

ALEKSANDER GŁOGOWSKI

Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan





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OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF PAKISTAN**

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
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For Magdalena

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INTRODUCTION

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is one of the “new” nuclear powers. It formally joined this exclusive club in 1998, when it conducted its first nuclear test explosions, although analysts had been writing about the fact that this country possessed these weapons of mass destruction for almost two decades. Currently, the country’s nuclear potential is estimated at 130 to 140 nuclear warheads. The possibility of using these weapons is the subject of scientific research as well as inquiries by publicists. Equally interesting is the question of their potential transfer into the hands of numerous Islamic terrorist organisations. In analysing the possibility of escalation of the nearly 70-year-old conflict in South Asia and the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation into the hands of terrorists, the factor of Pakistan’s strategic culture is very important. It determines the perception of external threats by decision-makers, both military and political. The following text is an attempt to look at this issue. When considering strategic culture, it is necessary to start by defining the concept, which will be the subject of Chapter One. Chapter Two will provide a sketch of the history of Pakistan. It is a state that was established in 1947 as a result of the partition of British India. To understand the contemporary implications of this process, it is necessary to go back to the period of the Muslim conquest, then to present the period of British colonial rule and finally to show the process of dividing the Subcontinent into two independent dominions according to religious criteria. Chapter Three will examine Pakistan’s military. Two determinants shaping the strategic culture are shown here: British heritage, still alive and visible in the continuity of traditions of existing units, which is so important for the military, and Islam, which is one of the most important factors unifying the multi-ethnic society

of Pakistan. Chapter Four is devoted to the main directions of Pakistan's foreign policy – i.e., relations with its neighbours: India, China, Iran and Afghanistan, as well as the United States and the Russian Federation. Chapter Five presents the assumptions of the defence doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

1. THE CONCEPT OF “STRATEGIC CULTURE”

In order to structure further considerations, both Polish and international definitions of the concept of strategic culture will be presented below. It is important to note at the outset a certain significant explanatory weakness in these definitions. They have all been developed from the Western experience, whether in the process of analysing threats from the Cold War period, as a basis for research on phenomena occurring in the broadly understood Western civilisation, or for describing the foundations of the political decisions of the Soviet Union. Pakistan, on the other hand, is a Muslim country; therefore, it is guided not only by secular motivations, but also, and perhaps above all, by the religious factor, which will play a serious role in the decision-making process.

As noted by Roman Kuźniar, strategic culture reaches and influences strategy through various routes. Firstly, it provides ideas and norms for the community of both professional strategists and politicians, who set specific goals and tasks for strategists (or take on the role of strategists themselves). Secondly, strategic culture conditions the perception of the strategy's environment (i.e., internal politics and the international situation); it constitutes the “glasses” through which the world is viewed and the processes and events taking place in it are assessed. Thirdly, it selects strategic options that emerge on its own initiative or in response to external challenges. Fourthly, strategic culture conditions the ability to mobilise national resources for the goals set by the strategy. Finally, there is no doubt that strategic culture frames the public debate on national security.¹

¹ R. Kuźniar, *Polityka i siła. Studia strategiczne – zarys problematyki*, Warszawa 2006, pp. 186-187.

Krzysztof Malinowski argues, on the other hand, that strategic culture refers to the sphere of beliefs shared by society and political elites relating to security policy and – thus – to the place of a given state in the international system. In a narrower sense, it pertains to the political aspects of the use of military force.² British researcher of international relations Kerry Longhurst defines strategic culture as collective beliefs, ideas, values, positions and practices regarding the use of force, which are formed gradually through specific historical processes and are subject to change as a result of a nation's dramatic experiences.³

According to American political scientist Jack Snyder, strategic culture is the sum total of ideas, conditioned by emotional reactions and behavioural patterns, that members of a national strategic community have acquired through learning or imitation and shared with each other regarding nuclear strategy.⁴

According to Alastair I. Johnston, strategic culture is an integrated system of symbols (e.g., argument structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) that seeks to establish comprehensive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating conceptions of the role and effectiveness of military force in interstate political affairs and clothing these concepts with such an aura of facts that strategic preferences appear uniquely realistic and effective.⁵

Colin S. Gray defined strategic culture using the example of the USA as modes of thought and action in relation to power, derived from the perception of national historical experience, aspirations for self-characterisation, and all the many distinctly American experiences (geography, political philosophy, civic culture and way of life) that characterise an American citizen.⁶

² *Kultura bezpieczeństwa narodowego w Polsce i Niemczech*, ed. K. Malinowski, Poznań 2003, p. 16.

³ K. Longhurst, *Niemiecka kultura strategiczna – geneza i rozwój*, [in:] *Kultura bezpieczeństwa narodowego w Polsce i w Niemczech*, ed. K. Malinowski, Poznań 2003 p. 194.

⁴ J.L. Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Options*, Santa Monica 1977, p. 8.

⁵ A.I. Johnston, *Thinking about Strategic Culture*, "International Security" Vol. 19, 1995, no. 4, p. 46.

⁶ C.S. Gray, *National Style in Strategy: The American Example*, "International Security" Vol. 6, 1981, no. 2, p. 22.

According to Yitzhak Klein, strategic culture, on the other hand, is the set of attitudes and beliefs held by the military establishment regarding the political objectives of war and the most effective strategy and operational methods for achieving them.⁷

Pakistani researcher Hasan-Askari Rizvi defines the concept of strategic culture as a set of beliefs, norms, values and historical experiences of the dominant elite that influence the understanding and interpretation of security problems and the environment, shaping its responses to them.⁸

As K. Malinowski points out, there are two possible approaches to the issue of the importance of culture in security research: rationalist and constructivist. The first recognises the limited value of this factor in explaining state behaviour. Culture is treated here as "absent" or, at most, as an auxiliary element, one of many variables alongside institutional pressures, the influence of lobbying groups or the ambitions of decision-makers. It is politicians who manipulate public opinion according to these assumptions, using references to culture. In the constructivist approach, international politics is interpreted in social terms as the effect of interactions between social structures and an actor (the state), determined mainly by norms and values. Identities and norms act as the primary causal variables, creating the actor's own preferences and, finally, even to some extent, the effects of their actions.⁹

In the case of Pakistan, we are dealing with a specific society that differs in values from the Western societies the aforementioned perspectives were designed to describe. Therefore, the optimal solution is to use both approaches functionally, aiming to gain a clearer understanding of the motives driving political decision-makers. Becoming aware of the deep cultural differences between the researcher and the researched object (in this case, the Pakistani elites) is crucial to avoiding a mistake often made by Western researchers: using "our" (i.e., Western) conceptual clichés to describe societies guided by an axiological system different from the Western one.

⁷ Y. Klein, *A Theory of Strategic Culture*, "Comparative Strategy" Vol. 10, 1991, no. 1, p. 5.

⁸ H.-A. Rizvi, *Pakistan's Strategic Culture*, [in:] *South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances*, ed. M.R. Chambers, Carlisle 2002, p. 307.

⁹ *Kultura bezpieczeństwa narodowego...*, pp. 24-25.

This difference is far greater than the distinctions between the strategic cultures of the West and the Eastern Bloc, which have become the basis for theoretical considerations in the field of strategic studies.

2. HISTORICAL DETERMINANTS OF PAKISTAN'S STRATEGIC CULTURE

Considerations on the strategic culture of Pakistan should begin with a brief presentation of the genesis of this state. Indeed, it was the process of political emancipation of Indian Muslims that led to the conflict with the Hindu majority, which continues to this day and has a significant impact on the perception of both the great eastern neighbour and, more broadly, the international environment as a whole by Pakistan's social and political elites, including the military.

2.1 Islam in the Indian Subcontinent

Islam began to reach the Indian Subcontinent in the very first years of its existence, that is, at the end of the 8th century. The spread of this religion has been influenced by the traditional caste-based social structure that developed in Hinduism. According to its principles, a person is born assigned to a place on the social ladder with no possibility of advancement. Belonging to the lowest, so-called "untouchable" castes, places an individual practically outside society. Islam, on the other hand, is an egalitarian religion, like Christianity. Muhammad's prophecy is addressed to every human being, regardless of their social status. The new religion has received a lot of attention, especially among representatives of the lowest Hindu castes, which should come as no surprise. Conversion to Islam opened up opportunities for Hindus for social advancement, which involved

a change of occupation. This was particularly true for the trade and service industries, which, being very profitable, were reserved for the upper castes. The belief that those who avoid the caste system through religious conversion should be removed from society is still evident today, especially in the statements of far-right Indian politicians, who regard Muslims living on the Indian subcontinent as apostates of Hinduism and, therefore, at the very bottom of the traditional social pyramid.¹⁰

In the 7th century, the provinces of Sindh and Balochistan were subjugated to the then Islamic Persia. There were mass conversions to Islam in the conquered territories. Subsequent Muslim dynasties came from Afghanistan. The Ghurids and Ghaznavids extended their rule to the southern reaches of the subcontinent. The reign of the Mughal dynasty resulted in the flourishing of a specific local culture, combining Islamic elements with those rooted in the Hindu tradition. Excellent examples of richly illustrated writing and calligraphy have survived to the present day. Mention should also be made of the magnificent examples of Indo-Muslim architecture, such as the 17th-century Taj Mahal mausoleum and the imperial forts in Agra, Delhi and Lahore, as well as numerous mosques.¹¹ The Mughals established an administrative system modelled on the Persian structure and hierarchy of public offices. Attempts were also made to spread the Persian language as a literary and courtly language. The result of this policy was the formation of the Urdu language, initially used by soldiers serving the dynasty. The liberal policies of the Mughals encouraged the interpenetration of Muslim and local cultures. Followers of Hinduism began to hold high offices in the Mughal state. The exception was Emperor Aurangzeb, who ordered the destruction of temples in the areas under his control and the construction of mosques, as well as forced conversions.¹² The memory of his bloody rule has a greater impact on Hindu-Muslim relations today than the period of tolerant rule of his predecessors. During the reign of the Mughal dynasty, a social order based

¹⁰ Ch. Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India*, New York 1996, pp. 358-360.

¹¹ H. Kulke, D. Rothermund, *A History of India*, London 2004, pp. 161-196.

¹² S. Wolpert, *A New History of India*, Oxford 2000, pp. 149-169.

on religious tolerance was established. Hindus were exempt from the jizya tax, as stipulated in the Koran regarding non-Muslims.¹³

2.2 British Rule

British interest in India resulted in the establishment of the East India Company in 1600. Initially, it operated as a private enterprise, profiting from the monopoly guaranteed by Elizabeth I on trade with the Indian principalities. Gradually, it began to build its own factories in India, expanding the territory it controlled. After winning the Battle of Plassey in 1757, the Company took full control of the province of Bengal.¹⁴ Gradually, the government in London took over the management of the Company and, through it, of India. British policy towards the local population was based mainly on economic exploitation.¹⁵ For Hindus, the Europeans had replaced the previous rulers, and in order to find employment in colonial institutions, they only had to learn another foreign language – this time English. For Muslims, British rule was initially a serious shock, experienced by the entire Muslim community of that time, subject to colonial rule. The Quran assumes the rule of Islam as the last prophecy, and in the meantime, new rulers appeared, considered infidels or, at most, tolerated “People of the Book”. The Muslim elite did not want to accept the new situation and learn the language of the colonisers.¹⁶ The only structure in which Indian Muslims have traditionally participated in large numbers is the armed forces. This was due to both the existing socio-political order in India and the pacifism prevalent among followers of Hinduism. In 1857, the Sepoy Mutiny took place – an uprising of Indian soldiers serving in the Company’s army.¹⁷ Its result was a reform of the colonial structures of the British authorities, consisting of taking control of India from

¹³ J. Kieniewicz, *Historia Indii*, Warszawa 2003, p. 295.

¹⁴ H. Kulke, D. Rothermund, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, pp. 215-219.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ J. Kieniewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 505.

the Company directly through London, symbolised by the coronation of Queen Victoria as Empress of India in 1877.¹⁸ The British then realised that they could not maintain their rule over India by relying solely on repression and basing their authority on British cadres. A process of constitutional reforms was initiated, providing the local population with the opportunity to participate in the colonial administration and local legislative bodies. The primary beneficiaries of these transformations were the Indians, as they possessed a modern intellectual elite and spoke English.¹⁹ This state of affairs exacerbated the frustration of the Muslim minority. In 1885, at the initiative of the Scottish politician Allan Octavian Hume, the Indian National Congress was formed. Initially, its aim was to engage the Indian intellectual elite educated along British lines and to include them in the work of the institutions governing India.²⁰ The group sought to expand the political autonomy of the colony and increase access for representatives of the local population to political institutions. The Indian National Congress brought together representatives of all faiths, although Hinduism was obviously predominant. However, after the Sepoy Mutiny, the British treated the local population with suspicion. This attitude had a deep ideological justification, stemming from the popular sense of superiority over the colonised population at the time. It was assumed that the white race, and among its representatives the British in particular, was predestined to rule the world and that its political institutions were the most perfect ever invented by man. In this sense, ruling over India was the fulfilment of the historical mission of carrying the “white man’s burden” (the author of this term is the popular English writer Rudyard Kipling) and, therefore, the participation of the Indians in the governance of their country had to be, by its very nature, limited and subjected to strict control by the Europeans. The representatives of the Muslim elite were aware that the Hindu majority had not only a numerical advantage, which could not be influenced, but also an intellectual one, resulting from the factors mentioned above. In an attempt to reverse this unfavourable situation, the proponent of Islamic modernism, Sir Sayed Ahmad Khan,

¹⁸ H. Kulke, D. Rothermund, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

¹⁹ S.Ph. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, Washington, D.C. 2004, p. 22.

²⁰ H. Kulke, D. Rothermund, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

founded the Anglo Muhammadan Oriental College in the city of Aligarh in 1875 – a university where Islamic subjects and general education were taught according to the best British models of the time, created by the excellent universities of Oxford and Cambridge.²¹ It was a thoroughly modern university, aimed at educating a new generation of Indian Muslims to the best standards so that they could compete with Indians for positions in the colonial administration. This was to be achieved through the introduction of English as a language of instruction. Much importance was also attached to spiritual formation, based on modernist principles. The enormous interest among students in the establishment of the university in Aligarh contributed to the opening of similar academic institutions in other parts of British India, such as Nazrana Mohmaadi (based first in Calcutta and from 1885 in Allahabad, now Prayagraj), under whose auspices the first Muslim college for women, a school for the blind, a medical college and a technical university were established, along with Islamia College, established in 1913 in Peshawar (inhabited by Pashtuns, also known as Afghans, in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa). The graduates of these universities became the modern Muslim intellectual elite of British India. Initially, Hindu and Muslim politicians worked together harmoniously within the Indian National Congress, forming a unified pressure group on the colonial authorities to expand the scope of autonomy. The British response was a policy of *divide et impera* (divide and rule), that is, stoking antagonisms between the two religious communities, referred to by historians as communal conflicts. The experiment of dividing the province of Bengal in 1905 along religious lines can be seen as an example of the implementation of the *divide et impera* policy. For Hindus, it was an unacceptable interference in the traditional social and administrative structure, creating artificial antagonisms, while for Muslims, it created an opportunity to live in accordance with the principles of Islam within the province they governed.²² The British, on the other hand, positioned themselves as the guarantors of the rights of the Muslim minority in India, which was numerically dominated by Hindus. On

²¹ *A History of Pakistan and Its Origins*, ed. Ch. Jaffrelot, London 2002, p. 10.

²² G. Johnson, *Partition, Agitation and Congress: Bengal 1904-1908*, "Modern Asian Studies" Vol. 7, 2004, no. 3, pp. 533-588.

December 30, 1906, the Muslim League was founded – a mass political party with the goal of protecting the interests of the Muslim minority in India. This group treated religion exclusively in political categories, as a system of principles, legal and social norms which, on the one hand, regulate every form of human activity and, on the other hand, fundamentally distinguish Muslims from Hindus.²³ Its leaders belonged to the westernised intellectual and financial elite of India at that time, and most were not particularly religious.²⁴ Not surprisingly, then, doctrinally the League was a modernist grouping, accepting the civilisational and scientific-technological achievements of the West and treating religion instrumentally as a factor distinguishing it from Congress. Initially, the question of Indian independence was not raised; on the contrary, the League declared its loyalty to the Crown. The situation changed when the British reversed the decision to partition Bengal in 1912.²⁵ Originally, some League activists combined their membership with that of the Congress, as it was believed that the two parties shared a common goal, despite their deep differences, of representing the Indian people to the colonial authorities. Gradually, however, the League and the Congress began to drift apart politically. It should be remembered that not all Indian Muslims supported the activities of the League. Initially, the future creator of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, while a Congress activist, distanced himself from the League's loyalist British political line, which he eventually joined in 1912. The party's main demand became that the Muslim minority be given a guaranteed one-third of the seats in the colonial Indian Parliament by establishing a separate electoral district to ensure that their rights would be respected. However, the differentiation of electorates according to communalist criteria (a term which, in the history of the subcontinent, denotes the division of the population according to their religion) was not accepted by Congress politicians. The radicalisation of Muslim sentiment was facilitated by the growing influence of Hindu fundamentalists (the most radical of whom demanded the forced "reconversion" of Muslims

²³ S.Ph. Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21.

²⁴ I. Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, Basingstoke 2005, pp. 91-93.

²⁵ L. Ziring, *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History*, Karachi 1999, p. 4.

to Hinduism) in Congress, which allowed the League to frighten its potential supporters with the spectre of discrimination against their religious community by the Hindu majority that would accompany independence. Indeed, Hindu fundamentalists regarded the followers of Islam either as former members of the lowest untouchable caste (who should be reconverted to Hinduism) or as the heirs of the Arab-Persian invaders (who should leave India, as should the British). The use of violence by supporters of the congressional right-wing increased fears about the future peaceful coexistence of the two religions in an independent state. Another reason for breaking off cooperation with the Congress was the League's social base – the Muslim elite originating from large landowners, merchants, industrialists and representatives of the liberal professions. This influenced the conservative, preservationist nature of the party's political manifesto, differentiating it from the Jawaharlal Nehru group, which sympathised with the ideology of European socialism that was taking over the Congress. There were fears of possible nationalisation of industrial estates and forced agrarian reform. The growing antagonism between Indian parties and the rise of municipalist aggression (for which representatives of both sides of the conflict were responsible) caused the Muslim League to demand the creation of a separate state for Muslims. Jinnah is widely considered to be the founder of the so-called "two-nation theory"; however, the poet and politician Muhammad Iqbal was also one. Initially, he advocated the creation of one independent India, but under the influence of political events, he changed his views. He stated that the cultural differences between Hindus and Muslims were so serious and deep that they could not coexist peacefully within the same state.²⁶ In a democracy, the law is made by the majority, and in India, that majority is undoubtedly composed of Hindus. Muslims may, therefore, become a potentially discriminated minority. Law is one of the most important elements of Islam, so adopting laws that contradict religious commandments and prohibitions is unacceptable to Muslims. In a similar vein, M.A. Jinnah spoke out, highlighting such fundamental differences regarding everyday life, such as family law and the consumption of beef by Muslims, which is strictly prohibited by Hinduism. He also highlighted that the two communities lived virtually

²⁶ A. Hussain, *Pakistan: Its Ideology and Foreign Policy*, London 1966, p. 49.

side by side in India, as British colonisation rarely saw intermarriage outside their own religious circles due to differences in family law – Islam allows polygamy, unlike Hinduism – with many even living in separate neighbourhoods. In 1929, the government in London initiated Round Table talks with the participation of the League and the Congress, aiming to develop a compromise political platform that would implement concepts acceptable to all. However, attempts at agreement ended in failure, with both sides accusing each other of a lack of will to compromise. The League was sceptical about the policy of passive resistance and civil disobedience that was then being promoted by the Congress, which was under the spiritual influence of Mahatma Gandhi.²⁷ The British, therefore, implemented their own solution in the form of the Government of India Act of 1935, introducing elections within the religious districts [“curiae” – translator’s note], which were held in 1937, thus fulfilling the League’s main demand.²⁸ These ended with the League winning in Bengal and Punjab and the Congress winning in all other provinces. Nehru did not agree to the formation of a joint coalition government with the participation of League representatives, which confirmed M.A. Jinnah’s fears about a possible common future within one state. The Congress, on the other hand, consistently denied its opponent the right to consider itself the exclusive representative of Indian Muslims, citing the fact that its ranks also included a significant number of people professing Islam.²⁹ Another serious difference of opinion between the major parties arose over the issue of India’s possible participation in World War II as part of the Commonwealth forces and the anti-Hitler coalition. Britain was recruiting for the army fighting the Axis states on a voluntary basis. Gandhi and Nehru called for a boycott of the recruitment boards, deeming the war not to be in the interest of the people of India. M.A. Jinnah took an opposing stance and, while supporting the UK war effort, called on his fellow believers to join the armed forces. He hoped that, in return for loyalty, London would prove more receptive to his political proposals. On March 24, 1940, in Lahore, the Muslim League adopted a resolution (then called the *Lahore*

²⁷ S. Wolpert, *Jinnah of Pakistan*, Oxford–New York 2003, pp. 108-109.

²⁸ H. Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, Karachi 2007, pp. 21-22.

²⁹ S. Wolpert, *Jinnah...*, p. 159.

Resolution, and in modern historiography – *Pakistan Resolution*), which demanded the creation of a separate state for Indian Muslims.³⁰ Referring both to the two-nation theory and to previous experience, it considered the coexistence of Hindus and Muslims in one state, even a federal one, to be impossible.³¹ The Lahore Resolution did not specify precisely whether one or more Muslim states were to be established on the subcontinent, leaving this issue to be decided in the future. Gradually, however, a concept of the territorial shape of this state emerged. There was a reference to a political project by Choudhry Rahmat Ali, a Muslim lawyer practising in Britain, who, in 1933, while studying at the University of Cambridge, published a pamphlet titled *Now or Never*.³² In it, he argued for the need to create a separate state for Indian Muslims, justifying this, like M. Iqbal and M.A. Jinnah, by stating the impossibility of two nations coexisting within one state. The novelty of his concept was the proposed name for this country: *Pakistan*. It was thought to be derived from the letters contained in the names of the northern provinces of India, inhabited mostly by Muslims:

- P – Punjab
- A – Afgania (NWFP)
- K – Kashmir
- I – *and*, as a conjunction
- S – Sindh
- TAN – Balochistan.³³

The word *Pak* in Urdu means “pure”; so, Pakistan is “the land of pure people”. Rahmat Ali also advocated for the need to grant independence to the western part of Bengal, which was mostly inhabited by Muslims, but he saw no place for it in Pakistan. This was similar to his views on other principalities and Indian provinces with a majority Muslim population, as he noted the existence of fundamental linguistic and cultural differences

³⁰ P. Pania, *Article on Lahore Resolution*, [on-line:] www.worldsindhi.org/publish-reports/5July05.html – 4 XI 2017.

³¹ L. Ziring, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

³² www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00-islamlinks/tht_rahmatali_1933.html – 4 XI 2017.

³³ *A History of Pakistan...*, p. 13.

between their inhabitants and the population of the northern provinces. Rahmat Ali's intellectual speculations led to the concept of establishing a significant state for "non-Arab" Muslims, which would unite not only the aforementioned provinces, but also Iran and Afghanistan. In this case, the name Pakistan would be formed as follows:

- P – Punjab
- A – Afgania (NWFP)
- K – Kashmir
- I – Iran
- S – Sindh
- T – Afghanistan
- AN – Balochistan.³⁴

The politicians of the Muslim League adopted the name of the state they sought to create along with its early, moderate concept. Although this name is not officially mentioned in the Lahore document, the *post-factum* set of demands adopted at that time became known as the Pakistan Resolution. Its adoption is commemorated by a monument erected in Lahore, which resembles the Eiffel Tower in Paris in both appearance and function as a viewing platform. The aspirations of Hindus and Muslims to have their own state were favoured by the international situation. In the course of building the anti-Hitler coalition, the Atlantic Charter was adopted on 14 August 1941. Its signatories, including Great Britain, recognised the right of all nations to have their own state. This provided a legal and international basis for the fight against colonialism and the pursuit of self-determination, which was later guaranteed in the United Nations Charter signed on June 26, 1945. In Britain itself, there was a consensus among the main political groupings that India should be granted independence. The only dispute now was the question of when and how it would be done. The difficult economic situation of Great Britain, which after World War II became increasingly financially dependent on the United States, also played a role.

³⁴ Ch. Rahmat Ali, *Pakistan: The Fatherland of Pak Nation*, Cambridge 1947, p. 20.

2.3 Partition of British India

The Labour government of Clement Attlee nominated Lord Louis Mountbatten as Viceroy of India, and he took office on February 21, 1947. His mission was to facilitate the transfer of power over India to its people. The last Viceroy was the great-grandson of Queen Victoria and the uncle of Prince Philip, husband of the later British Queen Elizabeth II, as well as the Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in South East Asia (for which he received, in addition to numerous decorations, the title of Viscount of Burma). He was also known for his views, which were close to the Labour Party programme. The Prime Minister gave Mountbatten a one-year deadline to complete the transfer of power over India, but the Viceroy himself declared that he would do so by mid-August 1947. Initially, he supported the Congress' position that India should remain united and consist of provinces grouped under a federation. However, as the day of the handover of power approached, acts of violence against communalism became more frequent, inspired, on the one hand, by League activists and, on the other, by Hindu radicals demanding the removal of Muslims from India or their forced conversion to Hinduism.³⁵ Opponents of Mountbatten's actions accuse him of sympathising with Hindus, which was related to his friendship with Nehru and Gandhi. Some also mention close relations between Lady Edwina Mountbatten, who had great influence over her husband, and J. Nehru. The viceroy's supporters explain the warm relations with the Indian representatives by the very difficult character and cold, distant personality of M.A. Jinnah, whose opposite was the sincere and open J. Nehru.³⁶ It is worth recalling here an anecdote about the creator of Pakistan. He was said to speak English much better than Urdu. At one election rally, he uttered the phrase "Pakistan Zindabad" ("Long live Pakistan"), but because he had a very strong Oxford accent, those present heard "Pakistan's in the bag".³⁷ In appearance, the founder of Pakistan resembled an English gentleman – in an impeccably tailored

³⁵ Ch. Jaffrelot, *The Hindu Nationalist...*, p. 303.

³⁶ S. Wolpert, *Jinnah...*, p. 315.

