die übertragene Information bleibt repräsentiert. Damit ist ein Quasi-Objekt ein vollwertiger Mittler und im Wortsinne *lieu tenant*, Platzhalter.

Nun teilt das transkulturelle Medium Eigenschaften mit Quasi-Objekten. Anders als die personalen Akteure wie die Boten und Türöffner bzw. Türsteher, die hinzukommen, repräsentieren auch transkulturelle Quasi-Objekte wie ein Fussball beim Länderspiel material stellvertretend jemanden oder etwas (in diesem Fall verschiedene Nationen), der, die oder das abwesend sein kann. Zu den verstörendsten Erfahrungen mit Anderen gehört die Beobachtung, dass sich ständig Objekte an meine Stelle setzen, somit eine auch sächliche und mediale Alterität herrscht. Das Bewusstsein für anorganische Mitspieler haben insbesondere Serres, Latour und Descola ins Licht gehoben. Sie vertreten Menschen, können sich aber nicht selbst vertreten. Um sie einzubeziehen und ihre Rechte zu übermitteln, brauchen Dinge menschliche Stellvertreter. So wie die Dinge bereits Lieutenants von Menschen sind, brauchen diese Platzhalter wiederum menschliche Lieutenants. Dies gilt auch für transkultureller Verhältnisse. Bezogen auf eine transkulturelle Perspektive heisst dies, dass es nicht ausreicht, personale Mittler wahrzunehmen. Es gibt eine Fülle von Quasi-Objekten, die transkulturell sind. Ich habe Reliquien, die eine grenzüberschreitende Translation hinter sich haben, und Kunstschätze wie auch Gebrauchsgegenstände wie Möbel und Lampen, die ins andere Land verschoben wurden, beschrieben. Ein Beispiel sind die Lampen aus dem Ostberlinerr Palast der Republik, die sich heute im Pavillon Noir in Aix-en-Provence befinden. Solche Objekte werden von verschiedenen Menschengruppen berührbare Dinge. Menschen und Dinge bilden transkulturelle Felder. Bei Transport bieten sie doppelte Schnittstellen der De- und Rekontextualisierung an. Sie unterliegen mehrfacher Kontingenz. Wenn sie transkulturell eingesetzt werden,

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[28]   M. S e r r e s, *Der Parasit*, S. 347 ff.

[29]   B. L a t o u r, *Der Berliner Schlüssel. Erkundungen eines Liebhabers der Wissenschaften*, Berlin 1996, S. 62-83 (frz. *La clé de Berlin et autres leçons d'un amateur de sciences*, Paris 1993).

können sie ihre Funktionen im neuen Kontext zurückerhalten, reaktualisieren wie auch verändern.

Dem Dritten als Feld und *lieu tenant* bin ich vor allem bei den Studien über die Gabe begegnet. In der Praxis des Gabentausches tritt hervor, wie *ego* und *alter ego* im Geben, Empfangen und Wiedergeben miteinander verbunden werden. Die Gabe schafft zugleich eine andere soziale Praxis, sie belohnt Handeln, das nicht rein utilitaristisch ist. Es lässt sich nicht als alleinige Transaktion zwischen zweien begreifen. Ich habe sie als deutsch-französisches Feld ermittelt, im Sich drangeben, im Verzicht auf Reichtum, der geteilten psychischen Einstellung der Entbehrung („âpreté" und „aridité", das sind Rauheit und Kargheit) und Verzückung, dargestellt, wie die Vertreter der Dritten Wege es propagieren, als religiös-mystische Praxis der Hingabe der Personalisten oder pseudoreligiöse atheologische Entbehrung und Verausgabung im Collège de sociologie.

Formuliere ich diese Anthropologie transkulturell, werden leibliche und mediale Vollzüge auf eigene Weise wahrnehmbar. Mit Figuren wie dem Übersetzer greife ich nach Funktionen, die im Dienste stehen für Andere und ins Spionieren kippen können. Es sind Funktionen der persona, spezifische Rollenspiele. Zusätzlich zur Figur des Boten bringt der Begriff des Stellvertreters etwas Anderes ins Spiel: ich zeuge etwa für die geschorenen Frauen, an ihrer Stelle. Ich bin ihr Fürsprecher. Hinzu kommt etwas Ungewohntes: in ethologischer Perspektive bekomme ich eine besondere Weise in den Blick, wie physische und sensorielle Fähigkeiten der menschlichen Spezies sich in nicht-menschlichen Anderen verlängern – so eine Hinneigung zu ostdeutschen Welten repräsentiert in der Translation von Lampen.

Bezieht man Descolas Analyse, wonach das naturalistische Denken der Europäer frühere analogische Verknüpfungen überdeckt, ein, heißt dies, dass im Lichte transkultureller Prozesse sprachlose Verbindungen zwischen belebt und unbelebt sichtbar werden[30]. Dies gewinnt angesichts der Vielsprachigkeit, der Sprachbarrieren für Europäer eine besondere Dringlichkeit. Die Europäer verfügen nicht über eine gemeinsame Sprache. Es muss nicht-sprachliche Verfahren geben, um Übertragungen zu bewerkstelligen. Transitive Klassifikationen sind ganz besonders für das vielgestaltige und zerklüftete Europa unerlässlich. In einer fragmentierten Welt werden mit den Mitteln der Korrespondenz disparate Elemente versammelt und verbunden. Bei den transitiven Formen der transkulturellen Verbindung kommt weniger die vertikale Kette der Wesen, vom Wurm zu Gott, ins Spiel, sondern die horizontale. Sie beruht nicht auf der Sonderstellung des Menschen aufgrund seiner Innerlichkeit, seines reflexiven Bewusstseins, seiner Sprachfähigkeit. Denn hierin unterscheiden sich Europäer nicht

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[30]   P. D e s c o l a, *La composition des mondes. Entretiens avec Pierre Charbonnier*, Paris 2014.

(wohl aber in den Sprachen selbst). Indem beide, Deutsche und Franzosen, Dinge beseelen, um in Kontakt zu treten, schaffen sie eine gleitende Ordnung, in der jeweils organische und anorganische Wesen versammelt sind. Sie schaffen Klassifikationen nach analogen Eigenschaften, so dass Ordnungen im deutschen Kontext mit solchen im französischen Kontext korrespondieren. An die Stelle von stereotypen Analogien wie „Was dem Franzosen sein Rotwein ist dem Deutschen sein Bier" tritt eine Doppelfunktion: die wandernden Dinge, eine Reliquie, ein geraubtes Bild oder eine Lampe, wirken für den jeweils Anderen am französischen und am deutschen Ort. Diese Dinge gehen ein zweites Mal durch Hände und werden erneut eingesetzt, ausgestellt und gebraucht und bekommen dadurch jeweils Sinn.

Alterität als gespaltenes Lebewesen

Die Sphäre, die ein Drittes bildet, lediglich als gesellschaftsbildende Instanz zu fassen, schränkt die Perspektive unnötig ein. In philosophisch-anthropologischer Hinsicht gehört das bewusstseinsmässige Übergreifen auf das Ich und den Anderen zur menschlichen Ausstattung. Die leibliche Anwesenheit des Anderen und seine Anwesenheit mit mir stellen eine präreflexive Koexistenz dar. Die menschliche Sphäre ist dadurch charakterisiert, dass Innenwelt und Mitwelt sich verbinden. Das menschliche Lebewesen „vermag zum Anderen hinüberzugehen"[31]. Die Ausdrucksweise des Anderen erzeugt in mir eine Resonanz. Ich verandere mich. Fischer begreift dies als zwei sich überlappende exzentrische Positionalitäten, die ein gemeinsames Drittes, eine künstliche Mitte erzeugen[32]. In diesem Raum findet Vermittlung statt, in dem sich entscheidet, ob Konflikte vermieden werden oder koordiniert wird. Menschen können sich nicht zu zweit „aufheben". Mitschwingen hat eine Verkörperung in einer Sphäre, eines Dritten zur Voraussetzung. Ist nun Mitschwingen transkulturell angelegt, braucht es eine besondere Art und Weise von Verkörperung, die sich nicht einfach auf eine gemeinsame Sprache stützen kann.

    Zu der vertikalen Anlage von Alterität – der Andere als höhere transzendierende Instanz – wie auch zu einer rein personalen Verfasstheit von Alterität steht meine eigene Erfahrung als Zwischenglied zwischen Kulturen in vielerlei Hinsicht quer. Sie vollzieht sich auf einer horizontalen Ebene, die verschiedene Kontexte verknüpft. Dies veranlasste mich, mich immanent-physischen Vorgängen von Kontakten

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[31] J. F i s c h e r, „Der Dritte. Zur Anthropologie der Intersujektivität," in *Wir / ihr / sie. Identität und Alterität in Theorie und Methode*, Hrsg. W. E ß b a c h, Würzburg 2000, S. 103-136, S. 124.

[32] Ibid., S. 103-136.

zuzuwenden. Ich bin selbst lokalisiert, situiert in Berührung mit konkreten Schnittstellen. Als Körper des Dritten, der jeder Übertragung vorausgeht. Alterität konsequent transkulturell umsetzen heisst auch, sie intrapersonal zu erforschen.

Im Laufe meiner *biographie intellectuelle*, meines Forscherlebens, habe ich mich von der Person zur persona bewegt. Der Gegensatz von authentischem Ich und Rolle hat mir nicht mehr eingeleuchtet. Die Übernahme von Drittrollen bereitet auch schöne Erlebnisse. Darunter sind die Figuren, die sich zwischen verschiedenen Kulturen aufhalten, so der Bote, der Übersetzer, der Lauschende wie auch der Fürsprecher. Eine Leerstelle bildet indes die Person, die leiblich selbst alterität ist. Indes spüre ich Unbehagen am Konzept des Drittraums und der Hybridität. Zugespitzt gesagt: Ich bin weder physisch auffällig noch gescheckt. Ich lenke zwar die Aufmerksamkeit auf transkulturelle Medien, die zwischen belebt und unbelebt wechseln, ich werde aber beim Durchlaufen kultureller Schwellen nicht selbst hybrid[33], sondern ich de- und rekontextualisiere und spiegele nicht gegenseitig, sondern stellvertretend. Ich bin gleichwohl einer, nämlich meiner leiblichen Alterität ausgesetzt.

Die Analyse der leiblichen Dimension leidet unter der viseozentrischen Verengung der Alteritätsphilosophen: es ist ein grosser Unterschied, ob ich einem Blick ausgesetzt bin, der mich eventuell demütigt, oder ob ich einem Ohr ausgeliefert bin, das mein Anderssein wahrnimmt und mich beschämt. Damit thematisiere ich mich als Migrant, der mit Akzent spricht und in einer asymmetrischen Situation steckt. Ich habe in den letzten vier Jahrzehnten überwiegend Begegnungen erlebt, in denen ich mit Akzent gesprochen habe, mein Gegenüber dagegen nicht. Der Akzent ist leiblich, er teilt mit Körpergesten die Ausdrucksfunktion. Er ist eine der expressiven Masken, eine besondere transkulturelle persona. Wie der Dialekt oder der Soziolekt stellt der Akzent eine akustische Maske (Canetti) dar, die es erlaubt, mittels unverwechselbaren lautlichen Merkmalen den Sprecher zu identifizieren. Er gehorcht dem Indizienparadigma.

Die akzentbehaftete Stimme ist ein Drittes in mir und ausserhalb von mir und zwischen mir und Anderen. Die Stimme erzeugt ein anderes Drittes zwischen uns als es der Blick vermag. Die Lautgeste hat als Besonderheit, dass der ausgestossene Laut

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[33] Hierzu, allerdings ohne Bezug auf transkulturelle Kontextualisierung, O. Ette, U. Wirth (Hrsg.), *Nach der Hybridität. Zukünfte der Literaturtheorie*, Berlin 2014. In französischen Diskussionszusammenhängen wird Widerstand gegen Modelle von Hybridität, etwa Vorstellungen von der sogenannten Kreolisierung, laut, sofern sie nur neuaufgelegte Kulturalismen seien. So wendet sich besonders Jean-Loup Amselle gegen Vorstellungen, die gewissermaßen analog zu gekreuzten hybriden Pflanzen „gescheckte" Menschen oder Kulturen entwerfen. J.-L. Amselle, *Branchements, anthropologie de l'universalité des cultures*, Paris 2001.

an das Ohr des Anderen gelangt, dieser Laut aber zugleich auch mich selbst doppelt erreicht: in meinem eigenen Ohr und in meinem Leibinnerem höre ich meine Stimme. Freilich als entfremdete, wie jedes Abhören einer Tonbandaufnahme ans Gehör bringt. Erst aufgezeichnet durch ein Medium – vermittelt – kann ich meine Stimme hören, wie der Andere sie hört. Mit dem Akzent wird die entfremdende Wirkung noch einmal verdoppelt. Nicht nur ist meine eigene Stimme mir fremd, sie wirkt auf den anderen durch die veränderte Aussprache fremd und verhindert Symmetrie. Von Gegenseitigkeit kann keine Rede sein, wenn der eine mit, der andere ohne Akzent spricht. Obwohl die Beherrschung der Fremdsprache geradezu die Integration bezeugt, stellt sie der Akzent sofort wieder infrage. Er transportiert im phonetischen Aspekt des Signifikanten ein Überbleibsel aus der Erstsprache. Er macht den Signifikanten zum gespaltenem Zeichen, das auf zwei Kontexte verweist: das Signifikat auf die Aufnahmekultur, die Abweichung im Phonem auf die Erstkultur. Über den Laut bleibt der Sprecher metonymisch körperhaft mit seiner Herkunft verbunden. Der Akzent ist leiblich bedingt, denn die Beschaffenheit von Lippen, Stimmbändern, Stimmritze, Rachen, Thorax und Zwerchfell sorgt dafür, dass dem Sprecher eine Grenze gezogen ist, die die perfekte Aussprache vereitelt. Diese Alterität ist kaum hintergehbar. Der Andere, das ist derjenige ohne Akzent, übernimmt diese meine Rolle nicht. Es handelt sich nicht um einen verallgemeinernden Anderen, sondern um eine spezifische Anderheit, die starke Variationen der Beurteilung hervorruft. Akzente erfreuen sich unterschiedlicher Beliebtheit. Ein deutscher Akzent im Französischen dürfte nicht dieselbe Reaktion hervorrufen wie ein französischer im Deutschen. Schambesetzt ist der Akzent hier doppelt: als Defizienz des Akzents schlechthin, als deutscher Akzent im Besonderen. Die Sprache – das Überbleibsel der anderen Sprache – wird und macht im Akzent verletzlich. Für meine damit verbundene Scham habe ich in Derridas Klage über seine gezwungene richtige Rede[34] Unterstützung empfunden, auch wenn Derridas Dilemma infrakulturell ist. Bei ihm ist es das ihm peinliche Idiom der Algerienfranzosen, das er vermeidet.

Scham und Unsicherheit stellen ambivalente Gefühle im Kulturkontakt auf Dauer. Ich fühle mich gebraucht, ich stehe im Dienst der Vermittlung, nur ich kann die beiden Kontexte verknüpfen. Ich fühle mich nicht sicher. Meine Zugehörigkeit ist bedingt. Im Konfliktfall muss ich das Land wieder verlassen. Ich bin der Dritte, der potentiell immer von zweien ausgeschlossen werden kann. Ich bin sofort als Fremder identifizierbar. Ein immer auch leibliches Gefühl.

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[34] Jacques Derrida schildert in *Le monolinguisme de l'autre* (Paris 1996), wie ihm die meridionale Aussprache des Französischen wie der Pieds-Noirs-Akzent peinlich ist und er sie konsequent und gezwungen vermeidet.

Die Kränkung ist mehrfach: Ich stehe als Mittler zwar im Dienst, werde aber nicht unbedingt gesehen. Ich fülle eine Rolle als Bote aus (sie brauchen mich), und ich bin gleichwohl unsichtbar als Bote, als solcher nicht gewürdigt. Sekundäre Tätigkeiten haben weniger Prestige. Wahrgenommen werde ich hingegen als Defizienter, als Sprecher mit Akzent. Diese Kränkung verwandelt sich in Erbitterung: das Gegenüber glaubt sich überlegen, überhebt sich über mich, obwohl oder weil es kein Wissen vom Anderen und meist keine sekundären Fähigkeiten hat.

Nun habe ich gelernt, dass die Scham auch bei perfekter Beherrschung der Fremdsprache bleibt und zwar leiblich vermittelt, eine innere Not, die sich dramatisch im Schielen von André Gorz oder in den leiblichen Verrenkungen von Georges-Arthur Goldschmidt ausdrückt. Ihre Alterität bleibt als Schmerzerfahrung. Sprache bzw. kommunikatives Handeln zur Grundlage von Konsensethiken heranzuziehen, ist angesichts der Erfahrung von Irritationen im transkulturellen Kontakt – eine alltägliche Erfahrung von unzähligen Menschen – sehr problematisch. Manchen scheint es auch möglich, schmerzhaften Erfahrungen unter den Bedingungen von Mobilität, Migration und Kulturwechsel einen Gewinn abzutrotzen. Paradiesvögel, frühere wie Felix Paul Greve oder Elsa Loringhoven, jüngere wie Hubert Fichte setzen Strategien der Frechheit ein. Alterität wird hier ein Spiel mit der Verwandlung, ein lustvolles Verweigern jeglicher Identität.

Jenseits der Stellvertretung: Weder *ego* noch *alter* noch *tertius*

Es gibt Verbindungen, die nur ich im Kontakt zwischen Kulturen knüpfen kann; keiner kann und wird es an meiner Stelle tun. Ich stellvertrete, aber niemand vertritt mich. Habe ich mich nun von Identitäten, des *ego* und des *alter*, freigespielt durch Rollen, was bin ich dann, was passiert dann? Jetzt scheinen drei Möglichkeiten auf: ich nehme mich als den „widernatürlichen" Dritten wahr und an; ich verlange nach dem Zeugen, der mich als Dritten bezeugt; ich gehe aus meiner Drittposition zugunsten unbekannter Fremdheit heraus.

