Security Outlook 2018

Edited by
Artur Gruszczak

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121

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Contents

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Foreword

Today's world is increasingly preoccupied with the state of its security. Challenges, risks and threats mushrooming across the regions and continents evoke feelings of discomfort, uncertainty, and anxiety. Domestic instability, regional conflicts and global tensions reflect deep, structural security problems. Any plausible and reasonable response to those problems, challenges and dilemmas requires an insight into contemporary political, economic, social and cultural phenomena at national and international levels. This collected volume is a modest attempt to delve into some aspects of security which drew attention of the authors in the year 2018. The contributors belong in the Department of National Security of the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland (http://www.zbn.inp.uj.edu.pl/en_GB/). Their chapters illustrate the research profile of the Department and individual interests of each author. The institutional factor has determined the structure of the publication: it links selected global and regional issues with some aspects of Poland's security.

Artur Gruszczak
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Migration and Security in 2018

ABSTRACT

2018 was another year of heated debate on the consequences and effects of migration on political stability, social order and international ethics. The debate encompassed multiple specific issues and varied aspects of migration: political, criminal, legal, ethical and humanitarian. In this chapter main migration trends are analysed against the backdrop of national policies of selected states and international efforts undertaken on the global as well as regional scales. Three case studies are presented: the global compacts adopted by the United Nations; the cooperation in the EU on immigration, borders and asylum issues; the US immigration policy under the Trump administration.

Keywords: migration, refugees, asylum, global compacts, United Nations, European Union, United States

Migration has long been one of the most debatable issues in contemporary security studies.[1] Originating in local, usually unfavorable, living conditions, it affects a growing number of people regardless of their education, skills, living standards, race, ethnicity, language, religion and mindset. As a global phenom-

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[1]   See: A. Weinar, S. Bonjour, L. Zhyznomirska (eds), *The Routledge Handbook of the Politics of Migration in Europe*, Abingdon–New York: Routledge, 2018; V. Bello, *International Migration and International Security. Why Prejudice Is a Global Security Threat,* Abingdon–New York: Routledge, 2017; G. Lazaridis (ed), *Security, Insecurity and Migration in Europe*, Abingdon–New York: Routledge, 2016; G. Lazaridis, K. Wadia (eds), *The Securitisation of Migration in the EU: Debates Since 9/11*, Basingstoke–New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015; N. Steiner, R. Mason, A. Hayes (eds), *Migration and Insecurity. Citizenship and Social Inclusion in a Transnational Era*, Abingdon–New York: Routledge, 2013; J. Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*, London–New York: Routledge, 2006.

enon, it brings divergent consequences which affect different states and societies as well as regional and global organizations. Human mobility has been a dynamic process with direct effects and long-term repercussions for stability and security. This chapter aims to place issues around migration within a wider framework of security and development; this should contribute to a broader understanding of migration and mobility against the overall security backdrop presented in this Security Outlook.

Migration trends in 2018

Migration is an increasingly complex phenomenon which has recently shifted from the human security perspective to a state-centric one highlighting national security interests and the principles of international order. Factors triggering local migrations and resettlements, as well as large-scale cross-border migratory movements, remain relevant irrespective of changing cultural, social, economic and environmental landscapes. They are: nature, politics, labor and technology. Natural catastrophes, diseases, climate change and demographic trends have severely affected territories, populations, and local and regional orders. Political strategies and action plans set legal and administrative frameworks for migration flows, regulating people's mobility with inclusionary as well as deterrence strategies. Labor needs in developed markets have generated a growing demand for manpower, both skilled and unskilled. Market forces stimulate migration but are not accompanied by effective employment policies and sound integration programs. Finally, technology has given a strong impulse to long-distance migration flows. The Internet and wireless communication (cellular telephony) enable the planning and coordination of inter-regional and inter-continental migratory movements as well as adaptation on arrival in the country of destination. This facilitates migrants' mobility and settlement but, unfortunately, also leaves opportunities for illegal trafficking and abuse of migrants wide open.

2018 was another year of heated debate on the consequences and effects of migration on political stability, social order and international ethics. The debate encompassed multiple specific issues and varied aspects of migration which can be divided into the following categories:
1) Political aspects:
– proliferation of local tensions and conflicts, spreading of violence,
– activities prejudicial to national security interests (radicalism, extremism, terrorism),

– radicalization of political opinions leading to anti-systemic extremist be-
havior.

2) Criminal aspects:
– 'crimmigration', as a nexus between migration and crime,
– trafficking in human beings,
– trafficking of illicit goods by migrants, such as drugs and arms,
– forgery of documents,
– forced labor,
– illegal activities in host countries (participation in organized criminal groups,
prostitution, extortion).

3) Irregular aspects:
– human smuggling (facilitation, transportation and entry),
– irregular crossing of borders,
– irregular employment and stay in a host country.

4) Ethical and humanitarian aspects:
– risks and threats to life and limb,
– vulnerability of certain groups of migrants (children, women, the elderly),
– displacements and resettlements,
– asylum practices and terms of international protection of refugees,
– assistance to asylum seekers and refugees.

The above catalogue of contentious issues refers to the migration phenomenon
in 2018 in three fundamental dimensions: (1) size, intensity and geographical
distribution of main migration and refugee flows; (2) risks and dangers experi-
enced by the migrant population; (3) economic consequences of migration flows.