³⁷ www.ibnlive.in.com/blogs/sagarikaghose/223/53763/fthblog-for-the-bjp=jinnah-is-about-politics-not-history.html – 4 XI 2017.

suit, pith helmet, walking stick and monocle – rather than the leader of a nation fighting colonialism. In many photos, he can be seen with a cigar and a glass of cognac, which indicated that in his private life he did not strictly follow the precepts of Islam. In doing so, he distinguished himself from Congress politicians, who demonstratively appeared in regional dress, a remnant of the Gandhi-inspired campaign to boycott British goods in favour of local products and to spin linen and sew garments themselves. There is no doubt that the last viceroy of India had great ambitions. His personal goal was to preserve the unity of India and, when that proved impossible, to maintain the strongest possible links between the newly established dominions and between them and Great Britain. He argued that they should be governed by one common governor-general. Of course, the person who would hold this high office was to be himself. Mountbatten tried to maintain the unity of India until the last moment. Contrary to his personal ambitions, Nehru, following Gandhi's advice, even offered M.A. Jinnah the post of prime minister of the future government.³⁸ However, he rejected the offer, realising that the majority of seats in parliament would certainly go to the Congress, leaving him with only the role of a figurehead – a hostage to his political opponents who held the majority in parliament. Some historians point to M.A. Jinnah's incurable illness (lung cancer) as the reason for his firm and uncompromising stance on the issue of an independent Pakistan. The League leader was aware that there was no worthy successor in the party with comparable charisma who would have enough strength to effectively oppose Nehru and defend the rights of Muslims in the future all-India parliament. M.A. Jinnah's illness is also cited as the reason for his haste to complete the partition of India. He predicted that in his absence, no one would be able to convince the British of this concept, balancing Gandhi's popularity and J. Nehru's organisational effectiveness.³⁹ The Viceroy, recognising the partition of India as inevitable, prepared a plan for its implementation. For this purpose, the Indian provinces were classified into one of three categories: provinces with a Muslim majority (to become part of Pakistan), provinces with a Hindu majority (to form India), and

³⁸ S. Wolpert, *Jinnah...*, p. 316.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 367-368.

provinces with a diverse ethnic-religious structure (to be divided). This third category included Punjab, one of India's richest and most fertile provinces, which surprised some League activists who wanted the entire region, where Muslims had a slight numerical advantage, to become part of Pakistan. A separate problem was the future of the formally sovereign principalities, previously governed by rulers linked to the government in London only by international agreements, on the basis of which Great Britain conducted their defence and international policy. There were dozens of principalities, ranging in size from the area of a single city to a territory similar in size to several European countries. Typically, their rulers exercised autocratic rule, disregarding the will of their subjects. From a legal point of view, once Great Britain's colonial rule over India was abolished, these principalities should have regained full sovereignty. However, the network of historically established connections, especially economic and infrastructural ones, meant that in most cases they could not exist independently.⁴⁰ In this connection, Lord Mountbatten appealed to the princes to decide on the accession of their countries to one of the emerging dominions. Recognising the formal sovereignty of the principalities, the viceroy left each ruler free to choose which of the emerging dominions they would like to join. As it turned out, this principle, although legally correct, became a source of conflict between the new states. Generally, rulers and subjects shared the same religion; in such cases, the accession process went smoothly. However, there were exceptions; sometimes the ruler was of a different faith. This concerned the vast territorial principalities of Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir. In the first case, the ruler was a Muslim and his subjects were Hindus; in the second case, it was the other way around. Nehru appealed to the rulers to take into account the will of their subjects when making decisions, but future events meant that this position of the future Prime Minister of India could be considered insincere and opportunistic. At the same time, the British partitioned the Punjab province, which was inhabited by Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs. According to many supporters of M.A. Jinnah, this richest province of the subcontinent should be incorporated in its entirety into

⁴⁰ I. Hussain, *Kashmir Dispute: An International Law Perspective*, Islamabad 2000, p. 4.

future Pakistan. However, its eastern part was mostly inhabited by followers of Sikhism and Hinduism, so it was decided to divide it. To resolve the dispute over the shape of the future border, the viceroy appointed an arbitration commission chaired by London lawyer Sir Cyril Radcliffe.⁴¹ It should be mentioned here that the arbitrator had never been to India before and had no understanding of the realities of the subcontinent. This was intended to guarantee his complete impartiality, but it resulted in serious problems.⁴² The document prepared by the commission, based on the religious structure of the individual districts, became the basis for the final delimitation of the border between the dominions. In principle, the rule was adopted that Muslim-majority areas would be allocated to Pakistan, while Hindu and Sikh-majority areas would be allocated to India. However, C. Radcliffe made one very important exception to this rule. Despite its predominantly Muslim population, most of the Gurdaspur district was awarded to India, providing that dominion with a direct, year-round road link with Kashmir and, thus, opening the door for the local maharaja to effective accession to India.⁴³ Many years after the partition of the country, C. Radcliffe justified his decisions by the need to take into account many other factors and, therefore, not only ethno-religious ones. He was keen to preserve the functionality of the infrastructure, such as irrigation canals, roads and railways, that had been built under the auspices of the British, not assuming at the time that Punjab would ever be partitioned.⁴⁴ Attempts were also made not to violate the boundaries of individual villages or tehsils (the smallest administrative unit) and, where possible, to use natural boundaries such as rivers, hills or irrigation canals. Opponents of the method of partition of Punjab, particularly Pakistani historians, accuse the commission of favouring India, for example in the case of Gurdaspur, pointing out that in most cases all doubts and

⁴¹ O.H.K. Spate, *The Partition of the Punjab and of Bengal*, "The Geographical Journal" Vol. 110, 1947, no. 4-6, pp. 201-218.

⁴² O.B. Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, London 2002, p. 59.

⁴³ V. Schofield, *Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War*, London 2003, pp. 33-39.

⁴⁴ H. Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, Washington, D.C. 2005, pp. 5-6.

factors “other than religion” were taken into account in India’s favour, while the problem of dividing the irrigation infrastructure remained unresolved until the 1960s. Other critics claim that C. Radcliffe was merely a figurehead and that the entire commission was a hoax, since Mountbatten himself was said to have drawn the dividing line, expressing his personal sympathies and prejudices. The participants in those events also disagree in their accounts and assessments. C. Radcliffe himself, in his memoirs written years later, explained that he had treated the partition in a purely administrative sense, as he had assumed that the two Dominions constituting the Commonwealth would certainly cooperate with each other in a friendly manner and that any disputes and possible errors in his work would be resolved and corrected in the course of bilateral talks.⁴⁵ This kind of idealism, moreover, can also be seen in other thorny issues, such as the division of the Indian army. It was then assumed that there would be a joint high command for both dominions, with a British marshal, Claude Auchinleck, a veteran of fighting in North Africa during World War II, in the lead. The armed forces of India and Pakistan were also given British commanders, as it was assumed that the armies of the dominions would never fight against each other.⁴⁶ Even if tensions in mutual relations proved to be very high, the officers of the Crown were to prevent a fratricidal fight, as they had taken an oath of allegiance to the same monarch. The future brutally falsified these idealistic notions. The partition of India saw a mass exodus of people from one dominion to another, accompanied by unprecedented violence. According to various estimates, between half a million and a million people were killed.⁴⁷ The massacres witnessed at that time were permanently embedded in the consciousness of both witnesses and subsequent generations of Indians and Pakistanis. Where, for generations, representatives of the two communities lived side by side and shared common interests, mass killings and thefts occurred. Trains full of the corpses of refugees, slaughtered by armed gangs along the way, arrived in Pakistan’s Lahore and India’s Amritsar. The homes of minority

⁴⁵ L. Ziring, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-62.

⁴⁶ S. Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within*, Karachi 2008, pp. 21-23.

⁴⁷ I. Talbot, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

representatives were plundered by their neighbours, and they themselves were killed or forced to emigrate. Under the watchful eye of the evacuating British colonial administration, macabre ethnic cleansing took place, comparable to that known from the territories of the former Yugoslavia. The state of anarchy into which the Indian-Pakistani border was plunged also encouraged the activities of gangs of common criminals who disguised their actions under religious-nationalist slogans. Against this background, the division of the armed forces proceeded with surprising calm. The principle adopted was that individual military units would remain where they were stationed at the time, while each officer and soldier could choose whether to remain in his unit or move to the dominion with which he felt personally attached.⁴⁸ There are known accounts of ceremonial farewells for officers deciding to leave their units. Over the traditional glass of cognac “for the king and the fatherland” they vowed lifelong friendship. Time has shown that more than once, two colleagues from one regiment later had to stand face to face on opposite sides of the front. However, the distribution of military equipment, including weapons and ammunition, was much worse. Pakistan never received all the items allocated to it, and what arrived on the western side of the border often proved to be obsolete or unusable. It is not only Pakistan's eastern border that has been the subject of controversy; the issue of the border with Afghanistan was also a serious diplomatic and political problem. It was demarcated by the British-Afghan Treaty, which ended the war between the two countries in 1893.⁴⁹ The Afghan side, in particular, regarded this solution as temporary, a legacy of the colonial period. The term *border* is also rarely used in British literature, while the term *Durand Line* is commonly employed (named after the diplomat Mortimer Durand, who participated in the process of negotiating it), which Afghans interpret as evidence of its temporary nature. The line was drawn to take into account the strategic and defensive interests of British rule over India in the event of possible external aggression. The partition occurred during the struggle for influence and political

⁴⁸ A.H. Amin, *The Pakistan Army till 1965*, Arlington 1999, pp. 77-86.

⁴⁹ Text for: *The Durand Line Border Agreement 1893*, ed. Y.S. Fida, Peszawar 2003.

control over Central Asia between Great Britain and Russia.⁵⁰ At that time, Afghanistan played the role of a buffer state, separating the zones of influence of the great European powers. The Durand Line was never a “border” in the European sense of the word, as there were no difficulties in crossing it for the local population. However, it became a political problem with the emergence of independent Pakistan. The new state declared, with the consent of the British Parliament, that it was the heir to the international treaties previously concluded by Great Britain that related to British India. This particularly concerned treaties defining state borders, including the 1893 agreement establishing the Durand Line.⁵¹ The Afghans had a different opinion. They believed that the demarcation was temporary and concerned only the British Empire, and since a new geopolitical and legal situation had arisen, the agreement should be renegotiated. They also sought to have a plebiscite held in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and NWFP province, asking residents not only whether they wanted their areas to be annexed to Pakistan or India, but also whether they wanted their lands to be returned to Afghanistan.⁵² This solution, however, was jointly rejected by both M.A. Jinnah and Nehru. The local population decided to join Pakistan, but this did not mean the end of problems. Some politically active Pashtuns became involved in the movement for national autonomy within the Pakistani state, led by a former supporter of remaining part of India, Abdul Ghaffar Khan.⁵³ Others began to demand the creation of Pashtunistan, an independent nation-state. The latter concept was supported by the government in Kabul; however, fortunately for Pakistan, Afghanistan did not have the strength or resources to implement it effectively.⁵⁴ The only form of protest against Pakistan's takeover of the territories west of the Durand Line was the vote against Pakistan's admission to the United Nations (UN) in the General

⁵⁰ R.A. Johnson, *Russians at the Gate of India? Planning the Defence of India 1885-1900*, “Journal of Military History” Vol. 67, 2003, no. 3, p. 698.

⁵¹ S.M. Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, New York 2000, pp. 27-28.

⁵² M.K. Jalalzai, *Afghanistan, Central Asia, Pakistan and the United States*, Lahore 2003, p. 27.

⁵³ M.S. Korejo, *The Frontier Gandhi: His Place in History*, New York 1994, pp. 195-214.

⁵⁴ M.K. Jalalzai, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

Assembly. Given the popular support received by Karachi, this had only a symbolic meaning. These events impacted bilateral relations and significantly influenced the formation of Pakistan's foreign policy towards its western neighbour.

It is difficult to provide a clear-cut account of British rule over India. Contemporary Indian Pakistanis point to two important elements that they consider to be positive legacies of the British Raj: the apolitical civil service (formerly the Indian Civil Service) and a legal system based on British common law and Westminster parliamentarism. What is undoubtedly negative, however, is the course of the Indian partition process. The assumptions were noble, based on democracy and respect for the will of the individual, but the practice turned out to be tragic in its consequences. Millions of people lost their homes and their entire life's work and were forced to rebuild everything from scratch in an alien environment.⁵⁵ The newly established dominions began their existence with a conflict that has not been finally resolved to this day, and mutual hostility is passed down from generation to generation, making any kind of dialogue difficult. Undoubtedly, the existing economic ties linking India and Pakistan, as well as Britain and other countries of the former empire, proved to be a serious problem. In favourable conditions, these ties could serve as the foundation for close cooperation, but in the realities of decolonisation and the desire to emphasise one's own independence, particularly in the face of the growing Pakistani-Indian conflict, they became a heavy burden. Pakistan emerged on the international scene as an independent state on 14 August 1947, exactly 30 minutes earlier than neighbouring India (in fact, it happened simultaneously, but Mohammad Ali Jinnah decided to establish a half-hour time difference between the two countries). Karachi was chosen as the capital, being the largest city of the dominion, and at the same time a seaport and the administrative centre of the Sindh province. Pakistan includes the provinces of Balochistan, Sindh, NWFP and almost half of Punjab, with the city of Lahore, as well as East Bengal, separated from the rest of the country by Indian territory. The populations of these provinces differed in language and local traditions. Understandably, Bengal (named East Pakistan) had the greatest separateness. The Ben-

⁵⁵ I. Talbot, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

gali language spoken in this province was very different from the others, and a very rich literature was also created in Bengali (for example, a Nobel Prize winner, Rabindranath Tagore, wrote in Bengali).⁵⁶ The NWFP also had its own peculiarities, inhabited by Pashtuns living according to their own customs, guided by the Pashtunwali code of honour. The most economically developed province was Punjab, previously known as the granary of British India. The adopted dividing line was intended to hinder the functioning of local agriculture as little as possible, but it was not possible to avoid the separation of infrastructure that had existed for centuries, including, which is particularly burdensome, irrigation systems.⁵⁷ The mass migration of the Muslim population from India created very serious social and economic problems. For the most part, these people possessed only what they managed to take with them. The new authorities had to provide them with accommodation and conditions for further living. The plan was to use the estates left behind by Indians migrating to India for this purpose, but as was easily predicted, much of it had been looted by neighbours beforehand. Urdu-speaking immigrants (called Mohajirs in Pakistan – after the term traditionally used to refer to Muhammad and his companions who fled from Mecca to Medina) from the middle class of Central India (then the United Provinces, today the state of Uttar Pradesh) chose Karachi and its surroundings as their destination, hoping to find attractive work there.⁵⁸ This became the cause of conflict between them and the indigenous population of the Sindh province, which quickly became a minority in the capital. The situation of immigrants from the eastern part of Punjab who remained in India was slightly better, as they did not differ culturally from the inhabitants of the western part of Pakistan and adapted to the new conditions quite quickly. The actions of the central government, aimed at creating a united Pakistani nation, have in fact deepened existing divisions and antagonisms. M.A. Jinnah and his associates stated that the new state should be based on two pillars: one religion and one language. Urdu was chosen for this purpose as it was the historical language of the Mughal court, written in Persian like the Holy

⁵⁶ O.B. Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

⁵⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 59.

⁵⁸ *A History of Pakistan...*, pp. 16-17.

Quran.⁵⁹ Islam is not a homogeneous religion; it has many sects and branches that have historically been in conflict with each other. The majority of Pakistan's population is Sunni, but there is also a large Shiite minority, so adopting Sunnism as the state religion was detrimental to the idea of unity. M.A. Jinnah himself came from a Shia family but was not particularly religious. This, moreover, characterised the entire secular intellectual elite of Pakistan at the time. They treated religion as a factor that distinguished their community from other Indian religious groups and as a set of norms that were more cultural and traditional than legal in nature.⁶⁰ It is significant that M.A. Jinnah emphasises details such as cuisine or family law, while omitting the aspects of polytheism and monotheism as distinctive features of Muslim identity. The secularised Pakistani elite did not set itself the goal of building a religious state based on religious prohibitions and commandments or the authority of theologians, but strove to create a modern secular state in which Islam would be only a cultural and historical element. There are certain analogies here with the concepts of contemporary European Christian democracy, which were certainly known to the European-educated M.A. Jinnah.⁶¹ This idea, although correct from today's perspective, proved impossible to implement, as it did not take into account the needs and real-world perceptions of the majority of the citizens of the new state, as well as the influence of radical Islam in society. As the communalist conflict escalated and the date of the British departure from India approached, the League sharpened its religious rhetoric using the mullahs. A unifying force was sought to unite the ethnically diverse inhabitants of the northern provinces. The only common feature of these peoples was Islam and the Muslim tradition known from the Quran and the Sunnah (that is, Islamic law based on parables from the life of the Prophet Muhammad); hence, M.A. Jinnah and his supporters played this card in their political propaganda purely for opportunistic reasons. It was officially stated that in "Greater Hindustan", Muslims would become a persecuted and discriminated minority. It was emphasised that Indian Muslims had more in common with their

⁵⁹ I. Talbot, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

⁶⁰ *Ibidem*, pp. 27-230.

⁶¹ H. Haqqani, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-8.

fellow believers from the Persian Gulf region or Iran than with their neighbours down the street who were Hindus. It should be remembered that the fundamentalist group Jamaat-e-Islami initially did not accept the partition of British India and the creation of Pakistan, because it considered the new state to be un-Islamic (as it was based on secular statutory law and not the Quran), and the partition of the subcontinent itself as a betrayal of the mission of converting the entire population of India to Islam. Another mistake made in the creation of Pakistan was the poor resolution of the language issue.⁶² M.A. Jinnah and his associates decided that the official language of the new state would be Urdu because it is the only language on the subcontinent written in the Persian alphabet, derived from the Arabic language in which the Quran was written. However, this language was native to only about 3% of the population. It was mostly spoken by the Mohajirs of Central India, not the indigenous people of Pakistan.⁶³ This arrangement particularly discriminated against the people of Bengal who spoke their own language, which was completely different from Urdu. The effects of the zeal in introducing Urdu as the language of offices and administration were felt very quickly. The Mohajirs supported representatives of the indigenous Sindhu population in economically attractive jobs in the state administration and the capital city of Karachi. In Bengal too, local officials and soldiers had to make way for immigrants from India. This caused frustration and resentment among those who had worked in the colonial administration for generations. Apart from the religious issue, M.A. Jinnah cited the threat from the numerically superior "Hindu element" as the reason for the historical necessity of creating Pakistan; this was made real by the acts of aggression committed against Indian Muslims by Hindu fundamentalists. In this situation, the only national institution that enjoyed universal respect was the armed forces, but their ethnic structure also did not fully reflect the diversity of Pakistan. Traditionally, the dominant groups in the Pakistani (and previously Indian) armed forces have been the Punjabi and Pashtun peoples.⁶⁴ The Mohajirs were, and still are, a significant group; some of them

⁶² I. Talbot, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-16.

⁶³ O.B. Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

⁶⁴ S. Nawaz, *op. cit.*, p. XXX.

chose to migrate to Pakistan as military men, while others opted to serve in the army as a means of finding their way in a new country, as it provided shelter, food and the opportunity to make a good start in a new reality. The army played a special role during the period of mass exodus of the Muslim population to Pakistan. The administration of the new state was only just forming at the time, so it was not capable of providing adequate care and medical assistance to those in need. In this situation, it was the military that took over social functions. They built tents and shelters for refugees, prepared food for them, dug wells and protected them from robberies, or at least attempted to do so.⁶⁵ This made the army associated with security at the time. It later exploited this trust by taking power in the country. The bloody experiences of the partition of the subcontinent were and are still used to shape Pakistan's state ideology and create the national identity of its inhabitants. The ever-present Indian threat was constantly highlighted. In fact, politicians from Delhi themselves gave grounds for this by calling Pakistan a "seasonal state" or "the invention of one clever man" in public statements. In Pakistani schools, children were taught who the enemy of their homeland was, in an attempt to replace the sense of ethnic bonds of individual nations and peoples, as well as belonging to the Muslim religious community (Arabic: *umma*), with "modern", secular nationalism, such as in Kemalist Turkey.⁶⁶ Literary and musical works were intended to sustain the memory of those who died in the fight against the Hindu threat. A similar state policy essentially survived until the beginning of the 21st century, making the army and Islam the two pillars of Pakistani statehood.⁶⁷ The process of creating the Pakistani state was fraught with difficulties. The largest political centres of the former colony – Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata – found themselves within India's borders. Similarly, the most important industrial plants, ammunition depots and arms factories were also located there. The arrangements for the division of the state treasury and the military arsenal remained in practice only on paper. The Pakistanis received shipments of damaged rifles and cannons from India. Even the office equipment

⁶⁵ H. Haqqani, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-30.

⁶⁶ S.Ph. Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

⁶⁷ H. Haqqani, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-132.

was often found to be damaged. The ministries began their work literally in the open air, thanks to the involvement of private individuals, as Karachi lacked public buildings that could accommodate the offices and institutions being established. There was a shortage of professionals, both in the administration and in the armed forces. The employment of British officers in top command positions was adopted as an interim option. Attempts were made to fill staff shortages in the so-called “technical weapons” by engaging foreign contract officers. As part of this project, Poles began serving in Pakistan – soldiers of the Polish Armed Forces in the West who decided to remain in exile for political reasons. It is worth mentioning here General Władysław Turowicz. Along with nearly 90 other airmen, he chose to serve in the Royal Pakistan Air Force (RPAF) and is considered one of the fathers of the Pakistan Air Force; he helped organise and train its personnel.⁶⁸ He completed 18 years of service as Deputy Chief of Air Staff.⁶⁹ Along with him, a number of *Virtuti Militari* Cross bachelors, including veterans of the Battle of Britain (e.g., Major Bronisław Malinowski), chose to serve in Pakistan. They commanded Pakistani fighter squadrons and trained young pilots at the RPAF College in Risalpur. The memory of Gen. Turowicz (and his colleagues) was commemorated with a plaque and permanent exhibition at the Karachi Aviation Museum. Poles also helped build the Royal Pakistan Navy; an example is Commander Romuald Nałęcz-Tymiński, who served as a destroyer commander in the Royal Pakistan Navy and in the 1960s was the commander of a flotilla of destroyers. Our compatriots played a part in the creation of the civilian Pakistan International Airlines.⁷⁰ Pakistan was initially treated by both the British and the Indians as a “seasonal state” or “one man’s (M.A. Jinnah’s) project”. This is evidenced by the process of partition itself and the retention of the joint military command of both Dominions with

⁶⁸ K. Ahmad, *Untold Tales of Pakistan Air Force: A Glimpse of Life in PAF* [n.p., n.d.], pp. 65-75. I write about it in more detail in the monograph *Polish Eagles over the Himalayas*, Kraków 2004.

⁶⁹ J. Knopek, *Władysław Turowicz (1908-1980). Zapomniany organizator lotnictwa pakistańskiego*, “Przegląd Polonijny” Vol. 1, 2006, pp. 119-129.

⁷⁰ T. Lachowicz, *Dla Ojczyzny ratowania... Szkice z dziejów wychodźstwa polskiego w Ameryce i inne*, Warszawa 2007, pp. 304-306.

British generals. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of (independent) India, often claimed that Pakistan would not be capable of independent existence and would sooner or later rejoin the Indian Union. The determination of the Pakistanis, however, allowed them to build a state – perhaps imperfect, but one that has been functioning for 70 years. From the very beginning, it was exposed to a serious test in the form of an armed conflict with its larger neighbour. What emerges from the above considerations is a picture of Pakistan as a state growing out of the traditions of the British Empire. The constitutional basis of the new state was the Government of India Act, passed by the House of Commons and the House of Lords in July 1935 and signed by King George VI in August of the same year. With the subsequent British Indian Independence Act of July 3, 1947, creating two independent dominions, this became the first constitution of independent Pakistan. Under this transitional legislation, officials of the former Indian Civil Service (a tool of the former colony's administration) retained their positions, as did judges. The Parliament of Pakistan was given the name Constituent Assembly, suggesting that its primary task was to prepare a new constitution. In reality, due to the growing internal conflict over the future shape of the state, it was only possible to adapt the British “colonial constitution” to the needs of an independent political entity by means of amendments. Agreement on a new constitution was reached only eight years later, in 1956. To sum up, Pakistan inherited both the legislative (Parliament) and the executive (Governor-General and Prime Minister, assisted by the Pakistan Civil Service) and judicial (Supreme Court and the provincial court system) powers from the period of British rule, and the persons holding these highest offices in the state were often nominated by the colonial authorities, or at least approved by them.⁷¹ It is worth noting that this was the result of the process of slowly preparing India to transfer power into the hands of a local elite educated according to European models, often at British universities. An example of such a figure was Muhammad Ali Jinnah himself, the creator of independent Pakistan and its first Governor-General, a barrister educated in Great Britain (it should be emphasised that, unlike Lord L. Mountbatten,

⁷¹ H. Hussain, *Tale of a Love Affair That Never Was: United States-Pakistan Defence Relations*, “Defence Journal of Pakistan” Vol. 6, 2002.

who held this office in India, M.A. Jinnah had real competences, comparable to those previously enjoyed by the viceroy in united India). The newly established state struggled with serious financial problems from the very beginning of its existence. The cause of these problems was a disagreement over the division of the budget of the former British India. The last united Indian government had an amount of four billion rupees at its disposal. The value of the Indian currency at that time was equal to the US dollar.⁷² This means that the Indian rupee in 1947 would have been worth US\$11.23 today.⁷³ During the negotiations, the Pakistani side demanded a billion rupees as the basis for its future functioning. However, the Indian side did not want to agree to this. After heated negotiations, the final amount was agreed at 750 million rupees. Initially, the new government in Karachi received only 200 million rupees in cash. The payment of the remainder was delayed, linking the debt to Pakistan's military operations in Kashmir. It was only Mahatma Gandhi's hunger strike that prompted the Delhi government to pay the arrears of 500 million rupees. The "missing" 50 million was never received by Pakistan as the Indian government withheld it for "obvious financial claims".⁷⁴ The described situation had a negative impact on the ability of the government being formed in Karachi to perform its basic functions.

2.4 Socio-Economic Factors

- Territory: 796,095 km²⁷⁵
- Shoreline: 1,046 km (Arabian Sea)

⁷² H. Singh, *Devaluation of Indian Rupee: Reasons & History since 1947*, [on-line:] <http://www.jagranjosh.com/general-knowledge/devaluationof-indian-rupee-reasons-history-since-1947-1475640486-1> – 14 XI 2017.

⁷³ <https://www.dollartimep.com/inflation/inflation.php?amount=100&year=1947> – 14 XI 2017.

⁷⁴ P.I. Cheema, *The Armed Forces of Pakistan*, Karachi 2003, p. 17.

⁷⁵ *Pakistan – Country Factsheet*, [on-line:] <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/pakistan/factsheets/> – 2 X 2017.