Nach der Rückkehr in das Land meiner Herkunft spreche ich nicht mehr mit Akzent, ich werde wieder unauffällig. Aber diese Unauffälligkeit täuscht. Meine Fremdheit ist verdeckt. Sie ist eine unsichtbare Alterität, das was Kundera *Unwissenheit*, *Ignorance*[35] nennt. Nach 1968 emigrierte Tschechen versuchen nach 1989 zurückzukehren. Die Dagebliebenen nehmen deren Anderheit nicht wahr, bzw. wollen sie nicht wahrnehmen. Die gemeinsame akzentfreie Sprache täuscht. Der Zurückgekehr-

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[35]   M. K u n d e r a, *Unwissenheit*, München 2001.

te bzw. Besucher ist ein Dritter, der auf gemeinsame Erfahrungen der Dagebliebenen wie auf unversöhnliche Konflikte unter ihnen trifft. Sie haben eine sie verbindende Erfahrung, an der er nicht teilhat. Umgekehrt ist sein Ort, der Tschechisches und Französisches verbindet, den Widerstreitenden unerklärlich. Der Dritte entsteht hier durch das *principium exclusi tertii*[36]. Er tritt auf, wenn zwischen zweien ein unlösbares Dilemma auftritt. Der Dritte hebt eine Opposition von Elementen mit unterschiedlichen Eigenschaften auf. Für mich etwa sowohl Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Deutschen und Franzosen wie auch die Spannungen zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschen. Diese Drittposition ist allerdings „widernatürlich", sie kann nicht integriert werden. Sie hebt zwar den Konflikt zwischen zweien momenthaft auf, sie beseitigt die Antagonismen aber nicht dauerhaft, sie führt nicht die Anerkennung des einen durch den anderen oder ihren Zusammenschluss gegen den gemeinsamen Feind, den Dritten, herbei. Solche hegelianischen Lösungen finden nicht statt. So wie es unmöglich ist, die Sprache mit Akzent wirklich einzugemeinden, so wenig können bei Konflikten transkulturelle Fremdheiten assimiliert werden. Diese widerstrebende Seinsform ist nicht auflösbar. Ich kann diese Unmöglichkeit annehmen.

In diesem Dilemma erwuchs in mir zugleich der Wunsch, es möge für meine nicht leicht wahrnehm- und verstehbare Rolle als Dritter einen Zeugen geben. Es wurde für mich immer wichtiger, nicht nur meine Rolle als Mittler zu spüren, eine Rolle, in der ich für den Ersten und den Zweiten auch zeuge, sondern auch für diese meine Rolle meinerseits Zeugen zu haben – also nicht nur Ich als Dritter, sondern ein weiterer Dritter, der mich als Dritten bezeugt. Er oder sie könnte mir wenn nicht Anerkennung, so doch eine Vergewisserung meiner Erfahrung verschaffen. Der Dritte mit sekundären Funktionen braucht einen Zeugen für seine unsichtbaren und unterbelichteten Leistungen. Musterbeispiel für fehlende Wahrnehmung sind die vielen unterbezahlten Übersetzer. Ein bescheidenes Gegenmittel sind die inzwischen eingerichteten Übersetzer-Preise. Auch mir ist ist ein Preis, kein Übersetzer-Preis, aber einer für meine Forschungsreise ins Transkulturelle zuteil geworden. Solche Zeugen zu haben, heisst auch, einen Ausweg aus der Dyade der beteiligten Deutschen und Franzosen zu finden: der Zeuge ausserhalb bestätigt, dass mein Tun „wirklich" verbindend ist. Es wird ein Wissen, eine Gewissheit, eine Wahrheit, die meinem Hochstapler-Gefühl – ich staple Wissen immer höher auf und zweifle doch an meinen Fähigkeiten – entgegenwirkt. Wenn mein transkulturelles Leben von einem anderen Anderen, einem Dritten ausserhalb, bezeugt ist, ist dies etwas anderes als geläufige Anerkennung durch

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[36] A. Bennholdt-Thomsen, „Natur und Widernatur bei Kleist," in: *Neohelicon. Acta comperationis litterarum universarum* 25/2 (1998), S. 123-144, S. 137. Das Beispiel aus *Penthesilea*: Die Amazonen, die beim Kampf der Trojaner gegen die Griechen auftreten.

Gegenseitigkeit. Ich umlaufe diese Falle der Anerkennung. Ich spüre mich selbst, insofern meine Erfahrung für mich zeugt, „wahr" wird.

So besteht die eine Möglichkeit darin, meine Lebenserfahrung zum Zeugen meiner von mir erprobten Theorien zu machen. Die andere Möglichkeit bietet sich, wenn ich die Mittlerposition, die Position des Dritten, auch die Position des Zeugen, verlasse und zu einem Selbstgefühl ohne die erste, zweite und dritte Person gelange. Das begehren, was ein anderer begehrt; sich anders entscheiden, weil die anderen sich so entscheiden; Vorteile aus dem Streit zwischen zweiten ziehen – das alles lässt sich wohl kaum als wahres Selbst begreifen. In der Beziehung von *ego* und *alter* liegen viele Bedingungen der Fremdbestimmung, sowohl beim ersten *alter* (dem Zweiten) wie bei zweiten *alter* (dem Dritten), etwa Werte und Urteile, auch Anforderungen, die vom jeweils Anderen vorgegeben werden. Auch die sogenannten Hybriden entkommen dem Zwang nicht. Die Frage bleibt, was bleibt bzw. passiert, auftaucht, wenn jemand sich ohne den Blick, ohne die Anerkennung, ohne das Angesprochensein durch andere erfährt und erforscht.

Ohne auf Anerkennung angewiesen zu sein, ohne vom Blick der anderen abhängig, das bedeutet nicht, ohne Bindungen auszukommen vermeinen, ohne Gesellschaft, ohne Andere. Es bedeutet, einen Raum jenseits von ich (*ego*), du (der oder die Andere), er, sie, es (der, die, das Andere, *tertius*), sie (die Anderen) zu finden, einen Raum, in dem Alterität als unbekannte Bindungen zu entdecken sind. Diese Erfahrung weist einen Ausweg aus Narzissmus, der mich in einem zweifelhaften Verhältnis zu mir selbst und zum Anderen gefangenhält. Sie setzt mich dem Nicht-Wissen, dem Unbekannten aus. Fremd sein – zugleich bei mir sein, ohne verspannt-widerborstig zu sein, ohne Zeugen zu benötigen.

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ABSTRACT

Self – Others – Third
In my paper, I align the dynamics of philosophical and sociological theory leading from egology to tertiariness with my own Franco-German life story. The step from I to Thou in dialogism and personalism is still overdone in recent theories of the third. Simmel's interactionist tertiary figures (divorce judge, tertius gaudens, the foreigner) reveal their ambivalence between familiarity and treason in a transcultural contact. My own mediating roles, such as messenger and spokesman (thus personas), stand for others, they require someone to open the door. They are tied with neutral alterity when they de- and re-contextualize things, and with corporeal alterity inasmuch as accent establishes foreignness in the long run.

KEYWORDS: personalism, persona, tertiarity, mediator, ambivalent figure, representative

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LEARNING FROM THE OTHER

THINKING AS AN ENGAGING FORM OF SCHOOL EXPERIENCE

Although the issue of educational experience has been raised and discussed in philosophy of education quite often, it still deserves some scrutiny. It does not mean, however, that the real research questions in the field exist as perennial difficulties that ceaselessly require critics' regular attention or comments. Conversely, philosophical questions on education reveal their complexity and richness mainly in particular situations for their interpreters, demonstrating themselves through pedagogically sound personal and idiosyncratic insights rather than through universal or objective truths. Eventually the philosophical style of thinking and questioning depends on the approach adopted by the interpreter seeking for understanding in particular circumstances. In this chapter, I am drawing on the rich pedagogical and philosophical tradition of reflection on the issue of otherness. Analyzing the educational phenomenon of learning from the other, I put a particular emphasis on the inspirations that originate in the contemporary philosophy of education.[1]

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[1]   See e.g. J. G a r r i s o n, A.G. R u d Jr., *The Educational Conversation: Closing the Gap*, New York 1995; I. G u r - Z e ' e v, *Destroying the Other's Collective Memory*, New York [cop. 2003], *Counterpoints*; S. T o d d, *Learning from the Other: Levinas, Psychoanalysis, and Ethical Possibilities in Education*, Albany 2003; P.P. T r i f o n a s (ed. by), *Pedagogies of Difference: Rethinking Education for Social Change*, New York–London 2003; P. H o g a n, *The New Significance of Learning: Imagination's Heartwork*, London–New York 2010; G.J.J. B i e s t a, *The Beautiful Risk of Education*, London–New York 2013; D. B a k h u r s t, "Learning from Others", *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 47/2 (2013), pp. 187-203; D. L e w i n, A. G u i l h e r m e, M. W h i t e (ed. by), New Perspectives in Philosophy of Education: Ethics, Politics and Religion, London–New York 2016.

What draws my attention in this study is the mode of experience in which one learns from the other. In more practical terms, I wonder under which conditions it is possible to support school students in their own learning from others. Furthermore, I try to investigate what kind of pedagogical culture we should develop in schools to strengthen the atmosphere in which students engage in learning. I am searching for possibilities of promoting students' participation in a truly worthwhile education.

In the first step, I discuss the concept of learning. I focus on two select approaches to learning with the hope that after considering them, we will be much better prepared to dwell on the current school culture. Then, I move on to the issue of engagement in thinking and present an example of strategies taken by scholars to support school students in developing this value. In the third and final step, I draw a few conclusions from all the issues discussed here and suggest certain recommendations for educational practice.

At the outset, however, let me make a comment of a methodological nature. I start with questioning the place of the otherness in the experience of learning and eventually I finish the study without any final closure in the sense of achieving definite, measurable outcomes. In fact, I set out with questions and I wind up with doubts. Even the recommendations for practice are of gentile nature, with no aspirations to solving the problem for good. It looks like I land up exactly at the place I started at. Do I find myself going in circles? In a way, I do. However, this is not a vicious circle. The philosophical style of inquiry I apply here values a possibility to make detours in reflection[2] even if it does not lead to a conclusive closing. It does not avoid questions notwithstanding the circumstances in which they arise. But it also enriches the course of inquiry in a productive way. 'Productive' means here revealing new possibilities of seeing the researched issue in a new light that transforms its understanding. This means that the lack of final conclusions in this study is not a drawback if its style of thinking really demonstrates inquisitiveness of the whole inquiry conducted here.

Now, let me begin with reflections on the learning process and otherness.

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[2] Cf. P. Ricœur, "Narrative Identity," in. P. Ricœur, *Philosophical Anthropology*, Cambridge–Malden 2016, p. 240; B. Blundell, *Paul Ricœur between Theology and Philosophy: Detour and Return*, Bloomington 2010, p. 2.

Conflicting Forms of Learning and Encountering the Other

To clarify my position and explain what the phrase 'learning from the other' may mean in educational research, I shall begin with juxtaposing two select approaches to learning. The first approach is focused on labor, the second on life.

Learning as Labor

Human experience of learning takes on a broad spectrum of meanings. As we know, one may learn in various circumstances arranged by different forms of organization, among others, formal education (kindergartens, schools, and universities), less formal education (workshops, conferences, training courses) or completely outside the sphere of any institution, that is, within informal education (meetings with peers, watching television or travelling and visiting new places). In each case, a plethora of possibilities emerge for a person to acquire new knowledge and skills. Usually, this happens in a relationship with other people, including other learners and teachers. The methods of learning differ from rote learning to problem solving and they are adapted for various styles of teaching. It seems to me, however, that neither forms of organization nor methods and styles of teaching are tailored nowadays to support students in their learning from others. Not in the sense of giving students a chance to recognize in a critical way what is really of value in their learning. To the contrary, it looks as if teaching is aimed to divert students' attention from worthwhile activities and draw it to the production and consumption of goods. Learning from others becomes a part of economy where all activities are judged on the basis of business merits.

One of the critics of the contemporary education, Alexander Sidorkin, 'suggests that learning – any school learning, even within a free school, democratic school, or a school of human development – remains essentially an exploitative economic enterprise.'[3] Sidorkin is quite radical in his post-Marxist interpretation of teaching and learning and his view of education as a form of 'productive labor'[4] deserves some critique.

His argument concerning education understood as labor is highly thought-provoking but at the same time overrealistic, so to speak. It is a fact that economy is indispensable from school life. I can also agree that there are only rare examples of institutions where the learning process is really satisfactory for students and it works

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[3] A. Sidorkin, "The Labour of Learning", *Educational Theory*, 51/1 (2001), p. 91.

[4] Ibid., p. 94.

for their betterment. Schooling system is still waiting for new ideas that could change it or even lead to a profound educational revolution.[5] But if education is going to make a real difference in students' lives, it needs to be developed as an *imaginative action* and not only as a mere economic enterprise. Human beings need some myths or utopias to flourish.[6] Myths can be understood not only necessarily in a negative way, as the fabric of society deformed by ideology, but also in a positive way, as the main vehicle for our imagination and understanding of the world.[7] But for Sidorkin learning should not be anymore 'at the center of an institution such as school.'[8] This comes from the assumption that school learning is inevitably biased by economy, which represents rather one-sided point of view. It leads Sidorkin to a very critical insight: 'Education should be classified as one of the society's unavoidable ills. We should tolerate education, restrain it, regulate it, and try to make it more humane, but never admire or idealize it.'[9] The suggestion that education should be 'tolerated' promotes the atmosphere of indifference in schools which may result in the lack of concern or even apathy. Students and teachers who merely tolerate the educational system are not likely to advocate criticism or resistance, not to mention creative changes. So, if they are to restrain oppressive educational system, they need to make use of their critical thinking, not outside the schools but within their educational and institutional framework. It would be much better for their pedagogical development and identities if they actively demonstrated their resentment in schools, showing that learning can mean much more than it has already been defined by the organization.

Learning can play an unusual role in the life of students and teachers when it is experienced in the atmosphere of liberty and personal autonomy. And we probably agree with Sidorkin to this point. However, Sidorkin claims 'de-educationalization of schooling' which can be explained by the recommendation that 'we can simply stop thinking of schools as exclusively educational institutions, and instead make them centered on a much more complex idea of a democratic good life' (p. 106). In my opinion and contrary to what Sidorkin advocates, education requires transformation from the inside. This includes revision of the way knowledge is understood and practiced in the schooling system. Obviously, there is no panacea for all educational shortcomings but the positive transformation of the system is not possible without

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[5]   Cf. K. Robinson, L. Aronica, *Creative Schools: The Grassroots Revolution That's Transforming Education*, New York 2015.

[6]   Cf. A. Sidorkin, "The Labour of Learning", p. 105.

[7]   Cf. L. Kołakowski, *Obecność mitu*, Wrocław 1994.

[8]   A. Sidorkin, "The Labour of Learning", p. 106.

[9]   Ibid., p. 104.

some crucial changes concerning understanding of the epistemic dimension of teaching and learning processes. Sidorkin contrasts academic knowledge with knowledge necessary for 'a democratic good life.' It seems to me that this opposition is false and it reveals misguided understanding of the role academic knowledge can play in social life. Academic knowledge is of a pivotal importance for building a proper atmosphere for democratic education and any kind of a shortcut, that is, a way that diminishes the value of knowledge in the process of social education, is not really a good recommendation.

'Learning is impossible to sustain as an all-encompassing activity around which everything is centered. Yet what I find most worrisome is the steady decline of extracurricular activities and other "peripherals" of school life – rituals, celebrations, and the extermination of places and periods of times. Most children get up in the morning and go to school so that they can be around their friends and sometimes around a few cool adults. Community and fellowship are by far the strongest attractors and the hardest currency schools can offer in exchange for their incessant demands. The schools become obsessed with the increasing of "on-task" time and getting rid of everything noneducational.'[10]

In his interpretation of the schooling systems, Sidorkin accepts the idea that learning is primarily a cognitive activity and it pertains mainly to academic knowledge. Although he argues for more a comprehensive concept of schooling, he does not offer more a inclusive idea of learning where students' understanding of others would be emphasized more than academic forms of knowledge. It seems to me that in his view the learning process and the 'extracurricular activities' are seen as opposite. And although he suggests inclusion of the 'noneducational' activities into the schooling system, he does not develop more comprehensive view of teaching and learning. He perceives emancipation in school education as a myth and accuses universities of benefiting from its perpetuation (p. 105). In my understanding, he underestimates the value of tradition and academic knowledge for acquiring human identity and building social bonds.[11] It seems also to me that he overlooks the fact that emancipation can be practiced even when educational institutions do not support those who wish to broaden their horizons and enhance their field of liberty.

After providing criticism of education understood as labor, Sidorkin outlines a possible future for schools. 'They need to be small, personal, and they must allow for student choice and teachers' experimenting with a multitude of non-educational

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[10]   Ibid., 106.
[11]   See: R. G o d o ń, "Understanding, Personal Identity and Education", *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 38/4 (2004), pp. 589-600.

activities. These very well may be more expensive schools, but those who benefit must pay at least something.'[12] This promotes a fairly exclusivist view of schooling, which was rather not the point of the Sidorkin's endeavor and quite far removed from a 'complex idea of democratic good life' in schools.