(1) The estimated total number of migrants increased three-fold over the
past half-a-century and doubled over the last thirty years. It amounted to the
record high level of 258-266 million in 2017[2], representing 3.4% of the global

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[2]   The International Organization for Migration, being since 2016 the United Nations Migration
Agency, put the estimate at 258 million (see IOM, *Global Migration Indicators 2018*, Berlin:
IOM, 2018, p. 18). According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) and the World Bank the number of international migrants, including refugees,
reached 266 million (see World Bank Group, *Migration and Remittances. Recent Developments
and Outlook*, "Migration and Development Brief" 2018, no. 29, p. v).

population.[3] The number of registered and identified refugees worldwide (as of the 30th of June 2018), according to the criteria established by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), was 25.6 million.[4] To that one should add 3.2 million asylum-seekers, 124,100 returned refugees, 39.7 million internally displaced people (IDPs), 2.5 million returned IDPs and 3.9 million stateless people.[5] The clear majority of the migrant population is economically active, employed in various sectors of national economies in different regions of the world. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates for 2017, there are 164 million migrant workers in the world. They account for 70.1% of the 234 million working age migrant population (15 years and over).[6] Although the media highlighted the migratory movements and concurring problems in Europe and the US, the largest migratory groups were concentrated in Africa and Asia. They surround zones of protracted conflicts, poverty and natural catastrophes as well as political instability or repression, located in South Asia (Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Bangladesh), the Middle East and North Africa (Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Morocco), Central America and the Caribbean (El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Cuba, Haiti).[7]

The migrant population is active in search of better protection and improved conditions of establishment and residence. Therefore, strong pull factors in the high-income developed countries in North America and Western Europe, as well as in Australia and New Zealand (stability, safety, prosperity, job opportunities), stimulated massive movements not only from the countries which were plunged into chaos, violence, civil strife or armed conflict (as is the case of Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Ukraine, El Salvador or Venezuela) but also secondary movements from countries hosting migrants and refugees or being only transitory areas on long-distance migratory routes (such as Turkey, Greece, Morocco, Saudi Arabia or Mexico).

Migratory pressure generates various negative effects, in terms of law (illegal and irregular status of migrants), security (growing threats of a criminal or

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[3]   IOM, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
[4]   This category includes 5.4 million Palestine refugees under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). See UNHCR, *Global Trends 2017*, Geneva: UNHCR, 2018, p. 12; UNHCR, *Mid-Year Trends 2018*, Geneva: UNHCR, 2019, p. 3.
[5]   Data extracted from UNHCR mid-year 2018 report: UNHCR, *Mid-Year Trends 2018*…, p. 3.
[6]   ILO, *Global Estimates on International Migrant Workers. Results and Methodology*, 2nd ed., Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 2018, p. 5.
[7]   See an interactive map on world migration geography maintained by IOM: https://www.iom.int/world-migration.

terrorist nature), stability (problems of migrants' adaptation to local conditions) and administration (obligation to manage individual application for the status of refugee or residence, assistance for temporarily protected migrants). A considerable proportion of migrants either enter the territory of a host state illegally or are denied the right of residence in one. As a result, they become subject to return procedures, although the capabilities of destination countries to effectively enforce the return mechanisms differ and depend on available human, logistical and financial resources. In the EU, the number of potential returnees rose dramatically: from 1.4 million in 2011 to around 5.5 million in 2017.[8] In 2018, the number of return decisions issued to third-country nationals was 287,000, an increase of 2% in comparison to 2017. The number of effective returns was 148,000, a decrease by 5%. The data from the beginning of the migration crisis (2014-2015) show that the effectiveness ratios have been around 50%, differing strongly in regard to main countries of migrants' origin: highly efficient in neighboring areas (Ukraine, Russia, Albania) and rather ineffective in remote countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mali).[9] The stock of third-country nationals subject to deportation from the US increased from around 1.5 million in 2011 to 3.2 million in 2017. In Saudi Arabia, the annual average rate of migrant deportation from the beginning of the current decade has been over 500,000.[10]

(2) Migrants constitute a part of the global population particularly exposed to risks, threats and shocks. Because of the lack of assistance from their governments and deficits of international protection, they are especially vulnerable to various forms of abuse, including trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation (including children), modern slavery and forced labor.[11] The worst conditions are in conflict situations, which exacerbate not only the smuggling of endangered populations but also abuse, violence and ruthless exploitation. Despite many efforts undertaken by international organizations (governmental and nongovernmental) and numerous governments, the scale of trafficking in human beings has been growing in recent years and 2018 was no exception. Europol (EU Law Enforcement Co-operation Agency) ascertained that "Migrant smuggling remains a lucrative and highly profitable criminal business. Low risk and

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[8]   World Bank Group, *Migration and Remittances. Recent Developments and Outlook*, "Migration and Development Brief" 2018, no. 30, p. xii.
[9]   See Frontex, *Frontex Risk Analysis for 2019*, Warsaw: Frontex, 2019, p. 25.
[10] World Bank Group, *Migration and Remittances…*, no. 30, p. xii.
[11] See R. A n d e r s s o n, *Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe*, Oakland, Ca.: University of California Press, 2014.

comparatively low penalties attract opportunistic criminals and professionalised OCGs [organised criminal groups] alike. Specifically, the use of cash and underground banking methods such as *hawala* represent growing challenges".[12]

An exact number is extremely difficult to arrive at because of the shortages of available data, their often contentious sources and divergent methodologies applied by international and domestic units.[13]

Experts representing global humanitarian institutions underline the gravity of this problem. The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking (ICAT) estimated that children account for 28% of identified victims of trafficking in human beings. This indicator is considerably higher in such regions as Sub-Saharan Africa as well as Central America and the Caribbean, amounting to 64% and 62% respectively.[14] According to Henrietta Fore, UNICEF Executive Director, "Trafficking is a very real threat to millions of children around the world, especially to those who have been driven from their homes and communities without adequate protection".[15] As the most vulnerable category of migrants, minors fall victim to abduction, sexual violence, forced recruitment to armed groups (the so-called child soldier phenomenon) and slavery. Moreover, child protection systems and care arrangements often lack adequate facilities and personnel as well as sufficient funding. UNICEF noted that "Children are often placed in inadequate shelters, where they risk further traumatization and revictimization".[16] Therefore, migrants and refugees reach the transit areas of final destinations often in very poor mental and physical condition, traumatized, exhausted, undernourished and without material resources, which demands from the receiving institutions a considerable organizational, administrative, financial and material effort. Not every transit or host country is adequately prepared for such a burden and often tends to lower reception and assistance standards. The human security dimension of the position of migrants and refugees has been determined by an entangled set of economic, geographical, political and ideo-

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[12] Europol, *EMSC 3rd Annual Activity Report – 2018*, The Hague: European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, 2019, p. 11, https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/emsc_report_final_2019_2final.pdf (accessed April 30, 2019).