- Borders: 7,257 km, including with Afghanistan 2,670 km (the so-called “Durand Line”, not recognised by the government in Kabul), with China 438 km, with India 3,190 km (border dispute in Kashmir), with Iran 959 km
- Population: 252,363,571 (October 2024⁷⁶)
- Ethnic composition: Punjabis 44.7%, Pashtuns 15.4%, Sindhis 14.1%, Sariaks 8.4%, Muhajirs (migrants from India after 1947) 7.6%, Baloch 3.6%, others 6.3%
- Natural increase: 1.43% (2017)
- Urban population: 39.7%
- Literacy: 69.5% among men, 45.8% among women, 57.9% among the whole population
- PKB: 1.347 billion USD, \$5,600 per capita (2024)
- Economic growth: 3.07% (2024)⁷⁷
- Military spending: 2.8% of GDP (2023)⁷⁸
- Largest cities:⁷⁹
 - Karachi: 11,624,219
 - Lahore: 6,310,888
 - Faisalabad: 2,506,595
 - Rawalpindi: 1,743,10
 - Multan: 1,437,230
 - Hyderabad: 1,386,330
 - Gujranwala: 1,384,471
 - Peshawar: 1,218,773
 - Rahim Yar Khan: 788,915
 - Quetta: 733,675
 - Muzaffarabad: 725,000

⁷⁶ *Ibidem.*

⁷⁷ K. Haider, *Pakistan Economy Grows 3.07% Buoyed by IMF Loan, Lower Rates*, [on-line:] <https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/business/international/2024/09/30/pakistans-economy-expands-307-buoyed-by-imf-loan-lower-rates/> – 2 X 2017.

⁷⁸ N. Tian *et al.*, *Trends in World Military Expenditure*, 2023, [on-line:] https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/2404_fs_milex_2023.pdf – 2 X 2017.

⁷⁹ *Pakistan Cities by Population 2024*, [on-line:] <https://worldpopulationreview.com/cities/pakistan> – 2 X 2017.

- Battagram: 700,000
- Kotli: 640,000
- Islamabad: 601,600
- Bahawalpur: 552,607
- Sargodha: 542,603
- Sialkot: 477,396
- Sukkur: 417,767
- Larkana: 364,033
- Sheikhpura: 361,303

Pakistan's geographical location makes its territory extremely difficult to defend. The distance between the Khyber Pass on the Afghan border and the town of Wagha on the Indian border is approximately 578 km. The distance between the same point on the Afghan border and the village of Chackothi on the Line of Control dividing Kashmir is only 420.72 km.⁸⁰ The terrain is flat, criss-crossed by canals and rivers, which does not pose a serious obstacle to modern armed forces. Major cities such as Lahore and Karachi are located parallel to the Indian border, with the former practically on the border line itself. The ethnic structure and relations between the individual groups inhabiting Pakistan are complex. Especially after the secession of East Bengal in 1971, the dominance of Punjabis in the army increased, arousing distrust and even hostility among other ethnic groups. Separatism is particularly visible in Balochistan, but the Pashtuns also display some characteristics of this type of activity. The experiences of the 1971 war mean that any autonomous or separatist tendencies are affected by the trauma caused by the military defeat in the war with India and the loss of almost half of the territory and population. Ethnic problems are also visible in the armed forces, although the dominance of Punjabis is not as apparent there, thanks to the traditional involvement of Pashtuns in military service.

⁸⁰ *Driving Distance Calculator and Driving Directions Pakistan*, [on-line:] https://distancecalculator.globefeed.com/Pakistan_Distance_Calculator.asp – 2 IX 2017.

3. TWO CORNERSTONES OF PAKISTAN'S ARMED FORCES

3.1 British Heritage

Another structure inherited by Pakistan from the period of British rule was the armed forces. During the division of the former British Indian Army (BIA), the principle was adopted that the new dominions would receive existing human and materiel resources in a 2:1 ratio in favour of India. This was a complicated process, as the British did not maintain religiously uniform units within their armed forces for fear of possible mutinies. Therefore, two parallel activities were carried out: the existing military units were divided “on paper”, taking into account their previous places of deployment, and the soldiers serving in them were distributed to ensure their full staffing. The process of dividing and relocating troops between the new dominions was completed on November 7, 1947. Pakistan was allocated six armoured regiments, eight artillery regiments, 34 engineer companies and 22 infantry battalions, while India was allocated 13, 18, 61 and 88 respectively.⁸¹ It was a very complicated task in terms of logistics. A significant number of British Indian Army units were based outside the Subcontinent (whether in Europe, Burma or the Dutch West Indies). Those that remained were dislocated mainly in the eastern part of the colony, where they were expected to face the looming Japanese threat until recently. They had to be brought back to their home garrisons in order to

⁸¹ S. Riza, *The Pakistan Army 1947-1949*, Karachi 1989, p. 136.

divide the units among the new states. This task was also made more difficult by the issue of the officer corps: they were mostly British, who knew that their service would end on the day independence was declared. Not everyone was interested in the new positions, and the young states were not ready to offer each of them similar salary conditions to those they had previously. Another major logistical task was the physical division of existing military units among the new states. The units of the British Indian Army since 1857 (i.e., since the bloodily suppressed Sepoy Mutiny, also known as the First War of Indian Independence) had not been ethnically homogeneous. This was achieved by recruiting individual battalions in the infantry or squadrons in the cavalry from among representatives of different religions and ethnic groups. The aim was to prevent another mutiny by Indian soldiers, in keeping with the principle of *divide et impera*, by exploiting both old communal disputes and generating new ones. Thanks to this method, British officers acted as peacemakers and units from different communities kept each other in check: in the event of a mutiny, the “neighbour” could be used to pacify it. This practice found its ideological, pseudo-scientific justification in racial theory, which became part of British doctrine adopted in the 1880s. According to it, the inhabitants of India were divided into two groups according to their suitability for military service: the so-called “martial races” and “non-martial races”. The concept of a (human) race was then understood as a biologically formed large human population or a group of related populations with specific physical features passed down hereditarily, more or less geographically isolated. According to this definition, the racial differentiation of people was most clearly manifested by the colour of the skin and the features of the head (hair shape, facial profile, outline of the nose and lips, frame of the eyes).⁸² It was also believed that, like the aforementioned physical characteristics, races were characterised by certain psychophysical properties. From the military’s point of view, such features were courage and bravery. According to the adopted pseudo-scientific criteria, only 10% of the Indian population belonged to the “military races”. It was assumed that people of the Indo-Aryan type, characterised by tall stature, fair complexion, long head, narrow pronounced nose, living mainly in

⁸² R. Tokarczyk, *Współczesne doktryny polityczne*, Warszawa 2010, p. 285.

the north of the subcontinent (Punjab and Rajasthan), were the most useful in the army. In contrast, the people of southern India were dark-skinned, short in stature, with flat noses and prominent lips. This same racial concept led politicians of the time to conclude that the local population was, for anthropological reasons, unfit to govern and decide for itself; therefore, the local army had to be commanded by Europeans. The management of colonies inhabited by “uncivilised peoples” was, thus, not only a right, but also a duty for the British – given by God himself. This idea found its expression in literature. Perhaps the most famous example of this is the poem by Rudyard Kipling *White Man's Burden*.⁸³ The vision of the exceptional character of the British (and, among them, the English) was also preached by other poets, including William Blake in his 1804 poem *Jerusalem Hymn*.⁸⁴ Another popular piece still performed during the annual concert *The last night of the Proms* (and also sung by English fans during matches of the national football team), which is a relic of imperial British literature, is the song *Rule Britannia*, with lyrics by the poet James Thomson from 1740.⁸⁵ Based on the accepted racial theory, the primary region for recruiting soldiers for the British Indian Army was the Punjab. Outside this region, Sikhs and Pashtuns, as well as Dogras and Gurkhas living in Nepal, were particularly deemed worthy of recruitment into the armed forces. Representatives of the Jat caste (now living in north-west India and Pakistan) and the Rajputs (north and central Indian representatives of the kshatriyas-knights-caste) were also considered to have military value. Importantly, the number of recruited Muslims was relatively small.⁸⁶ In the face of the approaching partition of the subcontinent, the British tried to convince the representatives of the emerging dominions to maintain the unity of their armed forces under a common (of course, British)

⁸³ R. Kipling, *The White Man's Burden*, 1899, [on-line:] <https://sourcebookp.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/kipling.asp> – 10 II 2017.

⁸⁴ *Jerusalem Hymn*, [on-line:] <https://www.songandpraise.org/jerusalem-hymn.htm> – 10 II 2017.

⁸⁵ *Hymns*, [on-line:] <https://www.songandpraise.org/rule-britannia-lyricp.htm> – 10 II 2017.

⁸⁶ A. Farooqui, 'Divide and Rule'? *Race, Military Recruitment and Society in Late Nineteenth Century Colonial India*, "Social Scientist" Vol. 43, 2015, no. 3-4, pp. 53-57.

command. When strong resistance was encountered, especially from Jinnah, efforts were made to create a joint wartime command for both armies and to limit the tasks of the local commands to peacetime internal security services. Nearly a year of difficult talks culminated in the agreement concluded on June 26, 1947 to divide the British Indian Army between the two dominions, each of which was to have its own Supreme Command.⁸⁷ This meant that a complex operation had to be performed in less than two months. It was necessary not only to assign individual units to the new countries, but also to make a religious exchange of personnel so that, as a rule, Muslims would serve in Pakistan and Hindus in India. In the first case, however, Muslim officers and soldiers were allowed to remain in India if their families made the same choice. It should be noted that despite numerous references to British traditions, the Pakistani army does not benefit from the experience of mixing the ethnic composition of military units, preferring a territorial enlistment of volunteers. Nationality and language issues are not taken into account in officer recruitment and promotions. It is rather tradition – very often family tradition, as children of soldiers also choose military service – that makes the inhabitants of the Punjab or Pashtuns more willing to join the military than representatives of other nations. An echo of the old British racial theory is the common opinion among Pakistani officers that Hindus are less combative than they are, which is why it takes as many as (depending on the speaker's assessment) three to five Hindus to defeat one Muslim.⁸⁸ Pakistanis have repeatedly learned that this stereotype is untrue, but it is still present in the public consciousness. In the years 1947-1951, the positions of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army were held by British generals – Frank Masservy and Douglas Gracey. In August 1947, European officers constituted a significant part of the officer corps of the emerging Pakistan Army. Of the six partition commanders, five were British. Of the 13 artillery brigade commanders, 10 were British. Out of six commanders of armoured regiments, all six were British. Out of 42 infantry battalion commanders, 30 were British (interestingly, there

⁸⁷ S. Riza, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-128.

⁸⁸ C. Fair, *Is Pakistan's Army as Islamist as We Think?*, [on-line:] <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/09/15/is-pakistans-army-asislamist-as-we-think/> – 10 II 2017.

were also three Indians among them).⁸⁹ Below is a comparison of the demand for personnel for the emerging Pakistani army with the actual staffing levels of officers:

- Staff Officers (above colonel): 100 needed, 10 available
- Staff Officers (lower ranks): 1,720 needed, 490 available
- Armoured troops: 290 needed, 140 available
- Artillery: 400 needed, 130 available
- Engineering troops: 700 needed, 80 available
- Signal troops: 250 needed, 80 available
- Infantry: 1,650 needed, 1,060 available
- Services: 700 needed, 450 available
- Logistics: 540 needed, 250 available
- Electricians and mechanics: 400 needed, 20 available
- Doctors and veterinarians: 800 needed, 620 available
- Others: 200 needed, 120 available
- Total: 7,750 needed, 3,450 available.⁹⁰

Pakistan was allocated the following armoured units:

Probyn's Horse (5th King Edward VII's Own Horse)

Regimental motto: *Ich Dien* (from Old German "I serve" – refers to the motto of the Prince of Wales, heir to the throne of the United Kingdom). The unit was established as part of the British Indian Army in 1857 in Lahore. It took part in numerous military campaigns, including Lucknow, Forty Taku, Beijing (1860); Abyssinia, Ali Masjid, Peiwar Kotal, Charasiach, Kabul (1879); Afghanistan (1878-1880); Malakand, Punjab, Mesopotamia (1915-1918); and Meiktila. After being motorised in 1940, it participated in the Burma campaign from 1941 to 1945. As part of the partition among the newly established dominions, it was awarded to Pakistan. The Dogra Squadron and the Sikh Squadron were replaced by the Punjabi Mussalman Squadron (from the Royal Deccan Horse) and the Kaimkhani Squadron (from the 18th King Edward's Own Regiment).⁹¹ It is a unit

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 247.

⁹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 115.

⁹¹ J. Gaylor, *Sons of John Company: The Indian & Pakistan Armies 1903-1991*, Tunbridge Wells 1996, pp. 69-70.

traditionally regarded as elitist. Candidates for service usually come from wealthy or “well-established” families. This custom still exists today.⁹²

The 6th Duke of Connaught’s Own Lancers (Watson’s Horse)

The unit was established in 1860. It participated in the following campaigns: Afghanistan 1878-1880; Tel-el-Kebir, Egypt 1882; Punjab, China 1900; Shaiba, Kut-al-Amara 1915-1917; Tigray 1916, Baghdad; Mesopotamia 1915-1918; Afghan-Indian borderlands; Afghanistan 1919. It became a motorised unit in 1939. During the Second World War, it took part in the Second Battle of Monte Cassino and the Italian campaign. During the partition, a Jat squadron went to the 7th Light Cavalry in exchange for a squadron of Punjabi Mussalman from the same regiment, and a Sikh squadron went to the 8th King George V’s Own Light Cavalry in exchange for a second squadron of Punjabi Mussalman from the same regiment.⁹³ The unit’s officers have a reputation for being very friendly and open. The most famous of them was General Zia ul-Haq, who later became President of Pakistan.⁹⁴

Cavalry (The 10th Queen Victoria’s Own Cavalry)

The unit was established in 1846 in Peshawar. It participated in the following campaigns: Multan, Gujarat, Punjab, Delhi 1857; Ali Masjid, Kabul 1879; Afghanistan 1878-1880; Chitral, Malakand, Punjab, Mesopotamia 1917-1918, Afghan-Indian Frontier, India 1915. It was motorised in 1940. During the Second World War, it fought in North Africa from 1940 to 1943. During the partition, the Dogra Squadron left for Hodson’s Horse and the Sikh Squadron for Poona Horse. In return came the Punjabi Mussalman Squadron from Hodson’s Horse and the Ranghar Squadron from the Scinde Horse⁹⁵ regiment. The unit has a reputation for being very Anglophile, attached to colonial traditions.⁹⁶

⁹² C. Schofield, *Inside the Pakistan Army: A Woman’s Experience on the Frontline of the War on Terror*, London 2011, p. 214.

⁹³ J. Gaylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72.

⁹⁴ C. Schofield, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

⁹⁵ J. Gaylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80.

⁹⁶ C. Schofield, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

The 11th Prince Albert Victor's Own Cavalry (11th Frontier Force)

Regimental motto: *Kabul to Kandahar* (from Kabul to Kandahar). The unit was established in 1849 after the Sikh Wars. It participated in the following campaigns: Delhi 1957; Lucknow, Ahmad Khel, Kandahar 1880; Afghanistan 1878-1880; Kut-al-Amara 1917, Baghdad, Mesopotamia 1915-1918; Afghanistan 1919. Mechanised in 1940, it took part in battles during World War II: North Africa 1940-1943; Burma 1942-1945. The 1st Sikh Squadron left during the division to join the 18th King Edward VII's Own Cavalry.⁹⁷ The unit demonstrated particular bravery and effectiveness during the wars with India in 1965 and 1971. Other regiments joke about this unit: "From Kabul to Kandahar, that's all they know." The proverb refers to the regiment's participation in the Anglo-Afghan wars and its motto, and is yet another proof of the continuity of tradition.⁹⁸

The 13th Duke of Connaught's Own Lancers

Regimental motto: *Spearhead*. A unit raised in 1805 during the Siege of Bhutpore. It participated in the following campaigns: Ghazni, Afghanistan 1839; Multan, Punjab; Central India; Afghanistan 1878-1880; Burma 1885-1887; Kut-al-Amara 1917; Baghdad, Mesopotamia 1916-1918; Afghan-Indian Frontier, India 1917; Afghanistan 1919; Afghan-Indian Frontier 1937-1940. Unit motorised in 1938. During World War II, it took part in battles in Syria 1941; Gazala; Bir Hacheim; El Adem; Sidi Rezegh 1942; Tobruk 1942; North Africa 1940-1943.⁹⁹ The oldest and most magnificent unit of the Pakistani cavalry. The officers have a reputation for being distant and phlegmatic, renowned for their ironic sense of humour.¹⁰⁰

The 19th King George V's Own Lancers (nickname: *Tiwana Lancers*)

The unit was established in 1861. It participated in the following campaigns: Taku Forts, Beijing 1860; Ahmad Khel, Afghanistan 1878-1880; Tirah, Punjab, Battle of the Somme, Cambrai 1917; Flanders 1914-1918; Damascus, Palestine 1918. Although the unit was not originally planned to

⁹⁷ J. Gaylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-82.

⁹⁸ C. Schofield, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

⁹⁹ J. Gaylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-88.

¹⁰⁰ C. Schofield, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

be mechanised, this was accomplished in 1941. The regiment took part in World War II, fighting in Burma from 1942 to 1945. The Jat squadron was exchanged for the Punjabi Mussalman squadron with the Central India Horse, while the Sikh squadron was exchanged for the Punjabi Mussalman squadron with Skinner's Horse.¹⁰¹ The junior officers of the regiment have a reputation for being more intelligent than their superiors. The unit is called the *factory of generals*. Its staff is known for being hospitable yet arrogant. Its members also boast impressive sporting achievements and are renowned for their accuracy in shooting.¹⁰²

The 15th Lancers

The unit was formed in 1857. It took part in the Afghan wars of 1879-1880 and 1919. It also fought in East Africa in 1915. Following motorisation in 1937, it became a training unit for the 1st Indian Cavalry Group based in Jhansi.¹⁰³

Sam Browne's Cavalry (12th Frontier Force)

The unit was established in 1849. It participated in the following campaigns: Delhi 1857; Lucknow, Charasiah, Kabul 1879; Afghanistan 1878-1880; Kut-al-Amara 1917; Baghdad, Mesopotamia 1916-1918; Mozambique 1915; Afghan-Indian Frontier, East Africa 1917; Afghanistan 1919. Motorised in 1937, the unit served as a training regiment for the 2nd Indian Cavalry Group based at Ferozepore.¹⁰⁴

The armoured and motorised units allocated to Pakistan, like those allocated to India, were based on cavalry traditions. This was a practice typical of the British Army, where cavalry units were also motorised. A similar situation occurred with the 24th Uhlan Regiment and the 10th Mounted Rifle Regiment of the 10th Cavalry Brigade, which replaced horses with tanks and cars in the Polish Army. It is a reconnaissance unit combining the traditional splendour of the old cavalry units with the ac-

¹⁰¹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰² J. Gaylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-102.

¹⁰³ C. Schofield, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 83-84.

tivities of those established later in independent Pakistan. The regiment's soldiers are famous for their sports achievements.¹⁰⁵

The Pakistani Army received the following infantry units:

The 1st Punjab Regiment (transformed into the Punjab Regiment in 1965)

One of the oldest units of the British Indian Army. It continues the traditions of the regiment of the former Madras Army, among whose commanders the most famous was the later Lord Wellington. The individual battalions that make up the unit fought in the following campaigns: Sholinghur, Carnatic, Seringapatam, Mysore, Assaye, Laswarrie, Bourbon, Nagpore, Arakan, Ava, Bhurtpore, China, Burma 1885-1887; Suez Canal, Egypt 1915; Aden, Shaiba, Kut-al-Amara 1915-1917; Tigris 1916; Baghdad, Mesopotamia 1915-1918; Afghan-Indian Frontier 1915; Afghanistan 1919; Sidi Barrani, Tobruk 1941; Gazala, El Alamein, Gothic Line, Singapore, Burma 1942-1945.¹⁰⁶

- 1/1 Punjab (later, 1 Punjab)
- 2/1 Punjab (later, 2 Punjab)
- 3/1 Punjab (later, 3 Punjab)
- 5/1 Punjab (later, 4 Punjab)
- 7/1 Punjab (later, 18 Punjab)
- 14/1 Punjab (later, 20 Punjab)¹⁰⁷

The 8th Punjab Regiment (in 1956, transformed into the Baluch Regiment)

Like the 1st Punjab Regiment, this unit also follows the traditions of the Madras Army. It was formally established only in 1923. The battalions that formed it took part in the following campaigns: Cochin, Meheidpore, Afghanistan 1878-80; Burma 1885-1887; China 1900; France and Flanders 1915; Macedonia 1918; Helles, Krithia, Gallipoli 1915; Suez Canal, Egypt 1915; Megiddo, Palestine 1918; Tigris 1916; Kut-al-Amara 1917; Baghdad, Mesopotamia 1915-1918; Afghanistan 1919. During World

¹⁰⁵ C. Schofield, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

¹⁰⁶ J. Gaylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 133-134.

¹⁰⁷ S. Riza, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-204.

War II, the unit fought in Northern Malaya, the Italian Campaign (1943-1945) and Burma (1942-1945).¹⁰⁸

- 1/8 Punjab (later, 1 Baluch)
- 2/8 Punjab (later, 2 Baluch)
- 3/8 Punjab (later, 3 Baluch)
- 4/8 Punjab (later, 4 Baluch)
- 5/8 Punjab (later, 5 Baluch)
- 6/8 Punjab (later, 13 Baluch, and since 1980, 1 Sindh)
- 8/8 Punjab (later, 17 Baluch, and since 1980, 2 Sindh)
- 9/8 Punjab (later, 18 Baluch, and since 1980, 3 Sindh)¹⁰⁹

Baluch Regiment (formerly, the 10th Baluch Regiment)

The unit traces its traditions back to the regiment that was part of the Bombai Army, founded in 1820. It had been operating under its new name since 1844. Its battalions took part in the following campaigns: Aden, Reshire, Bushire, Koosh-ab, Persia, Delhi 1857; Central India, Abyssinia, Kandahar 1880; Afghanistan 1878-1880; Egypt 1882; Tel-el-Kebir, Burma 1885-1887; British Empire, 1896 1897-1899; China 1900; Messines 1914; Armentières 1914; Ypres 1914-1915; Gheluvelt, Festubert 1914; Givenchy 1914; France and Flanders 1914-1915; Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia 1916, 1916 1915-1918; Palestine 1918; Kut-al-Amara 1917; India 1917; Kilimanjaro, East Africa 1915-1918; Afghanistan 1919. During World War II, battalions of this regiment fought, among others, at El Alamein in North Africa (1940-1943), during the landing in Sicily in 1943, during battles in Italy, including on the Gothic Line, in Malaya, in Singapore and in Burma (1942-1945).¹¹⁰

- 1/10 Baluch (later, 6 Baluch)
- 2/10 Baluch (later, 7 Baluch)
- 3/10 Baluch (later, 10 Baluch)
- 4/10 Baluch (later, 11 Baluch)
- 5/10 Baluch (later, 12 Baluch)
- 6/10 Baluch (later, 14 Baluch)

¹⁰⁸ J. Gaylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-162.

¹⁰⁹ S. Riza, *op. cit.*, pp. 204-207.

¹¹⁰ J. Gaylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-166.

- 7/10 Baluch (later, 15 Baluch)
- 8/10 Baluch (later, 16 Baluch)
- 17/10 Baluch (later, 19 Baluch)¹¹¹

12 Frontier Force Regiment (transformed into the Frontier Force Regiment in 1956)

The unit continues the traditions of the formation established during the wars with the Sikhs. It was formally established in 1846. Its battalions took part in the following campaigns: Pegu, Multan, Gujarat, Punjab, Delhi 1857; Ali Masjid, Kabul 1879; Afghan-Indian Frontier, Kandahar 1880; Afghanistan 1887-1880; Chitral, Malakand, Tirah, Peking 1900; Somaliland 1901-1904; Suez Canal, Egypt 1915; Megiddo, Nablus, Palestine 1918; Aden, Tigris 1916; Kut-al-Amara 1917; Baghdad, Mesopotamia 1915-1918; India 1914, 1915, 1916-1917; Afghanistan 1919. During World War II, the unit took part in the following battles: Gallabat, Agordat, Abyssinia 1940-1941; Gazala, Bir Hacheim, El Adem, North Africa 1940-1943; landing in Sicily, landing at Reggio, Gothic Line, fighting in Italy 1943-1945; Greece 1944-1945; Northern Malaya, Burma 1942-1945.¹¹²

- 1/12 Frontier Force Regiment (later, 3 Frontier Force)
- 2/12 Frontier Force Regiment (later, 4 Frontier Force)
- 3/12 Frontier Force Regiment (later, 5 Frontier Force)
- 4/12 Frontier Force Regiment (later, 6 Frontier Force)
- 5/12 Frontier Force Regiment (later, 2 Frontier Force)
- 8/12 Frontier Force Regiment (later, 13 Frontier Force)
- 9/12 Frontier Force Regiment (later, 14 Frontier Force)
- 14/12 Frontier Force Regiment (later, 11 Frontier Force)¹¹³

13 Frontier Force Rifles (transformed into the Frontier Force Regiment in 1956)

Like the 12th FF, the regiment was raised during the Sikh Wars. Its battalions took part in the following campaigns: Delhi 1857; Lucknow, Peiwar Kotal, Kharasiah, Kabul 1879; Afghanistan 1878-1880; Tirah, China

¹¹¹ S. Riza, *op. cit.*, pp. 207-211.

¹¹² J. Gaylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 172-173.

¹¹³ S. Riza, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-215.

1900; La Bassee 1914; Armentières 1914; Givenchy 1914; Nueve Chapelle, Ypres 1915; Aubers, France and Flanders 1914- 1915; Suez Canal, Egypt 1915-1917; Gaza, El Mughar, Nebi Samwil, Jerusalem, Palestine 1917-1918; Aden, Tigris 1917; Kut-al-Amara 1917; Baghdad, Mesopotamia 1916-1918; Persia 1918-1919; Afghan-Indian Borderlands, India 1917; Balochistan 1918; East Africa 1916-1918; Afghanistan 1919. During World War II, the battalions of the regiment took part in battles: Abyssinia 1940-1941; Syria 1941; Gazala, Sidi Razegh 1942; Mersa Matruh, North Africa 1940-1943; fighting in Italy 1943-1945, including the Second Battle of Monte Cassino, Gustav Line, fighting for Florence, Gothic Line, Bologna, Malaya 1941-1942; Imphal, Burma 1942-1945.¹¹⁴

- 1/13 Frontier Force Rifles (later, 7 Frontier Force)
- 2/13 Frontier Force Rifles (later, 8 Frontier Force)
- 4/13 Frontier Force Rifles (later, 9 Frontier Force)
- 5/13 Frontier Force Rifles (later, 10 Frontier Force)
- 6/13 Frontier Force Rifles (later, 1 Frontier Force)¹¹⁵

The 14th Punjab Regiment (transformed into the Punjab Regiment in 1956)

The unit was formed in 1922, although some battalions had an older tradition. They participated in the following campaigns: China 1860-1862; Peking 1860; Abyssinia, Ali Masjid, Ahmed Khel, Kandahar 1880; Afghanistan 1878-1880; Tel-el-Kebir, Egypt 1882; Punjab, Malakand, Peking 1900; China 1900; Ypres 1915; Aubers, France and Flanders 1915; Macedonia 1918; Suez Canal, Egypt 1915; Nablus, Palestine 1918; Basra, Kut-al-Amara 1915; Baghdad, India 1915-1917; Narungombe, East Africa 1916-1918; Afghanistan 1919. During World War II, battalions of this regiment fought in the following campaigns: Agordat, Keren, Abyssinia 1940-1941; Singapore, Malaya 1941-1942; Hong Kong, Southeast Asia 1940-1943; Imphal, Monywa 1945; Burma 1942-1945.¹¹⁶

- 1/14 Punjab (later, 5 Punjab)
- 2/14 Punjab (later, 6 Punjab)

¹¹⁴ J. Gaylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 176-177.