There is no doubt that learning has a lot to do with labor. It is not, however, a good idea to subordinate the whole process of education to economic values. This is why defining education as a mere form of labor has some limits which should not be overlooked. Learning includes also cultural qualities, among others, self-understanding that originates in interpreting tradition and works of art. If we really aim to limit coercion in education, we need to create a friendly atmosphere so that students could experience close and sincere encounters with the past. This means that the role of legacy that is conveyed by academic knowledge cannot be diminished in educational practice if it is to support students in their creative and inspiring learning experience. And obviously this kind of knowledge should be placed in the very center of the authentically educational activities and of the inclusive schooling system.

Dialogical Learning for Life

The world of labor is not, however, the only possible framework for understanding of school experience. Another and completely different interpretative position may be built on the basis of the dialogical conception of learning.[13] Sidorkin, who is critical about the economic value of schooling system, acknowledges that dialogue can be a great inspiration for conceptualization of school life.[14] He enumerates three values or characteristics of the dialogical form of school experience: complexity, civility, and carnival. Discussing the three values, he draws mainly on Martin Buber's and Mikhail Bakhtin's concepts of dialogue. Complexity ensures that there is plurality of voices articulated and recognized in school life. This is supported by civility that makes room for an interchange of the voices so that a kind of interplay between them emerges. And finally, carnival introduces 'different phases of school life. It produces an image of an alternative social world, fulfills the social criticism function, and creates time

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[12] A. Sidorkin, "The Labour of Learning", p. 107.

[13] C.f. N. Burbules, *Dialogue in Teaching: Theory and Practice*, New York–London 1993; I. Ward, *Literacy, Ideology and Dialogue: Towards a Dialogic Pedagogy*, New York 1994; A. Sidorkin, *Beyond Discourse: Education, the Self, and Dialogue*, Albany 1999.

[14] See: A. Sidorkin, *Beyond Discourse…*, p. 142.

and space for the most intense dialogical encounters.'[15] For Sidorkin, only through practicing the three values teachers and students can participate in school life in such a way that it becomes the real sphere of liberty where all participants may demonstrate their differences or even confront them and still remain 'in concert with others.'[16]

The dialogical approach is also adopted by Andrew Metcalfe and Ann Game.[17] Similarly to Sidorkin, they emphasize the relational character of educational experience. They seek to explain how dialogue alters students' and teachers' identities. Through discussion on dialogue, they present their main argument concerning the idea of learning for life: only dialogical experience may reveal the actual significance of education and explain what learning for life may mean in an individual, personal experience. But the most crucial issue for them is the very special role that difference plays in educational experience. The role is not defined by cognitive or competitive values of learning. The importance of difference is quite strictly related to the value of community and cooperation. And this is also something they share with Sidorkin.

'People who identify with knowledge take it personally, seeing the world and others only for what these say about themselves, as a mirror of themselves. People in dialogue, however, are able to hear the differences offered by others because they are not personally affronted. Through the play of differences, they are making something that they share with others but that is no one's personal property.'[18]

For Metcalfe and Game, what is really pivotal here is not fighting against academic knowledge but striving for a privileged position of the encounter itself and in that sense suspending any kind of relationships of rivalry. Only in a friendly, inclusive atmosphere of meeting the other learning can be excised as a truly educative experience, leading to inquisitive and epiphanic moments. In such circumstances learning does not aim to know better but to experience uniqueness of one's living in the world: 'From a dialogic view, maturity is neither knowingness nor independence, but an ability to live well in time and space, so that life is graced by a capacity for wholeness and wonder.'[19]

According to Metcalfe and Game, learning inevitably involves dialogue but real dialogue always leads to some kind of education: 'It follows that dialogue is always

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[15]   Ibid.
[16]   Ibid., p. 144.
[17]   A. Metcalfe, A. Game, "Significance and Dialogue in Learning and Teaching", *Educational Theory*, 58/3 (2008), pp. 343-356.
[18]   Ibid., p. 345.
[19]   Ibid., p. 355.

a learning experience, and that there is no learning without this dialogical meeting with difference.'[20] The whole process of teaching and learning revolves around recognition of difference and ability to understand or even to strengthen the voice of the other. In that sense conversation always embraces education since it cannot end up with indifferent reactions of interlocutors to new experiences. When properly conducted, dialogue consists of some changes in the way participants understand their surrounding and themselves. At the same time the real experience of learning requires from students and teachers ability to cope with new and often unusual situations or factors. Hence, the logic of questioning and seeking for answers is characteristic of any kind of valuable learning.

As far as methodology is concerned, Metcalfe and Game draw on phenomenological tradition, particularly Maurice Merleau-Ponty and philosophy of dialogue developed by Martin Buber. In both cases knowledge is conceptualized in a comprehensive way and it includes contribution of the learner to the content of the whole process of cognition. This means that knowledge is of existential nature and any attempts to suppress it by objectivity procedures lead to educational disappointments. Learning as well as properly understood cognition processes can be defined as modes of being in the world: 'In phenomenology, participation is the principle of knowledge: we know, not as subjects observing objects, but through our being in the world.'[21] From phenomenological point of view, argue Metcalfe and Game, ability to encounter the other and to get engaged in a genuine dialogue is an indispensable disposition of a learner.

Considering argument for the strong position of dialogue in educational practice allows Metcalfe and Game to conclude: 'If educational theory loses its ability to recognize dialogue, it loses its ability to understand education as a transformative rather than a simply accumulative process. Without dialogue, there can be no education, no aliveness, no meaning. Because there is dialogue, teaching and learning are creative processes, and not just refractions of competing voices.'[22] Understanding of learning derived from Buber's conception of dialogue is rather one-sided. It excludes more pragmatic view of teaching and learning and the fact that educational practice is assessed nowadays according to its ability to strengthen the position of students on the labor market.

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[20] Ibid., p. 346.
[21] Ibid., p. 347.
[22] Ibid., p. 346.

Overcoming the Opposite Approaches

I have presented two different approaches to learning that are opposite to each other. The first is based on the assumption concerning economic value of human actions, the second on the conception of dialogue and ability to encounter others with respect for all their idiosyncrasies or even for the 'holiness' of educational experience itself.[23] Both approaches merit some criticism and neither explains how the relationship with others supports students in their own learning.[24] The former, concerning labor, does not take seriously enough the links between tradition, academic knowledge, and democratic good life. The concept of learning conveys much more than transmission of knowledge and knowledge itself means more than collected and processed data. It is crucial to recognize, as Metcalfe and Game do, that knowledge has a social structure and exists only within human relationships. However, we should not overestimate the significance of dialogical encountering. Metcalfe and Game go too far with identifying dialogue as a remedy for the gap between cognition and everyday life activities as well as for revealing the sacred dimension of learning experience. They rely on the dialogical logic exclusively. As a result of that, they ignore the fact that learning needs some tangible benefits that could be recognized by students as something really worth of effort. Otherwise students treat all actions offered in schools as futile. It follows that although learning understood as dialogue is irreducibly open, it needs to indicate some ends to achieve.

However, the approaches discussed here respond to the need of bridging the gap between knowledge and everyday practice in school environment. While the labor approach stresses the economic claim that rules social relations in schools, the dialogical approach emphasizes the claim for encounter and wonder as the final goal of schooling. Both claims are radical and not very likely to be successful. It seems to me that to overcome the gap between the cognitive orientation of schooling system and the

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[23]   See ibid., p. 356: 'Dialogical awareness, however, allows these processes to lead back to the holiness of the whole.'

[24]   C.f. in this context discussion on a more balanced relationship between dialogue or conversation, otherness and education: N. Burbules, *Dialogue in Teaching…*; D. Bakhurst, P. Fairfield (ed. by), *Education and Conversation: Exploring Oakeshott's Legacy*, London–Oxford–New York–New Delhi 2016; J. Tischner, *Inny. Eseje o spotkaniu*, Kraków 2017; M. Rebes, "The Dialectic versus Dialogical Character of Philosophy and Its Influence on the Upbringing of Young Generations," in *Wielogłos w myśli o wychowaniu. 100 lat polskiej pedagogiki filozoficznej*, eds. S. Sztobryn, K. Dworakowska, Warszawa 2020, pp. 96-112; J. Brejdak, *Zrozumieć innego. Próba rozumienia Innego w fenomenologii, hermeneutyce, filozofii dialogu i teorii systemu*, Kraków 2020.

needs of everyday life we need to introduce a change in a style of thinking in schools and about schools, which rather is not likely to occur if scholars are not actively and personally participating in it. In the second part of this chapter, I present a project conceived by a group of educationalists that was carried out in select primary and secondary schools. Although the project was focused on creative and critical thinking, its idea was to support students in their ability to learn. Scholars as participants from outside the school were there to strengthen students' engagement in learning.

Engaging Students: Reflections after a School Intervention

In the following passages, I present some thoughts and reflections that have come from my own participation in a teaching project devoted to school students and their competencies. As a leader of the project, I had an opportunity to take part in all activities of its implementation. I could also see how philosophical concepts that stimulate our thinking on teaching and learning actually revealed their real impact in schools. I begin with a short presentation of the project and then move on to discuss some insights that I have made when drawing on my experience in schools.

The Project 'Academy for the Art of Thinking'

The project *Academy for the Art of Thinking* (AAT)[25] was aimed at the miserable condition of teaching in light of the feedback given to schools and universities by employers. Their main concern pertained to the fact that graduates' performance in exercising the academic knowledge acquired in schools and universities was not satisfactory in the work place. It was said that graduates were not able to demonstrate how to utilize the knowledge and competences promoted in the course of their education. Criticism referred to the lack of creativity and critical thinking as well as reluctance to find alternative ways of thinking.

Within the project, the group of educationalists from university was to conduct classes for primary and post-primary students to support them in their learning and practicing their abilities to think creatively and utilize acquired knowledge. Teachers ran workshops in two cycles, each of 10 groups of students in 8 schools. Altogether

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[25] The AAT (POWR.03.01.00-00-EF10/16) was prepared as an answer to the call "Philosophical education" announced by The National Centre for Research and Development in Poland. It was implemented in primary and secondary schools from January 2018 till June 2019.

240 students attended the classes. They were offered a 30-hour course, hold at their school, usually after the regular classes. The course was optional for students. They could choose if they wished to enroll after one 'inspection' class they were offered. Although the project had quite strict rules concerning students attendance (the certificate of attendance was offered only to students who were present at most classes), actually there was no formal obligations for them to participate in classes. They could withdraw whenever they wanted fearing no consequences. The program was very flexible in the content. It embraced topics from philosophy, literature, media, and others fields not only of academic interest.

The program was tailored to the needs of the participants hence its details were determined almost class by class by a leading teacher. Each teacher taught one class and was responsible for seeing to it that the program met students' needs. Teachers sometimes switched groups. This allowed students to meet different staff members and various styles of teaching.

One of the main assumptions of the project was that the ability to think was not defined in one style. It was rather understood as a set of various abilities that are necessary in successful learning. The meaning of the concept of thinking was not 'normative' but rather 'functional' or 'operational.' Teachers could draw on different conceptions of thinking if they decided that this was required to achieve the main goal. The point was to support students in their learning so that they could successfully demonstrate their knowledge. Hence the course was to support students in:

– intellectual and linguistic competences, among others, forming and posing questions, logical reasoning;
– personal interests and integration of their knowledge from different subjects;
– ability of self-reflection and self-criticism;
– ability of critical thinking and justifying one's own and others judgements;
– competence in communication, ability to listen to others;
– ability to collaborate and to participate in discussions in the atmosphere of tolerance and openness to others;
– ability to build their responsibility for their own learning;
– social, moral, and aesthetic responsiveness;
– understanding of philosophical traditions.

As a leader of the project, I was responsible for all classes and all students performance. I had to invite colleagues who had philosophical background and were able to share their expertise with students of primary and secondary education. Teachers were responsible for creating a friendly, inclusive atmosphere so that students would be likely to participate. The risk for the teachers was rather high. There were quite strict rules concerning the funding: 10 out of 12 students had to demonstrate

they improved their abilities during the course and that they reached high final achievements.

Reflections on Implementation

The main activity within the project began a few weeks before the actual classes started. A few teachers visited schools in September and October 2018 to introduce the idea of AAT workshops. In fact, from that point it was quite clear that one of the main difficulties we were to face was the traditional style of teaching that dominated in most schools where we were to hold workshops. Speaking of the style, I do not mean mere methods used by teachers but the kind of mentality dominating in schools, that is to say, the perception of the relationship between teachers, students, and the content taught at schools. Actually, as far as the methods used by the school teachers were concerned, at that moment there were no evident signs that anything needed serious improvement in this regard.

Some Obstacles Concerning the Concept of Thinking

Given the main purpose of our course, which was supporting students in their creative and fruitful thinking, what mattered heavily from the very beginning was the fact that the concept of thinking was usually limited to a mere intellectual competence or a form of academic knowledge plus skills that required memorizing and reproduction activities. It seems to me that students got used to the situation where thinking was practiced as a form of school learning procedures that was announced and trained at their classes.

Another observation pertains to one of the most popular concepts during the enrolment, which was "creativity." Since the public debates showed that employers accused schools of neglecting creativity of their students, there was a strong social pressure on schools to strengthen this 'competence.' Unfortunately, some parents, teachers, and students tended to perceive creativity in education as a matter of state-of-the art teaching techniques rather than a form of a thoughtful approach or inquisitive learning.

Last but not least, the dominant tendency among student was to strive to achieve goals, usually deemed to be successful examination results. 'Thinking' in this context was just a means to an end. At first, some students wished to participate in the workshop because they believed their career prospects would benefit from it. Since the

workshop emphasized the ability to think, students expected they would be trained in using special techniques or logical tricks. At the very early stage of classes, some students decided to withdraw since they were disappointed with the lack of such 'magic' solutions.

Observations about Students and Their Learning

The survey (questionnaire) that was performed in mid-course revealed that students were *open to new experiences*. At the same time it showed, however, they expected that teaching at AAT classes would be boring and distant from their everyday activities. In particular, young students (higher primary education age) were tired of staying long hours in schools and they needed relaxing activities, often physical (games, playful activities). Some of them expected to find 'attractive' exercises at AAT classes. Older students (secondary school) preferred workshops with many small group tasks. They indicated that they scarcely ever had a chance to chat and share their opinions, interests, and passions with school friends so they were satisfied when AAT classes offered such opportunities.

When asked about the *usefulness* of the AAT workshops they attended, most students could not find any relationship between the workshops and their own personal situation concerning their learning at the mid-course survey. However, the final survey showed that some students changed their opinion and noticed that the AAT course helped them in being more insightful and thoughtful in learning in other fields than at the workshop classes, too.

Nevertheless, when they were asked to define learning, they tended to use some platitudes and clichés, probably acquired from their school experience. Most of them were not able to recognize and express in their own words what the real benefit of AAT classes could be in regard to their own learning. However, some students, mainly of secondary level, realized that they practiced they ability to think creatively and thought that the topics offered at workshops for debates were inspiring. Eventually, they also found the course to be supportive in developing their inspirations for learning.

Thoughts Concerning the Academic Teachers

It was a real challenge for some members of the staff to change their university style of teaching and respond to the expectations and needs of younger students.

Apparently, teaching adults at university seems to be completely different from teaching children or teenagers in schools. It is not so much a matter of methods or not only this. The real difference lies in the recognition of the situation and in the style of responsiveness to the students. Teachers who had never worked with young students had to change quickly their habits so that they could be able to create a friendly atmosphere for learning for young people. This required from them an ability to suspend their ambitions and plans and to strive for their own way of communication with students. Quite often they had to work hard with their own limitations as well as with prejudices of the students. Those whose lectures were usually adored by university students felt like beginners in schools and had to learn how to get with their insights to young learners.

Teachers also had to improve their students' ability to listen and participate in understanding. Obviously, they had to maneuver and take mainly an inclusive and gentle approach. Some students were really distracted by a plethora of possibilities for learning in schools. Educational institutions are in fact rich in offers of various activities for students to join. There are many optional courses and private classes that students may attend. Constantly bothered by various suggestions of what one could learn, they had real difficulties with concentration. To change their attitude so that they attentively reacted to the teachers' invitations was a real challenge. Teachers had to be patient. Certainly, patience is an important virtue of any teacher but it is rather acquired through years of practice. Teachers participating in the project had very limited time for learning this ability.

Debate as an Outcome

The AAT courses were hold in two cycles. Each was completed with a debate at the university where students were to demonstrate what they learned and how they could discuss selected topics with their peers. Students were invited to the main campus at the university. The old university campus was an outstanding place for the debates and very attractive for many school students. This emphasized the fact that the debates were to be a kind of celebration. Both the debates were led in a formal but friendly style and students had to be really in control and share their opinions in a thoughtful manner.

Most students attended the debates although it was the first and for most of them the only AAT meeting outside their schools. The first debate was devoted to the issue of self-learning and the second to the issue of being taught. In both cases, the meeting started with a short provocative lecture delivered by an academic and afterwards

students had time for preparing their responses. They were encouraged to enter into debate not only with the lecturer but also with their peers from other schools.

Although AAT students regularly participated in debates and discussions, what occurred to be still new for some of them was the conversational style of the university debate that moderator introduced to all participants. Drawing on their experiences from regular school debates, some students thought that they should compete with other groups. They tried to dismiss the arguments of the others with no real effort to understand their messages; they just went for the win. This was stopped by the moderator and from that moment on all students kept discussion in more friendly and inclusive style. At the end, the moderator clarified that when debating, university teachers tend to share their understanding instead of demonstrating their power or position and this style of debate was recommended at AAT classes.

Reflections on the Outcomes

Presenting the AAT project in a narrative style, I have tried to show its key aspects, particularly these which uncovered the real value of practicing thinking with school students. Although philosophical thinking is often conceived as an unteachable ability, it turned out that practicing reflection with students can have a real philosophical value.