[13] See UNODC, *Countering Trafficking in Persons in Conflict Situations. Thematic Paper,* Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2018.

[14] UNICEF, *Children Account for Nearly One-third of Identified Trafficking Victims Globally*, 29 July 2018, https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/children-account-nearly-one-third-identified-trafficking-victims-globally (accessed January 4, 2019).

[15] Ibidem.

[16] Ibidem.

logical factors, which throughout 2018 tended towards aggravation of the status of migrants and their existential conditions.

(3) Migratory flows are often driven by poverty and underdevelopment (as push factors) and the prosperity, welfare and job opportunities offered by destination countries (pull factors). The economic dimension of patterns of migration is therefore relevant for evaluating current trends and long-term tendencies in global mobility. Moreover, the official incomes generated by immigrants in host countries go together with a 'grey' and 'black' economy of migrant activity as well as the profits earned by the criminal organizations which exploit migrants.

It is commonly known that migrant workers transfer their incomes to their countries of origin, usually to ensure the material existence of or improve the standard of living of their families. Such deposits distributed to underdeveloped areas help diminish global material inequalities and reduce the scope of poverty and marginalization in many regions. Global remittance flows reached $625 billion in 2017 and were estimated at $689 billion in 2018. The strong upward trend which marked 2017 and accelerated in 2018 followed a slow decline which particularly affected low- and middle-income countries (LMICs). The rebound in 2017, showing a dynamic increase of 8.5%, led to a stable increase in the following year. According to the latest estimates from the World Bank Group, these flows in 2018 may have amounted to $528 billion, a further increase of 10.8%.[17] Remittances are now more than three times the size of official development assistance to LMICs.

Although labor migration prevails in overall migrant mobility, one has to acknowledge that international refugees, irregular migrants and illegal (criminal) migratory groups also generate considerable income which is transferred in both legal and illicit ways to various beneficiaries. Global revenue from the business of illegal migration and human smuggling is difficult to assess, and estimates vary from $7 billion to $35 billion annually.[18] Individuals as well as organized criminal groups, often operating at the international and inter-continental scale, charge the migrants for the facilitation of cross-border journeys, for fraudulent travel documents and 'arranging things' in destination countries upon arrival. The scale of the real 'dark side' of migration is impossible to evaluate: it includes

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[17] World Bank Group, *Migration and Remittances…*, no. 30, p. xi.
[18] *Taking Root. The Complex Economics of the Global Smuggling Economy.* In: C. Horwood, R. Forin, B. Frouws (eds), *Mixed Migration Review 2018. Highlights. Interviews. Essays. Data*, Geneva: Mixed Migration Centre, 2018, p. 104.

participation in organized gangs dealing with drug trafficking, arms smuggling, prostitution, extortion and robbery. The 'crimmigration' effects of migratory flows are evident, although their extent is difficult to verify empirically.

Global Compacts

The need to cope effectively with the challenge of global migration was expressed in various international organizations. The United Nations, as a natural forum for taking action on global issues, launched in 2016 an intense debate on a comprehensive approach to migration as a large-scale, complex, worldwide phenomenon. The adoption of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants[19] in September 2016 at a high-level plenary meeting on large movements of refugees and migrants constituted an important point of reference for the overall discussion on the multiple effects of migratory and refugee flows. The commitments included in the document called for the coordinated action of UN member states within a coherent political framework. As a follow-up to the New York Declaration, UN member states decided in April 2017 to develop a global compact on safe, orderly and regular migration (Global Compact for Migration – GCM). This sought to work out a 360-degree vision of international migration covering the key issues, explaining interconnectivity as well as addressing main risks and challenges. Having agreed on the guiding principles, UN member states devoted the first half of 2018 to intense intergovernmental negotiations on the detailed objectives and commitments. A "zero draft" was released in early February 2018 as a result of stocktaking meetings and the active engagement of UN Secretary General.[20] It was followed by negotiations held at the UN Headquarters in New York, which ended on the 13th of July 2018 with the approval of a final text of the GCM. The document was ultimately adopted on 10 December 2018 by representatives of 164 countries participating in the Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration in Marrakech.

The GCM was founded on 23 goals which promote safe, orderly, predictable, non-discriminatory and regular migration. They included, amongst other things: reduction of the factors and drivers compelling people to leave their

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[19]   United Nations, *Resolution A/RES/71/1 Adopted by the General Assembly on 19 September 2016*, http://undocs.org/A/RES/71/1 (accessed January 4, 2019).

[20]   Migration Data Portal, *GCM Development Process*, https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/global-compact-migration, (accessed 4 January 2019).

country of origin; stress on proofs of identity and legal documentation possessed by migrants; availability of pathways for regular migration; coordinated international save-and-rescue efforts for missing migrants; prevention and combating of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings in the context of international migration; access to basic services for migrants; investment in skills development; faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances; safe and dignified return and readmission.[21]

In the last stage of the GCM process, the UN General Assembly approved the document on 19 December 2018. 152 countries voted in favor of the resolution; 5 states were against it; 12 countries abstained from the vote.[22] The voting showed that the original aim of working out a comprehensive approach to a problem affecting nearly all UN member states was not fulfilled completely. Differences in national approaches to various aspects of migration and international protection of refugees meant that some of the ambitious goals pursued from the beginning of the process were discarded. Many countries voiced reservations about the final provisions of the GCM and overtly hesitated to endorse it despite its legally non-binding character. They not only boycotted the conference in Marrakech, but also declined to support the global compact in the UN General Assembly. The five opponents – namely the US, Israel, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic – constantly presented, for different reasons, an anti-immigrant stance, highlighting threats to national security, risks of the tolerance for uncontrolled migration and, last but not least, unfounded constraints on state sovereignty. Similar arguments were raised by those which abstained from endorsing the GCM, including Austria, Australia, Italy and Switzerland.