¹¹⁵ S. Riza, *op. cit.*, pp. 215-218.

¹¹⁶ J. Gaylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-181.

- 3/14 Punjab (later, 7 Punjab)
- 4/14 Punjab (later, 8 Punjab)
- 5/14 Punjab (later, 16 Punjab)¹¹⁷

The 15th Punjab Regiment (transformed into the Punjab Regiment in 1956)

The unit was established in 1922, although the traditions of the battalions comprising it date back to 1860. They took part in battles in China from 1860 to 1862, Ali Masjid, Peiwar Kotal, Egypt in 1915, Megiddo, Palestine in 1918, Tigris in 1916, Kut-al-Amara in 1917, Baghdad, Mesopotamia from 1915 to 1918, Persia, Border Afghan-Indian in 1917 and Kilimanjaro, East Africa from 1914 to 1917. During World War II, the regiment's battalions fought, among others, in Abyssinia from 1940 to 1941, British Somaliland in 1940, West Borneo from 1941 to 1942, South-East Asia from 1941 to 1942, during the fighting in Italy from 1943 to 1945, including the Second Battle of Monte Cassino (on the Gothic Line) and in Burma from 1942 to 1945.¹¹⁸

- 1/15 Punjab (later, 9 Punjab)
- 2/15 Punjab (later, 10 Punjab)
- 3/15 Punjab (later, 11 Punjab)
- 4/15 Punjab (later, 12 Punjab)¹¹⁹

The 16th Punjab Regiment (transformed into the Punjab Regiment in 1956)

The unit was founded in 1922, although its traditions date back to 1857. Its battalions took part in the campaigns in Afghanistan (1878-1880), Burma (1885-1887), Chitral, Tirah, Punjab, Malakand, La Basse (1914), Messines (1914), Armentières (1914), Givenchy (1914), Ypres, France and Aubers, France (1914-1915), Macedonia (1918), Suez Canal, Egypt (1915-1916), Megiddo, Nablus, Palestine (1918), Aden, Tigris (1916), Kut-al-Amara (1917), Baghdad, Mesopotamia (1915-1918), Borders of Afghanistan Indian (1916-1917), Bohobeho, Narungombe, Nyangao, West Africa (1917-1918)

¹¹⁷ S. Riza, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-221.

¹¹⁸ J. Gaylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-184.

¹¹⁹ S. Riza, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-223.

and Afghanistan (1919). During World War II, the regiment's battalions fought, among others, in: Mescelit Pass, Massawa, Abyssinia (1940-1941), Jitra, Ipoh, Singapore, Malaya (1941-1942), Sidi Barrani, Omars, Benghazi, El Amalein, Mareth, Djebel Garci, Tunis, North Africa (1940-1943), 1st Battle of Monte Cassino, Kaladan, Imphal, Burma (1942-1945).¹²⁰

- 1/16 Punjab (later, 13 Punjab)
- 2/16 Punjab (later, 14 Punjab)
- 3/16 Punjab (later, 15 Punjab)
- 4/16 Punjab (later, 17 Punjab)
- 7/16 Punjab (later, 19 Punjab)¹²¹

The Bahawalpur Regiment (A unit of the sovereign principality of Bahawalpur, which had acceded to Pakistan, incorporated into the Baluch Regiment in 1956)

- 1 Bahawalpur (later, 8 Baluch)
- 3 Bahawalpur (later, 20 Baluch)
- 4 Bahawalpur (later, 21 Baluch)¹²²

From the examples given of the campaigns and battles in which the various battalions of the infantry regiments allocated to Pakistan took part, a picture emerges of units with a wealth of combat experience across many continents and in changing conditions of warfare. The majority of the officer corps were British, but the process of so-called “Indianisation” gradually progressed. However, it never reached a sufficient number of officers to enable the armies of the newly established dominions to function independently once independence was declared. For example, in the Indian Army, the highest-ranking local officer was a brigadier, and there were 19 lieutenant colonels. There were only three commanders of independent units serving in the armoured forces. There were only 18 battalion commanders in the infantry and only 10 in the artillery.¹²³ This meant that British and/or Commonwealth officers had to be em-

¹²⁰ J. Gaylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 186-187.

¹²¹ S. Riza, *op. cit.*, pp. 223-224.

¹²² *Ibidem*, pp. 225-226.

¹²³ *Ibidem*, p. 114.

ployed in command positions; otherwise, the newly created armed forces would not be capable of performing any combat tasks. This problem was particularly acute for Pakistan.

Artillery units allocated to Pakistan:

- 21 Mountain Regiment (transformed into 1 Mountain Regiment)
- 3 Field Regiment (renamed 2 Field Regiment)
- 4 (SP) Field Regiment (renamed 3 (SP) Field Regiment)
- 5 Field Regiment (renamed 4 Field Regiment)
- 33 Anti-Tank Regiment (transformed into 7 Field Regiment)
- 38 Medium Regiment (renamed 8 Medium Regiment)
- 18 HAA Regiment (renamed 5 HAA Regiment)
- 25 LAA Regiment (renamed 6 LAA Regiment)
- 2nd Indian Survey Regiment (renamed 13th Survey Regiment).¹²⁴

By 30 October 1947, Pakistan had received only 5,000 Lee–Enfield .303 Mk IV rifles out of 223,373 that were held in British Indian Army warehouses.¹²⁵ After 1956, when Pakistan was formally declared a republic (which meant that the British monarch was no longer the actual head of state, represented by the Governor-General, but was now recognised only as the head of the Commonwealth of Nations, of which Pakistan is one of many members), the units referring to cavalry traditions lost their patrons – in line with the cavalry tradition, which was also followed in pre-war Poland, called *chiefs* – members of the royal family and aristocrats. There, too, where a crown had hitherto featured in the unit's symbol, it was replaced by a star and crescent. However, both the numbering and the other symbolism, as well as the appearance of the gala uniforms, mean that a specific British esprit de corps is still present in the Pakistani armoured forces, along with a sense of continuity of tradition dating back to the colonial wars and the battles on the fronts of World Wars I and II.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ *Ibidem*, pp. 198-200.

¹²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 141.

¹²⁶ S. Nawaz, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.

New names for armoured units after 1953:

- 5th Horse
- 6th Lancers, Fateh Khem Karan (in memory of the Battle of Khem Karan in 1965)
- Guides Cavalry (Frontier Force)
- 11th Cavalry (Frontier Force)
- 12th Cavalry (Frontier Force)
- 13th Lancers
- 15th Lancers
- 19th Lancers.¹²⁷

Other armoured units, already being created in Pakistan, also referred with their names to the British cavalry custom:¹²⁸

- 4 Cavalry (formed in 1956). Prince Aly Khan's Own | nickname: The Brave Four
- 7 Lancers (formed in 1991)
- 8 Cavalry (formed 1991) Izz-Ul-Khail – A unit established in Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Storm. It refers to tradition.
- 8th King George V's Own from the time of British India
- 9 Horse (formed 1991) | nickname: The Arabian Horse
- 14 Lancers (formed 1993) | nickname: Ghazi Squadron (warrior squadron)
- 15 Lancers (formed in 1955)
- 16 Horse (formed 1993) | nickname: Al-Mugheerat
- 17 Lancers (formed in 1998)
- 18 Horse (formed in 1994)
- 20 Lancers (formed 1956) | nickname: Haidri
- 21 Horse (formed 1990) | nickname: Murtajiz
- 22 Cavalry (formed 1962) | motto: Death or Glory
- 23 Cavalry (formed in 1962)
- 24 Cavalry (formed 1962) | nickname: The Chargers
- 25 Cavalry (formed 1962) | nickname: the Men of Steel
- 26 Cavalry (formed 1968) | nickname: the Mustangs

¹²⁷ J. Gaylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 298-300.

¹²⁸ C. Schofield, *op. cit.*, pp. 214-222.

- 27 Cavalry (formed 1965) | nickname: Ribatul-Khail – Steeds of War
- 28 Cavalry (formed 1969) | nickname: Chhamb Hunters
- 29 Cavalry (formed in 1968)
- 30 Cavalry (formed 1966) | nickname: Bold Till Death
- 31 Cavalry (formed in 1966) | nickname: Sprocketeers (gears)
- 32 Cavalry (formed in 1964)
- 33 Cavalry (formed in 1971) | motto: Fortune's with the Bold (loosely translated: fortune favours the brave)
- 34 Lancers | nickname: The Dragoons
- 35 Cavalry (formed in 2014) | nickname: al-Mubarizun
- 37 Cavalry | nickname: Ribat-us-Sehra
- 38 Cavalry (formed 1971) | nickname: Desert Hawks
- 39 Cavalry (formed in 1971) | nickname: the Vanguarders
- 40 Horse (formed in 1987)
- 41 Horse (formed in 1987)
- 42 Lancers (formed in 1988)
- 43 Cavalry (formed in 2015) | nickname: al- Zarib
- 44 Cavalry (formed in 2016) | nickname: The Pioneers
- 51 Lancers (formed 1971) | nickname: Silver Eagles
- 52 Cavalry (formed in 1972) | nickname: Howalmustaan
- 53 Cavalry (formed 1972) | nickname: the Golden Eagle
- 54 Cavalry (formed in 1974) | nickname: The Fifty-Fourth, Hizbullah
- 56 Cavalry (formed in 1985) | nickname: Raad ul Harb
- 57 Cavalry (formed in 1985)
- 58 Cavalry (formed in 1985)

As was the case with the allocation of British India's budget, India failed to honour its commitments to release allocated military supplies to Pakistan. Only 4,703 tonnes of supplies out of the 165,000 tonnes allocated reached their destination. Pakistan has also not received a single one of the 249 tanks it was due. Equipment and heavy machinery for the allocated units had to be purchased by the new state from the UK.¹²⁹ Out of the 46 British Indian Army training centres, only seven were located in territory allocated to Pakistan. Of the 40 military supply warehouses, only

¹²⁹ P.I. Cheema, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

five were situated there. Additionally, only three of the 17 arms factories were found in that territory.

Pakistan Navy

The newly formed Pakistan Navy fared much worse. It included the following units:

- HMPS anti-aircraft frigate. His Majesty Pakistani Ship Godavari – Flagship, Narbada Anti-submarine frigate: HMPS Shamsher
- Minelayers: HMPS: Oudh, Balochistan, Malwa, Kathiawar
- Minesweepers: HMPS: Baroda, Rampur

The Royal Pakistan Navy also had seven other small patrol vessels.¹³⁰ There was a lack of harbour facilities (docks and warehouses) and even adequate buildings to house the command institution. The personnel situation was no better: 92 officers volunteered to serve in the RPN, the highest rank of which was Captain Haji M.S. Choudri. Policymakers decided to fill these gaps by employing British and Commonwealth¹³¹ officers. The first commander of the RPN was Vice Admiral James W. Jefford. He remained in this position until 1953. In September 1950, the RPN decided to employ four German mechanics, headed by ex-Kriegsmarine captain Gunther Ludwig.¹³² In 1951, Romuald Nałęcz-Tymiński was accepted for service in the RPN. A year later, he took command of HMPD Tippu Sultan, and on July 11, 1952, he commanded the Pakistani destroyer flotilla.¹³³ During World War II, this Polish officer served on the ORP *Błyskawica*, commanded the ORP *Ślązak* (including covering the unsuccessful Allied landing at Dieppe) and the ORP *Conrad*.¹³⁴ It is worth mentioning that the ORP *Ślązak* was called the HMS *Bedale* before being handed over to Poland in April 1942 and after being returned to the British in August 1946. It was handed over to the Indian Navy in April 1953 and sailed under the Indian flag as INS *Godavari* until 1979, when it was

¹³⁰ Pakistan Navy History Section, *Story of the Pakistan Navy 1947-1972*, Islamabad 1991, p. 65.

¹³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 69.

¹³² *Ibidem*, p. 132.

¹³³ *Ibidem*, p. 148.

¹³⁴ <http://www.mw.mil.pl/index.php?akcja=postactyminski> – 7 XI 2017.

scrapped.¹³⁵ The former commander, thus, found himself on the other side of the “front” with his former unit.

Pakistan Air Force

The worst in terms of organisation was the emerging Royal Pakistan Air Force (as in the case of the navy, this branch of the force retained the adjective indicating the country's affiliation with the Commonwealth of Nations). The personnel consisted of 200 officers and 2,000 non-commissioned officers and privates. Of these, only 60 were pilots and 800 were aircraft mechanics. Most of these personnel were British. The highest rank was GP Capt (Col) Mohammad Khan Janjua.¹³⁶ In this type of weapon, the longest-serving commanders-in-chief were British officers with the rank of Air Vice-Marshal: Allan Perry-Keene, Richard Atcherley, Leslie William Cannon and Arthur McDonald. It was not until 1957 that the Pakistan Air Force was headed by an Air Marshal, Asghar Khan. In the initial period of its existence, a key role was also played by Polish officers and contract airmen who served as squadron commanders, mechanics and instructors. The highest-ranking among them, Air Commodore (General) Wladyslaw Turowicz, served until the mid-1960s as deputy commander of the PAF for technical matters.¹³⁷ Of the Pakistani air squadrons, only nine SQ existed within the Royal Air Force before the partition of British India. It was formed in 1943-44 in Burma and took part in fighting in the local theatre of war. The remaining units were formed after 1947 on the territory of Pakistan. However, both the name and symbolism (pilot badge, cockade painted on aircraft and squadron symbols) refer to British patterns.¹³⁸

- No. 1 Squadron | nickname: Rahbers, Mianwali base
- No. 2 Squadron | nickname: Minhas, Masroor base

¹³⁵ *HMS Bedale (L 26): Escort Destroyer of the Hunt (Type II) Class*, [on-line:] <https://uboat.net/allies/warships/ship/4635.html> – 7 XI 2017.

¹³⁶ M. Shah, *The Gold Bird: Pakistan and Its Air Force – Observation of a Pilot*, Karachi 2002, p. 46.

¹³⁷ I write more extensively on this subject in the monograph *Polish Eagles over the Himalayas* (original title: *Polskie Orły nad Himalajami*), Kraków 2004.

¹³⁸ <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/9sqn.htm> – 10 II 2017.

- No. 3 Squadron, Chaklala Base
- No. 4 Squadron
- No. 5 Squadron | nickname: Falcons, Rafiqui base
- No. 6 Squadron | nickname: Antelopes, Chaklala base
- No. 7 Squadron | nickname: Bandits, Masroor base
- No. 8 Squadron | nickname: Haider, Masroor base
- No. 9 Squadron | nickname: Griffins, Sargodha base
- No. 10 Squadron
- No. 11 Squadron | nickname: Arrows, Sargodha base
- No. 12 Squadron | nickname: Globe Trotters, Chaklala base
- No. 14 Squadron | nickname: Tail Choppers Shaheens, Kamra base
- No. 15 Squadron, Kamra base
- No. 16 Squadron | nickname: Black Panthers, Peshawar base
- No. 17 Squadron | nickname: Tigers, Samungli base
- No. 18 Squadron | nickname: Sharp Shooters, Rafiqui base
- No. 19 Squadron | nickname: Warhawks Sherdils, Mianwali base
- No. 20 Squadron | nickname: Cheetas, Rafiqui base
- No. 22 Squadron | nickname: Ghazis, Masroor base
- No. 23 Squadron | nickname: Talons, Samungli base
- No. 24 Squadron, Sargodha Base
- No. 25 Squadron, Mianwali Base
- No. 26 Squadron | nickname: Black Spiders, Peshawar base
- No. 27 Squadron | nickname: Zarrars, Rafiqui base
- No. 41 Squadron, Chaklala Base
- No. 81 Squadron | nickname: Kangaroos, Peshawar base
- No. 82 Squadron, Sargodha Base
- No. 83 Squadron, Rafiqui base
- No. 84 Squadron, Masroor base
- No. 85 Squadron, Samungli Base
- No. 86 Squadron, Mianwali Base
- Combat Commander School Sargodha¹³⁹

¹³⁹ <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/airforce-squadronp.htm> – 10 II 2017.

Pakistani intelligence

The British officer was also the founder of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). From January to June 1948, this institution was headed by an Australian, General Walter Joseph Cawthorne. He is considered to be the creator of its first structures. This veteran of the Battle of Gallipoli and the fighting on the Indo-Afghan border was regarded as an excellent expert on the issues of the Indian Subcontinent. He began his service in British intelligence in 1939 and was Director of Intelligence of the Indian Command from 1941 to 1945. In 1947, he joined the Pakistan Army. After leaving his post as Director General of the ISI, he served on the General Staff, where he was Deputy Chief. He served as High Commissioner (Ambassador) of Australia in Karachi¹⁴⁰ from 1954-58. The question of whether the ISI, at the time it was headed by a subject of the British king, was a service loyal only to Pakistan or whether it was also pursuing the interests of the UK remains unanswered. However, available British sources support the thesis that this loyalty was most likely dual.¹⁴¹ His successor was Gen. Shahid Khamid, a graduate of the British Military Academy at Sandhurst.¹⁴² When leaving the Indian Subcontinent, the British had no intention of relinquishing their influence there and securing it, in particular, against communist infiltration, which resulted directly from the emerging Cold War system. Although none of the studies on British counter-intelligence mention it explicitly, it can be assumed that there was very close cooperation with the Pakistani secret services. This is supported by the fact that they were headed by the Australian officer in question. For comparison, in India, the first head of the Intelligence Branch was an Indian, B.N. Malik, but the countries agreed to depute a Special Liaison Officer to Delhi. The first of them was Lt. Col. Kenneth Bourne, an officer with experience of serving in India during World War II. Representatives of India and Pakistan were also invited to attend

¹⁴⁰ H. Kiessling, *Faith, Unity, Discipline: The ISI of Pakistan*, London 2016, pp. 15-16.

¹⁴¹ C. Walton, *Imperium Tajemnic. Brytyjski wywiad, zimna wojna i upadek imperium*, transl. M. Antosiewicz, Wołowiec 2015, pp. 197-199.

¹⁴² A. Rashid, *Obituary: Maj-Gen Syed Shahid Hamid*, [on-line:] <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-maj-gensyed-shahid-hamid-1497723.html> – 13 II 2017.

the Second Commonwealth Security Conference in 1951.¹⁴³ The British established their own liaison officer in Karachi only in 1951 at the express request of the Pakistani authorities. Previously, they had merely maintained an MI5 outpost there.¹⁴⁴ From these facts, it can be concluded that in the period immediately after the independence of the Subcontinent, the government in London focused more on cooperation with India than with Pakistan. Whether this was due to differences in potential between the new states or a lack of faith in the survival of the Indian Muslim state is unknown. In the case of Pakistan, the model of functioning for the secret services was initially adopted based on the British one. The role of external intelligence, covering the entire former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, including the present-day province of Gilgit-Baltistan, similar to the British MI6, was played by the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (known by the acronym ISI). Counter-intelligence tasks were performed by the Intelligence Bureau, the equivalent of MI5.¹⁴⁵ As in New Delhi, in Karachi too, the new intelligence service was based on civilian cadres taken over from the Indian Intelligence Bureau.¹⁴⁶ However, the entire colonial archival holdings were probably destroyed, although it can be assumed that at least some of them may still be in London today. The tasks and goals of the ISI changed after the first military coup in 1958. The intelligence service also began to spy on representatives of the political opposition, diplomats, journalists, other foreigners (including those from the West) and its own diplomats working abroad (until then it had only been responsible for coordinating the work of the military attaché). In this way, the ISI became a tool for the army to remain in power and gained a superior role over both the civilian Intelligence Bureau and the Military Intelligence, which replaced the intelligence organisations of the individual branches of the armed forces.¹⁴⁷ The shift in the ISI's focus towards the role

¹⁴³ Ch. Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5*, London 2009, pp. 442-444.

¹⁴⁴ C. Walton, *op. cit.*, pp. 209-210.

¹⁴⁵ H. Kiessling, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 16.

¹⁴⁷ G. Shaun, *The ISI and the War on Terrorism*, "Studies in Conflict & Terrorism" Vol. 30, 2007, no. 12, p. 3.

of a kind of “political police” came at the expense of its traditional tasks, the consequences of which were painfully felt during the war with India in 1965. This is discussed in more detail in the second volume of this study.¹⁴⁸ Internally, too, contrary to the popular opinion about the omnipotence of this organisation, the ISI has failed to live up to the hopes placed in it. The public mood in East Pakistan was misjudged, which ultimately led to the dissolution of the state and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971.¹⁴⁹ The takeover of power in Pakistan by civilian politician Zulfikar Ali Bhutto after the lost war with India meant a temporary decline in the importance of the ISI. However, as early as March 1973, this institution could boast of having uncovered a mysterious military plot to overthrow the government. In this way, the ISI regained the trust of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, becoming the second political police, alongside the Federal Security Force he had established, which dealt with the elimination of political opponents of the government.¹⁵⁰ In reality, it was merely a game between the services aimed at promoting General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq to the position of commander-in-chief of the army. ISI analysts presented the Prime Minister with a psychological profile of the candidate, which showed that he had no political ambitions. On July 5, 1977, the general staged a coup d'état and ruled Pakistan until August 17, 1988. The intelligence service most likely did not inform the Prime Minister about the coup plans. The role of the ISI in promoting General Zia ul-Haq as head of state is also indicated by the fact that the then Director General of Intelligence, General Ghulam Jilani Khan, was rewarded with the post of Governor of Punjab, the richest province of Pakistan.¹⁵¹ The ISI played a key role in Pakistan's support of the mujahideen fighting against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. A special unit was established within the ISI – the Afghan Bureau, headed by Brigadier Mohammad

¹⁴⁸ B. Cloughley, *A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections*, New Delhi 2002, p. 116

¹⁴⁹ R. Banerji, *Pakistan: Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI): An Analytical Overview*, “Journal of Defence Studies” Vol. 5, 2011, no. 4, p. 2.

¹⁵⁰ A. Shah, *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan*, Harvard 2014, pp. 122-123.

¹⁵¹ H. Haqqani, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

Yousaf.¹⁵² The American CIA has given the Pakistanis the ability to practically decide which factions fighting in Afghanistan will receive what aid. This has provided the ISI with the opportunity to support the pro-Pakistani faction Gulbuddin Hekmatyar at the expense of Islamabad's unwillingness to support Ahmad Shah Massoud.¹⁵³ In the Koranic schools established on the Afghan-Pakistani border under the aegis of the ISI, approximately 83,000 fighters were trained between 1983 and 1997. The weapons and equipment they received are estimated to be worth around three billion USD.¹⁵⁴ The ISI is also suspected of creating (or at least tolerating the existence of) the Maktab al-Khidmat (Services Office) organisation, which recruited Arab volunteers to fight against the Soviets. It was founded by Mullah Abdullah Azzam, known for his Salafist views, and succeeded by Osama bin Laden. The office became the nucleus of the terrorist organisation commonly known as al-Qaeda.¹⁵⁵ Apart from its activities related to the fighting in Kashmir (which is discussed in more detail in Volume 2 of the publication), in India the ISI is accused of supporting separatist and terrorist organisations of a non-Islamic nature. Until the secession of Bangladesh, Pakistani intelligence was said to have supported the Assam Liberation Front (ULFA), National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NDCN), People's Liberation Army (PLA), North-West Students Organisation (NESCO) and the United Liberation Front of Seven Sisters (ULFOSS), which operated in Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Tripura and Mizoram. It also supported Sikh organisations such as the Sikh Youth Federation and sheltered participants in the 1984 fighting with Indian troops (which ended with Operation Blue Star).¹⁵⁶ Pakistani intelligence was also involved in supporting the Muslim side in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Perhaps one of the most

¹⁵² M. Yousaf, M. Adkin, *Afghanistan: The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower*, Havertown 2001, p. 38.

¹⁵³ G. Shaun, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

¹⁵⁴ S. Winchell, *Pakistan's ISI: The Invisible Government*, "International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence" Vol. 16, 2003, no. 1, pp. 377-378.

¹⁵⁵ M.J. Roberts, *Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: A State within a State?*, "Joint Forces Quarterly" Vol. 48, 2008, p. 105.

¹⁵⁶ B. Raman, *The Kaoboy of Re&AW: Down Memory Lane*, Atlanta 2013, p. 127.

high-profile episodes is the case of supplying weapons to Bosnian Muslims, which was a clear violation of the UN embargo. Gen. Javed Nasir, the Director General of Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan's military intelligence), revealed in his testimony before a court in Lahore (on October 23, 2002) that he had delivered a number of anti-tank missiles to the Bosnian side by air. This was to help lift the siege of their positions by Serbian forces.¹⁵⁷ It was most likely about Hongjian HJ-8 missiles manufactured in China and used by Pakistan.¹⁵⁸ The case was publicised on an international forum by the lawyers of two accused Serbian soldiers: Momcilo Perisić and Ratko Mladić. Their defence was that their clients' actions against Bosnian civilians were merely a response to violations of international law by the Pakistani military and Bosnian Muslims. The Pakistani side refused to extradite the former intelligence chief, citing his poor health – memory loss resulting from a car accident. The extradition did not take place.¹⁵⁹ According to the German author of the ISI monograph, Hein G. Kiessling, the involvement of Gen. Nasir's actions was much more serious than merely incidental, as he would like to present in court. In his opinion, the Pakistani intelligence ISI, in cooperation with Iran, was to transfer to the Bosnian side not only anti-tank missiles, but also three-inch mortars, Russian and Chinese Kalashnikov rifles, land mines and light weapons. The equipment was to be transported on board Pakistan Air Force aircraft.¹⁶⁰ One such machine was shot down in January 1993 over the Adriatic Sea. During the examination of the wreckage, it was found that the plane was carrying ten containers of weapons for Bosnians fighting against the Serbs.¹⁶¹ Bosnia and Herzegovina government officials also

¹⁵⁷ H. Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*, London 2005, pp. 148-149.