First of all, some students highly praised the AAT classes for the inspiration they found there and support in constructing a logical and thoughtful line of argumentation in their reflections. Although teachers tended not to be instructive but rather supportive, and the transmission of knowledge was not the key issue at the AAT classes, some students recognized the inherent logic within the discussions related to the issues raised and debated at the classes. This showed that young students were able to share with academic teachers their passion for understanding. Obviously, it was a very individual experience at the AAT classes but still the fact that some students managed to make such insights was a very positive result of the project.

What's more, the social significance of the workshops was revealed in the attitude of students to the participation in the classes. Most students were satisfied with the fact that they could meet their peers, make new friends, and share with them their opinions. They took part in discussions, notwithstanding the fact that for many of them it was a real challenge. At first, they were timid or embarrassed by the prospect of sharing their thoughts. Later, they even claimed to have more possibilities to actively participate in debates. It seems that the course was a good lesson for them in arranging discussions and active participation in deliberative forms of social life.

Finally, the main reason of attending the AAT classes for many students was initially that they would earn a certificate of a relatively high academic status. In the context of current cultural obsession with certificates, it is quite clear that students followed the dominant pattern and declared their wish for certificates as an evident argument for participation. However, some students apparently understood eventually that the real value of the course was different. They learned how to think in circumstances different from school and in diverse styles so that some of them began to reflect on their own learning in a more critical and thoughtful way. At least one student who used to skip lessons improved in this respect, started to attend school classes regularly and more seriously reflected on his learning (it was a case that was revealed during the course).

Thinking, School and Engagement: Drawing Conclusions from AAT Workshops

The outcomes of project show that academic scholars can have an important 'impact' on the way school students are engaged in their learning and thinking. It also demonstrates that students are quite open to new experiences and styles of learning. Although they often conceive of thinking in quite a formal way, they are likely to alter this understanding. New knowledge and a new style of acquiring understanding does not distract students from participation in classes. They need, however, an assistance of teachers to plough through the rich tradition of thinking and the history of ideas. They need some support in seeking for ideas that can help them to work out their own attitude to learning. Scholars can play an extraordinary role in this endeavor. They can strengthen the students' ability to inquire in a critical and creative way and in cases where it is necessary, they can provoke students to 'awake' and become more inquisitive and critical.

The world of life is not given to human beings. It depends on the everyday efforts that we all make to understand the environment and to dwell in the world in a more reasonable and rational way. Scholars and particularly philosophers of education have a special responsibility in this matter. They live not only in the world of our everyday experiences. They also participate in the world of ideas. This places them in privileged position to share their philosophical understanding with others who have no access to such a, so to speak, 'worldly' rationality. Scholars can suspend their 'world of ideas' or just open it to the students who have had no go at such 'elite' experiences so far. Obviously, it needs patience and understanding. But if teachers are not ready to

tolerate students ignorance or reluctance, if they do not wish to intervene into school life, how can knowledge demonstrate its real value for students?

Conclusion and Recommendations

In this chapter, I aimed to throw some new light on the special mode of experience in which school students learn from others. To achieve this goal, I discussed the concept of learning in both theoretical and empirical context. And although there are no final and definite outcomes of this investigation and it is difficult to come to its final conclusion, it gives some food for thought. Let me present some recommendations that arise from this discussion on learning from others and that can be worth of further consideration.

First of all, it seems to me that school learning is a quite moderate mode of being. It is futile when its participants tend to use extreme views or convictions. Learning involves plethora of activities that serve various purposes. This is why schools need to provide space for actions that are of different nature: some are very pragmatic and almost ready to be used in practice, some others are more abstract and they need conceptual consideration. Labor and dialogue belong to this rich spectrum of learning experience. They can be juxtaposed as opposite forms of learning, but differences between them do not need to lead to a conflict, for sure not at the level of personal interactions. Instead, schools can develop mild forms of personal relationships which would allow all participants to hold with their own views and understandings. Human beings are different and there is enormous potential in this plurality. Obviously, this does not mean that there is no room in learning for discussions and disagreements. The point is, however, that school life has to be inclusive. School communities should contain differing students and they cannot dismiss those who think in their own way. The 'other' is indispensable to school life, otherwise schools become exclusive or even fanatic. To avoid this danger, we have to consider conflicting forms of learning in a more dialogical style, embracing different modes of learning.

School learning requires also integrity, particularly in the context of the main aims of education that are to be recognized by students. The proper atmosphere in educational institutions relies on their loyalty to the students as well as to their mission. Unfortunately, they betray both if economic values become their *raison d'être*. Schools need to take seriously their task to prepare students for their future careers but they cannot be reduced to mere vocational training. Labor should not replace human flourishing but at the same time schools should respond in a supportive way to

the pragmatic needs of their students when these appear. Here the mild or balanced approach is also recommended.

Balanced or even reserved attitude towards extreme issues in teaching and learning does not mean that schools can resign from supporting students in their individual interests, even when these are quite unique. Students need to have the opportunity to exercise their liberty. They can only learn successfully in the circumstances where they can reveal their individuality, feelings, and doubts without the fear that they would be punished for raising unpopular questions. At the same time, they need to learn how to discuss loaded issues and how to deal gracefully with the opponents' opinions. Schools are responsible not only for transmitting knowledge but also for preparation of our citizens to differ in a respectful way.

Last but not least, it seems that thinking is nowadays considered a desirable value in schooling system and its social reception is quite good. But it can easily lose its attractive position. If schools are not likely to include different views and opinions into the practice of everyday school life, if they are not open to new initiatives that promote critical and creative thinking, the situation can change. Unfortunately, not for the better. To strengthen the pedagogical culture that supports students in their learning and advocates philosophical style of thinking, schools need to limit their cognitive claims and formal procedures. Instead, they can expose the real value of the learning process. Their curricula have to include more activities that are not just informative or instructional but that are helpful in explaining issues that really concern students. School learning requires that kind of cognition that could draw students' attention and interest. It appears students do not want to waste their time for vague classes, unclear in their messages. They expect cognitive benefits and wish that teachers offer them new knowledge. And teachers should respond to it by helping students to get engaged in their own, individual learning. Their message should be provoking and, paradoxically, unpopular.

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Abstract

The author is mainly concerned with the conditions under which it is possible to support school students in their own learning from others. He explores both philosophy of education and educational practice. In the first part of the article, two opposite approaches to learning are discussed: one focused on effortful work, the

other on dialogical concept of life. The second part is devoted to a description of a philosophical project in the field of critical and creative thinking (Academy for the Art of Thinking) that was carried out in schools with young and older teenage learners. A special attention is paid to the issue of students' engagement in learning. In conclusion, certain reflections are formulated and some recommendations are suggested to practitioners.

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How Do Immigrants Become Civilizational Others? Or Othering Immigrants in Central European Immigration Crisis Narratives

Some Thoughts on Boundary Drawing and Its Persistent Appeal in Times of Civilizational Identity

Civilizational boundary drawing became a leading narrative on European identity in light of the post-Arab Spring refugee crisis. This holds true for the whole of Europe, however, it has been particularly voiced in Central Europe. The current (2021-22) immigration crisis on the Belarussian-EU border and its reflection in public debates is yet another vivid illustration of a persistent appeal of civilizational boundary drawing. This time securitization of border control-immigration nexus seems to constitute major point of reference for „Europe vs. non-Europe"[1] identity narratives.

Historically, civilizational othering has been a prevalent pattern of European identity building. Bo Strâth's insightful diagnosis is a clear illustration of that process:

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[1] B. S t r â t h, "A European Identity: To the Historical Limits of a Concept," *European Journal of Social Theory*, 5/4 (2002), pp. 387-401.

There are in particular three mirrors in which the idea of Europe has taken shape: the Oriental/Asian, the American and the East European. In these mirrors the Other has been seen both in terms of inferiority to Europe and in terms of a model to emulate.[2]

Civilizational boundary drawing became the narrative of „Europe vs. non-Europe" identity building process.[3] Europe's *mission civilisatrice* took two major forms. Externally, civilizational boundary drawing was reflected in Europe's moral imperative to expand its normative model of international system. Internally, European civilization narrative has been framed by Enlightenment philosophy, law, and social organization.

Social science followed this preoccupation with civilizational boundary drawing in social identity construction processes. Lynn Jamieson explains convincingly the power and complexity of „othering" processes in social identity construction*:*

A wide range of empirical work indicates possibilities of differentiation without negatively stereotyping; strangers, even those seen as being very different in terms of how they do things, need not necessarily be enemies. Clearly processes of negative 'othering' are common and aspects of many societies and social groups but they are by no means universal and are not built into all theoretical understandings of identity processes.[4]

What makes othering of immigrants in the post-Arab Spring immigration crisis narratives a particular kind of boundary work is that it contributed significantly to re-emergence of historical *Europe vs. non-Europe* civilizational divides.

In what follows I discuss some of the approaches to conceptualizing othering and civilizational boundary drawing in recent immigration crisis narratives as set against the background of the erosion of pluralist tradition of European identity.

Michèl Lamont and Virág Molnár came up with a fairly comprehensive view on multidimensionality of othering as a relational process. The key assumption made here is complementarity of symbolic and social othering as „equally real."[5] As they suggest:

Symbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space. They are tools by which individuals

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[2] Ibid., p. 391.

[3] Ibid.

[4] L. Jamieson, "Theorising Identity, Nationality and Citizenship: Implications for European Citizenship Identity," *Sociológia*, 34/6 (2002), p. 514.

[5] M. Lamont, V. Molnár, "The Study of Boundaries in Social Sciences," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 28 (2002), p. 169.

and groups struggle over and come to agree upon definitions of reality. Examining them allows us to capture the dynamic dimensions of social relations, as groups compete in the production, diffusion, and institutionalization of alternative systems and principles of classifications . . . They are an essential medium through which people acquire status and monopolize resources. Social boundaries are objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal access to and unequal distribution of resources (material and nonmaterial) and social opportunities. They are also revealed in stable behavioral patterns of association, as manifested in connubiality and commensality. Only when symbolic boundaries are widely agreed upon can they take on a constraining character and pattern social interaction in important ways. [6]

Míriam Juan Torres illustrates empirically how symbolic othering of immigrants is instrumentalized in order to (re)introduce strict criteria of national and civilizational belonging.[7] Based on an analysis of public opinion towards immigration-refugees-identity nexus in Europe, Torres argues that:

Immigration is used to redefine who belongs to an "us" defined in opposition to a "them." Concerns over the strength of one's national identity increase when immigrants are framed through this lens. It becomes an issue that reflects fears about the destruction of one's in-group, traditions and way of life and reinforces cultural insecurities. Both as a result and a cause, it is an issue that can be, and has been, easily instrumentalized by those with authoritarian populist tendencies.[8]

Torres' emphasis on immigrants as civilizational others accelerating "cultural insecurities,"[9] which are skillfully instrumentalized in populist rhetoric seems consistent with the widespread trend of the policy of fear that is manifested in securitization of immigrants. Thus, the policy of fear assuming the form of securitization of immigrants is rooted in the social construct of "prejudice as cognition" as is insightfully explained by Valeria Bello[10]:

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[6]   Ibid., pp. 168-169.

[7]   M.J. Torres, "Public Opinion toward Immigration, Refugees, and Identity in Europe: A Closer Look at What Europeans Think and How Immigration Debates Have Become So Relevant, Migrations in the Mediterranean," *IE.Med Mediterranean Yearbook* 2019.

[8]   Ibid., p. 72.

[9]   Ibid.

[10]   V. Bello, "The Spiralling of the Securitisation of Migration in the EU: From the Management of a 'Crisis' to a Governance of Human Mobility?," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 48/6 (2020), p. 7.

Our approach actually considers prejudice as a cognition that informs the social construction of migration as a threat. Prejudice is consequently the main qualifier of a perspective of the nation that ties a society through the discrimination of specific groups of individuals, who are thus socially constructed as outer threats (Bello 2017a). The securitisation of migration first happens cognitively in actors' perspectives and then epistemically spirals through practices and narratives . . . which are the concrete elements that can be analysed for research purpose.[11]

Drawing on the Copenhagen School research paradigm of securitization theory,[12] it needs to be noted that securitization of immigration crisis itself has been widely discussed.[13] What makes the securitization theory particularly relevant approach to immigration-security nexus is its focus on explaining how do immigrants become existential threat. The government as securitizing actor identifies immigrants as those who constitute an existential threat to public order, health or, more broadly, traditional way of life of the national community. Here the central conceptual axis of securitization theory assumes the form of the government (the securitizing actor) speaking of an existential security threat (speech act) to the society (the audience) justifying the objective need to introduce extraordinary countermeasures.[14]

Empirical reflection of the Copenhagen School's conceptualization of securitization of immigration crisis could be found in case study analyses by João Estevens[15] as well as Givi Gigitashvili and Katarzyna W. Sidlo.[16] Analytical perspective adopted in

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[11] Ibid.

[12] O. W æ v e r, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in *On Security*, ed. by R.D. L i p s c h u t z, New York 1995, pp. 46-85; See also: i d e m, "Politics, Security, Theory," *Security Dialogue*, 42/4-5 (2011), pp. 465-480.

[13] P. B o u r b e a u, *The Securitization of Migration: A Study of Movement and Order*, London 2013. See also: J. H u y s m a n s, "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38/5 (2000), pp. 751-777; V. S q u i r e, "The Securitisation of Migration: An Absent Presence?," in *The Securitization of Migration in the EU: European Union in International Affairs*, ed. by G. L a z a r i d i s, K. W a d i a, New York 2015.

[14] O. W æ v e r, "Securitization and Desecuritization."

[15] J. E s t e v e n s, "Migration Crisis in the EU: Developing a Framework for Analysis of National Security and Defence Strategies," *Comparative Migration Studies*, 6 (2018).

[16] G. G i g i t a s h v i l i, K.W. S i d l o, "Merchants of Fear: Discursive Securitization of the Refugee Crisis in the Visegrad Group Countries," *EuroMesCo*, 89 (2019), [online] https://www.iemed. org/publication/merchants-of-fear-discursive-securitization-of-the-refugee-crisis-in-the-visegrad-group-countries/, accessed 18 January 2022.

these contributions seem to offer a rather consistent picture of the policy of fear of the mass other, which aims at legitimizing emergency measures.

João Estevens provides for a comparative analysis of the EU member states national security cultures applied to migration-security nexus as set against a wider background of the EU's policy on forced migration as security challenge.[17] Pretty heterogeneous picture of the EU's member states national security perspectives on forced migration as national security concern finds its reflection is different emphasis given to external and internal factors interplay in strategic thinking.

In the case of Central and Eastern European member states of the EU, the security-migration nexus is approached primarily, although not exclusively, in terms of illegal immigration as public security concern. More specifically, national security strategic thinking is focused here on countering implications of mass inflow of illegal immigrants for both national and Schengen border regime functionality, public order, and social cohesion. Interestingly, forging the EU's integrated border control seems the only common denominator for the EU member states national security strategic perspectives on migration-security nexus.

As concluded by João Estevens, „the securitization of migration is very much the securitization of immigration and is more focused on securing the nation-state and its population than securing the (im)migrants. Though migration is recognized as a transnational phenomenon that requires cooperation, there is an uncertain path on how MS address, and in some cases even ignore, the cooperation with the EU on migration issues besides integrated border management. In general, the lack of clear similar patterns of change reveals a divergent approach to migration-security nexus probably due to different security and defence strategic cultures inside the EU, though it is difficult to assess that just by analysing national security and defence strategies."[18]

Against this general comparative perspective on migration–security in the EU member states national security strategic cultures we can now move into an empirical case study illustration of migration securitization in Central European political discourses.

In line with the Copenhagen School's orthodoxy and following Gabriella Lazaridis, Givi Gigitashvili and Katarzyna W. Sidło assume that „[s]ecuritization of migration is [therefore] a 'top down' process, in which various political, societal and security elites present migration as an existential threat to fundamental values of . . . societies and states."

Following this conceptual construct, Givi Gigitashvili and Katarzyna W. Sidło offer a wide spectrum of empirical evidence of what could be identified as

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[17]   J. Estevens, "Migration Crisis in the EU…"
[18]   Ibid., p. 15.

existentialization of migration-security nexus in Central Europe. Political leaders, public intellectuals, and opinion leaders who adopt the rhetoric of migrants as mass others posing imminent threat to national security and national identity seem to conform with the discursive securitization of migrants.[19]

Thus, a common feature of the Central European discursive securitization is the fact that it was „implemented through employment of speech acts portraying migrants and asylum seekers as a threat to the respective countries' i) internal security (including economic security) and sovereignty (i.e. state security), and ii) (Christian) culture and identity (i.e. societal security). Refugees and migrants were depicted as terrorist wishing to impose their own (Islamic) values and culture and benefit from V4 welfare, all with a blessing from Brussels attempting to impose refugee quotas against the will of the Visegrad countries' governments (and people)."[20]

It needs to be noted that the discursive securitization of migrants remains a key narrative in the recent migration-border crisis on the EU-Belarus border. Here again securitizing actors portray migrants and refugees as illegal immigrants who should be considered an existential threat to national security.

Another important, although seemingly underestimated, dimension of the discursive securitization of migrants related to the recent EU-Belarus migration-border security nexus is domestic terrorism factor. As pointed out insightfully by Graig R. Klein:

Securitisation framing of refugees and migrants, and associated political rhetoric, can have massive negative implications for countries. Such rhetoric could increase the percentage of a country's population who are hesitant, fearful, or outraged about living near or having non-native residents in their community or neighbourhood. This then fuels an increased likelihood of domestic terrorism as some individuals turn to, and may think they are supported in, direct violent actions such as domestic terrorism.[21]

By way of concluding remarks, it seems to me legitimate to assume that a discursive securitization of migrants has been a permanent feature not only of Central European political discourses. The recent Central European case study of symbolic othering of migrants on the EU-Belarus border could be considered part of a wider historical European picture. As it is put in a seminal paper by Dimitris Serafis, Sara

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[19]   G. Gigitashvili, K.W. Sidlo, "Merchants of Fear…," p. 2.
[20]   Ibid., pp. 6-7.
[21]   G.R. Klein, "Reframing Threats from Migrants in Europe," [online] https://icct.nl/ publication/reframing-threats-from migrants-in-europe/, accessed 22 January 2022.