The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants provided a stimulus for a new approach to the world-wide problem of refugees. Similar to the migration issue, a global compact on refugees (GCR) was initiated by the United Nations on the basis of the report 'In Safety and Dignity: Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants'[23], prepared by the UN Secretary-General for the high-level meeting in New York, and a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework

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[21] United Nations, *Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration*, A/CONF.231/3, https://undocs.org/A/CONF.231/3 (accessed January 4, 2019).

[22] United Nations, *General Assembly Endorses First-Ever Global Compact on Migration, Urging Cooperation among Member States in Protecting Migrants*, GA/12113, December 19, 2018, https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/ga12113.doc.htm (accessed January 4, 2019).

[23] United Nations, *In safety and Dignity: Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants. Report of the Secretary-General*, UN General Assembly, A/70/59, 21 April 2016, https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/in_safety_and_dignity_-_addressing_large_movements_of_refugees_and_migrants.pdf (accessed April 30, 2019).

(CRRF) annexed to the New York Declaration. The CRRF set four basic objectives: (1) ease pressures on the host countries involved; (2) enhance refugee self-reliance; (3) expand access to third-country solutions; (4) support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.[24] The UN Resolution called on the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to develop the CRRF on the basis of a multi-stakeholder approach in close coordination with relevant states and involving other appropriate UN entities, national and local authorities, international organizations, the private sector, civil society, academia and the media. CRRF also aimed at engaging refugees in more creative self-sufficiency mechanisms and supporting the hosting communities.[25] UNHCR was also authorized to coordinate works on the global compact on refugees and encourage states and non-state actors to deliver their ideas and proposals. A 'zero draft' of the GCR was presented in January 2018 and a 'draft one' in March 2018. Both documents sought to clarify basic goals of the compact and set out a program of action. Four major goals were established: (1) an improved system of burden- and responsibility-sharing; (2) strengthened national protection systems and response capacities; (3) improved socio-economic conditions for refugees and resilience-building in host communities; (4) greater efforts to address root causes and work out durable solutions to emergencies and protracted crisis situations.[26] The draft GCR also encompassed the CRRF and the Program of Action. The latter sought to facilitate the application of a comprehensive blueprint for assistance for refugees and countries particularly affected by large refugee movements. It also laid down principles for more equitable burden- and responsibility-sharing. It set out specific areas requiring mutually reinforcing mechanisms of support to host states as well as countries of origin, where appropriate.[27]

The presentation of GCR was followed by formal consultations, thematic discussions and stocktaking exercises under the aegis of the UNHCR lasting until June 2018.[28] The official version of the GCR was presented in September 2018 in an annual report by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to the UN Gen-

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[24] *Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework*, Annex 1 to New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, United Nations, *Resolution A/RES/71/1…*

[25] M. Thomas, *Turning the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework into Reality*, "Forced Migration Review" 2017, no. 56, p. 69.

[26] UNHCR, *The Global Compact on Refugees DRAFT 1 (as at 9 March 2018)*, https://www.unhcr.org/events/conferences/5aa2b3287/official-version-draft-1-global-compact-refugees-9-march-2018.html (accessed April 30, 2019).

[27] Ibidem.

[28] *Managing Flow. A Legal and Policy Overview*. In: C. Horwood, R. Forin, B. Frouws (eds), *op. cit.*, p. 147.

eral Assembly. It was discussed on the 24th of September 2018 during a high-level ministerial conference hosted by UNHCR. On the 17th of December 2018, the UN General Assembly affirmed the Global Compact on Refugees, adopting it as part of a resolution on the Office of the UNHCR, which received 181 votes in favor, two against (US and Hungary) and three abstentions (Eritrea, Liberia and Libya).[29] In addition to the above mentioned elements (guiding principles and objectives, the CRRF and the Program of Action), it contained arrangements of burden- and responsibility-sharing through a Global Refugee Forum (to be convoked every four years), national and regional arrangements for specific situations, and tools for funding, partnerships, data gathering and information sharing.

The European Union: mitigating long-term effects

The migration crisis which began in 2014 and reached its climax in 2015-2016 was eased in 2018 through a combination of preventive, deterrent and repressive measures taken individually by the EU's member states as well as at the level of the EU institutions and agencies.

The number of illegal crossings at Europe's external borders reached their lowest level in five years, falling by 27% to an estimated 150,000.[30] Likewise, the number of first time asylum applications decreased by 9% and was 581,000, reaching approximately the level of the year 2014 preceding the outburst of the crisis.[31] Germany continued to be the most preferred EU country, followed by France, Greece and Spain. A radical drop was noticed in arrivals to Italy, resulting from the protective and restrictive measures adopted in the Central Mediterranean as well as a hard-line approach adopted by the Conte government, especially a new decree on immigration enforced by the far-right interior minister, Matteo Salvini. Although Syrian nationals continued to prevail in numbers in immigration flows to the EU, their share in the total number of asylum applications

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[29] N. Risse, *UNGA Votes to Adopt Global Compact on Refugees*, SDG Knowledge Hub, December 18, 2018, https://sdg.iisd.org/news/unga-votes-to-adopt-global-compact-in-refugees/ (accessed April 30, 2018).