¹⁵⁸ *Arms Trafficking to Bosnia Goes on Despite Embargo*, [on-line:] <http://www.nytime.com/1994/11/05/world/arms-traffickingto-bosnia-goes-on-despite-embargo.html?mcubz=0> – 5 IX 2017.

¹⁵⁹ Q. Butt, *Islamabad Refuses to Hand Over Ex-ISI Chief to Bosnia Tribunal*, *The Express Tribune* 2011, [on-line:] <https://tribune.com.pk/story/256199/islamabad-refuses-to-hand-over-ex-isi-chief-to-bosnia-tribunal>.

¹⁶⁰ H.Kiessling, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

¹⁶¹ C. Wiebes, *Intelligence and the War in Bosnia 1992-1995: The Role of the Intelligence and Security Services*, Berlin 2003, p. 172.

testified before the Hague tribunal that another channel for arms transfers from Pakistan was the smuggling route through Turkey.¹⁶² Pakistani C-130 Hercules aircraft were also reported to be participating in the Turkish air bridge to the city of Tuzla.¹⁶³ The issue of supplying weapons to the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina raised many controversies because, on the one hand, there was an embargo imposed on Bosnia and Herzegovina by the United Nations, and on the other, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, which also includes Pakistan, declared that it would not comply with it in order to allow the government in Sarajevo to exercise the right of self-defence, which is inherent to every state.¹⁶⁴ The involvement of the ISI in supporting Islamist militants not only in Pakistan's immediate vicinity – Afghanistan and India – but also in distant Bosnia and Herzegovina indicates that the factor of Islamic solidarity plays a significant role in determining the goals and tasks of this institution. This raises concerns about the loyalty of its personnel: whether it is stronger towards the state or towards the religious community. However, involvement in the international arms trade in the Balkans may also have a much simpler, purely material justification. It should be noted that the first commanders-in-chief of the Pakistani armed forces and their respective types to come from the Subcontinent – Gen. Ayub Khan (Army), Vice Admiral Haji Mohammad Siddiq Choudri (Navy), and Air Marshal Asghar Khan (Air Force) – were recommended for their posts by their British predecessors. They were also usually graduates of British military academies, namely: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (Berkshire), Britannia Royal Naval College (Dartmouth, Devonshire) and Joint Service Defence College (Latimer, Buckinghamshire). Thus, the British tradition in the Pakistan Armed Forces is alive and passed on to subsequent generations.

¹⁶² *Ibidem*.

¹⁶³ *Ibidem*, p. 173.

¹⁶⁴ *Pakistan Sends More Troops to Bosnia*, [on-line:] <http://www.upi.com/Archives/1995/07/26/Pakistan-sendsmore-troops-to-Bosnia/9114806731200/> – 5 IX 2017.

3.2 The Meaning of Islam

In analysing Pakistan's contemporary strategic culture, it is important to pay attention to the notion of the founding myth of the new state. It is worth referring to the definition of the concept of the myth of the beginning proposed by Anna Siewierska-Chmaj. The myth of the beginning is the basis of national self-identification; it provides evidence of a respectable, albeit mythical, lineage maintains the continuity of national existence in a given area, and guarantees ownership rights to the land.¹⁶⁵ The same author presents the concept of M.A. Jinnah as the myth of the beginning or, rather, the founding myth typical of newly emerging nations. Jinnah stated: "Pakistan as the homeland of Indian Muslims" (hence the capital letter). He quotes the famous statement of the founder of the state: "Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, have separate customs and literature. They do not marry each other, nor do they share a table. In fact, they belong to two different civilisations that are based on opposing and hostile ideological principles. (...) It is clear that Hindus and Muslims draw inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes and different episodes of their history. Very often the hero of one is the enemy of the other, and similarly, the victories of the latter are the defeats of the former. Forcing two such peoples to live in one state, when the first is a majority and the second a significant minority, must lead to a boiling point and the complete destruction of the social fabric needed by any government."¹⁶⁶ During the Lahore Conference in 1940, M.A. Jinnah clearly articulated, "Muslims are not a minority. Muslims are a nation by every known definition."¹⁶⁷ A. Siewierska-Chmaj writes: "The political myth with a religious background became a dangerous myth for Pakistan since religion was the unifying factor of the new nation. Demands arose for the state to function according to the principles of Sharia. How can one justify the existence of a secular state when its founding myth itself uses religious arguments? How can

¹⁶⁵ A. Siewierska-Chmaj, *Mit polityczny jako fundament ideologii. Próba analizy*, [in:] *Przekazy polityki*, Kraków–Rzeszów–Zamość 2009, p. 22.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶⁷ H. Khan, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

a nationalist ideology be created that is consistent with the teachings of the Quran? What was missing was a symbolic but secular framework that could capture the imagination of citizens. The non-functionality of the origin myth based solely on religious principles was proven by the declaration of independence by East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. Islam proved to be an insufficient element to maintain the unity of the young state and to form the basis of a Pakistani national identity.”¹⁶⁸ In turn, Prof. Piotr Klodkowski notes that civilisational barriers existing in one country, according to M.A. Jinnah, must necessarily lead to an escalation of conflict and persecution of the minority, marked by the stigma of the “stranger”. Thus, a state was created whose cornerstone was the principle that the coexistence of powerful civilisations in a common area must necessarily lead to conflict between those who profess different values.¹⁶⁹ The cited authors omit another element of Pakistan’s founding myth: the suffering that accompanied the partition process. The acts of violence that took place in the second half of 1947 can be described by the contemporary concept of ethnic cleansing.¹⁷⁰ The term “deportation” (transfer of population from one state to another by force) within the meaning of the Statute of the International Military Tribunal¹⁷¹ may also be used. Although there was no formal state of war between the new dominions, these terms reflect the factual situation. This image is perpetuated in the minds of Pakistanis not only through scientific publications and school textbooks, but also through pop culture. The image of the massacre of Muslims was shown, among others, in the film production *Jinnah* (dir. J. Dehlavi, premiered in 1998, with popular British actor Christopher Lee in the title role). Pakistan is, thus, presented to the public as a kind of “oasis of safety” protecting Indian Muslims (as a nation) from the existential threat posed by Hindu India. This trauma was deepened by the experience of military defeat in 1971, when Pakistan lost half of its

¹⁶⁸ A. Siewierska-Chmaj, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

¹⁶⁹ P. Klodkowski, *O pęknięciu wewnątrz cywilizacji*, Warszawa 2005, pp. 187-192.

¹⁷⁰ D. Petrović, *Ethnic Cleansing – An Attempt at Methodology*, “European Journal of International Law” Vol. 5, 1994, no. 3, p. 343.

¹⁷¹ B. Janusz-Pawletta, *Międzynarodowe prawo humanitarne konfliktów zbrojnych*, Warszawa 2013, p. 147.

territory and population to the state of Bangladesh, which was established with Indian help. A characteristic feature of Pakistani historiography is the emphasis on the “external factor” as the cause of these tragic events while avoiding responsibility for the erroneous internal policies pursued by successive governments in Karachi and Islamabad. Painful experiences are used by politicians and the military as a factor mobilising society to fight the external enemy – India – and justifying the huge military expenditures for a poor country. Referring to the slogan of the “Indian Muslim State” and the myth of struggle and martyrdom for freedom is also a justification for maintaining the conflict over Kashmir that has been going on for 70 years. Pakistani politicians are, in a way, hostages of their own historical policy. Educating society and integrating it around the issue of “defending the homeland against the Hindus” and “fighting the Hindu occupation of Kashmir” makes any peace agreement with the neighbour, determining the future of the disputed province in a way other than its incorporation into Pakistan, unacceptable to public opinion. The question of the role of Islam in Pakistan is also noteworthy. The aforementioned Piotr Klodkowski gives the example of this state to justify the concept of a “rupture within civilisation”. Indeed, it perfectly illustrates the Pakistani problem from the founding of the state to the present day. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, like the creators of the concept of the “Indian Muslim state” – the poet Muhammad Iqbal and the lawyer Choudhry Rahmat Ali – belonged to the secularised, colonial Indian elite. His views evolved from the concept of fighting for the independence of one India to striving for a state for Indian Muslims. He did not want an Islamic theocracy in the state he eventually managed to create. In the texts of speeches preserved to this day (M.A. Jinnah did not leave behind any book in which he would have presented the assumptions of his political thought, and his vision of Pakistan can only be “read” from preserved public speeches and the accounts of his associates), there is not a word of him demanding the introduction of Sharia as the law of the state.¹⁷² On the contrary, one can cite statements in which he propagated secularist slogans. For example, on February 7, 1935, in the Central Legislative

¹⁷² S. Karim, *Secular Jinnah & Pakistan: What the Nation Doesn't Know*, London 2010, p. 29.

Assembly of India, he said: “Religion should not be allowed into politics. Religion is a matter between man and God. When I talk about minorities, I am talking about a secular issue.” On August 11, 1947, at the forum of the emerging Pakistani Constituent Assembly, he said words that can be considered his political testament: “You are free. You can go to your temples, your mosques and other places of worship in the state of Pakistan. You may belong to any faith or caste, which has nothing to do with the interests of the state. If we stick to this principle, then over time Hindus will cease to be Hindus, Muslims will cease to be Muslims – of course not in the religious sense –because that is a matter of the person’s individual faith, but in the political sense – as citizens of the state.” In an interview given on May 21, 1947, to journalist Doon Campbell, Jinnah explained his concept of the state: “The government of Pakistan is a popular representation and democratic form of government. Its Parliament and its Government, responsible to Parliament, will finally be responsible to the electorate, to the people in general, regardless of faith or caste, and this will be the decisive factor in the policy and programme of the Government. Minorities will be citizens of Pakistan and will enjoy all the rights and obligations of citizenship, regardless of religion or caste. They will be treated fairly and equitably. The government will manage the administration and will be controlled by Parliament. The joint consent of the Parliament will be a guarantee that minorities will not be victims of injustice. We will introduce legal guarantees for minorities, which in my opinion should be included in the new constitution. There is no doubt about the fundamental rights of citizens, which are the protection of their religion and faith in every case, especially freedom of conscience and the protection of their cultural and social life.” In one of his last public speeches before his death in February 1948, Jinnah said: “In the case of Pakistan, there will be no theocratic state ruled by clergy with a Divine mission. We have many non-Muslims: Hindus, Christians, Parsis, but they are all Pakistanis. They have the same rights and privileges as any other citizen and will play a legitimate role in Pakistani affairs.”¹⁷³ Slightly less secular, but still aligned with the democratic standards of the time it was created,

¹⁷³ Quotes from: <http://pakteahouse.net/2013/08/13/jinnahunequivocally-wanted-pakistan-to-be-a-secular-state/> – 14 XI 2017.

is the so-called “Objectives Resolution”, adopted in 1948 by the Constituent Assembly. This resolution has been included in every subsequent Pakistani constitution. Its authorship is attributed to the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, successor to Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan: “Sovereignty over the Universe belongs solely to Allah Almighty. The authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people, to be exercised within the limitations He has determined, is a sacred heritage.” This Constituent Assembly, representing the people of Pakistan, is established for the purpose of preparing a constitution for the sovereign and independent state of Pakistan. The state exercises its power through elected representatives of the people. The principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as proclaimed by Islam, will be fully respected. Muslims may conduct their individual and social lives according to the teachings and requirements of Islam as stated in the Holy Quran and Sunnah. Appropriate provisions are made for minorities to be able to freely develop and practice their religions and develop their own culture. Pakistan is a federation and its constitutional units are autonomous. Fundamental rights are guaranteed. These include equal status, equal opportunities, equality before the law, social, economic and political justice, freedom of conscience, expression of faith, worship and association, which are subject to law and public morality. Appropriate provisions regulate the legal protection of the interests of minorities and backward and oppressed classes. The independence of the courts is guaranteed. The territorial integrity and federal character of the state and its independence, including sovereign rights to land, sea and air territory, are ensured. The people of Pakistan are developing and taking their rightful place among the nations of the world, contributing to the advancement of world peace, progress and the happiness of humanity.¹⁷⁴ Thus, we are dealing with a declaration – a document in which there is, on the one hand, an explicit reference to Allah, Islam as a religious and social system, and to Islamic sources of law (Quran and Sunnah), and on the other hand, guarantees of respect for the rights of religious minorities to organise their lives according to their own rules. However, empirical observation shows that these provisions are interpreted in a rather arbitrary way. What’s more,

¹⁷⁴ H. Khan, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-64.

the document dates back to almost 70 years ago. It was created in completely different social realities than today. According to research conducted in 2009 by the British Council, over 75% of respondents self-identified first and foremost as Muslims (members of the Ummah) and only secondly as Pakistanis.¹⁷⁵ 67% of those surveyed by a local opinion poll centre supported the process of institutional Islamisation of the state.¹⁷⁶ We can see, therefore, that the process of making Islam an integrating factor, overcoming ethnic particularisms, was successful in Pakistan, but with serious side effects: yes, it was possible to construct a specific state ideology that overcame the existing divisions. However, it was not “Pakistani-ness” that became it, but “Islamicness”. When analysing the role of Islam in Pakistan, attention should be paid to its internal diversity. The basic division is between the main branches (sects). According to a July 2017 study, Muslims constituted 96.4% of the population, of which 85% were Sunnis and 15% were Shiites.¹⁷⁷ Another difference appears between believers living in rural and urban areas. In the countryside, religiosity has a more traditional, folk character. Mullahs are members of local communities. Culinary prohibitions are largely limited to the consumption of pork, and due to the prevailing poverty, meat consumption in general is low. Separation between the sexes is practically non-existent, as farm work is done jointly. Sufi sects, based on a specific cult of saints, are particularly popular here. The resting places of the founders of these “orders” are popular pilgrimage sites. The situation is different in cities. There, alongside a secularised elite, are representatives of a radicalising middle class. This is facilitated by the compulsory teaching of Islam in schools, which aims to educate young people to feel a greater bond with the Muslim countries of the Middle East than with India, which is similar in terms of traditional culture. In such families, it is possible to practise gender segregation because they have appropriate material and housing conditions

¹⁷⁵ *British Council Pakistan, The Next Generation*, [on-line:] <http://www.britishcouncil.pk/pakistan-Next-Generation-Report.pdf> – 24 XI 2017.

¹⁷⁶ *Gilani Research Foundation, Religion and Governance: Islamization of Society*, [on-line:] <http://www.gallup.com.pk/Polls/31-05-11.pdf> – 24 XI 2017.

¹⁷⁷ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/pk.html> – 24 XI 2017.

for this.¹⁷⁸ The vast majority of the officer corps of the Pakistani armed forces comes from lower middle-class families, so the processes observed in these social groups are intertwined. A spectacular example of the changes taking place in the ranks of the Pakistani army is the introduction of a new armed forces motto in the 1970s. The previous motto, identical to the motto on the national coat of arms, Faith, Unity, Discipline (Urdu: *ittehad, yaqeen aur tanzeem*), has been replaced by a new one: Faith, Piety, War in the path of Allah (Urdu: *imaan, taqwa, jihad fi sabilillah*).¹⁷⁹ On the symbolic level, the figure responsible for integrating the multi-ethnic society of Pakistan is Mohammad Ali Jinnah, known as *Quaid-e-Azam* (Great Leader). He is surrounded by a kind of cult, similar to the one we had in Turkey in the case of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk or, in Poland, Marshal Józef Piłsudski. M.A. Jinnah is the patron saint of the University of Islamabad, Chaklala Airport near Rawalpindi, and numerous streets throughout Pakistan. Next to it, a similar cult is held in memory of the heroes who died in the wars with India, especially in the one considered victorious in 1965. A special permanent exhibition was dedicated to them at the National Museum in Lahore, a series of postage stamps featuring them was issued, and a popular television series, *Nishan-e-Haider* (The Sign of the Lion), was filmed. The Sign of the Lion is also the name of Pakistan's highest military decoration, awarded only posthumously. A relatively new form of manifesting patriotism in Pakistan is monuments commemorating the 1998 nuclear test explosions, in the form of a mountain in which the charges were placed. According to the supporters of the constructivist theory of securitisation, security as an utterance, a speech act, is an act whose use is understood as constructing rather than reflecting reality. Hence, securitisation is "...the intersubjective constitution of an existential threat of sufficient significance to have a significant political effect."¹⁸⁰ Using this paradigm, we can see that the Indian threat is

¹⁷⁸ N. Qasir, *Pakistan Studies: An Investigation into the Political Economy 1948-1988*, Karachi 1996, pp. 163-168.

¹⁷⁹ S. Ijaz, *The War within*, [on-line:] <https://tribune.com.pk/story/198057/the-war-within/> – 14 XI 2017.

¹⁸⁰ Ł. Fijałkowski, „Akt mowy” i „język bezpieczeństwa” a konstruowanie globalnych zagrożeń (dyskursywne podejście do bezpieczeństwa), „Kultura – Historia – Globalizacja” Vol. 14, 2013, p. 14.

treated – by Pakistani politicians and the military – as a tool for social mobilisation and legitimising the desirability of a multi-ethnic Muslim state outside the Indian Union. In this sense, this contestation of India as a “Hindustan” that threatens its existence is one of the “reasons for existence” of Pakistan in its present form. This makes it an important element of strategic culture: it clearly defines the enemy against which the state must defend itself using all available means adequate to the threat. In turn, to acquire these tools, one should be ready to make even the most serious sacrifices. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto referred to these emotions in his famous statement: if India has nuclear weapons, we will eat grass, we will go hungry, but we will also have our own.¹⁸¹ Of course, the question remains open for researchers: to what extent is India’s existence a real threat to Pakistan, and to what extent is it merely a projection of politicians in Islamabad, part of the internal political discourse? Another interesting question is to what extent the Pakistani armed forces are susceptible to Islamisation processes and to what extent they are guarantors of the modernist nature of the state. Due to the limited access of foreign researchers to the officer cadre, not to mention ordinary soldiers, it is not possible to conduct detailed empirical research on the worldview that dominates in the army. Due to the lack of opportunities to conduct methodologically correct research, “home-made” methods emerge. Within the Pakistani officer corps itself, it is generally accepted that a sign of sympathy for fundamentalist views is wearing a beard. If we take this “criterion” seriously, then in 1999 only four out of 50 “one-star” generals had such an image, and only one ISI intelligence chief in the entire history of this institution. Of the senior officers who participated in the 1999 coup, Mahmud Ahmed and Mohammed Aziz Khan were considered religious radicals, but only the latter wore a beard. Meanwhile, the leader of the coup, Gen. Musharraf, was not and is not a fundamentalist, which clearly indicates that when it comes to taking over power in a state, a sense of “corporate solidarity” is more important than the attitude to the Quran and the Sunna.¹⁸² The conditions that a candidate for a Pakistani officer must meet include a preliminary “screening” that only individuals with sec-

¹⁸¹ Y. Khan Bangash, *Eating Grass*, [on-line:] <https://tribune.com.pk/story/826538/eating-grass/> – 14 XI 2017.

¹⁸² J.R. Schmidt, *The Unraveling: Pakistan in the Age of Jihad*, New York 2011, p. 195.

ondary, secular education can pass: one must have a high school leaving examination with a score of at least 50%. Only then are they subjected to a qualification process, which includes a counter-intelligence “background check”. From official documents and available academic publications, a picture emerges of the instrumental treatment of religion in the training and service of officers. Islam is supposed to fulfil important functions here, although these have little to do with theology: religion is a factor integrating the multi-ethnic society of the state, artificially established in 1947. This function became even more crucial after the secession of Bangladesh in 1971, when the prospect of a “domino effect” became a trauma for the civilian and military elites ruling the country. The term “ideological boundary” was coined at that time, denoting the ideological frontier that the military is to defend with the same determination as the geographical border. Islam is also a factor raising the morale of the army to fight against a numerically and, for some time now, technologically stronger enemy – India. The concept of jihad is very useful here. As Pakistani security analyst P. I. Cheema writes: “Participation in the jihad is a great honour in two senses: death is then martyrdom, while victory makes a warrior-hero.” The same author points out that in view of Indian superiority, Pakistani officers and soldiers “must focus on gaining moral superiority, manifested by a higher degree of professionalism, studying the latest strategic and tactical concepts and ideologically inspired leadership.”¹⁸³ It is difficult to speak of any religious fundamentalism here, as similar references can also be found in the history of European armies. The motto of the German army, *Gott mit Uns*, was already inscribed on the buckles of soldiers’ belts in imperial times, while Polish banners and sabres bore the motto *Bóg, Honor, Ojczyzna* (God, Honour, Fatherland). If we examine the perception of the concept of shahid (i.e., martyr) in Pakistan, we notice two tendencies. One traditionally refers to Muslims who died or fell in defence of their faith, as only Allah himself can recognise a person as a shahid.¹⁸⁴ On the other hand, in official documents as well as in state propaganda, the term *shahid* is used to describe anyone who gave their

¹⁸³ P.I. Cheema, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

¹⁸⁴ K. Zaheer, *Definition of a Shaheed*, [on-line:] <https://www.dawn.com/news/1057801> – 11 II 2017.

life in defence of the Islamic homeland – Pakistan. Moreover, in this sense, not only Muslims can be (and are) considered shahids, but also representatives of other religions who died in the service of Pakistan. Such a symbol of martyrdom for the homeland is the highest state decoration, *Nishan-e-Haider*, awarded only posthumously. Customarily, whoever receives it is later addressed as a shahid in the literature. By custom, all those who died during the battles with the Indians are also referred to in this way, including Christians.¹⁸⁵ Here we can, therefore, speak not so much of the Quranic meaning of the word “shahid”, but rather of a thoroughly European tradition. After all, Horace already wrote in Canto III: *Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori* (it is sweet and proper to die for one’s country). The concept of “Islamic solidarity” was and is used as a justification for waging (to use the modern term) an asymmetric conflict both in Afghanistan (officially in the years 1979-1991, but one may get the impression that certain circles, especially in Pakistani intelligence, are trying to do so to this day) and in the Indian-controlled part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. In the first case, the matter does not raise any major doubts. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was perceived by Pakistan as a serious threat. It was feared that it would become another target for communist expansion (similar to what took place, for example, in Indochina). Using a heuristic perspective, one can refer here to Russia’s traditional interest in access to ports located on the warm (non-freezing), open waters of the Arabian Sea. Of course, Pakistan’s direct involvement in the fight against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan was impossible, if only because of the colossal difference in military potential. Therefore, indirect involvement was chosen by supporting local fighters, called *Mujahideen*. This term traditionally denotes participants in a holy war – *jihad*. Gradually, the United States also became involved in the process of training and equipping them (seeing the possibility of transforming Afghanistan into a “thousand Vietnams” – a war that would engage and exhaust the resources of a competing superpower) as well as the “oil” states of the Persian Gulf – in particular, Saudi Arabia (which in this way “got rid of” its native radicals, who, instead of participating in the internal

¹⁸⁵ A. Miraj, *The Story of Christian Martyrs*, [on-line:] <https://nation.com.pk/06-Sep-2012/the-story-of-christianmartyrs> – 11 II 2017.

politics of the monarchy, took an active part in the war with the Soviet Union and, at the same time, positioned itself as the leader of the Islamic world – or at least of its larger Sunni part). In the case of the Indian part of Kashmir, the matter is much more complicated. Since the beginning of the conflict in 1947, and particularly after the 1965 war, Pakistan has sought to demonstrate that its involvement is not aggressive towards India but rather a form of support for its Muslim brothers who are persecuted by the authorities in Srinagar and New Delhi. For Western analysts of international relations, this strategy is ineffective; however, it resonates with both Pakistani public opinion and numerous sponsors from the “oil” states of the Persian Gulf. In both described cases, a serious threat emerges: the circles financing the Afghan or Kashmiri jihad are highly radical and prioritise the ideological purity of the organisations they support (and in the first case, in which their volunteers actively participate). Consequently, the Pakistan-Afghan border has become a territory of activity for various groups and individual Salafi preachers. This has resulted in a dangerous synthesis of native Deobandi fundamentalism, represented by Abu Ala al Maududi and Wahhabism (now referred to as Salafism) originating from Saudi Arabia.¹⁸⁶ Maududi himself was more of an ideologist, politician or religious leader, and the Jamat-e-Islami association he founded focused on organic work rather than the use of active violence. However, with his teachings, he prepared the ground for the activities of more radical circles, which are generally referred to as the Taliban. In the context of the Kashmir conflict, this ideology is used not as a concept to help mobilise young Kashmiri Muslims to fight against the Indian government and security forces; it is also intended to help win the “government of souls”, especially in the face of a growing independence movement in Kashmir (and the European Kashmiri diaspora), represented by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front.¹⁸⁷ The use of the jihad slogan as a justification for involvement in Afghanistan and Kashmir coincided with the rule of military President Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. One of the main

¹⁸⁶ S. Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea*, London 2016, pp. 175-176.

¹⁸⁷ C.Ch. Fair, *Has the Pakistan Army Islamized? What the Data Suggests*, [on-line:] <https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/551459/fair.pdf;sequence=1> – 11 II 2017.

slogans of his policies and tools for legitimising authoritarian rule was Islamisation. This process will be described in more detail in the third volume of the publication. However, here the focus should be on the impact this programme had on the armed forces themselves, of which Gen. Zia was also the Commander-in-Chief. Some authors point to the general's close contacts with Jamaat-e-Islami and even the existence of some family ties with its leaders. He was known as a devout Muslim who attached great importance to religious practices, in contrast to previous military leaders who led Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s. He repeatedly expressed his belief that Pakistan Army officers should be characterised by adherence to religious principles. During the inauguration of the 1978 academic year at the military academy in Kakul, he stated that "officers should guard both ideological and geographical boundaries" (the order of these terms is important here).¹⁸⁸ While still the Chief of Army Staff, he "turned a blind eye" to the activities of Islamic agitators from JI and Tablighi Jamaat among the military. Later, as Head of State, he participated in the meetings of these associations, something that none of his predecessors did. He also ordered the introduction of Islamic studies into the training curriculum of the Command and Staff College in Quetta and introduced the institution of Muslim chaplains. The mullahs were henceforth to participate in the daily service of the soldiers and to be present with them on the battlefield. Most of these individuals did not have an adequate general education, and their religious education was also considered to be quite superficial. Attitudes towards religion began to be taken into account in officers' career development. Up to that point, it had not mattered, as the consumption of alcohol in officers' casinos was not only tolerated, but was even considered customary.¹⁸⁹ The ideologisation of the military was also facilitated by the involvement of Pakistani military personnel as officers and contract soldiers in the Persian Gulf states. General Zia himself was the commander of such a contingent in the Kingdom of Jordan, where he participated in pacifying the uprising in the Palestinian camps, known as *Black September*. This type of activity was justified not so much by

¹⁸⁸ A. Hyman, M. Ghyaur, N. Kaushik, *Pakistan: Zia and After...*, London 1988, pp. 106-107.