Grecoa, Chiara Pollarolia, and Chiara Jermini-Martinez Soria, inspired by Michael Holliday and Christian Matthiessen:

> Overall, the represented actors are conceptualized as a threatening mass – something 'other' (analogous to a natural disaster) which flows into Greece. The 'prepositional circumstantial' of the 'location/place' (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004, p. 262) realized by the prepositional nominal group 'in the Eastern Aegean' situates the invasion ('Wave of inflows') on the Greek-Turkish borders, advancing the sense of danger and threat in light of the traumatic past and fragile bilateral relations between the two states.[22]

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[22] D. Serafis, S. Greco, C. Pollaroli, C. Jermini-Martinez Soria, "Towards an Integrated Argumentative Approach to Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis: Evidence from the Portrayal of Refugees and Immigrants in Greek Newspapers," *Critical Discourse Studies*, 17/5 (2020), p. 552; See also: M.A.K. Halliday, Ch.M.I.M. Matthiessen, *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*, London 2004.

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ABSTRACT

In what follows, I will look upon narratives, policies and perceptions of civilizational othering of migrants in contemporary Central Europe through conceptual lens of civilizational identity perspective. The chapter presents a plethora of insights on how immigrants become civilizational others as part of securitization narratives. The empirical case study will be securitization of immigration policy in Central Europe.

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Solidarity With and For the Other and Responsibility For the Other in Light of Reciprocity of Social Interactions

An Insight into Philosophy of the Other

Introduction

Interpersonal solidarity and solidarity between states are more and more increasingly relevant for contemporary European societies. The more we experience the lack of solidarity, the more we see its necessity. Solidarity, like responsibility, is a concept that does not have a long tradition in either European society or social science. Although solidarity and responsibility were considered in social science earlier, these two concepts were not fully discussed until the 19th and 20th centuries. The evolution of the concepts of solidarity and responsibility shows the influence the development of social phenomena has had on philosophy as well as the impact of theoretical considerations of their sense and meaning. Philosophy contributes to these processes by readdressing these concepts and deepening their meaning.

A good example of this is the political transformation in Poland in the 1980s, in which the concept of solidarity played a key role. The philosophical analysis of the

phenomena, performed by Józef Tischner at the time when the Solidarity movement was being established, contributed fundamentally to the deepening of the meaning of the word solidarity' and, most importantly, to changes in social awareness. Tischner's thought draws its inspiration from the phenomenological trend, i.e. the philosophy of Husserl, Scheler, and the philosophy of dialogue. This enables solidarity and responsibility to be analyzed through the prism of the philosophy of dialogue. Thanks to it, the problem of solidarity and responsibility can be grounded in an important problem in European culture, which is the issue of identity.

The question of identity is, in a sense, an extension of the question about human being and his essence. The question what makes a human being is an issue that appears in the philosophy of the other and is to be related to identity and interpersonal interactions. It is precisely on this background that we see the need for solidarity and responsibility, which points to the root experience of the problem of **identity** and the meaning of **interpersonal relations**. Therefore, the aim of the article is to show solidarity and responsibility through the prism of the mutual relationship between human beings based on the criterion of identity.

The chapter consists of two parts. The first part discusses the **problem of responsibility** which arises from the question about oneself and identity. The second part is devoted to **different experiences of solidarity** as framed by the role the other plays in one's identity construction as well as juxtaposition of solidarity with responsibility presented from the perspective of the philosophy of dialogue as well as phenomenology focused on intersubjective relations.

Since its very beginning, and with a particular intensity in the modern age, philosophy framed and transformed the meaning of solidarity and identity. It was a living organism that expressed changes taking place in human mentality and in philosophy itself. Philosophy changed the perspective of human being as member of social community – society. Modernity is particularly important because philosophy had so huge an impact on this epoch as never before or after. At the same time, modernity confirmed the accuracy of a philosophical diagnosis concerning European culture. In general, this problem is related to the subject that is treated as the omnipotent owner of the world, judging others. It also depicts the world of nature through the prism of human perspective. This reduction of the surrounding world to one's perspective is devastating for human being. This tendency stems from focusing on 'I/myself' as opposed to the need of building social bonds. How to build these bonds in a culture for which it is the *ego* that matters the most? The idea of solidarity comes to the rescue by providing platform for bringing people – otherwise disparate in terms of in social roles and social interactions – together.

In this chapter, the phenomena of solidarity and responsibility for both one-self and the community are presented through the prism of the search for human identity. The identification with the community plays an important role for every man; the identification that results in it that a person wants to relate to himself, to reveal his nature, but also to express his communion with others. The problem of identity is a very important and at the same time very sensitive one surrounded with many misinterpretations and simplifications. It is fully revealed through solidarity and responsibility. Therefore, we will deal with the phenomenon of responsibility and solidarity "with" and "for" others. We will refer to the question of identity and its various conceptualizations.

1. Responsibility For Myself and Others

The concept of identity – one of the key questions aside from to the question of where I am, which community I belong to – is an integral part of human culture. Let us begin with Herder, who assumes that this question has been integral to human civilization since its every beginning.

Answering this question, Herder claims, was essential for fulfilment of basic needs like finding food. But when did humans begin to think that they were distinct individuals? When did they begin to realize that humans were distinct from surrounding animals? This question is still relevant today. Nowadays we can even say that the question of identity and the attempt to answer the question about human being and their place in the world is a fundamental question that is difficult to answer unequivocally despite the fact that each of us is a human being. This problem has become particularly important in modern times since Descartes and his orthodoxy: "I think, therefore I am." Then the problem of 'I/myself' begins to crystallize. On its basis, a special interpersonal bond appears. Let us, then, return to the question of identity.

1.1. Responsibility From the Perspective of Identity Construction

At the very foundation of the concept of identity, there is a question not only about the nature of human being, but also a question of who I am. It is precisely this that characterizes contemporary European philosophy. Since Descartes and later on through Kant, 'I' becomes the focal point of philosophy.

The philosophy of dialogue also addresses the problem of identity. It offers a perspective through which responsibility and solidarity could be assigned a new, deeper

meaning. The question of 'I' and its identity finds a new meaning in relation to the 'other.' Initially, it was the Franz Rosenzweig's and Martin Buber's thought, which was of particular importance here. Both of them perceived this problem in light of existing metaphysics and therefore their philosophy has a religious basis. Through such analytical lens, this metaphysics gains new foundations. According to Buber and Rosenzweig, the concept of responsibility does not emerge directly. It rather emerges as a special kind of relationship based on revelation. Descartes and the tradition of European culture focused on the subject were unable to answer the question of who the human being is. The philosophy of dialogue perceives the problem of identity through the prism of another human being. Only the problem of responsibility in a specific sense will emerge from it, and a little later, the concept of solidarity.

1.2. The Etymology of the Responsibility Concept[1]

The term 'responsibility' does not have as long a tradition as 'truth' or 'freedom,' but it is especially important these days. One of the first philosophical works to deal with the concept of responsibility is *On Freedom* by John Stuart Mill. He focuses on responsibility through the prism of accountability for faults committed. Friedrich Nietzsche also uses the term 'responsible' in *The Genealogy of Morality*, discussing a process in the history of mankind that makes man more and more calculable and orderly, capable of keeping promises.

However, responsibility has only relatively recently become the subject of more extensive research. The first monograph on it was published as late as 1884; it was written by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl and was entitled *L'idée de responsabilité*.[2] Lévy-Bruhl addressed the problem of the meaning of responsibility by analyzing the thought of John Stuart Mill, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant, and pointed to two areas in which the concept of responsibility emerged. The first area concerns the subject shaped on the rational and free nature of human being, the second – moral awareness. Three decades later, Max Weber approached the ethics of responsibility

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[1]   In this short chapter, the passages in which reference is made to authors addressing the problem of responsibility in the past are English translations of sentences found in M. R e b e s, *Między imputatio i respondere. Martina Heideggera i Józefa Tischnera hermeneutyka odpowiedzialności w horyzoncie ontologii, agatologii i aksjologii*, cz. 1, Kraków [cop. 2014], p. 15.

[2]   L. L é v y - B r u h l, *L'idée de responsabilité*, Paris 1884. See also K. B a y e r t z, "Die Idee der Verantwortung. Zur erstaunlichen Karriere einer ethischen Kategorie," in *Arzneimittel und Verantwortung. Grundlagen und Methoden der Pharmaethik*, ed. by W. W a g n e r, Berlin–New York 1993, p. 435.

(*Verantwortungsethik*).[3] He saw responsibility as the ratio of the anticipated result of one's own action to the action itself.

1.2.1. Responsibility as Respondere *and* Imputatio

Mill, Hume, and Kant understood responsibility through the prism of ethics and accountability for the act committed. Responsibility understood in this way refers to the Latin word *imputatio*. However, as the example of phenomenology and, above all, the philosophy of dialogue shows, it is responsibility as *respondere* that forms the basis of responsibility.[4] It reveals the structure of the relationship 'with' and 'for.' The term *respondere* means an attempt to answer a given question. It also has an ethical sense, although it may refer to the ontological question of being oneself. The phenomenological trend created by Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl is of particular importance here.

1.3. The Concept of Responsibility in Light of Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl, Roman Ingarden, and Karol Wojtyła

The concept of responsibility appears also in Edmund Husserl's, Roman Ingarden's, and Karol Wojtyła's works. It plays, however, a different role in their particular philosophical systems.

Husserl's philosophy became an inspiration to some extent for philosophy of dialogue as exemplified by Levinas, Ingarden, and Wojtyła, to whom Tischner, one of the most influential philosophers of dialogue in Poland, referred. Let us, then, turn to Husser's thought in order to understand better his influence on Tischner's conceptualization of responsibility.

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[3]   See Max We b e r in: *Geistige Arbeit als Beruf: Vier Vorträge vor dem Freistudentischem*, vol. 2, München 1919, p. 56ff.

[4]   M. R e b e s, *Między imputatio i respondere…*, vol. 1, Kraków [cop. 2014], p. 20.

1.3.1. Edmund Husserl: Responsibility for One Own's Acting and Researching Inter-subjectivity

For Edmund Husserl, responsibility is an essential concept. It appears explicitly when Husserl discusses **the crisis of science and the need to concentrate on the source** (1), and when he discusses the **problem of inter-subjectivity** (2).

In the first case (1), the philosopher needs to focus on the question of the source of the phenomenon under investigation. Many ideas contributed to the development of this position; they are reflected in the works and series of lectures given by Husserl, starting with *Logical Investigations* (1901)[5] or *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy – First Book* (1913).[6] Husserl then deals with the problems of numbers, the concept of time, and the criticism of psychology, asking about source experiences and the 'pure ego.'[7] In his first works devoted to phenomenology, he addresses the problem of the subject, the constitution of the pure self. Later, he would focus on the overall picture of phenomenology. It is then that the works are created that present in effect the philosopher's responsibility.

In 1922, Husserl gave four lectures in London, which he published subsequently as *Meditationes de prima philosophia* in the references to Descartes.[8] A year later, he delivered classes on 'first philosophy.' It is in their course that the concept of 'I am' appears. At this time, Husserl comes to the conclusion that the question of a radical beginning requires the philosopher's responsibility towards humanity. Initially, the question of 'I am' comes down to the question of the pure life of the I, which requires the rejection of the current ideal of knowledge. Husserl developed the concept of responsibility in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (1935).[9] Responsibility shows as the responsibility of the philosopher for abandoning beliefs and convictions in favor of reflection

5 E. H u s s e r l, *Logical Investigations*, London 1973.

6 I d e m, *Ideas Pertaining to A Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book. General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, The Hague–Boston–Hingham 1982.

7 At the time when Husserl published his first book of the *Ideas*, he already had an outline of his second and third books, which were to be further developed and published. Later, he entrusted the edition of his manuscripts to E. Stein and L. Langrebe. The editing of the subsequent books prepared by them would not be approved by Husserl.

8 K. Ś w i ę c i c k a, *Husserl*, Warszawa 2005, p. 32.

9 E. H u s s e r l, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, transl. by D. C a r r, Evanston 1970, *Northwestern University studies in phenomenology and existential philosophy*.

on his own 'I am.' The philosopher must, therefore, cut off his radical attitude and radical criticism of life.

In the second case (2), responsibility is shown through the prism of inter-subjectivity. This problem only appeared in Husserl's work in 1927, when he dealt with the concept of "empathy" (*Einfuhlung*). Then the question of 'I' and 'other' emerges. Examining the problem of the original consciousness of Self and the source experience of the world in it, Husserl criticizes the question of the subject that has been present in philosophy since the times of Descartes. At this stage, there is room not only for the 'I' but also for the 'Other.' The latter will not be discussed in Husserl's philosophy. It will not be a foundation for it, although over time Husserl will draw attention to the problem of the other 'I' through the prism of the surrounding world.

In 1928, Husserl lectured in Amsterdam, and the following year in Paris. Emmanuel Levinas was attending Husserl's lectures then. On the basis of the Paris lectures, Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations*,[10] was drafted. It was initially translated, and later on the German version was to be expanded. Husserl considered it "the main work of his life."

In 1931, Husserl was invited by Kant-Gesellschaft as he was preparing to lecture in Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, and Halle. Inspired by Descartes' *Meditations,* Husserl coined the idea of transcendental phenomenology, which is based on "self-reflection [*Selbstbesinnung*] and a sense of responsibility."[11] Husserl had dealt with this problem earlier, in the fifth meditation on inter-subjectivity, when he wrote about the relationship between what is own and what is foreign.

These two aspects in Husserl show a responsibility that is interpreted from the perspective of 'I.' Phenomenology is to respond to the crisis of science. Philosophers referring to Husserl's philosophy, such as Scheler, Ingarden, and Heidegger, will also deal with the problem of responsibility.

1.3.2. Max Scheler: Responsibility in Light of Compassion and Being Responsible

Max Scheler was another representative of phenomenology directly inspired by Husserl. That was the case especially during his Freiburg period. Scheler focused on

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[10] Idem, *Cartesian Meditations* [*An Introduction to Phenomenology*], [London] 1973; idem, *Medytacje kartezjańskie*, transl. by A. Wajs, Warszawa 1982.

[11] K. Święcicka, op. cit., p. 43; I. Kern, "Einleitung des Herausgeber," in: E. Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität: Texte aus dem Nachlass Dritter Teil: 1929–1935*, den Haag 1973.

phenomenology through the prism of ethics. In his works, the problem of the other, responsibility for oneself and for others, and the need for solidarity appear. Max Scheler presents man as person and shows his relationship with values, his experience of values. In 1913-1916, he wrote his main works: *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*[12] and *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle und von Liebe und Haas*,[13] in which he touches on the problem of human emotions that go beyond the sphere of hedonistic experiences. In the former, Scheler draws attention to the person's bodily and spiritual integrity and values. In this context, the experience of responsibility and shared responsibility appears.

Scheler viewed responsibility through the prism of accountability understood as "sanity" (*Zurechnungsfähigkeit*);[14] owing to which, it is possible to function in a community. Any action and responsibility require a certain degree of sanity, the ability to be responsible. Responsibility appears through the prism of the person as an individual as well as a collective person. A human being needs a community to realize values. It is only on this basis that responsibility and co-responsibility for the implementation of values come up. According to Scheler, responsibility for the committed act (i.e. responsibility as *imputatio*) can be assigned to someone who is capable of being responsible, has the ability to answer.[15] In this sense, responsibility emerges as *respondere*, responding to something, but it is nevertheless a response understood not so much as an answer to a challenge, but rather as the ability to respond.

In the work entitled *The Essence and Forms of Sympathy* (1926),[16] Scheler points to a responsibility that precedes any judgment, that is, shows its source character.[17] It is prior to acts and is based on a feeling of community. Scheler emphasizes that man is a social being, and therefore 'I' is always in some 'We' for him.[18] This book develops

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[12]   M. S c h e l e r, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik. Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalismus*, 5 ed., Bern–München 1966.

[13]   I d e m, *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle und von Liebe und Haas*, Halle 1913. See A. W ę g r z e c k i, "Wstęp," in M. S c h e l e r, *Istota i formy sympatii*, transl. by A. W ę g r z e c k i, Warszawa 1986, p. IX.

[14]   M. S c h e l e r, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik…*, p. 478.

[15]   M. R e b e s, *Między imputatio i respondere. Martina Heideggera i Józefa Tischnera hermeneutyka odpowiedzialności w horyzoncie ontologii, agatologii i aksjologii*, vol. 2-3, Kraków 2018, p. 222.

[16]   The work dedicated to this investigation is Scheler's *The Nature of Sympathy* (original German title, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie* literally means the "essence and forms of sympathy").

[17]   He presents it in a new part which appeared almost ten years after the publication of *Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle und von Liebe und Haas*. It was supplemented by part C, which was entitled *On the Other Self*.

[18]   M. S c h e l e r, *Istota…*, pp. 344-345.

the thought initiated in Formalism that sensuality is not limited to hedonistic values; the key experience is feeling love and hate.

The principle of compassion and sympathy is shown. It is through its prism that the area of responsibility is slowly emerging. Scheler, referring to Schopenhauer and Bergson at that time, emphasizes the importance of feelings in ethics. Instead of the term *symferon*,[19] which Heidegger will use to indicate co-existence as an important element of being in the world and being oneself, Scheler uses the term *sympathia*.[20] In this way, he alludes to Husserl, who takes up the problem of empathy and values common to all. The experience of sympathy precedes all intellectual cognition, it is the basis of the possibility of empathy. Scheler does not represent the philosophy of dialogue, but in *The Essence and Forms of Sympathy*, he discovers the experience of 'Thou.'