[30] Frontex, *Frontex Risk Analysis for 2019*, Warsaw: Frontex, 2019, p. 8.

[31] Eurostat, *Asylum Statistics*, March 12, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics#Number_of_asylum_applicants:_drop_in_2018 (accessed March 28, 2019).

lodged in 2018 decreased to 13.9%, followed by Afghanis (7.1%), Iraqis (6.8%) and Pakistanis (4.3%).[32] This confirmed a tendency towards the diversification of refugee and migrant population, thereby making immigration to the EU a truly worldwide phenomenon. These general trends were confirmed by the data on the number of people granted protected status in the EU. The overall number of positive decisions was 333,400 (down by 40% from 2017) and the recognition rate dropped from 46% to 37% in the case of first instance decisions, although it remained on almost the same level (38% and 36% respectively) in regard to final decisions on appeal. Still, Syrians constituted the biggest group of beneficiaries (29%), though their share declined from 33% in 2017. Likewise, the percentage of other major nationalities decreased: 16% down from 19% for Afghanis, 7% down from 12% for Iraqis, 3% down from 5% for Iranians.[33]

What drew attention in 2018 was the further redirection of flows along the main migratory routes. While the Central Mediterranean maritime route to Italy saw lower migratory pressure due to the blockade of departures from Libya and deterrence by the Italian authorities, the Western Mediterranean path, connecting Morocco with Spain, rather unexpectedly became the major channel of irregular migrant flows to the EU. The situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, especially around the Greek Islands in the Eastern Aegean Sea, remained relatively stable, at least in comparison to the turbulent and dramatic period between mid-2015 and mid-2016. The geography of migratory movements towards Europe reflected in 2018 certain patterns which had been established in the early 2000s, concentrating on maritime routes stretching across the Mediterranean Sea and exploiting a specific ecosystem formed by state authorities, non-governmental organizations and criminal groups. The shifts in the numbers and intensity of migratory flows between the three main corridors – eastern, central and western – reflected a natural search for opportunities to find a best-chance route towards the EU's territories. Concurrently, security measures applied by Turkey

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[32] *Citizenship of First-time Applicants: Largest Shares from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq*, Eurostat, 12 March 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asylum_statistics#Citizenship_of_first-time_applicants:_largest_shares_from_Syria.2C_Afghanistan_and_Iraq (accessed March 28, 2019).

[33] *EU Member States Granted Protection to More than 300 000 Asylum Seekers in 2018*, Eurostat News Release no. 71/2019, April 25, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/9747530/3-25042019-BP-EN.pdf/22635b8a-4b9c-4ba9-a5c8-934ca02de496 (accessed April 30, 2019); *EU Member States Granted Protection to More than Half a Million Asylum Seekers in 2017*, Eurostat News Release no. 67/2018, April 19, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/8817675/3-19042018-AP-EN.pdf/748e8fae-2cfb-4e75-a388-f06f6ce8ff58 (accessed April 30, 2019).

and transit countries in North Africa and in the Balkans as well as the changing *modi operandi* of migrant smugglers and facilitators, including criminal traffickers, generated opposite tendencies which channeled the streams of migrants into unexplored trails, often exposing the travelers to risks and direct dangers.

The humanitarian aspect of inflows of third-country nationals to the EU went along with the growing awareness of the negative repercussions for social stability, internal order and political balance. Some inclusionary measures adopted in 2015 (such as a resettlement scheme, refugee relocation system and solidarity mechanism) fell short of their main objectives and were often boycotted by some member states. Meanwhile, security issues were put high on the migration agenda in many member states, including by their governments and leading political parties. Statements depicting migrants as a threat to national security and identity were voiced by parties which succeeded in the parliamentary elections in 2018 in Sweden and Italy. In many others anti-immigrant discourse, including hate speech, intensified and was increasingly used as a tool for raising political capital.[34]

Against that backdrop, EU institutions stressed not only the humanitarian and moral dimensions of the migration issues, but also negative outcomes posing risks to internal security and public order, especially due to the permanent illicit activities of smugglers and traffickers on the main routes heading to Europe. The European Council at its meeting on the 28th of June 2018 reconfirmed its determination to prevent a return to uncontrolled migratory flows and to effectively tackle illegal migration. Pointing to smugglers operating on the main migratory routes, the heads of states and governments declared their determination to definitively break the business model of the smugglers as well as increase search-and-rescue capabilities with the possible use of regional disembarkation platforms.[35] This position was confirmed by the European Council in October 2018 by underlining the point that the fight against people-smuggling networks needs to be stepped up in several ways. These include an intensified cooperation with third countries on investigating, apprehending and prosecuting smugglers, the setting up of a joint task force at the European Migrant Smuggling Centre

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[34] See: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *Beyond the Peak: Challenges Remain, But Migration Numbers Drop*, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2019, pp. 5-9, https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2019-beyond-the-peak-migration-annual-review-2018_en.pdf (accessed April 28, 2019).

[35] European Council, *European Council meeting (28 June 2018) – Conclusions*, EUCO 9/18, Brussels, June 28, 2018, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35936/28-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf (accessed June 30, 2018).