¹⁸⁹ C.Ch. Fair, *Has the Pakistan Army...*

economic reasons (as an opportunity to earn money) or training reasons (acquiring fighting skills), but above all as an expression of Islamic solidarity. It is difficult to assess clearly (due to the lack of such data or even the possibility of collecting it) whether the officers subjected to such pressure, when speaking to the soldiers, actually said what they thought or whether they were guided by pure opportunism aimed at individual careers. Research conducted by American political scientist Prof. Christine Fair from Georgetown University seeks to show the impact (or, rather, the lack thereof) of Islamisation policies on the ideological profile of officers in the Pakistani armed forces. Her team obtained data on the backgrounds of Kakul Academy graduates. They clearly show that most of the young officers come from the urban elite, especially graduates of private schools. They are, therefore, representatives of liberal circles. Conversely, young people from conservative Pakistani backgrounds are less interested in a military career. Punjabis and Pashtuns still constitute a larger percentage of the officer corps than in the overall population of Pakistan. The same author points out, however, that a certain symptom of the radicalisation of the Pakistani armed forces cadre is the small but visible participation of its representatives in terrorist attacks carried out on the territory of the country.¹⁹⁰ This refers to an isolated but spectacular incident on August 6, 2014, when several Pakistan Navy officers attempted to hijack the PNS Zulfikar to use in an attack on a US supply ship. Five perpetrators were arrested and confessed to links with the so-called “Islamic State”. The remaining five were killed while trying to take over the unit.¹⁹¹ This is the only terrorist act reported by the media to date involving active-duty military personnel, which does not provide a basis for far-reaching generalisations and hypotheses. Another serious problem is pointed out by Jason Roach in an article for *Small Wars Journal*. For the first time in their 70-year history, the Pakistani armed forces were directed to fight against their own people. This is related to Pakistan's participation in the “global war on terrorism” and, in particular, to actions

¹⁹⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹¹ F.-S. Gady, *5 Navy Officers Sentenced to Death in Pakistan for Trying to Attack US Warship*, [on-line:] <https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/5-navy-officers-sentenced-to-death-in-pakistan-for-trying-to-attack-us-warship/> – 11 II 2017.

against the so-called “Pakistani Taliban” in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, particularly in Waziristan.¹⁹² Data on the ethnic composition of the military units fighting there is not available. Although it is difficult to imagine using Pashtuns to fight against them, as ethnic and especially clan ties are key, engaging Muslims to fight against other Muslims also seems potentially dangerous. While this was possible in the case of the independence struggle of the people of East Bengal (future Bangladesh), who were alien to the people of West Pakistan and constituted a small percentage of the armed forces, the issue of fighting against nations known to them, whose representatives are widely represented in the armed forces, poses a serious threat both to the morale of the army and harms the process of state integration, which – until now – has been one of the key tasks of the Pakistani army. The previous wars with India contributed greatly to this, uniting different ethnic groups in the fight against a common, alien religious enemy.

¹⁹² J. Roach, *The Growth of Islamism in the Pakistan Army*, [on-line:] <http://smallwars-journal.com/jrnl/art/the-growth-of-islamism-in-the-pakistan-army> – 11 II 2017.

4. EXTERNAL DETERMINANTS OF PAKISTAN'S STRATEGIC CULTURE | CURRENT STATUS

The main determinant of Pakistan's foreign policy is its relations with India. Relations with its closest neighbours, such as Afghanistan and Iran, as well as with the superpower the United States and the Asian power China, should be assessed through this prism. An outline of this issue will be presented below. Due to the nature of the publication, it is only an outline, and Pakistan's foreign policy itself, along with its individual directions, deserves separate monographic studies.

4.1 Potential Conflict with India | The Nuclear Option

The reason for the change in the nature of the potential conflict in Kashmir from "traditional conventional warfare" to asymmetric warfare is the nuclearisation of the Indian Subcontinent. The nuclear capabilities of both sides do not yet allow for complete mutual destruction. For Pakistan, however, nuclear war would mean disaster, both economically and demographically. According to the realist paradigm, an open conventional war is, therefore, not likely and is certainly not a rational option, as India's conventional capabilities effectively deter Pakistan from an open, full-scale attack. However, there is no indication that the conflict over Kashmir will be resolved by political means in the foreseeable future, as its causes appear to be irremediable. In the current circumstances, Pakistan is

attempting to periodically test India's defence capabilities using asymmetric means and methods. An example of a terrorist attack that could have led to the transformation of an asymmetric conflict into an open India-Pakistan war was the terrorist attack that took place on December 13, 2001. Its target was the Parliament of the Republic of India in New Delhi.¹⁹³ This experience has shown that the existing Indian Sundarji doctrine is not adapted to new threats and requires a fundamental redesign of the defence concept, appropriate to the new circumstances of asymmetric conflict and low-intensity conventional conflict.¹⁹⁴ Undoubtedly, changes in India's defence doctrines were also influenced by processes taking place in international relations. Initially, the perception of armed conflict was determined by the fact that Indian staff officers were British, and so they drew on the theoretical and practical experience of the former colonial power, reinforced by victory as part of the anti-Hitler coalition in World War II. The gradual loosening of contacts with the United Kingdom and rapprochement with the Soviet Union, combined with the purchase of equipment and training of officer cadres in Moscow since the 1950s, resulted in the implementation of Soviet solutions.¹⁹⁵ The concept of Sundarji was conceived in 1980, nine years after the conclusion of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. Contemporary doctrine is being implemented in the new realities of a multipolar world. India's main publicly available security policy document is the Indian Armed Forces Joint Doctrine (IAF), released in 2017.¹⁹⁶ It is an extension

¹⁹³ *Parliament Attack Anniversary: Here's What Happened on December 13, 2001, and After*, [on-line:] <https://www.ndtv.com/indianews/parliament-attack-anniversary-heres-what-happened-ondecember-13-2001-and-after-1787198> – 3 I 2018.

¹⁹⁴ <http://www.ipcp.org/article/indo-pak/india-and-pakistannuclear-doctrine-a-comparative-analysis-260.html> – 15 IX 2017, vide A. Głogowski, *Pakistańska strategia bezpieczeństwa*, [in:] *Nowe strategie na nowy wiek. Granice i możliwości integracji regionalnych i globalnych*, eds M. Chorośnicki, A. Głogowski, J.J. Węc, Kraków 2013, pp. 530-531.

¹⁹⁵ S.A.A. Shah, *Russo-India Military-Technical Cooperation*, [on-line:] https://web.archive.org/web/20070314041501/http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2001_files/no_4/article/4a.htm – 15 IX 2017.

¹⁹⁶ *Joint Doctrine Indian Armed Forces*, [on-line:] <http://idp.nic.in/dot/JointDoctrineIndianArmedForces2017.pdf> – 15 IX 2017.

of the Indian Army Doctrine document of 2004.¹⁹⁷ India's National Security Policy is based on national security objectives and components of national power against the backdrop of the current and future domestic and global environment. It should be associated with the inalienable right to self-defence, the possession of deterrent capabilities, strategic autonomy, independence, cooperation, security and friendly relations with other states.¹⁹⁸ The Indian Army's first "policy" document was the Sundarji Doctrine, which dates from the 1980s. It was a defensive strategy based on the assumption that the border with Pakistan would be defended by seven "Holding Corps", consisting of an infantry division, a mechanised division and a small number of tanks. Their task was to slow down the enemy's attack using natural and artificial terrain obstacles. The offensive force was to consist of three armoured strike corps, each comprising infantry divisions, tank divisions and artillery support units. The strike corps were deployed deep into the country's territory: I in Mathura, II in Ambala and XXI in Bhopal.¹⁹⁹ The defence plan assumed the acceptance of the Pakistani military attack on its own territory, slowing down its advance with defence corps forces while simultaneously preparing a counter-attack towards selected strategic targets using armoured strike corps. To accomplish this task, it was necessary to gain air superiority so that Indian tanks could operate without fear of being destroyed by the Pakistani air force. This plan was based on a flawed premise: that the next war with Pakistan would be fought using large tank-equipped forces supported by air power. In the 1980s, this plan became outdated as Pakistan gained access to nuclear weapons. The tactics employed by the Pakistani side also changed; after the experience of the defeat in 1971 and taking into account the nuclear factor, they decided on the concept of asymmetric warfare. The burden of fighting shifted from large regular units to groups of local fighters trained in Pakistani military camps, with technical and

¹⁹⁷ *Headquarters Army Training Command, Indian Army Doctrine, 2004*, [on-line:] <https://www.filep.ethz.ch/isn/157030/India%202004.pdf> – 15 IX 2017.

¹⁹⁸ *Joint Doctrine Indian...*, pp. 2-4.

¹⁹⁹ *The Indian Military Doctrine-The Sundarji Doctrine: The Failure of the Sundarji Doctrine in Operation Parakram*, [on-line:] <http://ss24.blogspot.com/2013/09/the-indian-military-doctrinesundarji.html> – 15 IX 2017.

logistical support from Islamabad. Operation Parakram, described in Volume 2, which was carried out according to the assumptions of the Sun-darji doctrine, turned out to be a failure. It cost India nearly \$2 billion to mobilise and maintain armoured corps ready to strike Pakistan. Eight hundred Indian soldiers died in accidents and as a result of saboteurs' actions.²⁰⁰ The military and political effects of this tension in bilateral relations were rather negligible. This led to work on a new defence concept, which was partially ready in 2004, and the final document was made public in 2017. The basic assumption of the new Cold Start doctrine is to create the capacity to launch a retaliatory conventional attack against Pakistan before the international community has time to intervene. The objectives of the actions are to be limited so as not to give Pakistan a pretext for the nuclearisation of the conflict.²⁰¹ The point is, therefore, to find an effective conventional response to the asymmetric actions of Pakistan and/or armed groups it supports. For this purpose, divisional integrated battle groups (IBGs) were established in place of the former corps. Integrated battle groups consist of a mechanised infantry component, artillery and armoured forces. Their goal is to be able to carry out quick and surprise attacks on Pakistani territory with air support. One corps was retained, called the pivot corps, with strictly defensive tasks. The aim of the offensive operations is to occupy enemy territory at a depth of 50-80 km, thus providing politicians and diplomats with arguments in negotiations with Pakistan. Increasing the number of offensive units is intended to make it more difficult for enemy intelligence and reconnaissance to predict the direction of attack.²⁰² Currently, India has 120-130 warheads and Pakistan has 130-140 warheads.²⁰³ This is a significant potential, but it does not provide the parties with the certainty of mutual destruction, which, ac-

²⁰⁰ S. Joshi, *India's Military Instrument: A Doctrine Stillborn*, "Journal of Strategic Studies" Vol. 36, 2013, no. 4, pp. 512-540.

²⁰¹ Walter C. Ladwig III, *A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine*, [on-line:] http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf – 15 IX 2017.

²⁰² *Ibidem*.

²⁰³ *SIPRI Fact Sheet, Trends in World Nuclear Forces, 2017*, [on-line:] https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017-06/fs_1707_wnf.pdf – 15 IX 2017.

According to theorists of realism, is an important element of the balance of power. In the concept of the use of nuclear weapons published in 2003, the Indian side lists cases in which this would be possible: in the event of an attack with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons on Indian territory or on Indian armed forces outside their borders.²⁰⁴ Pakistan, on the other hand, permits the first use of nuclear weapons if Indian forces penetrate too deeply into Pakistani territory or capture any strategically or politically important urban centres. This may also be justified by the destruction of a significant part of the conventional capability or an attack on nuclear installations, as well as in the case of a naval blockade.²⁰⁵ Pakistan could, therefore, be the first to use nuclear weapons based on very vague, subjective criteria, and according to the Indian concept, a response would be possible in strictly defined cases. To achieve these goals, both countries are adapting their nuclear potential: Pakistan is mainly building tactical forces, while India is mainly building strategic forces. Pakistan expects to use its potential mainly against superior conventional forces (even a tactical attack on its own territory is possible). India could then respond by attacking strategic targets, including civilian ones, which would certainly be difficult to explain to international public opinion. The expectations of one's own society to respond adequately in the event of the destruction of a military unit with a nuclear weapon would probably be high. The new Cold Start doctrine does not eliminate this serious dilemma.

²⁰⁴ A. Sanders-Zakre, K. Davenport, *Is India Shifting Nuclear Doctrine?*, [on-line:] <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-05/news/india-shifting-nuclear-doctrine> – 15 IX 2017.

²⁰⁵ B. Chakma, *Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine and Command and Control System: Dilemmas of Small Nuclear Forces in Second Atomic Age*, "Security Challenges" Vol. 2, 2006, no. 2, pp. 115-133.

4.2 Relations with Iran

Relations between the nations inhabiting present-day Pakistan and Iran have a very long tradition. Islam came to the Indian subcontinent from what was then Persia, along with the Persian language and alphabet (in which Urdu, the official language of Pakistan, is written). Trade contacts have an even longer history, dating back to the times of the so-called “Silk Road”. A treaty of friendship was signed as early as 1949.²⁰⁶ Before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, relations between Tehran and Islamabad were friendly. They were united by military cooperation with the United States within CENTO and a common fear of communist influence. Tehran sold Pakistan oil and natural gas at preferential prices in exchange for the services of Pakistani instructors to the imperial army.²⁰⁷ Until the oil boom associated with the 1973 crisis, there was no clear economic advantage of Tehran over Islamabad. However, there was a concept of creating an Iranian-Pakistani or even Iranian-Pakistani-Afghan confederation, modelled on the Egyptian-Syrian one. This was met with moderate support from the United States, which hoped to weaken Soviet influence in Afghanistan.²⁰⁸ It also had some support in Western intellectual circles. However, the ambitious plan could not be implemented due to the dispute over the role of the hegemon in the federation. Pakistani politicians were reluctant to see the Shah of Iran in this role, and in the case of Afghanistan, the obstacle was the territorial dispute with Pakistan regarding the recognition or revision of the border on the Durand Line. The establishment of an integration organisation based on Iran was disliked by the Arab states, the Soviet Union and India. The Islamic revolution in Iran and the communist aggression against Afghanistan caused the concept of a federation to be shelved. Iran supported Pakistan militarily and financially during its wars with India in 1965 and 1971. Iranian spare parts and ammunition were essential for maintaining the combat readiness of US equipment

²⁰⁶ A. Vatanka, *Iran and Pakistan: Security Diplomacy and American Influence*, London 2015, p. 12.

²⁰⁷ H.V. Pant, *Pakistan and Iran's Dysfunctional Relationship*, “The Middle East Quarterly” 2009, pp. 43-50.

²⁰⁸ A. Vatanka, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

used by the Pakistani army.²⁰⁹ It would seem that the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 worsened bilateral relations. Pakistan remained an ally of the US. The Islamisation programme implemented at that time by General Zia ul-Haq also affected the large Shiite minority, of which Khomeini considered himself the protector.²¹⁰ A single Soviet intervention in Afghanistan brought together the two sides that saw communism as an ideological and geopolitical threat. The geopolitical situation changed significantly after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Cooperation was replaced by a struggle for influence in Kabul, with Tehran and Islamabad supporting opposing factions. Bilateral relations reached their worst-ever level after the Taliban captured Kabul on September 27, 1996. This coincided with the ideological conflict for primacy in the Islamic world between Iran and Saudi Arabia, in which Pakistan sided with the Saudis.²¹¹ Iran accused Pakistani officers of involvement in the ransacking of its consulate general in Mazar-e-Sharif.²¹² During the same period, Tehran began a policy of rapprochement with India, related to the search for markets for natural gas. For Islamabad, this meant the possibility of finding itself between two hostile but cooperating countries seeking joint control of Afghanistan. In the new post-Cold War geopolitical situation, both countries decided to seek means of effectively deterring potential aggressors. Both Iran and Pakistan have chosen a similar path to implement these plans, namely purchasing so-called “dual-use technologies”. The creation of a theoretically universal non-proliferation regime forced Pakistan to camouflage its work on nuclear weapons.²¹³ Work on the nuclear programme gained momentum when, in 1974, India carried out its first explosion, codenamed *Smiling Buddha*. A key role in the process of bypassing international proliferation restrictions was played by

²⁰⁹ A. Arif, *Future of Pakistan-Iran Ties*, [on-line:] <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2013/01/27/comment/columns/future-of-pakistan-iran-ties/> – 15 IX 2017.

²¹⁰ J.O. Bennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

²¹¹ M.A. Shah, *The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Ethnic Impacts on Diplomacy, 1971-1994*, London 1997, p. 29.

²¹² *A History of Pakistan...*, pp. 144-145.

²¹³ *Pakistan's Nuclear Ambitions: The Spider's Stratagem*, [on-line:] <http://www.economist.com/node/10424283> – 15 IX 2017.

Dr Abdul Qadir Khan, who stole uranium enrichment technologies using the centrifuge method from plants belonging to the European consortium Urenco, which produces equipment needed to enrich uranium for the German nuclear power industry.²¹⁴ He gained access to the company's secret material thanks to his fluency in German and Dutch, from which he translated technical documentation. He copied and forwarded valuable information to Islamabad.²¹⁵ After returning home, Dr Khan began purchasing the necessary components. Since the NPT treaty prevented the transfer of ready-made technologies at the level of cooperation between countries, he decided to operate under the cover of a private company registered in Dubai. The procedure was dubbed *Nuclear Walmart* in 2004 by then IAEA chief Muhammad El Baradei, in reference to the name of the popular US retail chain.²¹⁶ Contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) dating back to the early 1960s played a key role in the process of adapting enriched uranium for use as a nuclear warhead.²¹⁷ Developing nuclear technology, even based on simple solutions, is very expensive, especially for a country as poor as Pakistan. In 1987, a secret agreement was concluded between the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and its Iranian counterpart, the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran.²¹⁸ The talks were held in Dubai and concerned scientific and technical exchange and experiences. Tehran especially pressed Islamabad to accelerate negotiations and implement their outcomes during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).²¹⁹ The next rapprochement between Islamabad and Tehran took place in the 1990s. Standing at the head of the Pakistani army at the time,

²¹⁴ S. Nawaz, *op. cit.*, pp. 552-553.

²¹⁵ *Kahuta Research Laboratory*, [on-line:] <http://www.krl.com.pk/> – 15 IX 2017.

²¹⁶ M. Lander, *U.N. Official Sees a 'Walmart' in Nuclear Trafficking*, [on-line:] <http://www.nytimep.com/2004/01/23/international/23CND-NUKE.html> – 15 IX 2017.

²¹⁷ *Chinese Have Sold the M-11 Short-Range Missile to Pakistan*, [on-line:] <http://www.fap.org/nuke/control/mtr/news/910702-188884.htm> – 15 IX 2017.

²¹⁸ A.H. Cordesman, K.R. Al-Rodhan, *Iranian Nuclear Weapons? The Options if Diplomacy Fails*, [on-line:] www.csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/060407_irannucopionp.pdf – 15 IX 2017.

²¹⁹ B. Tertrais, *Pakistan's Nuclear Exports: Was There a State Strategy?*, [on-line:] www.npec-web.org/files/20060720Tertrais-Pakistannuclearexportp.pdf – 15 IX 2017.

Gen. Aslam Beg advocated cooperation with Iran to build strategic depth in the event of a future conflict with India. The bargaining chip was to be the transfer of nuclear technology. Gen. Beg probably sought to sign a mutual defence treaty, to which, according to his concept, Afghanistan could also be a party. This would, in a sense, mean a return to the previously abandoned concept of a federation. The immediate benefit for Pakistan was to be supplies of cheap natural gas and crude oil.²²⁰ In his memoirs, written while under house arrest, Dr Khan recalls meetings between Gen Beg and Iranian Defence Minister Ali Shamkhani, during which he allegedly promised to sell Iran nuclear technology.²²¹ However, during a meeting with Iranian President Mohammed Khatami in 1999, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto refused, even though her Iranian guest referred to earlier arrangements.²²² This demonstrates the lack of coordination in Pakistan's foreign and defence policy between the military and civilian centres. However, under an agreement concluded at an unspecified time, 500 older type P-1 centrifuges were sold to Tehran.²²³ According to information provided by Iranian dissidents from the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), Pakistan allegedly sold Iran "some quantity" of uranium for research purposes; however, it was not enough to produce even one small nuclear warhead.²²⁴ It remains unresolved to this day whether Dr Khan sold Iran the technology to produce nuclear warheads.²²⁵ However, there is serious evidence that this happened. In 2003, then-Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi decided to fully cooperate with the IAEA. He handed over to the commission's inspectors a file that turned out to have marginal notes in Urdu, the official language used only in

²²⁰ *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program*, [on-line:] <http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Pakistan/Pak-Testp.html> – 15 IX 2017.

²²¹ B. Tertrais, *Pakistan's Nuclear Exports...*

²²² R.J. Smith, J. Warrick, *Pakistani Scientist Khan Describes Iranian Efforts to Buy Nuclear Bombs*, [on-line:] <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article24981.htm> – 15 IX 2017.

²²³ T. Kennedy, *Bhutto Visit to Washington a Success in Every Way but One*, [on-line:] <https://www.wrmea.org/1995-june/bhutto-visit-to-washington-a-success-in-every-way-but-one.html> – 15 IX 2017.

²²⁴ A.H. Cordesman, K.R. Al-Rodhan, *Iranian Nuclear...*

²²⁵ *Ibidem.*

Pakistan. Equipment obtained from the Libyans was compared with that seen in the laboratory at Iran's Natanz. This was confirmed by IAEA experts in a report published on February 24, 2004.²²⁶ The P5+1 agreement, signed in June 2015, formally prevents the continuation of cooperation in the field of military nuclear technology, which is also likely to affect the Pakistani side. However, it opens up new possibilities for cooperation between Islamabad and Tehran, which until now have been impossible or seriously hampered by the sanctions imposed on Iran, particularly regarding the return to the concept of building a gas pipeline connecting Iran with India and/or China.²²⁷ Although historically and culturally close, Pakistan's relations with Iran are overshadowed by the conflict with India and the war in Afghanistan. For Tehran, Islamabad will never be as attractive a partner in mineral trade as New Delhi, for obvious reasons. The ongoing conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia puts Pakistan in a very difficult situation. The influence of the Arab monarchy is strong, which is related to the religious community. However, the proximity of Iran restrains those decision-making circles that would like Islamabad to actively engage, for example, in the war in Yemen.

4.3 Relations with China

Pakistan, as the third non-communist country, recognised the People's Republic of China on May 21, 1951 as the sole representative of the Chinese nation. In February 1957, Prime Minister Zhou Enlai visited the Pakistani capital. Economic relations were also strengthened, with the value of exports to the Middle Kingdom already constituting nearly 15.2% of Pakistan's total exports in 1952.²²⁸

²²⁶ D. Frantz, C. Collins, *The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who Sold the World's Most Dangerous Secrets and How We Could Have Stopped Him*, New York 2007, pp. 332-333.

²²⁷ <https://www.cfr.org/background/impact-iran-nuclearagreement> – 15 IX 2017.

²²⁸ G.L. Montagno, *Peaceful Coexistence: Pakistan and Red China*, "The Western Political Quarterly" Vol. 18, 1965, no. 2, Part 1, p. 311.

In 1956 and 1957, barter agreements were signed: Pakistani cotton for Chinese rice and coal.²²⁹ The agreement signed on March 2, 1963 is of key importance for both past and present bilateral relations. One of the reasons for its conclusion was the rapprochement between the US and India, along with New Delhi's defeat in the border war with China in 1962. In Article 1 of the aforementioned agreement, China recognises Pakistan's *de facto* control over that part of Kashmir located on the western side of the UN-delimited Line of Control (the Ceasefire Line until 1971).²³⁰ In this way, the People's Republic of China became politically involved on the side of Pakistan in the Kashmir conflict. In return, in the second article of the agreement, Pakistan transferred to the People's Republic of China parts of the territories of Ladakh and Aksai Chin, which directly border India and over which it had never exercised effective control.²³¹ A new trade treaty was also concluded. The emergence of Bangladesh after the 1971 war affected the decline in trade; it did, however, impact the implementation of the first major road projects. Two narrow roads connecting Xinjiang to Pakistan were built in 1968 and 1971. The largest engineering undertaking in this area to date is the international road known as the Karakorum Highway, which was opened in 1978. It enables China to provide Pakistan with aid in the form of equipment, ammunition and spare parts, and even to transfer troops to Pakistani territory in the event of another war with India.²³² Meteorological and topographic conditions cause this road to be closed during the winter season. Heavy rainfall and rock avalanches lead to closures in other months as well. For this reason, China, interested in maintaining a permanent land link with Pakistan, is seeking to modernise the connection. This is all the more important because, since 2002, the Chinese company has owned the port in Gwadar, which received its first ships in 2007. Military cooperation between Pakistan and China began in 1965 and was expanded in 1971. The Heavy Rebuild

²²⁹ M.A. Chaudhri, *Pakistan and the Regional Pacts*, Karachi 1988, p. 48.

²³⁰ *China-Pakistan Boundary Agreement*, "International Legal Materials" Vol. 2, 1863, no. 3, pp. 541-542.

²³¹ J.O. Bennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-73.

²³² Y. Vertzberger, *The Political Economy of Sino-Pakistani Relations*, "Asian Survey" Vol. 23, 1983, no. 5. p. 643.

Foundry (Project P-711) was built in Taxila near Islamabad. In 1992, it was expanded into the Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) production plant, manufacturer of MBT2000 Al Khalid tanks (in Chinese T-90-IIM).²³³ Also, in 1971, construction of the Aircraft Rebuild Factory (ARF) began. In 1975, it became part of the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) consortium. In 1994, production of the first Pakistani-Chinese training aircraft, the K-8 Karakorum, commenced there.²³⁴ In 2003, work began on the construction of a common multi-role aircraft called the *JF-17* (Joint Fighter) in cooperation with Chengdu.²³⁵ Countries such as Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Burma, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Uruguay and Sri Lanka are said to have expressed interest in purchasing it. The first contract was likely signed during the Dubai Air Show in November 2015.²³⁶ China is currently the main supplier of ships to the Pakistan Navy.²³⁷ Pakistan decided to cooperate with China in the field of nuclear energy after losing support from the US, Canada and European countries due to its involvement in military programmes. In late 1989, a contract was signed for the construction of a 300 MW reactor at Chashma, based on the Qinshan-1 system. Construction was completed in 1999. In 2012,²³⁸ another reactor with similar power was built in the same town. Construction of the next two units, with a capacity of 340 MW, began in 2008 and 2009, respectively. In February 2013, an agreement was signed to build a fifth 1,000 MW reactor in the city of Multan.²³⁹ In 2015, an agreement was reached to expand the existing nuclear centre near Pakistan's largest city, Karachi, by two units of 1,200 MW

²³³ *Hit Al Khalid (MBT 2000)*, [on-line:] http://www.militaryfactory.com/armor/detail.asp?armor_id=181 – 15 IX 2017.