1.3.3. Roman Ingarden: Responsibility as Potential Possibility

Roman Ingarden referred to Husserl, too. In a paper entitled *Über die Verantwortung. Ihre ontischen Fundamente*,[21] delivered at the 14th International Philosophical Congress in Vienna in 1968, Ingarden, Husserl's student, presented responsibility through the prism of the question of why human being can act in accordance with responsibility norm. Ingarden draws attention to the fact that any attribution of responsibility must be preceded by a potential possibility of responding, i.e. being accountable. Jacek Juliusz Jadacki challenged this position, accusing Ingarden of omitting the important element of responsibility, which is responsibility for something and for someone.[22] The expanded content of Ingarden's Viennese lecture was published in German two years later. This lecture in Polish was only published after Ingarden's death. The position of Ingarden will be defended by his student, Władysław Stróżewski, in the journal *Philosophical Studies*. Responsibility, in their opinion, has an ontological basis, i.e. before 'I' can be held accountable, 'I' must be accountable.[23]

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[19]   M. Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, ed. by I. Schüssler, Frankfurt am Main 1976, p. 64, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 18.

[20]   M. Scheler, *Istota…*, p. 121.

[21]   See: D. Gierulanka in: R. Ingarden, *Książeczka o człowieku*, transl. by A. Węgrzecki, Kraków 1999, p. 8.

[22]   W. Jadacki, „Odpowiedzialność i istnienie świata," *Studia Filozoficzne*, 5 (1973), pp. 245-257.

[23]   W. Stróżewski, „Nad «Książeczką o człowieku»," *Studia Filozoficzne*, 9 (1973), pp. 123-126.

1.3.4. Karol Wojtyła: Responsibility of the Individual for Its Own Acting

Following Scheler and Ingarden, Karol Wojtyła also referred to Husserl. The concept of responsibility plays an important role in Wojtyła's philosophical system, although his considerations on responsibility are shown through the prism of the 'I' and his experience of values. Even when 'another' appears, it is shown as the "alter ego." It should be noted, however, that this presentation of values and their experiencing shows the necessity for the participation of others, even if through the prism of 'I.'

In his book *Love and Responsibility* (1960),[24] Wojtyła focuses on responsibility, dealing with its theological and anthropological approach. He presents responsibility through the prism of love. For this purpose, he refers to the concept of love presented by Scheler. Responsibility for one another is at the center of mutual love. He shows it from the perspective of sexuality. The basis of sexuality is the experience of human existence and the good that can be realized together.

Also in his main work entitled *The Acting Person* (1969),[25] Wojtyła takes up the problem of responsibility, which he understands through the prism of responding, or *respondere*. Wojtyła states, "When man agrees to be responsible for his own actions, he does so because he has the experience of responsibility and because he has the ability to respond with his will to values."[26] The obligation to respond to values expresses the meaning of responsibility. Responsibility is not based on the relationship with another person, but on the duty to respond to values. Responsibility in the moral sense has a certain structure "to someone" and "for someone." This "to someone" transforms into responsibility for oneself before one's conscience, in front of oneself, that is, it is revealed by self-responsibility. Responsibility appears at the level of revealing the person. It shows a special nature, i.e. subordinating one's own freedom to objective truth.

1.3.5. Martin Heidegger: Responsibility from the Ontological Perspective

The aforementioned philosophers (Scheler, Ingarden, and Wojtyła) focus on responsibility through the prism of the possibility of responding. They also made an important transition from a philosophy centered on 'I' towards thinking that binds 'me' with another's 'I.' Martin Heidegger also referred to Husserl's phenomenology.

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[24]   K. Wojtyła, *Love and responsibility*, transl. by H.T. Willetts, London 1982.

[25]   Idem, *The Acting Person*, transl. by A. Potocki, Dodrecht [cop. 1979], *Analecta Husserliana*, vol. 10.

[26]   Ibid., p. 170.

Heidegger did not seem to address the problem of responsibility. The concept appears only sporadically and is not the main issue that he deals with. However, it does play an important role in his philosophical system. According to Heidegger, responsibility does not have an ethical dimension, but an ontological one. Heidegger does not see responsibility for the other person, but, following Husserl, focuses on the 'I' as being distinguished. Initially,[27] he focuses on the philosophy of life, therefore he understands responsibility as 'responding,' as my attitude to the fulfillment of my life. Over time, Heidegger will replace life with the concept of being. In this sense, responsibility is shown not by the German word *Verantwortung*, but *überantworten*."[28] Both of these words consist of a prefix added to the source word *antworten/-ung*, which means 'to correspond.' Therefore, Heidegger does not understand responsibility as being responsible for one's own act, but as a source openness to one's own being. *Dasein* goes beyond oneself to find oneself in his being. It entrusts itself to being in which it is. Searching for an answer to the source experience, the source identity of *Dasein*, Heidegger finds it in the relation to his own being. Responsibility can be understood as entrusting yourself to your own being. Referring to one's own being is accompanied by other beings that can be defined as the world of what comes from nature, as well as the world of things that are a product of *Dasein*. *Dasein* can slip into an inauthentic way of being, trying to be in the way of other beings. A wrong way of being means that *Dasein* falls into being existing or handy. *Dasein* lives not its own life, but beings that serve something.

Apart from beings which are unlike *Dasein*, there are also beings that exist like *Dasein*.[29] They appear in Heidegger's reasoning when he shows **the problem of co-existence** and **falling prey into oneself** (*Man-Selbst*).[30] Although Heidegger does not focus on dialogicality, what is remarkable is that he makes a special distinction of 'being of other' entities existing in the *Dasein* way. It should be emphasized that when he was coining the philosophy of dialogue in 1923, Heidegger also tried to find the source experience that distinguished man. He focused on co-existence (*symferon*), and good, but understood them through the prism of the question of being. In this

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[27] M. H e i d e g g e r, *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie* [*mit einer Nachschrift der Vorlesung „Über das Wesen der Universität und des akademischen Studiums"*], ed. by B. H e i m b u c h e l, Frankfurt am Main 1987, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 56/57, p. 4.

[28] I d e m, *Being and Time*, transl. by J. S t a m b a u g h, New York 1996, p. 252; J. F i l e k, *Filozofia odpowiedzialności XX wieku*, Kraków 2003, p. 136; M. R e b e s, *Między respondere i imputatio*…, vol. 1, p. 178, 191.

[29] M. H e i d e g g e r, *Being*…, pp. 107, 108.

[30] Ibid., pp. 121, 252.

context, Heidegger's problem of temporality emerges, which is not understood in the colloquial sense, but through the prism of care. Falling into the wrong way of being as well as falling into yourself is an integral part of being yourself. In the horizon of falling into oneself, the cry of conscience is revealed, which Heidegger understands not in an ethical, moral, but ontological way. The voice of conscience calls, "you want to be yourself."[31] In temporality, the call is revealed as a desire to have a conscience, to free yourself from yourself. This call is an important part of being yourself. It is precisely this openness that shows responsibility as entrusting oneself to being. Responsibility is understood as responding, openness, entrusting oneself to one's own being, which is always mine. In this sense, as Levinas would later notice, *Dasein* is lonely because it is reliant only on its own being.

The problem of co-existence turns into the problem of timing, and the problem of being *Dasein* turns into being oneself over time. Then, Heidegger departed from the analysis of *Dasein* and focused on the happening of being. Being manifests itself through speech, so instead of *überantworten* the concept *entsprechen* appears.[32] The word represents the 'game.' Responsibility is then speaking out and withdrawing from yourself. Heidegger, in this case, does not raise the problem of responsibility in terms of ethics, but ontology that precedes all consciousness. For Heidegger, however, it will never be a responsibility in the sense of being responsible for an action, but responding to the summons of conscience, which does not judge us but urges to be ourselves. In the case of *entsprechen*, there is no more room for coexistence, for the call of conscience: the very being manifests itself in thinking, in the discourse of thinking, the aim of which is to show being itself. Then the key role is played by the truth as non-secretiveness.

Although Heidegger does not deal with responsibility in the moral sense, it is in his environment, which is worth emphasizing, that the concept of responsibility becomes important. In 1933, Wilhelm Weischedel's book *Wesen der Verantwortung*[33] was published, which was a doctoral dissertation defended under Martin Heidegger. It is the first monograph on responsibility written in German. Weischedel perceives

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[31] Ibid., p. 301.
[32] The same one referred to by Heidegger in M. H e i d e g g e r, *Ku rzeczy myślenia*, transl. by K. M i c h a l s k i, J. M i z e r a, C. W o d z i ń s k i, Warszawa 1999, p. 29, and in i d e m, *Co zwie się myśleniem?*, transl. by J. M i z e r a, Warszawa–Wrocław 2000, p. 173, referring to answering with the words *Sagen* and *Entsprechen*. Idem, *Odczyty i rozprawy*, transl. by J. M i z e r a, Warszawa 2007, p. 174f; M. R e b e s, *Między imputatio i respondere…*, vol. 1, p. 191.
[33] W. W e i s c h e d e l, *Das Wesen der Verantwortung. Ein Versuch*, Freiburg im Breisgau 1933.

responsibility through the prism of speech (*Rede*) and presents it from the perspective of being human and caring for oneself.

Georg Picht also devotes his research to responsibility[34] but unlike Weischedel, he draws attention to a responsibility that is yet to happen. Responsibility is not analyzed through the prism of the past, but through certain possibilities that it gives to man. Picht, like Ingarden later, sees that the basis of responsibility is potency, not evils previously done. Responsibility understood through the prism of the source experience of being became an inspiration for many thinkers who wanted to look for a basis in the ethical experience of good through Heidegger's criticism. In opposition to Heidegger, a philosophy of dialogue emerged, e.g. the philosophy of Levinas, which focused on demonstrating that a meeting with the 'other' is the source experience.

1.4. Philosophy of Dialog: From Justice to Responsibility – Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, Emmanuel Levinas

Philosophers of dialogue gave a new twist to the search for identity. The key problem for them is not to focus on oneself, but on the other. They draw inspiration from the one who accompanies us. The philosophy of dialogue and Heidegger's theory of coexistence, developed in a similar period, reverse the order: it is not your own being but being for the other that reveals the essence of philosophy.

These philosophies focus on the problem of the other, on concepts such as trust and love. The thought of Franz Rosenzweig and Emmanuel Levinas is a relatively interesting and direct reference to responsibility. For Scheler, responsibility is presented through the prism of atheism. It is definitely different with Rosenzweig. As Berhard Casper argues in his Jerusalem speech, Rosenzweig's thought is based on responsibility.[35]

Rosenzweig presents the relationship between man and God and thus shows the space of the freedom of man, who is created by God, but given by him the freedom

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[34]   G. Picht, *Wahrheit, Vernunft, Verantwortung. Philosophische Studien*, Stuttgart [cop. 1969]; idem, *Die Verantwortung des Geistes: Pädagogische und politische Schriften*, Stuttgart 1969. See: M. Rebes, *Między respondere i imputatio…*, vol. 1, p. 16.

[35]   B. Casper, F. Rosenzweig, "Die gerettete Verantwortung. Über ein Grundmotiv seines Denkens," in *Sein und Schein der Religion*, ed. by A. Halder, K. Kienzler, J. Möller, Dusseldorf 1983, pp. 274-296. This article is based on a lecture prepared for the symposium *The Philosophy of Franz Rosenzweig*, given by Casper in Jerusalem on 29 April 1980. This symposium is also referred to by J. Filek in his book *Filozofia odpowiedzialności…*, p. 64ff.

through which man can attain salvation. The very fact of creation is a determination, but a loving God waits for man to have him saved. Man's responsibility for responding to God, who created him, lies within the space of creation and salvation.

Rosenzweig shows human responsibility through the prism of creation, revelation, and salvation.[36] From this perspective, there emerges a relationship between God and man, between man's freedom and God's omnipotence.

Responsibility in Rosenzweig appears through speech act, which is a gift from God. It is through speech act that responsibility becomes a key element of Rosenzweig's thought. As he himself says, man became himself when he began to speak and to use the gift through which God reveals himself to man. Within the realm of speech act, God reveals himself and gives a human being the opportunity to respond to his words with speech. This speech is existential. It would not be possible to show the possibility of responding through speech if Rosenzweig did not perceive the prafenomena, which are a-theistic. God leaves man and the world for God to express himself through man. In this way, responsibility is responding to God's voice. In speech act, we experience the root experience of responsibility as responding to a call. The constitution of the source experience in speech will be taken over by other representatives of this philosophy, such as Buber or Levinas.

In *I and Thou*, Buber talks about responsibility twice. Responsibility first appears in the experience of love. Buber states that love is the responsibility for the other. He presents it positively. In the second fragment, he presents it negatively, through the process of "impoverishment of the experience of responsibility."[37] In Buber, responsibility is understood through the prism of a special bond that links the pair of me and you. In a way, responsibility is the foundation but also a consequence of love. Buber's me-you is symmetrical. None of these elements can be separate; in the relationship, 'I' needs 'You' and 'You' needs 'I.' This symmetrical relationship happens in speech between us. Although Buber shows responsibility through the prism of love, he does not make it a fundamental concept of philosophy.

It was only Emmanuel Levinas who focused on responsibility as the basic experience in his philosophy.[38] Initially, this concept does not matter much, but over time, especially in his major works such as *Totality and the Infinity* and *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, it becomes more and more important. Levinas translates Husserl's

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[36] J. Filek, op. cit., p. 71.

[37] M. Buber, *Ja i Ty. Wybór pism filozoficznych*, transl. by J. Doktór, Warszawa 1992, p. 47.

[38] Tischner notes that Husserl and philosophy to date lack dialogicality. See J. Tischner, *Myślenie według wartości*, Kraków 1993, p. 193; idem, *Filozofia człowieka dla duszpasterzy i artystów*, Kraków 1991, p. 117.

work *Cartesian Meditations*, which speaks about intersubjectivism, about the relationship to the other 'I,' into French.

Levinas was in close conceptual proximity to Husserl.[39] He was also inspired by Heidegger and the problem of ontology. It was not so much that he directly agreed with them, but through his polemics he developed his own philosophical system in which the relationship between the 'I' and the other 'I' plays a fundamental role. Following Husserl, he criticizes modern science, including philosophy, in order to present its foundations on the basis of the human-to-human relationship. As Heidegger, he criticizes the existing metaphysics, but instead of ontology, he uses ethics, which shows empathy much more radically than Scheler.

Responsibility did not become a key concept in general philosophical thought until the 1960s. It emerged from the fact of "being for the other," which means that I am "a gift to someone." To be for another is to make a gift of oneself. Levinas' philosophy focuses on the problem of the "nature" of man who is responsible for the other. Each person is responsible for himself and for good which constitutes in the relationship between me and other[40].

The Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* shows man as a loner, "*homo solitarius*."[41] Levinas replaces this idea with a social man, **homo socius**. In rational thinking, man is presented as a loner even when he joins other people's discourse. Levinas criticizes the subject problem in Descartes. It focuses on the experience of the other who anticipates the awareness of being.

In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas begins his reflection by presenting the self-experience of self. It shows the basic self-reference to itself, to its own body. He calls it 'interiority,' in which he shows the relation of the 'I' to its own world. Man as an individual, being an element of nature, needs a home and work. However, constructing the house does not bring what is expected. Another human being is needed. The 'another' is not given by intentional acts but by facial epiphanies.

At the core of Levinas's thinking is the experience of the face he takes from Rosenzweig. The epiphany of another's face makes my identity questionable, but because it is being questioned, I feel 'I am.' It is not someone else but 'I' who is being challenged. The relationship with the 'Other' carries a certain mystery. The other one is unpredictable, which is why I fear others. In the meeting, conversation with

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[39] Levinas writes about this in the following works: *Théorie de l'intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl*, Vrin 1930; *De l'existence à l'existant*, Vrin 1947; *En découvrant l'existence avec Husserl et Heidegger*, Vrin 1949.

[40] J. T i s c h n e r, *Filozofia człowieka…*, p. 110.

[41] J. F i l e k, op. cit., p. 88.

the other, I feel anxious, fearful because I come too late. Fear can hold back, lead to destruction, bring a state of melancholy, stop, but the fear of the other leads to the suppression of the desire to take over the world, over another. Yet another fear is more poignant, it is responsibility for the other, for the evil that he experiences. It is this feeling of commitment, the fear of not being with others, that makes me abandon myself. My freedom is in question. The freedom to choose becomes the choice to be responsible for the other. Real fear is the fear of being one behind the other. Fear for oneself through the experience of another turns into fear in the horizon of responsibility, of being responsible for the other.

A call addressed to me by another obliges me to answer. Responsibility appears then through the prism of responses that move me, obliging me to respond, to be responsible. This obligation is not compulsory, but it is such an exhortation that I see it as if it comes from me. A human desire is discovered to be with and for others. In this being for another, I want to be a gift for another. Levinas uses the concept of sacrifice here.

By an act of sacrifice, the fear of 'I/myself' turns into fear of failing to take responsibility for the other. Helplessness, the feeling that I can do nothing, makes me experience the destruction of my own thinking aimed at achieving a specific goal, including domination over another. Metaphysics in its classic approach could not explain the problem of fear or the relationship with another human being. The philosophy of dialogue, including that of Levinas, takes a step forward. Metaphysics is not an abstract concept in it, but something that I experience when meeting another. Metaphysics manifests itself in giving oneself to the other. For me to make a sacrifice, I must first experience the closeness of another's face. Levinas does not consider which comes first, it does not matter. What is important, however, is that in offering himself to others, he moves towards himself, towards seeking his own identity. I withdraw from myself to be for another. Fear of something turns into fear for someone. I am not afraid for myself or what is threatening me, but my fear is the fear that I am not fair enough with others. Since there is evil, I am not fair enough since should I be fair, evil would not exist.