(housed by Europol) and improved monitoring and disruption of malicious on-line communications.[36]

A discussion on a new multiannual financial framework was started in 2018, giving the first projections of the next EU budget for the years 2021-27. Migration and borders acquired particular attention as matters of growing relevance for the stability and security of the Union and its member states, having learned lessons from the recent crisis and its prolonged repercussions. In May 2018 the Commission proposed a long-term budget for the 2021-2027 period in which funding for migration and border management was planned to triple, amounting to €34.9 billion. This radical increase in the funds for the management of migration and asylum (doubling the current financial perspective) was overshadowed by the skyrocketing spending on the management of external borders, quadrupling the current budget by establishing an Integrated Border Management Fund and allocating more than €12 billion for the decentralized agencies in charge of border management.[37] The latter aspect heralded the determination of the Commission to reinforce the relevant EU agencies and increase their impact on migration, asylum and border management. On the 12th of September 2018 the Commission brought forward a proposal for a new regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard, transforming it by 2020 into a standing corps of 10,000 operational staff with executive powers to effectively support member states on the ground. Similarly to that, the Commission advocated for the creation of an EU Asylum Agency in order to speed up return procedures and increase effective returns.[38]

The political and organizational actions undertaken in 2018 at the EU level coincided with several important developments which determined, to various extents, the state of migration, asylum, border control and accompanying security-related issues. Firstly, the EU-Turkey deal on irregular migration based on

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[36] European Council, *European Council Meeting (18 October 2018) – Conclusions*, EUCO 13/18, Brussels, October 18, 2018, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/36775/18-euco-final-conclusions-en.pdf (accessed October 30, 2018).

[37] European Commission, *EU Budget: Commission Proposes a Modern Budget for a Union that Protects, Empowers and Defends*, "Press Release", May 2, 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-3570_en.htm (accessed March 13, 2019).

[38] European Commission, *Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and Repealing Council Joint Action n°98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) n° 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EU) n° 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council*, COM(2018) 631 final, Brussels, September 12, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/so teu2018-border-coast-guard-regulation-631_en.pdf (accessed September 14, 2018).

the 2015 EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan and 2016 statement was in general implemented as far as the main conditions, i.e. halting the massive flow of refugees and asylum-seekers towards Europe in exchange for substantial financial assistance, were fulfilled. The number of refugees who came to Greece via Turkey fell in 2017 by 97% compared to the period before the agreement.[39] The Turkish authorities complained about the financial, organizational and administrative hardships caused by hosting more than three million refugees, mainly Syrian victims of the civil war. They also insisted that the EU transfer the money under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey scheme without delays and difficulties. On the 28th of June 2018, EU Member States agreed at the European Council meeting that the second instalment of €3 billion of the Facility (€2 billion financed from the EU budget and €1 billion by member states' contributions) would be transferred before the initial allocation of the first tranche of €3 billion has been entirely spent. By the end of 2018, the EU committed over €1 billion out of the next €3 billion instalment to humanitarian and development assistance under the Facility for Refugees mechanism.

Secondly, demographic and migratory trends were carefully monitored and analysed with a view of acquiring a full situational assessment of risks and tensions outside the EU, both at its external borders and in pre-border areas, as well as within member states' territories and at their internal borders, due to secondary migratory movements and the management of immigrants and refugees residing in the EU. As to the latter, the gradual restrictions on the movement of international migrants imposed by some countries in the Western Balkans in late 2015 / early 2016, up to the closing of the borders to migrants and asylum seekers of certain nationalities, decided on by Macedonia and Slovenia, significantly diminished the number of migrants entering the EU from the Balkans. However, long-term effects, entailing the processing of asylum application, temporary protection mechanisms, integration of immigrants, and administrative bottlenecks, exposed the main host countries in the EU to multiple problems, challenges and risks. As far as the external dimension is concerned, the EU put a proper emphasis on global demographic and migration trends, seeking viable responses to potential risks and future challenges. For instance, it extended cooperation and dialogue with African countries from the northern part of the continent to western and sub-Saharan Africa. The reason for this was the development and

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[39] Deutsche Welle, *EU Asylum Applications Drop off Drastically in 2017*, December 30, 2017, https://www.dw.com/en/eu-asylum-applications-drop-off-drastically-in-2017/a-41976192 (accessed April 12, 2018).

diversification of migratory routes from sub-Saharan Africa in response to the growing demographic pressures and worsening socio-economic conditions, as well as political tensions and conflicts taking place there, particularly in western Africa, the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa.

Thirdly, the EU, partially under pressure from anti-immigrant factions in such states as Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, Malta, the Visegrad Four and the Scandinavian countries, promoted an exclusionary approach which consisted in preventing migrants from reaching the territories of the EU and keeping those rescued in controlled hotspots established by member states on a voluntary basis.[40] The objective of keeping migrants and refugees out of Europe by placing them in so-called regional disembarkation platforms resembles an idea of buffer zones protecting the EU from an unpleasant and politically incommodious problem.[41] The securitization of internal and external migratory movements aims unambiguously at the lowering of a positive perception of immigrants by EU citizens and legal residents and portraying them as a serious problem of security and domestic order which should be deterred as early as possible and prevented from penetrating the territories of EU member states.

In spite of the declining migratory pressure on the EU's external borders and the appeasing statements of EU institutions, the long-term consequences of the migratory crisis were clearly visible during 2018. Secondary migration movements continued to cause severe strains on the immigration services in the member states. The number of asylum applications pending examination – despite a considerable reduction – still amounted to roughly 450,000 cases by the end of the year.[42] The risk of organised criminal activities at the external borders, the threat of terrorism-related movements across the borders and the growing anti-immigrant sentiments in the EU completed the grim security picture.

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[40] See F. Maiani, *"Regional Disembarkation Platforms" and "Controlled Centres": Lifting the Drawbridge, Reaching Out Across the Mediterranean, or Going Nowhere?*, EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy Blog, September 18, 2018, https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/regional-disembarkation-platforms-and-controlled-centres-lifting-the-drawbridge-reaching-out-across-the-mediterranean-or-going-nowhere/ (accessed February 20, 2019).

[41] See J. Henley, *EU Migration Deal: What Was Agreed and Will It Work?*, "The Guardian", June 29, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/29/eu-summit-migration-deal-key-points (accessed June 30, 2018).

[42] EASO, *Latest Asylum Trends – 2018 overview*, https://www.easo.europa.eu/asylum-trends-overview-2018 (accessed March 29, 2019).

