Nihilizm i radykalny altruizm. Ontologia determinowana etyką u J.-P. Sartre’a i E. Lévinasa .......... 137

NIHILISM AND RADICAL ALTRUISM. ETHIC-DETERMINED ONTOLOGY OF J.-P. SARTRE AND E. LÉVINAS

The basic concept of subjectivity in the philosophy of E. Lévinas and J.P. Sartre has roots in constant searching for the “meaning of things” as seen from the ontological point of view. Both philosophers obviously sense some kind of inconsistency there, the obligations and inevitable conflicts forced upon subjectivity, if the being is only being in being, pure tautology. Freedom or autonomy are inaccessible in ontological terms for both philosophers. Where Sartre’s existentialism expresses itself by the precedence of consciousness over the being – if only for a momentary act of existence and freedom – E. Lévinas perceives this internal conflict as a consequence of the moral imperative, coming from an unthinkable dimension. As J.-P. Sartre never abandons the ontological field, E. Lévinas consistently radicalizes his point of view, pointing out the metaphysics as horizon from where the ineffaceable longing for the other comes. Ontology must be substituted by metaphysics in the wish to get rid of the contradictions of subjectivity, to prevent egoism and fulfil ethical obligations to others. Ethical relation with another man isn’t hell – against Sartre, but a privilege to become true in the only eligible and not contradictory sense of humanity – E. Lévinas seems to claim. The transcendence in the existential approach of J.-P. Sartre potentiates the individual egoism, for fear of dominance from the other, for E. Lévinas – very differently – the transcendence funding the altruism is primary anchored in human nature.