Levians' justice has a much deeper meaning. It relates to the relationship between God and man, as well as between man and man. Justice is based on the divine law, from which man and God cannot deviate. This law is obligatory, which means that it must be accepted by man as his own, as flowing from his will.

Showing the problem of identity and relationship with another in *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas uses the concept of **separation**, also of truth and good, which is revealed in relation to another. But it was only in *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence* that Levinas made responsibility a technical concept. This book consists of previously

published works. One of them concerns the concept of substitution, which represents the special nature of being for another, of offering oneself for another. When *Totality and Infinity* talks about truth and freedom, which are manifested in a source way in the epiphany of the face, in *Otherwise than Being* there is the problem of being one for another, a substitution that develops the concept of offering and responsibility at the same time.

Levinas argues that "the responsibility for the other cannot have begun in my commitment, in my decision. The unlimited responsibility in which I find myself comes from the hither side of my freedom…"[42] As Levinas notes, good chose me before I could choose it in my freedom. True responsibility cannot be reduced to the realm of the present tense as presence, as it does to the past, to what is said, but it shows itself in speaking that cannot be summed up in terms of continuity and logical order. The speech act reveals the meaning of responsibility for another, which leads me to substitute for another against my will. This responsibility precedes object consciousness, prior to all knowledge and understanding. Responsibility is a response to the debt that I incurred due to my absence. The more I take on the problem of responsibility, the more I feel this obligation, my responsibility for another, for a debt that I incurred, even though it was not my will. In separating me from the other, the concept of substitution appears one behind the other. In this sense, responsibility in Levinas is a responsibility as a *respondere*, responding to a call, which also has the sense of *imputatio*, of taking responsibility for the evil experienced by another, even though it is not my fault.

Also, according to **Tischner**, who takes up the problem of interpersonal relations, the problem of responsibility appears. Initially, Tischner discusses responsibility in the article *Swemu istnieniu zaufać* ([To trust one's own consciousness], 1972), in which he refers to a book *Książeczka o człowieku (A Little Book about Human Being)* by Roman Ingarden.[43] He points out that Ingarden asks about a condition, about the possibility of feeling responsible.

In a text entitled *Sumienie i odpowiedzialność* [Consciousness and responsibility], published in 1977, he approaches the question of good will and conscience a key issue.[44]

The Polish translation of Levinas's book, which shows responsibility as being hostage to another, is also important. Tischner writes an introduction to a passage

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[42]   E. Levinas, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, Pittsburgh 2009, p. 10.

[43]   J. Tischner, "Swemu istnieniu zaufać," *Znak*, 11/221 (1972), pp. 1557-1562.

[44]   Idem, "Sumienie i odpowiedzialność," *W drodze*, 6 (1977), pp. 15-20. I discuss some parts of these papers in my book *Między respondere i imputatio*, vol. 2-3, p. 14.

of the Polish translation of Levinas *Otherwise than Being*, a book devoted to the problem of responsibility for the other, which precedes my freedom understood as my choice.[45]

In his article *Gra wokół odpowiedzialnosci* ([Approaching responsibility],1995), published after *The Philosophy of Drama*, Tischner tried to answer the question about the source experience of responsibility.[46] Tischner conceptualizes responsibility through the prism of accountability for the committed actions in order to reach what is the source experience of responsibility. Tischner sees it in experiencing drama. In this sense – as he says – responsibility is understood as answering a question asked by the 'Other.' It is therefore understood as *respondere*. Undoubtedly, in the article in the monograph issue of the *Znak* monthly, Tischner presented the problem of responsibility on the basis of the reflection accompanying it when writing his main work, *Philosophy of Drama* (1990). In this work, one can see the evolution of the meaning of interpersonal relations starting from the perspective of 'I,' i.e. through the prism of inter-subjectivity to a dialogical relationship based on the source experience of the encounter. In *Philosophy of Drama*, Tischner presents the problem of encounter, as well as man's way of reaching sin, which consists in breaking ties with another human being. Tischner presents it on the basis of the experience of such values as truth, beauty, and good. He shows them in the context of the specific situation of home, work, and a cemetery. Man comes to evil, which is understood as betrayal. This is because, on the one hand, he feels that he is better than the others, that he deserves someone better, and on the other hand, that he has betrayed him. For Tischner, the betrayal of another man means a loss of his self-esteem, his own identity. Another gave my existence meaning, and when I break my bond with him, I need to justify my existence again. In this sense, my identity and value comes from being with another, from responsibility for another, but in Tischner's case, in order to be responsible, you must first be free. He understands freedom, however, as a certain bond with another.

After publishing *The Philosophy of Drama*, which consisted of separate articles previously published, Tischner prepares a *The Controversy over Human Existence* in a similar formula. In the dispute over the existence of man, he shows a movement in the opposite direction, i.e., how a person returns from guilt to himself, to a state in which he can re-establish relations with another human being. The justification that God gives allows man to regain his own freedom, his identity. Tischner shows it in the horizon of creation, revelation, and salvation. He draws this inspiration from Rosenzweig, together with the thought of the freedom of man and God, which becomes the main

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[45]   J. Tischner, „Emmanuel Levinas", *Znak*, 1/259 (1976).

[46]   Idem, „Gra wokól odpowiedzialności", *Znak*, nr 10/485 (1995), pp. 47-55.

problem for Tischner. Responsibility as *imputatio* is shown again in terms of respond-ing, i.e., *respondere*. My freedom constitutes in my being able to answer a call. Although Tischner focuses on showing the relationship through the prism of human freedom, by showing it on the basis of responsiveness, he does it through responsibility.

Responsibility presented through the prism of the question of identity shows one more special value: solidarity. Tischner is one of the few dialogists who uses this concept. The concept of solidarity indicates a special kind of bond that is difficult to find in dialogues, although it is perceptible through the prism of interpersonal relationships. Tischner deals with the concept of solidarity before his main works are written. He may draw inspiration from the phenomenologists or representatives of personalism we have mentioned before, who, although far from dialogical thought, perceived the necessity of another. We are talking about Husserl, Scheler, Ingarden, and Wojtyla. It is on the basis of reading and the philosophy of dialogue by Martin Buber or Levinas that he tries to define what solidarity is. He is doing so when asked to deliver a homily at the Wawel Cathedral for members of the Solidarity movement. This path seems random, but is it so for sure? It seems evident that Tischner's analysis of Solidarity was deepened by reflection on the encounter between human beings.

2. Solidarity from the Perspective of Interpersonal Relations

In his speech at the Wawel Cathedral, Tischner states that solidarity refers to the ex-perience of a bond between people, based on mutual responsibility.[47] Tischner is then primarily influenced by phenomenology, including Heidegger's philosophy, therefore he captures relations through the prism of 'I,' but in defining solidarity he shows the necessity of the existence of another with whom one can be in solidarity. His analysis of solidarity goes much deeper than the previous analyses.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the need for solidarity was the result of the diversification of the social function of each member of the community, as well as the growing awareness of the social, cultural, and political processes that were taking place in Europe. Culturally, ethnically or religiously diverse societies need some kind of bond, a glue through which this diversity can have some common ground. The essence and meaning of this bond have evolved from solidarity resulting from the division of labor to co-responsiveness and being for the other. It was influenced by changes in social, political, and cultural consciousness. Philosophers had seen this evolution much earlier. The concept of solidarity also appears much earlier than the

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[47]   I d e m, *Spirit of Solidarity*, transl. by M.B. Z a l e s k i, B. F i o r e, San Francisco 1984, pp. 1-5.

process of differentiation. Let us then reach for the etymology of the concept, as well as the phenomenon, in order to be able to return to Tischner's philosophy and show its meaning through the prism of the philosophy of another, through Levinas' responsibility, substitution and "being one for the other." Before we get to the problem of responsibility, let's look at the etymology and phenomenon of solidarity before it became a term taken up by sociologists and philosophers.

2.1. Moving From Solidarity in the Social Sense To the Experience of Closeness of the Other

The etymology of the concept of solidarity refers to the Latin language dictionary, but the French language gave the word a new meaning.[48] Precisely in the period leading up to the outbreak of the French Revolution, this culture was re-emerging and had an ever greater influence on European culture. The changes that took place in society required a new description, new norms. Solidarity during the French Revolution and immediately after it did not play a great role, but its new meaning was slowly emerging. Let us return, however, to historically earlier events. The concept of solidarity did not exist, but the idea of solidarity can be found in other concepts of this period.

Friendship is the first example of a concept corresponding to that of solidarity. We can find it in the works of Aristotle. In Book VIII of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle analyzes friendship. He comes to the conclusion that friendship is a virtue that cannot be dispensed with. It binds people together. Its foundation is a sense of justice, which makes it possible for a person, regardless of the benefits that result from it, to follow principles that are not necessarily beneficial to him, but which are right. "We need friends when we are young to keep us from making false steps, when we get old to tend upon us and to carry out those plans which we have not strength to execute ourselves, and in the prime of life to help us in noble deeds – 'two together' [as Homer says]; for thus we are more efficient both in thought and in action."[49]

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[48]   Solidarity is a concept that, in the modern world, goes back to French. The etymology of the word, however, refers to the Latin verb *solido*, which means to make crack-free, to strengthen, and also to the adjective *solidus*: true, reliable, as well as tightly knit, an indivisible whole.

[49]   Aristotle, *Nicomachaean Ethics of Aristotle*, transl. by F.H. Peters, London 1906, p. 251.

There is also another important thread in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which shows that friendship is also grounded in opposites between friends. Aristotle refers here to Euripides, and also to Heraclitus.[50]

The New Testament is the source of concepts which are close to today's understanding of solidarity, although without an explicit use of the word itself. The New Testament speaks of brotherhood and, most importantly, love for one's neighbor. These are especially present in the Gospels and in the Letters of St. Paul.[51] This phenomenon of brotherhood will be linked to solidarity only in Scheler's philosophy by introducing the concept of empathy into it.

The first terms of solidarity appear in the 16th century, but also later through the prism of the maxim *obligatio in solidum*. This term means responsibility for the debt of people who are in some close relationship to me. This approach I present, among others, in the Napoleonic Codex.[52] It is also used by representatives of utopian socialism, such as Charles Fourier (1772-1837), Pierre Leroux (1797-1871),[53] as well as democratic socialism: Karl Kautsky (1854-1938) and Edward Bernstein (1850-1932).[54] In these instances, solidarity is treated as a means to achieve the goal of a happy state.[55] However, it was not until the 19th and 20th centuries that the concept of solidarity became a key factor in European thought.

Solidarity grounded in ethics will become the subject of interest in the emerging sociology, for example in August Comte[56] and Émile Durkheim. In his work *The Division of Labor Society* (1893), Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) focuses on the issues related to the division of responsibilities in society.[57] In the nascent sociology, Durkheim presents two types of solidarity: mechanical solidarity and organic solidarity based on contract. He also shows abnormal forms that lead to rejection of solidarity.

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[50] Ibid., p. 284.

[51] For example, passages from the Gospels, as well as from St Paul's letter Mt 22, 37-40, Mk 12, 29-31, Łk 10, 27, J 13, 34, Ga 6, 2.

[52] N a p o l e o n, *Civil Code*, Warszawa 1810, [online] https://www.bibliotekacyfrowa.pl/dlibra/publication/3661/edition/6697/content, accessed on 6 June 2022.

[53] S. S t j e r n ø, *Solidarity in Europe: The History of an Idea*, Cambridge [2009 or 2010], pp. 26-30.

[54] Ibid., pp. 47-56.

[55] Ibid., p. 59.

[56] A. C o m t e, *Système de politique positive ou Traité de sociologie instituant la religion de l'humanité*, Osnabruck 1967.

[57] É. D u r k h e i m, *The Division of Labour in Society*, transl. by G. S i m p s o n, New York–London 1969.

Max Scheler, both a phenomenologist and founder of sociology, definitely changes the meaning of solidarity from the concept of relations between members of a divided society, in which everyone has their own function and specific relations with others, to an idea that unites them into one, albeit differentiated, whole. Scheler focuses on responsibility and the principle of solidarity, on empathy, but according to him, the other person is needed, just like in Husserl, to explain the relationship between 'I' and 'other.'

However, Scheler shows through empathy that this experience is the source. *In Essence and Forms of Sympathy*, he mentions various types of sympathy and focuses not only on ontic and metaphysical but also epistemological relations between the individual and the community. He emphasizes that the possibility of "sympathizing with someone" is conditioned upon the existence of some sphere that allows you to assimilate and grasp this compassion. Compassion is more than an analogy to own experiences.

Scheler perceives participation in a world of values that is prior to experiencing what is external,[58] This world enables 'coexistence.' Scheler begins his analysis with a reflection on proper compassion by grasping, understanding or experiencing the experiences of others. Thus, Scheler distinguishes feeling and experiencing the experiences of others from compassion. Experiencing and feeling is not yet a participation, but merely an intermediate form in which the understanding and assimilation of pain plays a key role.

Compassion contains four truths: "direct compassion with someone," "compassion for something," "pure emotional contagion," and "feeling of unity."[59] The latter causes the Self to be absorbed by the experience of another Self. The feeling of unity is what is based on love, which leads to response.

Scheler notices that responsibility and solidarity are related on the basis of love; responsibility appears in the interpersonal space. A science that would bring together the feeling of oneness and love of a person could explain the whole history of mores. **Responsible solidarity**[60] is the guiding thread that expresses such a process. This process happened in different ways and created new forms, being responsible for the association and dissociation of groups.

The principle of solidarity in Scheler makes him take up the problem of Thou. His reflections influence Karol Wojtyla's philosophical thought in *The Acting Person* as

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[58]   M. S c h e l e r, *Istota i formy sympatii*, p. 88.

[59]   Ibid., p. 28.

[60]   Ibid., p. 349.

well as in his speeches at the University of Freiburg at a phenomenological conference on the other. Another person appears in the context of participation.

Wojtyła uses the concept of solidarity in the last, or fourth part, of *The Person and the Act*, presenting the fundamental relationship between person and act through the idea of participation. He writes, "The starting point for our discussions was the conviction that action marks a special moment in the manifestation of the person; and in the course of our study we have unraveled the various aspects of the person's dynamism in the action. Action has been indeed the road which led us to an understanding of the person and has simultaneously allowed us to grasp its own nature; for action not only carries the means, and a special basis, of the intuition of the person, but it also discloses its own self with every step that brings us nearer the person. On this road we have relied throughout on a strict correlation of the disclosure of the person and that of action, within one and the same pattern of which the person and his action are two poles; each strictly corresponds to the other; each displays and explains the other from its point of view. This correlation envisaged in its dynamic unfolding gradually reveals the main lines for the interpretation of the acting person."[61]

On the basis of this correlation, the figure of other people also emerges who take part in the realization of values. Wojtyła calls this phenomenon 'participation.' Actions are fulfilled in a community. Acting together with others, the fulfillment of a person, action, and the personalistic value of an act condition one another. In the idea of participation, participation appears as cooperation with others. Common self-relation is constituted through the prism of self-realization and cooperation. That is why Wojtyła notices that the contradiction of participation is extreme individualism or extreme totalitarianism. Individualism breaks interpersonal ties by focusing on oneself, while totalitarianism, understood as inverted individualism, rejects the self-realization and self-determination of the individual by subordinating the individual to the community. Wojtyła notices the differences between participation and community, community and community membership, community and participation.

An important element of the common good emerges in participation. It is the basis of action. Analyzing the problem of community, Wojtyła presents an authentic and inauthentic being in the community. In the authentic being there is an attitude of solidarity and opposition. Through the attitude of solidarity and opposition, the problem of mediation arises, the problem of dialogue.

At the antipodes of the authentic attitude, there is an inauthentic attitude, i.e., conformism and an attitude of avoidance. It is precisely showing these attitudes

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[61]   K. Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, p. 261.

that makes it easier to look at membership in a community and relations with one's neighbor.

Returning to the attitude of solidarity, Wojtyła states in the last part of *The Acting Person*: "The attitude of 'solidarity' cannot be dissociated from that of 'opposition,' for each is necessary to the understanding of the other. The attitude of solidarity is, so to speak, the natural consequence of the fact that human beings live and act together; it is the attitude of a community, in which the common good properly conditions and initiates participation, and participation in turn properly serves the common good, fosters it, and furthers its realization. 'Solidarity' means a constant readiness to accept. And to realize one's share in the community because of one's membership within that particular community. In accepting the attitude of solidarity man does what he is supposed to do not only because of his membership in the group, but 'common good.' The awareness of the common good makes person looking beyond its own participation; and this international reference allows it to realize essentially its own participation. Indeed, to some extent, solidarity prevents trespass upon other people's obligations and duties, and seizing things belonging to others. In this sense solidarity is in harmony with the principle of participation, which from the objective and 'material' point of view indicates the presence of 'part' in the communal structure of human acting and being. The attitude of solidarity means respect for all parts that are the share of every member of the community. To take over a part of the duties and obligations that are not mine is intrinsically contrary to participation and to the essence of the community."[62]

For Wojtyła, the man of solidarity, **homo solidarius**, is one who fulfills what belongs to a human guided by the common good. Solidarity understood in this way is not only about achieving individual goals, but also about what is good for the public.

Full understanding of responsibility and solidarity required showing the compassion that Scheler talked about, but also the principles of dialogicality. It appears in the 1920s and deepens the sense of compassion and co-responsibility. It will also play a major role in shaping solidarity. Emmanuel Levinas presents its important elements that will play a significant role in the emergence of the Solidarity movement in Poland and the formation of new European values.