The United States: tightening the screws

The US policy in regard to immigration responded to the growing tension between the tradition of the US as an immigrant country and the political imperative, put forward by the Trump administration, to transform the relatively open system toward a more restrictive, exclusionary and security-driven one. Despite the increasing obstacles and disincentives, the influx of migrants continued in 2018 and the foreign-born population reached the highest level since 1910. In 2017, according to the US Census Bureau data, 13.6% of the US population, what is equivalent to more than 44 million, were foreign-born inhabitants.[43] More than a half of the immigrant population came from the countries of the Western Hemisphere located south of Rio Grande (27% from Mexico, 8% from Central America, 17% from South America and the Caribbean). The proportion of European migrants shrank to roughly 10%.[44] Over 75% (more than 33 million) were lawful immigrants: either having obtained US citizenship, or the status of legal permanent resident, or that of temporary resident with authorization to live in the United States. However, almost one quarter of the foreign-born population (10.7 million in 2016) lived in the country without an appropriate authorization.[45] The majority of them had lived there for more than 10 years. A substantial part of the total number of irregular migrants (almost 800,000) is constituted by those foreigners who had come illegally as children and then fell subject to deportation. Under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, launched in 2012, they benefited from two-year deportation deferrals and work permits.[46]

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[43] Ph. Connor, A. Budiman, *Immigrant Share in U.S. Nears Record High but Remains below that of Many Other Countries*, Pew Research Center, January 30, 2019, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/30/immigrant-share-in-u-s-nears-record-high-but-remains-below-that-of-many-other-countries/ (accessed February 2, 2019); C. Felter, D. Renwick, *The U.S. Immigration Debate*, Council for Foreign Relations, July 2, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-immigration-debate-0 (accessed February 2, 2019).

[44] R. Nunn, J. O'Donnell, J. Shambaugh, *A Dozen Facts about Immigration*, The Hamilton Project, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., October 2018, p. 6, http://www.hamilton-project.org/assets/files/ImmigrationFacts_Web_1008_540pm.pdf (accessed January 5, 2019).

[45] J. S. Passel, D'V. Cohn, *U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Total Dips to Lowest Level in a Decade*, Pew Research Center, November 27, 2018, p. 5, http://www.pewhispanic.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2018/11/Pew-Research-Center_U-S-Unauthorized-Immigrants-Total-Dips_2018-11-27.pdf (accessed February 2, 2019).

[46] C. Felter, D. Renwick, *op. cit.*; L. Robertson, *The DACA Population Numbers*, FactCheck.org, January 12, 2018, https://www.factcheck.org/2018/01/daca-population-numbers/ (accessed February 2, 2019).

The mounting pressure generated by the social, political and security problems in the countries of origin of migrants, especially in the 'close backyard' of the US, i.e. Mexico and Central America, was reflected in the growing number of illegal border crossings and apprehensions of third-country nationals, especially at the US-Mexico border. At the same time, this illustrated changes in the US immigration policy and border management implemented by the Trump administration. The anti-immigrant narrative spread by conservative Republicans and sharp, often xenophobic rhetoric practiced by the president elevated the issue of migration to the category of the top issues of foreign and security policies of the US and one of the key issues of American national security interests. This posture was underpinned by selective arguments pinpointing certain aspects of migration and mobility while concealing other features based on empirical evidence. First of all, despite a strong rise in the number of illegal immigrants and apprehensions at the external borders, the scale of the migratory pressure was far below the level recorded in the early 2000s, not to mention the 1980s and 1990s.[47] What has changed in 2018 is the social profile of the migrant population, especially at the US-Mexico border. More than a half (53%) of foreigners apprehended at this border travelled in families. Earlier, individual adults far outnumbered those of family members or unaccompanied minors, amounting to 68% in 2016 and 89% in 2013.[48] The geographical composition also changed radically. It is no longer primarily Mexican nationals who try to cross illegally the border. In 2018 non-Mexicans accounted for 62% of apprehensions (for comparison, in 2000 they constituted just 2%). The majority of them come from Central American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras.[49] They arrived in 'caravans': organized waves trekking towards the US-Mexican border with the hope of crossing into the US territory.

The issue of refugees also underwent important alterations, partly as a result of the tough stance of the US authorities (including the 'refugee ban' imposed temporarily in the second half of 2017), partly due to limits on asylum.[50] The number of refugees admitted to the US fell in the first half of 2018 by 67% compared to the same period in 2017, reaching the record low in the 21st century. The

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[47]   J. Gramlich, L. Noe-Bustamante, *What's Happening at the U.S.-Mexico Border in 6 Charts*, Pew Research Center, April 10, 2019, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/10/whats-happening-at-the-u-s-mexico-border-in-6-charts/ (accessed April 20, 2019).

[48]   Data from US Customs and Border Protection, quoted in: ibidem.

[49]   Ibidem.

[50]   See S. Pierce, *Immigration-Related Policy Changes in the Two First Years of the Trump Administration*, Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute, 2019, pp. 17-21.

leading countries of nationality for refugees were: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar, Bhutan, Ukraine, Eritrea, and Afghanistan. In the second quarter of 2018, 82% of refugees were from those six countries.[51] President Trump substantially reduced the ceiling for refugee admissions and regional allocations in strong contrast to the decision taken by President Obama during his last year in office to raise the annual cap from 85,000 to 110,000.[52] Trump reduced the ceiling in the fiscal year 2018 to 45,000 and further scaled back the refugee program to the record-low limit of 30,000 for the fiscal year 2019.[53] The reductions were particularly meaningful in regional allocations: for instance, the cap for the Middle East and South Asia (including war-torn Syria and unstable Iraq and Afghanistan) dropped from 40,000 to 9,000; for Africa, from 35,000, to 11,000.[54]

The tough posture towards immigrants adopted by the Trump administration, accompanied by the numerous administrative and security measures implemented at the borders and in the interior, resulted in important and controversial developments which brought the US immigration policy to the forefront of public debate stimulated by the traditional, digital and social media. The legal and humanitarian aspects of the restrictive measures adopted by the federal authorities created confusion and sparked protests across the US. Four issues heated the debate:

(1) **Criminalization of illegal border crossings**. The tough attitude toward illegal crossings of the US-Mexico border was strengthened in May 2018 by the announcement from the Trump administration about the implementation of a 'zero-tolerance' policy. Immigrants apprehended crossing the southern border illegally were subject to prosecution.