²³⁴ *History*, [on-line:] <http://www.pac.org.pk/history> – 15 IX 2017.

²³⁵ *JF-17 Thunder Aircraft*, [on-line:] <http://www.pac.org.pk/jf-17> – 3 I 2016.

²³⁶ <http://sputniknewp.com/world/20151117/1030245428/chinafighter-jet-deal.html> – 15 IX 2017.

²³⁷ B.S. Syed, *China to Build Four Submarines in Karachi*, [on-line:] <http://www.dawn.com/news/1211363> – 3 I 2016.

²³⁸ <https://www.princeton.edu/pei/energy/publications/reports/No.321.pdf> – 15 IX 2017.

²³⁹ <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-O-S/Pakistan/> – 15 IX 2017.

each.²⁴⁰ In 2008, India withdrew from the construction of a gas pipeline linking it with Iran, known as IPI. This was a condition for signing a nuclear technology transfer agreement between Delhi and Washington. The US sought to influence the government in Tehran through international sanctions, primarily consisting of a ban on the export of raw materials, including natural gas.²⁴¹ China has expressed an interest in participating in gas infrastructure projects linking Pakistan with Iran. However, American pressure caused the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China to withdraw from the project. The conclusion of an agreement between the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Iran regarding the abandonment of the implementation of the nuclear programme meant that the project could be revisited. The project to build links between China's Xinjiang province (where a Special Economic Zone has been established) and the Pakistani port of Gwadar was announced in 2013 as part of a broader Chinese policy called the *Silk Road Economic Belt*. On April 20-21, 2015, President Xi Jinping met with top state officials and officers of the armed forces. At that time, 51 bilateral agreements were concluded, paving the way for major infrastructure investments in a significant project named the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The total value of Chinese investments is expected to amount to \$46 billion (USD). Under the agreement, the Chinese side received a 23-year lease of the port of Gwadar. As part of this investment, the largest airport in Pakistan will also be built.²⁴² The port's infrastructure will also include a \$2.5 billion (USD) floating LNG terminal with a capacity to process 0.3 billion m³ of gas per day.²⁴³ Energy investments include not only increasing the capacity of existing power plants by adding more nuclear reactors, but also building plants based on renewable energy sources.

²⁴⁰ <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/07/09/Sino-Pakistan-civil-nuclear-co-operation-A-growing-challenge-to-the-global-nuclear-order.aspx> – 15 IX 2017.

²⁴¹ U. Bhaskar, *Indo-US Nuclear Deal in Pipeline, Efforts on to Let Iran Down Lightly*, [on-line:] <http://www.livemint.com/Politics/bEi7nFyqA5hIfsx0svsvvM/IndoUS-nuclear-deal-in-pipeline-effortson-to-let-Irandown.html> – 15 IX 2017.

²⁴² <http://www.dailytimep.com.pk/national/12-Nov-2015/china-to-build-pakistan-s-largest-airport-at-gwadar> – 15 IX 2017.

²⁴³ <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2015/11/08/business/financial-bid-for-gwadar-lng-terminal-to-be-opened-this-week/> – 15 IX 2017.

There are also plans for another hydroelectric dam near Islamabad, providing 720 MW for \$1.4 billion (USD), and Suki Kinari in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, with a capacity of 870 MW worth \$1.8 billion (USD).²⁴⁴ The CPEC project is also set to include the large Diamir Bhasha Dam on the Indus River in Gilgit-Baltistan province, the construction of which began in 2011. Its capacity is expected to reach 4,500 MW, and the total investment cost is anticipated to amount to \$14 billion (USD).²⁴⁵ This investment, however, raises serious controversy in Pakistan, as the Chinese side expects to be given full control over its maintenance – which would mean a serious limitation on Islamabad's sovereignty. The project has been suspended and its future fate is unknown as of the date of this publication.²⁴⁶ Meanwhile, the world's largest solar power plant, the 900 MW Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park in Bahawalpur, has been completed at a cost of \$1.5 billion (USD).²⁴⁷ Due to its pioneering nature and size, it is an undertaking of great propaganda importance. The official website provides information on the amount of electricity it produces with an accuracy of one day.²⁴⁸ Investment in conventional power generation is also planned. One example is the 660 MW coal-fired power plant, worth \$1.9 billion (USD), being jointly built by Chinese and Qatari investors at Port Qasim in Karachi.²⁴⁹ The next coal-fired power plant will be built in Sahiwal. It is expected to produce a total of 1,320 MW of energy, and the construction cost is projected to be \$1.8 billion (USD).²⁵⁰ There are also plans to build

²⁴⁴ <http://nation.com.pk/islamabad/12-Apr-2014/deal-signedfor-870mw-hydropower-project> – 15 IX 2017.

²⁴⁵ <http://nation.com.pk/business/11-Dec-2015/govt-seeksbhasha-dam-inclusion-in-cpec> – 15 IX 2017.

²⁴⁶ S. Rana, *Pakistan Stops Bid to Include Diamer-Bhasha Dam in CPEC*, [on-line:] <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1558475/2-pakistan-stops-bidinclude-diamer-bhasha-dam-cpec/> – 15 II 2017.

²⁴⁷ <http://www.thenewsteller.com/pakistan/pak-china-900-mwsolar-power-project-agreed-to-expedite/18562/> – 15 IX 2017.

²⁴⁸ *Quaid-e-Azam Solar Power*, [on-line:] <https://www.qasolar.com/> – 15 II 2017.

²⁴⁹ <http://nation.com.pk/business/11-Apr-2015/china-qatar-tobuild-2-09b-coal-fired-power-plant-at-karachi> – 15 IX 2017.

²⁵⁰ *National Electric Power Regulatory Authority*, [on-line:] <http://www.nepra.org.pk/Licences/Licence%20Application/2015/Generation%20License%20App%20of%20unaneg%20Shdong%20RUYI.PDF> – 15 IX 2017.

several power plants to be fuelled by LNG. One such plant, worth close to \$3 billion (USD) and with a capacity of 1,200 MW, will be built in Balokki, Punjab.²⁵¹ A similar 1,180 MW power plant is being built in Bikki, near Sheikhpura, also in Punjab.²⁵² The most spectacular and important part of the investments under the CPEC is the construction and modernisation of the road and railway networks, with future plans for gas pipelines. A network of modern roads is to connect the most important cities of Pakistan – Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad – with the port of Gwadar and the Chinese border at the Khunjerab Pass. The Karakorum Highway is to be upgraded to enable year-round use, which will require the construction of tunnels. The main railway project aims to connect the port of Gwadar with Peshawar via the largest economic centres: Karachi, Haidarabad, Multan and Lahore. The trains are planned to run at a speed of 160 km/h, compared to the current standard of 60-82 km/h. This requires the construction of modern automatic signalling and the adaptation of platforms for the new trains.²⁵³ The very ambitious plan to build a high-speed rail link between Kashgar in China and Islamabad in Pakistan, called the *Karakorum Railway*, remains at the design stage.²⁵⁴ The CPEC will also include the construction of the first metro line in Lahore and a fibre-optic connection between Pakistan and China.²⁵⁵ Although it is not formally part of the CPEC, due to changing international conditions, and – in particular – the lifting of the embargo on trade with Iran, China has returned to the issue of building the “Pakistani” part of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. Pakistan-China relations are propaganda-styled as “all-weather friendship”. Indeed, from Pakistan’s point of view, Chinese support in both

²⁵¹ <http://www.thenewsp.com.pk/print/50520-ecneq-approvestransmission-line-for-balokki-power-plant> – 15 IX 2017.

²⁵² <http://en.dailyakistan.com.pk/pakistan/pm-nawazinaugurates-1180mw-bhikki-power-plant-in-sheikhupura/> – 15 IX 2017.

²⁵³ <http://paktribune.com/news/Railway-track-project-plannedfrom-Karachi-to-Peshawar-275016.html> – 15 IX 2017.

²⁵⁴ *China Tables Railway Project Linking to Pakistan*, [on-line:] <http://www.dawn.com/news/1116104/china-tables-railwayproject-linking-to-pakistan> – 15 IX 2017.

²⁵⁵ S. Rana, *CPEC Projects Worth \$11b Cannot Be Completed in Two Years: IPR*, [on-line:] <http://tribune.com.pk/story/970437/cpec-projects-worth-11b-cannot-be-completed-in-two-years-ipr/> – 15 IX 2017.

the economic and political-military dimensions cannot be overestimated. During the 1965 and 1971 wars, fear of China's involvement in the conflict limited India's ability to act. Even if Beijing's reactions were restrained, the possibility of its active support in the event of an attempt to eliminate Pakistani statehood curbed the ambitions of Indian staff officers. China is also a serious alternative to American military aid. Their equipment is not of the same quality as that of the superpower, but Pakistan cannot afford to purchase the most modern Western technologies. Moreover, China has never imposed any conditions on Pakistan in terms of limiting the use of supplied weapons, which the Americans are keen to do. However, information has emerged (so far denied by Beijing and not commented on by Islamabad) regarding the possibility of building a permanent Chinese naval base in Pakistan. This would be a significant change in the balance of power in the region. It would also change Islamabad's international position, making it even more dependent on Beijing and limiting the possibility of closer cooperation with the US.²⁵⁶

4.4 Pakistan-Afghan Relations

The Afghanistan-Pakistan border is a legacy of the period of colonialism. The demarcation line, called the *Durand Line*, was a result of the Anglo-Afghan wars and divided the lands under the sovereign rule of the Emir of Afghanistan from those ruled by the British monarch, represented by the viceroy. In this way, the lands inhabited by the Pashtuns were artificially divided between two states.²⁵⁷ Established on 14 August 1947, Pakistan declared itself the legal heir to all treaties concluded by Great Britain concerning its national territory – in particular, those regulating border issues with its neighbours. Established on August 14, 1947, Pakistan declared itself the legal heir to all treaties concluded by Great Britain concerning its national territory, particularly those regulating border issues

²⁵⁶ <https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/if-china-does-build-anaval-base-in-pakistan-what-are-the-risks-for-islamabad/> – 21 I 2018.

²⁵⁷ <http://www.khyber.org/history/treaties/durandagreement.shtml> – 21 I 2018.

with its neighbours. On July 26, 1949, the Afghan parliament declared the agreements concluded with Great Britain regarding its withdrawal from the Indian Subcontinent null and void.²⁵⁸ In Kabul, it was stated that since British rule over India was ending, the agreement between the kings dividing the Pashtun lands was null and void. Attempts to hold a plebiscite in which the people concerned could express their views on whether they wanted to return to Afghanistan were unsuccessful. Behind these claims, there was no argument of force that could appeal to the representatives of Great Britain. No subsequent Afghan government has recognised the Durand Line as the final state border under public international law. This is one of the reasons why Pakistan is interested in having at least a neutral government in Kabul. The worst possible scenario is a pro-Indian government, as this could mean the need to fight another war on two fronts or, even worse, a repetition of the “Bengal scenario” and India’s active support for Pashtun irredentism. Hence, Islamabad’s suspicion of any activity by New Delhi on the western side of the Durand Line. This concerns both India’s participation in the training of the Afghan army and the financing of investments that affect Pakistan’s strategic interests. For example, the construction of the strategic Route 606, connecting Afghanistan with Iranian ports, broke Pakistan’s previous monopoly on the transit of goods and deprived it of a tool for exerting economic pressure on its western neighbour.²⁵⁹ In the 1980s, the concept of strategic depth emerged in Pakistani staff circles. Pakistan’s geographical location means that the Pakistani army has no territory to which it could retreat, nor any area where it could absorb an Indian attack, regroup its forces and launch an effective counter-attack. It is likely that awareness of this fact was one of the factors that prompted Pakistani politicians and the military to envision a confederation with Iran and Afghanistan, as discussed in one of the previous sections. When this proved to be

²⁵⁸ A. Biswas, *Durand Line: History, Legality & Future*, New Delhi 2013, p. 19; vide: A.P. Quaseem, *Pak-Afghan Relations and the Durand Line Issue*, [on-line:] <http://www.ipp.org.pk/themuslim-world/986-pak-afghan-relations-the-durand-lineissue.html> – 21 I 2018.

²⁵⁹ http://www.fairobserver.com/region/central_south_asia/thegenesis-of-pakistan-strategic-depth-in-afghanistan-88910/ – 21 I 2018.

completely unrealistic, they began to seek other solutions. The most radical version of the concept of strategic depth, authored by Gen. Aslam Beg, proposed the possibility of withdrawing part of the Pakistani armed forces – especially the air force – to the territory of Afghanistan in order to carry out a counter-attack on the Indian troops occupying Pakistan.²⁶⁰ A more moderate and, therefore, realistic version assumed that Afghan territory would become a base for the ongoing guerrilla war in Kashmir. Its basic assumption is that since it was impossible to win an open war against India, it should be transformed into an asymmetric proxy conflict. In turn, using Afghanistan as a place to train Kashmiri mujahideen was intended (analogous to the US experience in Afghanistan in the 1980s) to protect Pakistan from accusations of supporting terrorists or an armed reaction from India. Islamabad would, thus, “incidentally” get rid of “unemployed” former Afghan mujahideen (including Arab volunteers) from its own territory, who posed and still pose a threat to Pakistan as preachers of radical Salafism.²⁶¹ There is also a third, “minimalist” understanding of “strategic depth”: it is in Islamabad’s strategic, existential interest that the government in Kabul be at least neutral and preferably friendly to Pakistan. Any pro-India (or perceived as such in Islamabad) government in Kabul has not been and will not be welcome, and all efforts will be made to change it. This reasoning led to support for the Taliban Movement in the 1990s.²⁶² This is how the issue was defined in 2010 by the then-Chief of General Staff, General Perves A. Kayani.²⁶³ The perception of Afghanistan’s role in Pakistani politics is evolving. However, one can clearly see that the perception of the Indian presence in Afghanistan is perceived as a threat to Pakistani interests related to the subjective security of the state. Some of the population along the Afghan-Pakistani border does not fully accept the division of their lands between the two

²⁶⁰ http://www.fairobserver.com/region/central_south_asia/thegenesis-of-pakistans-strategic-depth-in-afghanistan-88910/ – 21 I 2018.

²⁶¹ S. Narayanan, *Pakistan & Afghanistan: Understanding Islamabad’s Objectives and Strategies*, New Delhi 2010, p. 6

²⁶² Q. Siddique, *Pakistan’s Future Policy towards Afghanistan: A Look at Strategic Depth, Militant Movement and Role of India and the Us*, Copenhagen 2011.

²⁶³ http://www.fairobserver.com/region/central_south_asia/thegenesis-of-pakistans-strategic-depth-in-afghanistan-88910/ – 21 I 2018.

countries. The degree of integration of Pashtuns with the Pakistani state varies. Residents of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province generally accept the current shape of the border. For the people of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, until September 11, 2001, the line separating their lands from their compatriots living on the Afghan side of the border was practically non-existent. Subsequent attempts to seal it, undertaken since 2002, have not yielded positive results and have contributed to quarrels between local tribes and the central authorities. Pakistan has not yet been able to effectively control these areas. Thus, a “grey zone” was created, managed by local tribal elders. This area was used as a base for guerrilla operations against the Soviet Army in Afghanistan. Training camps for mujahideen were located here, which also served as orphanages and Quranic schools where Salafi preachers taught. In the absence of state control, criminal phenomena such as arms trafficking, smuggling and drug production have flourished. After the Soviet Army withdrew from Afghanistan, the government in Islamabad did not possess the strength or resources, and probably the political will, to restore control over the border. It has now become a base for groups fighting not only in Afghanistan, but also in Kashmir. After taking control of Kabul, the Taliban allowed anti-Indian fighters to move to the western part of the Durand Line. The Taliban Political Movement became independent from its former allies in Pakistani intelligence and began to pursue an increasingly independent policy. The government in Islamabad also continued to assume the possibility of using Afghan territory as strategic depth. After the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in 2001, Pakistani territory once again became the base for the military operation conducted beyond its western border by the United States and NATO. For Pakistan, the overthrow of the Taliban meant that the government in Kabul was joined by a group that was hostile to it, linked to the former Northern Alliance and India. Initial attempts to convince the ally to take into account Islamabad's interests (i.e., the creation of a government in Kabul based on the broadest possible political and especially ethnic base) ended in failure. This forced Pakistan into political manoeuvring. On the one hand, it formally cooperated with the United States; on the other hand, it at least tolerated individuals and groups associated with the former Taliban government on its territory, including Osama bin Laden. Pakistan's attitude towards events beyond the Durand

Line is, therefore, very complex and is rather a result of its relations with India. The federation's plans are even less realistic today than they were 40 years ago. Afghanistan, as a failed state, already poses a serious security threat to Pakistan, and its inclusion in state territory would only facilitate the infiltration of criminal groups and terrorists into Punjab.

The withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan on August 30, 2021 has created a new geopolitical situation in relations between Islamabad and Kabul. Unlike relations with the Taliban regime before 2002, the current state of bilateral relations can be described as unfriendly. The two countries have not established formal diplomatic relations, and the government in Islamabad has not formally recognised the new authorities in Kabul, although both sides are conducting political dialogue through the United Arab Emirates. The Taliban government, like the previous authorities, does not recognise the current state border with Pakistan. The Taliban no longer requires Pakistan's help in maintaining relations with the outside world as they did before 2002. They also no longer perceive Islamabad as a potentially reliable partner, which is evident from Pakistan's participation in the "anti-terrorist coalition" formed in 2001 under the aegis of the US (although it should be remembered that Pakistan's involvement was considered by the US to be at least "insufficient"). Hostile relations with its neighbour are also influenced by Pakistan's ongoing operations against local fundamentalist groups, notably the so-called "Pakistani Taliban" (Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan), which Islamabad accuses the current government in Kabul of supporting, despite its firm denials.²⁶⁴ The situation has worsened significantly due to the political and military actions taken against Afghanistan. The first of these actions included the decision to deport 200,000 Afghans from Pakistan, as well as the planned continuation of these measures. It should be remembered that there are currently around 1.7 million Afghans living in Pakistan, who are considered illegal immigrants.²⁶⁵ The deportations are not justified by international con-

²⁶⁴ A. Hussain, 'No Dialogue': Pakistan Says Open to Attacks on Afghan-Based Armed Groups, [on-line:] <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/28/no-dialogue-pakistan-says-open-to-attacks-on-afghan-based-armed-groups> – 2 X 2024.

²⁶⁵ S. Khan, *How Deportations of Afghans Imperil Pakistan's Security*, [on-line:] <https://www.dw.com/en/how-deportations-of-afghans-imperil-pakistans-security/a-67385848> – 2 X 2024.

siderations, but rather by the difficult economic situation in Pakistan, which makes it impossible to support such a large group of foreigners who, following the end of military operations in Afghanistan, the government in Islamabad no longer considers refugees. An example of military action is the attack carried out in March 2024 by Pakistani aircraft on camps of Islamic militants located on the Afghan side of the border, during which, according to the Afghan side, civilians were also killed. The attack was said to be a response to a terrorist attack on a Pakistani border post.²⁶⁶ The Pakistani side accuses Afghanistan of complicity in numerous terrorist attacks that have occurred in various regions of Pakistan in recent years, including those against Chinese citizens involved in implementing strategic investments.²⁶⁷ Given the limited success of Pakistan's actions to eliminate the TTP and similar fundamentalist armed groups, further action should be expected against both Afghan immigrants living in Pakistan and alleged or actual terrorist training camps on the Afghan side of the border. This, in turn, significantly hinders or even prevents the normalisation of bilateral relations, including the recognition of the government in Kabul and the establishment of diplomatic relations.

4.5 Relations with the USA

Pakistan-US cooperation dates back to the late 1940s. The social and property reform projects proposed by the Indian National Congress were contrary to the interests of the big landowners and industrialists of Punjab and Sri Lanka, who founded the Muslim League. After the partition of the Subcontinent, unlike India, ruled by the socialist J. Nehru, Pakistan avoided revolutionary changes in the ownership structure. For New Delhi, the natural partner was the Soviet Union. That's why Pakistan turned to

²⁶⁶ A. Hussain, 'Cousins at War': Pakistan-Afghan Ties Strained after Cross-Border Attacks, [on-line:] <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/19/cousins-at-war-pakistan-afghan-ties-strained-after-cross-border-attacks> – 2 X 2024.

²⁶⁷ A. Rajvanshi, *Why Pakistan-Afghanistan Tensions Are Soaring*, [on-line:] <https://time.com/6995069/pakistan-afghanistan-relations-taliban/> – 2 X 2024.

the United States. Another reason for Pakistan to find itself in the Cold War paradigm was its similar strategic location: just like Western countries in relation to the Soviets, Pakistan had a much smaller demographic potential in relation to India and an increasingly limited ability to balance conventional armed forces. Therefore, until it acquired nuclear weapons, it had to minimise this gap by obtaining the highest quality military equipment its taxpayers could afford. This naturally pointed to an alliance with the US as the only reasonable option. The United States did not give up trying to draw India into its sphere of influence, which affected its relations with Pakistan. For example, when providing military equipment to Karachi/Islamabad, they stipulated that it could not be used in combat in cases other than those permitted by the UN Charter.²⁶⁸ In the case of military aid provided to New Delhi during and immediately after the 1962 war with China, no such reservations were made. Islamabad, on the other hand, could count on diplomatic support from the US at the UN Security Council by blocking unfavourable resolutions on the Kashmir issue. During the Cold War, Pakistan remained a formal ally of the US as a member of military alliances CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation, formerly the Baghdad Pact) and SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation). American U2 spy planes took off from an air base near Peshawar. In return, Pakistan received access to modern military technologies and personnel training.²⁶⁹ The knowledge gained in this way was later passed on by Pakistani instructors to soldiers from the “oil” Gulf states, who also bought American equipment for a fee. Two wars with India, in 1965 and especially in 1971, showed Pakistani politicians that in such a conflict they cannot count on active and effective help from the United States.²⁷⁰ Only the recent declassification of the presidential archives of R. Nixon allowed for a more balanced view of the issue. Despite Islamabad’s unfair assessments, the US and China exerted strong diplomatic pressure on India, which resulted in the conflict not escalating in 1971 beyond its declared goal of “realising the right of the Bengali people to self-determination”. In practice, this meant defending Pakistan’s possessions in Kash-

²⁶⁸ L. Ziring, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

²⁶⁹ www.fap.org/irp/program/collect/u2.htm – 16 II 2018.

²⁷⁰ L. Ziring, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

mir, whether in the military dimension – since the Indian army did not take any decisive military action in the region to change the status quo – or in the diplomatic dimension. During the negotiations in Simla after the end of the war, the fact that Pakistani forces had been completely defeated was not taken advantage of. Pakistan played a significant role in establishing diplomatic relations between the US and China. The first unofficial meeting between Secretary of State H. Kissinger and Chinese Premier Chou Enlai took place under rather unusual circumstances: officially, the American diplomat was in Karachi, but his look-alike was sunbathing on the beach there. The “real” Kissinger was holding important talks in Beijing at the time. This camouflage was necessary because the two countries did not maintain diplomatic relations. It was only as a result of these talks, among others, that they were established.²⁷¹ Pakistan was not considered a leading US ally in the region until 1979. First of all, this position was reserved for Iran, which is rich in mineral deposits. Besides, the communist threat to Islamabad was rather illusory. The “Rawalpindi conspiracy”, nipped in the bud on March 9, 1951, bore the hallmarks of a provocation by the Pakistani secret services rather than a “real revolution”: only two military men participated in it, and most of its members were representatives of the artistic and literary bohemia. These were people who had no serious contacts in the army, politics or state administration.²⁷² For the Soviets, a much more important partner was India, with which cooperation gradually intensified, especially after the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation on August 9, 1971.²⁷³ As previously mentioned, the key year for the growth of Pakistan's importance to US foreign policy was 1979. Then, anti-Western Shiite fundamentalists came to power in Iran, led by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and the Soviet Army entered Afghanistan at the “invitation” of the local communist authorities. A new geopolitical situation emerged that favoured closer cooperation between the United States and Pakistan. For the Americans, it was a chance to

²⁷¹ S.M. Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy...*, p. 76.

²⁷² The description of the circumstances and course of the conspiracy is the subject of H. Zaheer's monograph *The Times and Trial of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy 1951: The First Coup Attempt in Pakistan*, Lahore 2007.

²⁷³ [http://mea.gov.in/bilateraldocumentp.htm?dtl/5139/Treaty of – 16 II 2018](http://mea.gov.in/bilateraldocumentp.htm?dtl/5139/Treaty%20of%20-%2016%20II%202018).

“deliver a thousand Vietnams to the Soviets”. For the Pakistanis, this meant the possibility of obtaining modern military technologies at attractive prices and influencing the situation in Kabul so that it could not take any actions coordinated with India against Pakistan’s interests.²⁷⁴ Indeed, Islamabad managed to purchase, among others, F-16 aircraft and Stinger surface-to-air missile systems. As mentioned earlier, Pakistan’s involvement in supporting the anti-communist mujahideen also served as camouflage for its nuclear weapons research programme. The United States pretended not to have any knowledge of this because their goal was more important to weaken the Soviet Union and its army in Afghanistan, rather than to force Pakistan to refrain from its nuclear ambitions.²⁷⁵ The withdrawal of Soviet (and formally Russian) troops from Afghanistan meant that Pakistan was no longer an interesting ally for the United States. Despite the implementation of a programme of democratic reforms in Islamabad, including the return of civilian politicians to power and the election of Benazir Bhutto, a graduate of Oxford University and popular in the West, as prime minister, Pakistan was “remembered” for its nuclear programme, and an economic embargo was imposed. This was intensified following the nuclear test explosions in 1998 and the Kargil conflict a year later. It is also worth mentioning the ambiguous approach of the US to the situation in Afghanistan after 1994, when most of the country was under Taliban rule. Although the administration in Washington officially criticised them for violating human rights, American companies tried to establish contact with them in order to build a strategic gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Pakistan to India (TAPI). This gives rise to various conspiracy theories. The famous American journalist and director Michael Moore, in his book and film *Fahrenheit 9/11*, directly blames American intelligence for allowing the Taliban to take over Afghanistan and tolerating bin Laden’s stay in that country. Once again, Pakistan became a significant state in US politics after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001. For Pakistan, this was a pragmatic decision related to the ultimatum that the then US Secretary of State Colin Powell gave to the country’s President General Musharraf. Cooperation

²⁷⁴ J.O. Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

²⁷⁵ *Ibidem.*

with the superpower, which included the lifting of the burdensome economic embargo and financial and military aid, was chosen instead of an open conflict with it, which would have had tragic consequences for Pakistan.²⁷⁶ And indeed, initially the cooperation seemed to be going well. The Americans used Pakistani airspace to conduct airstrikes on Taliban positions and the roads connecting the port of Karachi with Afghanistan to deliver supplies to troops stationed on the western side of the Durand Line. However, serious differences of opinion gradually emerged. First of all, when it comes to the shape of the future Afghan government, the US did not take into account its ally's interests, basing the new Afghan authorities on the forces of the pro-India Northern Alliance. The Americans also accused the Pakistanis of not being fully engaged in the fight against the Taliban.²⁷⁷ This topic deserves a broader, separate study. At this point, it is important to note the complex nature of this conflict: Pakistanis are forced to fight not only with Arab volunteers from al-Qaeda, but also with their own citizens who support a fundamentalist vision of the state. We are, therefore, dealing with a sui generis civil war. The United States is taking a series of actions that have little to do with international law and, moreover, weaken the position of the Pakistani army and government in the eyes of its people. The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, commonly called *drones*) to eliminate potential terrorists on Pakistani territory without the consent of its authorities is a clear violation of its sovereignty. This was noticed by, among others, the UN special envoy for human rights, Ben Emmerson.²⁷⁸ The government in Islamabad has repeatedly protested against this, despite the risk of being accused of supporting terrorists. Similar controversy surrounds the US operation *Neptune Spear*, which aimed to capture or eliminate Osama bin Laden on Pakistani territory without the consent of that country's authorities.²⁷⁹ There are also voices

²⁷⁶ S. Mohan, *Pakistan under Musharraf*, Delhi 2000, p. 84.