The problem of the 'other' has so far been shown through the prism of research on 'I.' In this context, the problem of the responsibility of solidarity has emerged. However, it lacked an approach for which the subject-subject relationship was the original, fundamental relationship. It was only the philosophy of dialogue that helped overcome this impasse.

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[62]   Ibid., p. 284.

2.2. Between Responsibility and Solidarity: A Philosophy of Dialogue

Since the emergence of the philosophy of dialogue, this philosophical trend has undergone some transformations, i.e., from the 'I-Thou' relationship itself through emphasis given on the role of speech act in the dialogue between interlocutors down to acting in the spirit of responsibility, or finally, solidarity. Emmanuel Levinas was the philosopher of dialogue who dealt with the problem of responsibility, and he also inspired Tischner, who made solidarity an important concept in interpersonal dialogue.

2.2.1. Emmanuel Levinas' Philosophy: From Responsibility to Solidarity

Although Emmanuel Levinas does not use the concept of solidarity *expressis verbis*, he nevertheless refers to it when discussing the issue of society addressed by Durkheim[63] and when he approaches responsibility through **separation** as well as **substitution**.

Before we move to considerations on substitution and being for the other, we must note that Levinas refers in his works to Durkheim and his followers, who, as we have already shown, dealt with the concept of solidarity.

Levinas studies Durkheim's philosophy during his studies in Strasbourg together with Maurice Halbwachs, Durkheim's student, who focuses on collective memory. At the same time, he devotes himself to studying Bergson, who, like Durkheim, deals with the problems of society, but unlike Halbwachs and Durkheim, focuses on the individual.

Levinas gradually began to challenge the way Bergson approached memory and time. He also challenged Halbwachs' approach to memory. He specifically rejected collective memory and consciousness to be understood continuously. At the very foundations of these problems, there is the essence and meaning of the subject itself. For Levinas, it is the basic category and source of philosophy.

Levinas, unlike Heidegger (*sum ergo cogito*),[64] shows a way out. He urges for not going towards being, but for transcending oneself and directing one's being towards others. It is a kind of overcoming totality, egoism initiated by the philosophy of Descartes.

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[63] E. L e v i n a s , *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, transl. by A. L i n g i s , Pittsburgh 1996, pp. 68, 272.

[64] J. T i s c h n e r , "Wstęp," in: E. L e v i n a s , *Etyka i nieskończony. Rozmowy z Philipp'em Nemo*, transl. by B. O p o l s k a - K o k o s z k o , Kraków 1991, p. 11.

In *Ethics and Infinity*, Levinas mentions Durkheim and Bergson, master professors from Strasbourg. Thanks to Durkheim, he perceives society through the prism of what is social, which cannot be reduced to the mental sphere. Durkheim sees social phenomena through the prism of "spiritual in individual life,"[65] the highest degree of which is recognition of others while liberation is the implementation in this life. Levinas, however, abandons the problem of society and focuses on criticizing the subject.

In *Totality and Infinity*, following Bergson, Levinas invokes Durkheim. Through the prism of Durkheim's sociology, he argues that society is not a set of 'I's' but an organism that goes deeper than consciousness. Durkheim places the source experience on the ground of religion. Levinas, however, sees Durkheim's limitation of mutual social relations to the social sphere, while he himself sees it in terms of relations. Levinas' reference to Durkheim does not deal with the problem of the division of labor and the resulting concept of solidarity. There is, however, something that more or less touches on the issue of solidarity which appears in Durkheim's thought.

Separation, according to Levinas, is the first concept that shapes the need for the principle of solidarity. Durkheim notes that solidarity becomes a value in a diversified society in which individual citizens play a specific role for themselves. Durkheim provides an example of a family and a society in which every person performs the same activities, so there is no need for solidarity. It was only due to specialization, individualization within a social group, and the performance of various functions that the principle of solidarity turned out needed. The specific roles of a woman and a man in the family meant that these functions and the mutual relationship required solidarity. Durkheim emphasizes that solidarity occurs where everyone has a function in society.

Unlike Durkheim, Levinas focuses on the separation in the sense of keeping myself distant from the other person. Following Durkheim, he approaches separation through the prism of social functions and law.[66] He shows the differences resulting from the identity of human being and his tendency to do good. Good appears not so much through the prism of the relationship between man and the world of abstract values as it is constituted between us when, forgetting ourselves, we discover the otherness of another. We find ourselves in being for another on the horizon of good and sacrifice. Levinas emphasizes that separation cannot be removed, but in relation to another, one can make this separation valuable.

Separation, that is division of functions in the sphere of labor, constitutes a value that connects distinct entities. Durkheim sees separation as a human function in a community. Separation for Levinas is manifested in responsibility for another. It

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[65]   Ibid., p. 22.
[66]   E. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, p. 103.

is the concept of responsibility that significantly binds the views of Durkheim and Levinas. However, before Levinas deals with responsibility in the collection entitled *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence,* he will use the concept of work, which is important to Durkheim. In order for a human being to come to the conclusion that he can find identity in relation to another, he searches for it in the world he actually lives in. A human being emerges from this world or from primordial indeterminacy to build a house in which he is to feel at home. Building the world of things, however, I feel lonely. Home and work do not bring satisfaction. They do not answer the question of one's own identity. Levinas demands something more basic than the juxtaposition of 'I' and 'Not-I,' derived from the natural world or things that serve some purpose. This search for a home and work will be later used by Tischner in *Philosophy of Drama*.

In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas shows that what is needed is a relationship in which human being finds himself, the meaning of his own existence. To do this, it must transcend the world of his own 'I.' He needs the closeness of a separated other human being whom he cannot comprehend on the basis of knowledge grasped in his own consciousness. Closeness means approaching another, which makes me responsible for another. Another comes closer to me and I feel responsible for another. This requires conversation, dialogue. For Levinas, *diakonia* reveals in discourse.[67] In the relationship which I establish with another person, I do not address him through the structure of I-Thou, but I-Man. This dialogue is rather a discourse, a speech in which there is no symmetry, nevertheless, I am responsible for the other, I must serve him.

Levinas focuses on the relationship with the other, but within this context there is also a community for which I strive for justice.[68] However, Levinas articulates empathy, going beyond being and non-being, which Durkheim could not do.

In *Totality and Infinity*, Levinas initiates the problem of responsibility, which in his next work, *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence*, will become a key issue. He departs from the issue of element and work to show responsibility through the prism of substitution.

The concept of substitution plays an important role. Separation revealed the space that divided us. Substitution shows the answer to the ethical call. This concept includes the form of offering, being for the other. One for the other is preceded by awareness and cognition and is based on a deeper relationship in which one person abandons himself to be for the other. Substitution appears not only in *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, but also in the *Humanismus des anderen Menschen*.[69]

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[67] Ibid., p. 101.
[68] Ibid., pp. 71-72.
[69] I d e m, *Humanismus des anderen Menschen*, Hamburg 1989, p. 5.

One for the other encompasses *der-eine-als-Hüter-seines-bruders* as well as *der-eine-verantwortlich-für-den-Anderen*.[70] It is precisely the concept of solidarity that appears in the "one for another relationship" (*der-eine-für-den-Anderen*), about which he writes in the introduction in *Humanism of the Other*. One for the other includes: "*Der-eine-als-Hüter-seines-dirtyers*", such as "*der-eine-verantwortlich-für-den-Anderen*." It is precisely responsibility, which is also present in the writings of Durkheim, and especially Max Scheler, that plays an important role in Levinas' thought. Substitution is the problem of Levinas' *obligatio in solidum* signaled at the beginning of this chapter. It is not about giving ownership to the thing you own, but it is about being for someone else.

Jacek Filek, referring to Bonhoeffer, follows his thought showing the difference between the principle of substitution and the principle of solidarity. Having replaced Scheler's "principle of solidarity" with the "principle of substitution," he claims, "it is not 'solidarity,' which will never be possible between Christ and human being, but it is substitution which is the principle of life for the new humanity. Perhaps I can feel solidarity with the guilt of another, but acting towards another is rooted in the essence of that principle of life, which is substitution." For Levinas, however, solidarity is not enough, something more is needed here: self-sacrifice, self-abandonment. Solidarity occurs in division of roles and individual contribution to the community. Offering is something deeper, it is about entrusting.

2.2.2. Józef Tischner: The Spirit of Solidarity and Responsibility

Tischner investigates not only the concept of solidarity *in abstracto* but also solidarity in action. The latter appears in the context of Husser's and Scheler's works. He presents solidarity through the prism of axiological self. On the other hand, however, Tischner seems influenced by Scheler and Wojtyła as well.

When delivering a homily to the members of "Solidarity" in 1980, Tischner started with a question: "What is this solidarity?" Solidarity flows from the experience of another person and from establishing a relationship between a person and a person, he argued. By experiencing the other, I am his witness and confidant. Solidarity is a bond that allows me to see interpersonal relationships from the perspective of hope.

Tischner's reflections on solidarity, based on Christianity and Judaism, phenomenology and the philosophy of dialogue, made it possible to show it through the prism of an ethical relationship based on mutual relations between people. For Tischner, solidarity means a structure of being "for someone," but also "with someone." This

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[70]   Ibid.

perspective was not present in Levinas's approach as he rejected a structure against someone. This 'against someone' structure grows out of Hegel's reflection on freedom. Tischner replaces it with Levinasian "for the other" and "with the other." In a sense, his words, recalling the letter to the Galatians of St. Paul "bear one another's burdens," correspond to the words of Levinas, who in *Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence* appears through the prism of the structure "one for the other," through "substitution."

Tischner publishes *Spirit of Solidarity*, which consists of pieces of a homily at the Wawel Cathedral, but also other speeches, for example, at the Solidarity Congress in 1980.[71] He is already familiar with Levinas's philosophy as he is the author of the introduction to the Polish translation of one of the parts of *Other Than Being or Beyond Essence*, however he presents the problem of relations through the prism of phenomenology. Only in later works will the influence of Levinas be stronger. One can see how Tischner poses the question about the source experience.

Tischner as a phenomenologist tries to approach the source of experience through the prism of dialogue, a labor understood as dialogue. For Tischner, labor is a social dialogue. A working human being takes part in the social dialogue. Each of us has our own separate task, but despite our differences, we need unity in diversity. In this sense, Tischner could refer to Durkheim, as well as to socialists, for whom work is a key problem. Tischner approaches labor through the prism of work that is meaningless, a work due to which, instead of self-realization and building a community, a human being faces the problem of treating himself as a mere means to an end. Work then is of no use to the human being, and he himself is treated as a tool.

Tischner emphasizes that a human being who works must be able to perceive the meaning of his actions, because he himself is what makes labor meaningful. When this is not the case, work means exploitation. The man works, but his work is not fairly rewarded or does not find a recipient. In the face of exploitation and the meaninglessness of work, the lack of acceptance for such a state affects others. This awareness calls to all and does not allow them to pass by indifferently anyone who is suffering. Our willingness to show solidarity with others flows from our disagreement to the suffering of others. This idea of substitution for one another means wanting to be with and for others. Tischner, following Durkheim, Scheler, and Wojtyla, sees a fault in dialectics that eliminates others.

Tischner states that solidarity **does not have a structure "against someone,"** but "for someone" and "with someone." Solidarity is caring, nurturing to another human being. It expresses something more than tolerance or acceptance, namely, a shared concern.

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[71] A. F r i s z k e, *Rewolucja solidarności 1980-1981*, Kraków 2014, p. 102.

In his subsequent works, such as *Philosophy of Drama* and *The Controversy over Human Existence*, Tischner focuses not so much on solidarity as on the experience of encounter. It deepens the understanding of solidarity, however. Meeting other people is what anticipates any possibility of the principle of solidarity. Tischner focuses on showing the human-to-human encounter as the source experience.

The experience of the meeting brings an important element to Tischner's philosophy, becoming the essence of his philosophy over time. It appears on the basis of the question about one's own identity and about the source experience of oneself. In experiencing oneself, there is freedom which makes possible any relationship with another human being. Freedom is not something you have, but what you share with another. **Human being is equally committed to himself and to another, in whom he discovers his own identity and the meaning of his own existence**. This is possible through freedom.

In his philosophical analysis, Tischner refers to phenomenology. More precisely, he refers to the ideas of Husserl or Ingarden, but also to Heidegger's phenomenological and hermeneutic reflection, as well as to the phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas, who explores the problem of the relationship between me and others. After 1976, Tischner sees evil not so much from the perspective of experiencing the value itself, the background of consciousness, but from the perspective of social interactions of humans. This can already be seen in the articles published in the collection *Myślenie według wartości* [Thinking according to values], when at the basis of axiology and action, there is an agathological level as opening to another human being.

Tischner borrows form Levians the agathological "level" in the encounter between human beings. This openness flows from the experience of the other. In addition to being inspired by Levinas's philosophy, we also see Marcel's thought. This thought shows philosophy from the perspective **of fidelity**. This experience is crucial for Tischner. The Levinasian account, in which the experience of the face is important, appears in a new light. For Tischner, the meeting and the conversation should refer to fidelity borrowed from Marcel. This reciprocity means being open to one another. The concept of reciprocity makes solidarity possible. Unlike Rosenzweig's or Levinas', Tischner's solidarity is based on a symmetrical relationship and so he makes it the key problem among dialogists.

Conclusions

Since Descartes through the changes taking place in the perception of ethics and its foundations after the French Revolution, freedom became the main problem in

European philosophy. Nowadays, apart from freedom, the key concepts are also responsibility and solidarity. Human being is a being who should not only develop on his/her own, but also needs a community in which he or she can build a world of values together with others. The thread that connects the experience of truth, freedom, responsibility and solidarity is the question of identity. Kant, Hegel, Schelling, and Fichte, among others, attempted to answer it, as also did representatives of the philosophy of dialogue and the philosophy of another. However, this was only the beginning; there were other issues that needed reflection.

In addition to freedom, the notions of **responsibility** and **solidarity** appear. Solidarity is designed to complete the issue of freedom by enabling accountability for intentions and deeds. Man not only realizes himself through the realization of values, but also other people accompany him in this realization. Solidarity is therefore about linking free people with each other through community, joint participation in life, taking part in the common realization of values. Responsibility, on the other hand, appears in an environment that reflects on human identity. However, the key experience is the relationship with others and the relationship of the individual with society. On the basis of inter-subjectivity, which can be perceived both in phenomenologists and in the philosophy of dialogue, the question of 'another' appeared. It showed the truth of the question about identity. In response to the question about 'I,' only the 'Other' or 'other' lets me discover myself. This finding of oneself, however, requires the choice of the other. Choosing me different makes me the one that is chosen and therefore I am someone special. In being responsible for another, I am the one who is "for" someone and "with" someone. Responsibility understood in a dialogical sense excludes turning against someone. This is due to Scheler and his presentation of interpersonal relationships through the prism of the senses. Before I feel sorry for someone by expressing my opinion, I feel compassion. This is the sphere that anticipates the rational approach.

Solidarity appears in the works of phenomenologists who ask about inter-subjectivity. However, solidarity is based in the philosophy of dialogue on the experience of substitution. This is because the source experience is a religious experience according to them. The relationship between man and God, which is reflected in the relationship between human beings themselves, cannot be based on solidarity: neither God nor human can show solidarity with me, but in the face of another, I can see the image of God. In my responsibility, I can replace another human being in its suffering, I can become his hostage. A philosophy dealing with inter-subjectivism deals with the other. In its own way, it is also a philosophy for which the most important problem is not the relationship with others, but it sees its necessity in building a community in which we realize values together. In this philosophy, the principle of solidarity will arise.

Tischner reverses this sequence, showing solidarity not so much on the basis of a principle, but based on experience. It will be of great importance for the political transformation in Central Europe in the 1980s. The ground and the element that will be developed later is the experience of freedom and responsibility. What binds solidarity and responsibility is the structure of relations "with," "for," but without the structure of "against." These structures emerge in the interpersonal relationship, in the space of the meeting. In it, man becomes **homo conscientiens** (a man uniting in feeling with others), and **homo respondens** (a man responding to a challenge), but also *homo solidarius* (a man of solidarity).

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ABSTRACT

In this chapter, the author presents the evolution of the term "solidarity" and its contemporary meaning from a philosophical perspective and the political transformation in central Europe. The development of the meaning of solidarity is accompanied by the experience of responsibility and co-responsibility. The analysis starts with the concept of responsibility and its different meanings with different philosophers and ends with the experience of solidarity. The process that goes from the analysis of concepts to the experience of responsibility and solidarity in interpersonal relations is shown. From Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger through Emil Durkheim, Max Scheler to the philosophers of dialogue Emmanuel Levinas and Józef Tischner. These two experiences, i.e., solidarity and responsibility, are interdependent and intertwined. Their basis is the source experience of the other. The transformation from the notions of solidarity and responsibility to the presentation of their experience reveals the enormous influence that the experience of the other has on the life of individuals as well as societies. These two experiences link the individual to the collective, their own self-realization, and the building of social bonds.

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The book addresses one of the fundamental questions posed in both the social sciences and the humanities, namely the question of identity and the role played by the "Other" in its construction. The issues analysed in the book are also very topical. Nowadays, when as a result of a number of processes it is more and more difficult to answer the question of identity, both in the individual and collective aspect, such questions become especially actual, and answers to them are provided by particular authors in their erudite articles, referring to canonical texts for Western culture. What makes this publication particularly relevant is the fact that the discussion concerns the figure of the "Other" and its role in identity formation. Admittedly, such analyses have a long academic tradition, the issue seems particularly topical today. The contemporary world is characterised by high mobility, as a consequence of which contacts with the "Other" are now more common and everyday than ever before.

Paweł Kubicki