(2) **Separation of children from their parents at the US-Mexico border**. The fast-tracking of criminal proceedings entails that every apprehended adult is sent directly to federal court under the custody of the US Marshals Service. This

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[51] Department of Homeland Security, *Legal Immigration and Adjustment of Status Report Fiscal Year 2018*, Quarter 3, https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/special-reports/legal-immigration (accessed April 30, 2019).

[52] Congressional Research Service, *Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy*, "CRS Report", no. RL31269, December 18, 2018, pp. 2-3, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31269.pdf (accessed January 4, 2019).

[53] J. Hirschfeld Davis, *Trump to Cap Refugees Allowed Into U.S. at 30,000, a Record Low*, "The New York Times", September 17, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/17/us/politics/trump-refugees-historic-cuts.html (accessed January 4, 2019).

[54] Congressional Research Service, *op. cit*.

means that adults accompanied by minors must be separated because children cannot stay with their parents in jail. According to official data, 2,737 children were separated from their parents in the period between April and June 2018.[55] This practice provoked outrage and criticism at home and abroad and induced Donald Trump to sign on the 20th of June an executive order ending family separations at the border. Nevertheless, the problem of migrant children travelling alone remained pending, generating humanitarian concerns and administrative costs. The number of children in the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement rose significantly in 2018, exceeding 14,000 in December – an all-time high.

(3) Immigration case completion quota in courts. The anti-immigrant stance adopted by Donald Trump was followed by the Justice Department and Attorney General Jeff Sessions. Among his numerous controversial decisions, one provoked an exceptional uproar. It concerned new requirements for immigration judges to meet case closing quotas as part of their performance metrics. From the 1st of October 2018 judges were required to complete 700 removal cases per year. In addition, they were tasked to maintain a remand rate of fewer than 15%. Judges called those new standards "an attack on judicial independence" and warned that the new quota system would put the process rights of immigrants at serious risk.[56]

(4) **The 'travel ban' and limits on visas for nationals of 'recalcitrant' countries**. The Trump administration continued the practice of preventing nationals of selected countries from entering the territory of the US, initiated in January 2017 in the form of the so-called 'travel ban'. The third iteration of the ban in June 2018 affected nationals of seven countries: Syria, Libya, Yemen, Iran, North Korea, Somalia and Venezuela. Trump's executive order of January 2017 also concerned limits on visas for nationals of countries which systematically refuse or delay cooperation with the US on the return of their nationals. They were upheld during 2018 although the list of recalcitrant countries was reduced to ten (compared to 23 in January 2017).[57]

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[55] C. Long, R. Alonso-Zaldivar, *Watchdog: Thousands More Children May Have Been Separated*, "U.S. News & World Report", January 18, 2019, https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2019-01-17/watchdog-many-more-migrant-families-may-have-been-separated (accessed April 30, 2019).

[56] A. Reichlin-Melnick, *As Immigration Courts Quotas Go Into Effect, Many Call For Reform*, Immigration Impact, October 1, 2018, http://immigrationimpact.com/2018/10/01/immigration-court-quotas-call-reform/ (accessed January 4, 2019).

[57] S. Pierce, *op. cit*., pp. 8-9.

The last, but not least, debatable issue was the project of building a wall along the US southern border. The promise made by Trump during his electoral campaign and after being elected president was placed high on his political agenda. In 2018 it was a highly contentious issue which finally provoked a confrontation with the Congress that led to the 35-day government shutdown at the turn of 2018 and 2019. Based on the executive order on border security and immigration improvement of January 2017, the Trump administration secured in March 2018 $1.6 billion for technical preparations and construction of a new, 160-km long section of the barrier. Hoping to gain the support of Americans concerned about the influx of Central American immigrants, in April 2018 Trump ordered the Pentagon to deploy 4,000 members of the National Guard to the southern border. Pointing to national security interests and threats from the increasing immigration and illegal border crossings, President Trump asked for $5.7 billion for the border wall project in the 2019 fiscal year but Congress opposed it. Nevertheless, Trump's constant pressure on domestic institutions as well as foreign actors (the government of Mexico) contributed to an extreme securitization of the wall issue and its positioning as one of the most salient on the policy agenda.

Conclusions

Another year of grappling with the dynamic issue of migration was marked by the continuing attention paid to the overall consequences of global mobility for security and stability. The securitization discourse was specifically formed by extreme views and opinions highlighting imminent threats and long-term risks provoked by migrants. The growing support for anti-immigrant political forces in Europe, as well as in the US and – partially – Australia, reflected the complexity of the migration issue in terms of threats and opportunities. The significant reduction of migrants admitted to the most developed countries responded to political and ideological pressures but at the same time procrastinated on making systemic changes in the immigration and social security domains. The reinforcement of border security measures and focus on the anti-crime and anti--terrorist effects of the policies toward migrants overshadowed the long-term consequences of taming immigration for economic development and the financing of welfare systems. This tension may rise in the near future, producing additional negative outcomes for stability and security all over the world.

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EU Member States Granted Protection to More than Half a Million Asylum Seekers in 2017, Eurostat News Release no. 67/2018, April 19, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/8817675/3-19042018-AP-EN.pdf/748e8fae-2cfb-4e75-a388-f06f6ce8ff58 (accessed April 30, 2019).

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