²⁷⁷ S. Khan, *Pakistan's Half-hearted Military Offensives Aren't Enough*, [on-line:] https://www.huffingtonpost.com/saad-khan/pakistan-halfhearted-mi_b_349872.html – 16 II 2018.

²⁷⁸ https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/un-usdrones-violate-pakistan-sovereignty/2013/03/15/308adae6-8d8a-11e2-adca-74ab31da3399_story.html?utm_term=.239bfff4a107d – 16 II 2018.

²⁷⁹ <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/tenserelationship-between-the-us-and-pakistan-since-bin-ladendead-a-832291.html> – 16 II 2018.

suggesting that the government in Islamabad was informed about the planned action and either agreed to it or was forced to do so, but did not disclose this fact to its own public.²⁸⁰ Violating Pakistan's sovereignty over its national territory definitely damages relations with the United States. Another point of contention is the nuclear cooperation agreement that the United States concluded with India on July 18, 2005. It gives the strategic adversary access to the latest American technologies (i.e., a potential advantage also in terms of the strategic nuclear arsenal). Pakistan's failure to secure a similar agreement with the US is a historical precedent.²⁸¹ The announcement of the suspension of US aid to Pakistan in early January 2018 was a serious blow to politicians in Islamabad.²⁸² Further evidence of the deterioration in bilateral relations was the inclusion of Pakistan on the list of states sponsoring international terrorism.²⁸³ The withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan has led to a significant change in Pakistan's importance in Washington's policy, namely a return to a peripheral position. This is indicated by the absence of Pakistan in the US National Security Strategy.²⁸⁴ On the other hand, the absence of Pakistan in the key strategic document of the US administration may indicate that this country is no longer perceived as a source of threats to US security, as it previously appeared in the context of Afghanistan and supporting international terrorism. Pakistan has become the subject of a debate in a US Congress subcommittee over allegations of election fraud and, according to the applicants, the unlawful arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan. Congress also passed a resolution calling on Pakistan to

²⁸⁰ <http://www.latimep.com/books/la-ca-jc-0417-killing-binladen-20160417-story.html> – 16 II 2018.

²⁸¹ G. Kennedy, *U.S. India Nuclear Deal*, [on-line:] <http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2017/ph241/kennedy-g1/> – 16 II 2018.

²⁸² <https://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/04/politics/us-suspendssecurity-assistance-to-pakistan/index.html> – 16 II 2018.

²⁸³ D. Jorgic, A. Shahzad, *U.S. Pushes Motion to Put Pakistan on Global Terrorist-Financing Watchlist*, [on-line:] <https://www.reuterp.com/article/us-pakistan-militantsfinancing-exclusiv/exclusive-u-s-pushes-to-putpakistan-on-global-terrorist-financing-watchlistidUSKCN1FX2EV> – 16 II 2018.

²⁸⁴ <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf> – 2 X 2024.

investigate the matter.²⁸⁵ Pakistan has also been criticised by the United States for trying to censor the internet and media.²⁸⁶ However, this had no significant impact on the Joe Biden administration's policy towards the government in Islamabad; only the priorities of cooperation changed: security issues have been replaced by financial and development issues.²⁸⁷ In the context of the presidential elections in the United States, the question arises: how will bilateral relations develop if one of the candidates wins? During his previous term, Donald Trump advocated for closer cooperation with India in order to build an alliance against the People's Republic of China. Pakistan was also perceived in this context as a country that was a close ally of the main adversary of the USA. It can, therefore, be expected that in the event of Donald Trump's victory, this policy will continue, further weakening and deteriorating relations with Pakistan. However, Kamala Harris will probably continue Joe Biden's conciliatory policy, which is based on maintaining financial aid for Islamabad and contacts at the military level. Training part of the Pakistani officer corps at American military academies has always been an important element in building Washington's influence in the Pakistani army, which is one of the key actors in the country's political scene. Ending this cooperation would entirely hand this field over to Beijing and Moscow. Maintaining development aid will also continue to be a tool to uphold Islamabad's economic dependence on Washington, serving as a powerful means of pressure. Abandoning this policy would also mean completely handing Pakistan over to China.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁵ M. Ahmed, *Pakistani Parliament Denounces US Congressional Resolution Calling for a Probe into Recent Elections*, [on-line:] <https://apnewp.com/article/pakistan-parliament-us-congressional-resolution-811d9879f00b250b1e217ec7cf306fb0> – 2 X 2024.

²⁸⁶ H. Pamuk, K. Singh, *US Urges Pakistan to Lift Internet Shutdowns, Social Media Restrictions*, [on-line:] <https://www.reuterp.com/world/us-urges-pakistan-lift-internet-shutdowns-social-media-restrictions-2024-02-21/> – 2 X 2024.

²⁸⁷ <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/15/inflection-point-us-hearing-on-pakistan-shines-light-on-complex-ties> – 2 X 2024.

²⁸⁸ U. Jamal, *What a Harris or Trump Presidency Could Mean for Pakistan*, [on-line:] <https://thediplomat.com/2024/07/what-a-harris-or-trump-presidency-could-mean-for-pakistan/> – 2 X 2024.

4.6 Relations with the Russian Federation

Pakistan's involvement on the side of the United States throughout virtually the entire period of the Cold War also shaped its relations with the Soviet Union. The two countries did not share a common border (Pakistan was separated from the then Soviet territory by a narrow strip of land belonging to Afghanistan, called the *Wakhan Corridor*). However, the alliance with the US made Pakistan an enemy of the Kremlin, especially since, for example, the Pakistani air base in Peshawar was used by the CIA to carry out spy flights, and Pakistani territory was later utilised as a logistical and training base for the anti-Soviet Mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Bilateral relations improved little after 1971, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's leftist Pakistan People's Party came to power in Pakistan. This change can be observed in scientific publications and the press in the Eastern Bloc countries, including that published in the Polish People's Republic. The thaw between Moscow and Islamabad ended after the military coup led by Gen. Zia ul-Haq and his involvement in supporting the Afghan Mujahideen fighting against Soviet aggression. The growing conflict between Beijing and Washington has placed Pakistan in a very difficult position as its former allies have become adversaries. Therefore, the possibility of continuing the policy of balancing between the US and China is now becoming impossible, or at least problematic. The government of Imran Khan tried to play the anti-Americanism card. In these geopolitical circumstances, the Prime Minister paid a visit to Moscow, where on 24 February, 2022, he met with President V. Putin. This took place precisely at the time of the beginning of the Russian aggression against Ukraine.²⁸⁹ So far, such a high-level meeting has only taken place once before: in the 1950s, before Pakistan joined the pro-Western political and military blocs.²⁹⁰ During this visit, a number of agreements were signed regarding the purchase of gas from Russia and Russian military technologies. It should be emphasised here that the Russians included Islamabad

²⁸⁹ C.R. Mohan, *Imran Khan Goes to Moscow as Pakistan Romances Russia*, [on-line:] <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/23/imran-khan-pakistan-russia-putin-india-geopolitics/> – 2 X 2024.

²⁹⁰ <https://www.britishpathe.com/asset/126247/> – 2 X 2024.

in a programme for selling strategic raw materials at competitive prices, also allowing barter exchange, which was beneficial for both sides. Russia, covered by international sanctions, manages its resources of convertible currencies sparingly, while Pakistan suffers from a chronic deficit, deepened by its placement on the UN list of countries supporting terrorism. Another important area in which closer cooperation was declared is combating international terrorism, especially that inspired by Islamic fundamentalism, which poses a threat to both the modernist governments in Islamabad and the Russian Federation. Pakistan also repaid its debt to Russian economic entities, which amounted to nearly \$93 million (USD), mainly through barter exports of its own goods to Russia.²⁹¹ Most likely, the rapprochement between Pakistan and the Russian Federation was inspired by Beijing, as the name Pakistan is not mentioned in the Kremlin's key strategic document, the *Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation* (which indicates that until 2022, Islamabad was of marginal importance to Moscow).²⁹² In this situation, Imran Khan's government decided to accept the conditions imposed by Russia and purchase oil and gas for roubles at a price well below the market price, which is contrary to the position of the United States.²⁹³ Both Imran Khan's government and the current government of Shahbaz Sharif maintain "friendly neutrality" towards Russia in its war with Ukraine. This is reflected in Pakistan's abstention from voting on anti-Russia resolutions in the UN General Assembly.²⁹⁴ One can also perceive the participation of Pakistani representatives in the meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in this way, despite the presence of a Russian representative. Moreover, during the deliberations, there was a direct meeting between President Putin and Prime Minister Sharif. In his speech, the Russian president called Pakistan

²⁹¹ M.S. Zia, *The Truth About Pakistan-Russia Ties*, [on-line:] <https://thediplomat.com/2023/09/the-truth-about-pakistan-russia-ties/> – 2 X 2024.

²⁹² *The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation*, [on-line:] https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/fundamental_documents/1860586/ – 2 X 2024.

²⁹³ U. Jamal, *Pakistan Pursues Oil Deal with Russia*, [on-line:] <https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/pakistan-pursues-oil-deal-with-russia/> – 29 III 2023.

²⁹⁴ *Pakistan Abstains from UN Vote on Ukraine War*, [on-line:] <https://www.nation.com.pk/25-Feb-2023/pakistan-abstains-from-un-vote-on-ukraine-war> – 29 III 2023.

“a priority partner both in South-East Asia and in Asia as a whole”.²⁹⁵ He declared his interest in further cooperation, including the construction of the Pakistan Stream gas pipeline, which connects Russia with Pakistan via Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan.²⁹⁶ In these circumstances, the information, confirmed by several sources, that Pakistan supplies artillery ammunition to the armed forces of Ukraine, deserves to be called a revelation.²⁹⁷ It is difficult to clearly assess the extent to which the attempt to cooperate with both sides of the conflict (the purchase of raw materials from Russia and the supply of ammunition to Ukraine) is a new strategy chosen by the Pakistani government, and the extent to which it results from the continued dependence on American development aid (implemented directly by the USA or through loans from the IMF). Pakistan's 2024 general elections extend the democratic mandate for Shahbaz Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League-Pakistan People's Party coalition led by Bilawal Bhutto. It continues the project of intensifying rapprochement with the Russian Federation. In February 2024, a meeting at the ministerial level was held within the framework of the 14th Pakistan-Russia Consultative Group on Strategic Stability. Although no agreements were reached at the time, the meeting took place in a friendly atmosphere.²⁹⁸ On May 21, 2024, as part of the meeting of the foreign ministers of the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, an official meeting of the Pakistani and Russian delegations took place. The Pakistani side congratulated Vladimir Putin on winning the presidential election, which is in clear contradiction to the position of the United States and most Western countries on this matter. A convergence of positions in assessing the current international situation was also expressed. In September 2024, Islamabad was visited by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia,

²⁹⁵ *Meeting with Prime Minister of Pakistan Shehbaz Sharif*, [on-line:] <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69355> – 1 X 2024.

²⁹⁶ M. Muran, *Pakistan and Russia's Pivot to the Global South*, [on-line:] <https://thediplomat.com/2024/09/pakistan-and-russias-pivot-to-the-global-south/> – 1 X 2024.

²⁹⁷ <https://economictimep.indiatimep.com/news/india/pakistan-an-alleged-air-bridge-for-arms-supply-to-kyiv/articleshow/93668823.cms> – 29 III 2023.

²⁹⁸ C. Ali, *14th Meeting of the Pakistan-Russia Consultative Group on Strategic Stability Held*, [on-line:] <https://www.newswire.com.pk/2024/02/08/russia-44/> – 22 V 2024.

Alexei Overchuk. During meetings with his counterpart, as well as with Prime Minister Sharif, he declared his interest in cooperation in the fields of science and technology, energy and communications. In this latter aspect, the opening of new air connections and the construction of railway links were announced. It was also declared that military cooperation would continue and strengthen, as well as “the coordination of positions in the forums of international organisations”.²⁹⁹ During the visit to Moscow by the Pakistani Minister of Privatisation and a delegation of sixty entrepreneurs on October 1, 2024, the first barter trade agreement in the history of bilateral relations was signed, concerning the export of Pakistani agri-food products to Russia.³⁰⁰ The occasion for this was the launch of the first *Pakistan-Russia Trade and Investment Forum*, which took place at the beginning of the month in the Russian capital.³⁰¹ These are further clear signals that Islamabad does not intend to participate in the international isolation of the Kremlin preferred by the West. In February 2024, the head of the Senate Defence Committee, Mushahid Hussain, during his visit to Moscow, declared Pakistan's interest in joining BRICS, indicating that an application to join the organisation could be submitted as early as this year, when Russia will chair the organisation's work.³⁰² Support for Pakistan's accession to BRICS was also expressed by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister (A. Overchuk)³⁰³ during his aforementioned visit to Islamabad. This means a decisive departure from the policy of balancing the distance between the parties to the war in Ukraine pursued during the previous term and the adoption of a political orientation towards Russia. The US reaction to the recent upsurge in diplomatic activity between Islamabad

²⁹⁹ M. Muran, *Pakistan and Russia's...*

³⁰⁰ <https://parepmoscow.com/en/media/news/pakistan-and-russia-sign-first-ever-barter-trade-deal/> – 1 X 2024.

³⁰¹ *1st Pakistan-Russia Trade & Investment Forum Underway in Moscow*, [on-line:] <https://www.radio.gov.pk/01-10-2024/1st-pakistan-russia-trade-investment-forum-underway-in-moscow> – 1 X 2024.

³⁰² S. Sarkar, *Pakistan Could Join BRICS in 2024 with Russia's Backing, Senator Claims during Moscow Trip*, [on-line:] <https://www.news18.com/world/pakistan-could-join-brics-in-2024-with-russias-backing-senator-claims-ahead-of-moscow-trip-8784524.html> – 22 V 2024.

³⁰³ M. Muran, *Pakistan and Russia's...*

and Moscow is not yet officially known. However, a convergence can be observed between the current activities of Pakistani diplomacy and the current policy of Beijing, which was expressed in the May summit meeting between Presidents Xi and Putin.³⁰⁴

³⁰⁴ Ch. Maynes, J. Ruwitch, *Putin and Xi Further Their Embrace to Defy U.S.-Led Pressure*, [on-line:] <https://www.npr.org/2024/05/17/1252069230/russia-putin-xi-china-visit> – 22 V 2024.

5. PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY

The basic doctrine of the Pakistani armed forces today is the concept of “offensive defence”. It is based on carrying out a counter-strike aimed at transferring the armed conflict to the territory of the enemy (i.e., India). During this time, peace talks and/or international assistance should be sought to negotiate a satisfactory solution.³⁰⁵ It is planned to occupy Indian territory to a depth of about 50 km from the border and hold it at all costs for up to three weeks.³⁰⁶ American analysts have conducted several “war games” that have proven that there is no scenario in which Pakistani armed forces would be able to occupy and hold a piece of Indian territory for that long.³⁰⁷ Pakistan has virtually no capability to absorb a massive conventional first strike from the enemy. This would mean its physical liquidation before the international community had time to respond effectively. Pakistan’s stocks of fuel, ammunition and spare parts are estimated to last only 15 days of traditional armed conflict.³⁰⁸ The mobilisation plan assumes that full combat readiness of the armed forces will be achieved

³⁰⁵ Y. Joshi, *Pakistan Army Doctrine Says ‘Attack First’*, [on-line:] <http://www.stratpost.com/pakistan-army-doctrine-says-attack-first> – 10 XII 2011.

³⁰⁶ *Pakistan’s Defense Policy in a Tough Neighborhood: RS44*, [on-line:] http://www.ukdf.org.uk/assets/downloads/RS44Pakistansdefencepolicyinatoughneighbourhood_dd_1.pdf – 10 XII 2011.

³⁰⁷ S. Ganguly, D.T. Hagerty, *Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons*, Seattle 2005, pp. 96-97.

³⁰⁸ R.S.N. Singh, *Pakistan’s Offensive-Defence Strategy*, [on-line:] <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/military-&-space/Pakistans-Offensive-Defence-Strategy.html> – 10 XII 2011.

within 96 hours of the conflict's onset.³⁰⁹ The second element of the new concept proposed by the then Pakistani Chief of Staff was the need to achieve strategic depth in case the earlier assumption could not be implemented and Indian troops entered Pakistani territory.³¹⁰ If the army failed to occupy and hold enemy territory, the remaining forces would regroup on Afghan territory to launch a counter-attack from there. This was especially true of the air force.³¹¹ It was intended to increase Pakistan's ability to absorb an attack.³¹² It is hard to imagine, however, that the loss of key cities such as Rawalpindi, Islamabad, Lahore, Gujranwala, Bahawalpur and perhaps also Karachi did not signify a total defeat for Pakistan. Besides, the main actor in this solution, Afghanistan, has never shown any interest in taking an active part in this scenario.³¹³ The international community's aspiration to restore peace, combined with strong national separatist tendencies in Pakistan, allows us to assume that India would not need to conquer (*debellatio*) the whole of Pakistan, but only occupy Punjab. Then the Pashtuns could demand independence. The Pakistani state would remain a mere rump entity, incapable of independent existence. Under the conditions described above, nuclear weapons became the basic tool for Pakistan to ensure its sense of subjective security. Pakistan's current nuclear potential is estimated at between 90 and 110 warheads.³¹⁴ The number of missiles capable of carrying them is estimated at 190.³¹⁵ This may not be a large number, but it does allow for achieving India's minimal credible deterrence potential. American international relations theorist John Mearsheimer points out the importance of nuclear weapons

³⁰⁹ http://www.ajmalbeig.addr.com/pak_army.htm#Doctrine – 10 XII 2011.

³¹⁰ V.R. Raghavan, *Siachen: Conflict without End*, New Delhi 2002.

³¹¹ S. Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within*, Oxford 2008, pp. 418-419; vide: E. Haider, *Pakistan Needs Strategic Depth*, [on-line:] <http://tribune.com.pk/story/268921/pakistan-needs-strategicdepth/> – 11 XII 2011.

³¹² G. Garner, *The Afghan Taliban and Pakistan's 'Strategic Depth'*, [in:] *Bellum: A Project of the Stanford Review*, [on-line:] <http://bellum.stanfordreview.org/?p=2184> – 11 XII 2011.

³¹³ E. Haider, *op. cit.*

³¹⁴ <http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/pakistan/nuclear/>.

³¹⁵ P.K. Kerr, M.B. Nikitin, *Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues*, Washington, D.C. 2011, p. 4.

for peace in South Asia in the article *India Needs the Bomb*.³¹⁶ While he justifies India's titular necessity, the same arguments can easily be used for Pakistan. In subsequent conflicts, starting in 1999, through the reactions to the terrorist attacks in New Delhi and Srinagar in 2008, and the one in Mumbai in 2011, the international community, especially the United States, adopted an active negotiation strategy. They forced India and Pakistan to start talks, preventing the conflict from escalating. Nuclear weapons are effectively playing their role as a factor increasing the international community's interest in the Indian Subcontinent. The first serious considerations about using nuclear weapons were undertaken there in 1998. At the time, this was based on five assumptions:

- credible minimum deterrence, assuming that India is a potential aggressor;³¹⁷
- the principle of massive retaliation: the Pakistani strike must be as painful as possible for the Indian side. Therefore, its targets include not only military facilities, but also selected cities and the civilian population living in them. The admissibility of a first strike: if Indian forces capture any of the politically and economically important cities (e.g., Lahore, Sialkot or the Pakistani part of Kashmir), a significant part of the conventional potential is destroyed or a centre for developing nuclear technology/storing nuclear warheads is attacked. It is also possible to use nuclear weapons if India imposes a naval blockade;
- maintaining the balance of nuclear power on the Subcontinent.³¹⁸

It is not only Mearsheimer's realistic concepts of the balance of power that are useful in understanding the thinking of Pakistani politicians, especially the military. The problem can also be viewed from the perspective of the Copenhagen School. This concept assumes that security is an act of speech and that the subjective perception of threats is a reaction of public opinion. One can observe the occurrence of a feedback loop between anti-India propaganda and social expectations for the political authorities to take a firm stance towards the neighbour. However, it is

³¹⁶ <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/24/opinion/india-needsthe-bomb.html>.

³¹⁷ S. Kapila, *India and Pakistan Nuclear Doctrine: A Comparative Analysis*, [on-line:] <http://www.nti.org/countryprofiles/pakistan/nuclear/>.

³¹⁸ B. Chakma, *op. cit.*

difficult to ascertain at present whether the anti-India sentiment of Pakistanis is a reaction to propaganda or, conversely, whether politicians are trying to meet public expectations for anti-India rhetoric. It is also necessary to remember the nation-building role of the “common enemy”: fear of the Indian threat is one of the two factors, along with religion, that unite the Pashtuns, Balochs, Punjabis and the inhabitants of Sindhu.

}} SUMMARY }}*

A fundamental element of Pakistan's strategic culture is the trauma resulting from its historical relations with India. The sense of the existence of the "Indian Muslim state" has been questioned ever since the will to establish it was announced in 1940. It was questioned both by supporters of Indian unity (understandably) and by the British. Even when agreeing to the implementation of this postulate, the latter, guided by their immediate political interest, assumed that this "experiment" would sooner or later end in fiasco and that the lands of present-day Pakistan would return in their entirety to the Indian Union. However, this did not happen; the "artificial state" established has been functioning for 70 years, and there is little indication that it will cease to exist. The survival of the state is one of the basic goals set by politicians, diplomats and especially commanders of the armed forces. In the case of Pakistan, the former seem to be doing a better job. The Pakistani armed forces have lost at least one war with India – in 1971 – and the second – in 1965 – can at best be considered a "draw with New Delhi in the lead". Nevertheless, thanks to its skilful recruitment of allies, Pakistan has always managed to minimise the losses it suffers as a result of lost wars. Even the loss of half of its population and territory in 1971 was handled adeptly by diplomats to avoid raising the prestigious issue of Kashmiri statehood during the Simla negotiations. The Indian trauma is a serious burden for Pakistan, particularly financially, as it determines the high level of expenditure on the armed forces at the expense of developmental tasks. It also influences its foreign policy in another dimension, affecting the choice of allies and decisions related, for example, to policy towards its western neighbour, Afghanistan. In other, more favourable circumstances, the government in Islamabad

would be happy with the establishment in Kabul of an effective government capable of controlling its own territory. The proximity of a failed state is a source of numerous military and non-military threats. Pakistan did not engage sufficiently in supporting the modernist and pro-Western government in Afghanistan; on the other hand, by participating in the “anti-terrorist coalition” itself, it alienated the armed opposition, and today – the Taliban, which is once again in power in Afghanistan. The taken-for-granted threat from India, reinforced by media propaganda and instilled in students in schools, causes public opinion to agree to maintaining enormous expenditure on the armed forces for a developing country and an army numbering nearly 500,000 men. The Pakistani armed forces seek to combine two seemingly different traditions: British and Islamic. From the former, they have adopted not only uniforms and symbolism, but also a special esprit de corps, particularly visible in armoured units that refer to the tradition of cavalry. Colonial roots give the modern Pakistani military a sense of uniqueness, of being superior to the civilians living around the special ‘cantonment’ districts they inhabit. It is connected with the caste division still present in the Subcontinent (also among Muslims), within which warriors and soldiers occupy a prominent place. From the Islamic tradition, the armed forces draw upon sacrifice and the willingness to give their lives in combat. Unfortunately, just like in society, the armed forces are slowly radicalising, which some analysts see as a potential threat to the state itself. Another flaw resulting from both of these traditions is the sense of superiority over the potential adversary – India – manifested in the erroneous assumption that the morale of the Pakistani army will allow it to overcome the numerical and even technical superiority of the enemy. This approach leads directly to underestimating the opponent on one hand and overestimating one’s own capabilities on the other. Unfortunately, despite repeated painful lessons, Pakistan is unable to draw the right conclusions and abandon the hope of resolving the disputes with India through military confrontation. The meaning of this term needs to be clarified. Traditionally, the word “army” is used in the sense of “ground troops” (this is the case with the US Army, for example). In Pakistan, the term “army” has two meanings: one refers specifically to the land forces, while the second encompasses the armed forces as a whole, including the Navy and Air Force. Especially

when one talks or writes about the armed forces as a factor exercising power in the state, it is important to note that all subsequent military dictators who ruled in Karachi and Islamabad came from the land forces. Using the term “army” to refer to the entire armed forces of Pakistan also has a military connotation. Pakistan is, despite having access to the sea, a continental country. The main military operations are conducted on land. The role of the air force is rather subservient to the land forces, and the fleet has played virtually no role in the conflicts with India thus far.

KEYWORDS: Pakistan, strategic culture, South Asia, India, Kashmir, Indian-Pakistan conflict

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Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a compelling and well researched exploration of Pakistan's strategic mindset which offers insight into the country's nuclear posture, military traditions, and geopolitical imperatives. In a time when South Asia remains a focal point of international security concerns, this book provides an in-depth analysis of how Pakistan perceives external threats and formulates its defence policies.

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This book enriches academic discourse and provides an insight necessary to comprehend Pakistan's defence strategies and their broader implications in an increasingly complex global security landscape.

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